| Title | Apple QuickTime FLI LinePacket Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Version | QuickTime player 7.6.5 |
| Analysis | http://www.abysssec.com |
| Vendor | http://www.apple.com |
| Impact | High |
| Contact | shahin [at] abysssec.com , info [at] abysssec.com |
| @abysssec | |
| CVE | CVE-2010-0520 |
| Apple QuickTime Player 7.6.5 |
| Apple QuickTime Player 7.6.4 |
| Apple QuickTime Player 7.6.2 |
| Apple QuickTime Player 7.6.1 |
| Apple QuickTime Player 7.6 |
| Apple Mac OS X Server 10.6.2 |
| Apple Mac OS X Server 10.6.1 |
| Apple Mac OS X Server 10.6 |
| Apple Mac OS X 10.6.2 |
| Apple Mac OS X 10.6.1 |
| Apple Mac OS X 10.6 |
| Class | 1- Code execution |
| Impact | Successfully exploiting this issue allows remote attackers to cause denial-of-service conditions. |
| Remotely Exploitable | Yes |
| Locally Exploitable | Yes |
FLIC files have variety of standards with extensions like fli, egx. The structure of these files have some kind of chunks that depends on their extension some of them exists in some file extension and some of them not. Internal layout of the fli extension is represented below:
File header
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | Frame chunk standard frame Postage stamp icon, FLC files only <img alt="" /> compressed or uncompressed color data <img alt="" /> compressed in various ways is one of either: "256" colour palette palette with 8-bpp RGB entries "64" colour palette palette with 6-bpp RGB entries <img alt="" /> is one of either: Black frame full black frame Uncompressed full frame uncompressed pixel block Full frame RLE compressed, EGI also supports Huffman/BWT Delta frame (old style) RLE compressed Delta frame (new style) RLE compressed, EGI also supports Huffman/BWT |
The File header length is 128 byte. Every chunk in the file starts with 6 bytes. 4 bytes is related to the length of the chunk and 2bytes is related to the kind of chunk and other chunk details are after these 6bytes. For example 2bytes of Frame Chunk have the F1FA value. One of the various chunks is Delta frame(old style) which holds the information about differences of previous and next frame.
After first 6bytes related to all chunks, 2bytes related to line number which difference of the two frame starts from that line. Next 2bytes are the number of lines exists in the chunk. The data section of the chunk starts after these 4bytes. Data segment is collection of lines which each line starts with a byte indicating number of packets in line and then the packets. Every packet have three section, first byte is ‘skip count column’; Then a byte for ‘RLE COUNT BYTE’ and after these two byte zero or some bytes of data exist. ‘skip count column’ is the number of pixels should be skipped from the current position of the line. If ‘RLE COUNT BYTE’ is positive number it indicate the number of bytes that should be copied after that and in case of negative number the absolute of the number is number of bytes should be copied. Because of checks on this numbers, it is possible to copy more data to the memory which in turn a heap over flow causes an access violation. Now based on these knowledge we are going to explain the binary:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 | .text:67881F50 sub_67881F50 proc near ; CODE XREF: sub_67883190+4Cp .text:67881F50 .text:67881F50 var_4 = dword ptr -4 .text:67881F50 arg_0 = dword ptr 4 .text:67881F50 arg_4 = dword ptr 8 .text:67881F50 arg_10 = dword ptr 14h .text:67881F50 .text:67881F50 push ecx .text:67881F51 mov edx, [esp+4+arg_0] .text:67881F55 mov al, [edx] .text:67881F57 add edx, 1 .text:67881F5A test al, al .text:67881F5C mov byte ptr [esp+4+arg_0], al .text:67881F60 mov [esp+4+var_4], 0 .text:67881F67 jle loc_67882009 .text:67881F6D push ebx .text:67881F6E push ebp .text:67881F6F mov ebp, [esp+0Ch+arg_10] .text:67881F73 push esi .text:67881F74 mov si, word ptr [esp+10h+var_4] .text:67881F79 push edi .text:67881F7A lea ebx, [ebx+0] .text:67881F80 .text:67881F80 loc_67881F80: ; CODE XREF: sub_67881F50+AFj .text:67881F80 movzx ax, byte ptr [edx] .text:67881F84 mov edi, [esp+14h+arg_4] .text:67881F88 add si, ax .text:67881F8B mov al, [edx+1] .text:67881F8E add edx, 1 .text:67881F91 movsx ecx, si .text:67881F94 add edx, 1 .text:67881F97 test al, al .text:67881F99 mov word ptr [esp+14h+var_4], si .text:67881F9E lea edi, [edi+ecx*4] .text:67881FA1 jle short loc_67881FCB .text:67881FA3 movzx cx, al .text:67881FA7 add si, cx .text:67881FAA lea ebx, [ebx+0] .text:67881FB0 .text:67881FB0 loc_67881FB0: ; CODE XREF: sub_67881F50+77j .text:67881FB0 mov cl, [edx] .text:67881FB2 mov ebx, [ebp+40h] .text:67881FB5 movzx ecx, cl .text:67881FB8 mov ecx, [ebx+ecx*4] .text:67881FBB mov [edi], ecx .text:67881FBD add al, 0FFh .text:67881FBF add edx, 1 .text:67881FC2 add edi, 4 .text:67881FC5 test al, al .text:67881FC7 jg short loc_67881FB0 .text:67881FC9 jmp short loc_67881FF3 .text:67881FCB ; --------------------------------------------------------------------------- .text:67881FCB .text:67881FCB loc_67881FCB: ; CODE XREF: sub_67881F50+51j .text:67881FCB jge short loc_67881FF3 .text:67881FCD mov cl, [edx] .text:67881FCF mov ebx, [ebp+40h] .text:67881FD2 movzx ecx, cl .text:67881FD5 mov ebx, [ebx+ecx*4] .text:67881FD8 neg al .text:67881FDA add edx, 1 .text:67881FDD test al, al .text:67881FDF jle short loc_67881FF3 .text:67881FE1 movzx esi, al .text:67881FE4 add [esp+14h+var_4], esi .text:67881FE8 mov ecx, esi .text:67881FEA mov si, word ptr [esp+14h+var_4] .text:67881FEF mov eax, ebx .text:67881FF1 rep stosd .text:67881FF3 .text:67881FF3 loc_67881FF3: ; CODE XREF: sub_67881F50+79j .text:67881FF3 ; sub_67881F50:loc_67881FCBj ... .text:67881FF3 mov al, byte ptr [esp+14h+arg_0] .text:67881FF7 add al, 0FFh .text:67881FF9 test al, al .text:67881FFB mov byte ptr [esp+14h+arg_0], al .text:67881FFF jg loc_67881F80 .text:67882005 pop edi .text:67882006 pop esi .text:67882007 pop ebp .text:67882008 pop ebx .text:67882009 .text:67882009 loc_67882009: ; CODE XREF: sub_67881F50+17j .text:67882009 mov eax, edx .text:6788200B pop ecx .text:6788200C retn .text:6788200C sub_67881F50 endp |
Value of packet counter is stored in AX at address .text:67881F80. Then from address .text:67881FB0 to .text:67881FC7 the values of the packets will be continued until AL is not zero in a loop. From address .text:67881F80 to .text:67881FFF there is a loop that copies all the values of the packets exist in a chunk to the memory. Here because of not checking the number of packets the software can be abused an cause exception.
Check out the Apple QuickTime FLI LinePacket Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Exploit.