


**PE Infection – How to Inject a dll**



**Nightmare - K053**

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**Thank you to my friends who help me in this research**

**(K053,Heli, L U C I F E R(B14ck\_Ic3))**

**Author: Nightmare(BioHazard)**

**Date: 03.05.2009(88.02.13)**

**Hint : Only the reader is responsible for any abuse of context of this document.**

## Introduction:

Our goal is to infect a Portable Executable file with a DLL. For that we need to obtain information on the structure PE.

So first we will discuss about PE Structure which is contain *PE Sections & Add a Section(Manually & Automatically)*.

Then we have a brief discussion of the *Import Table*.

Finally, we will discuss how to inject a DLL

## PE section(s):

00300000	0002C000			
00400000	00001000	firefox(		PE header
00401000	00001000	firefox(	.text	code
00402000	00001000	firefox(	.rdata	imports
00403000	00001000	firefox(	.data	data
00404000	00048000	firefox(	.rsrc	resources
0044C000	00001000	firefox(	.reloc	relocations
00450000	00009000			
00490000	00009000			
00550000	00002000			
00560000	00103000			
00670000	00104000			
00970000	00001000			
009F0000	00003000			
00A00000	00008000			
00A10000	00002000			
00A50000	00004000			
00B50000	00001000	swpg		PE header
00B51000	00012000	swpg	CODE	code
00B63000	00001000	swpg	DATA	data
00B64000	00001000	swpg	BSS	
00B65000	00001000	swpg	.idata	imports
00B66000	00001000	swpg	.reloc	relocations
00B67000	00001000	swpg	.rsrc	resources
00B70000	00004000			
01210000	00002000			
5A000000	00001000	klg		PE header
5A001000	00012000	klg	CODE	code
5A013000	00001000	klg	DATA	data
5A014000	00001000	klg	BSS	
5A015000	00001000	klg	.idata	imports
5A016000	00001000	klg	.reloc	relocations
5A017000	00001000	klg	.rsrc	resources

As you can see a Portable Executable contains “.text , .rdata , .data , .rsrc , reloc , BSS” are PE sections which has been generated by windows loader.

“.text” stores main code of a PE.

“.rdata” contains read only data such as String literals , Debug Directory & .....

“.data” stores all static data and initialized global.

“.BSS” contains all uninitialized global.

“.rsrc & .reloc” store details for relocating the image while loading

Now we need to know how to add a section into a PE. At first I'd like to do it in a hard way that needs a little Patience , some neurons in your head and a good Hex-Editor J .

First we have to gather the last section's information, so open our target(*firefox* J ) in a hex editor program and find *.reloc*.



So that the first 8 bytes for the name of the section. The next 4bytes are shown is Virtual Size. The next 4bytes are virtual address. The next 4bytes are Raw Size. The next 4bytes are Raw Offset then we have 12bytes which is nulls , then 4bytes for flags. And one important point is that our section alignment is 1000h.

Now we will add a section with 1000h Vsize and Rsize(it's not related to section alignment). Now we need to calculate our new section's information.


```
New Virtual Address = Virtual Address + Virtual Size + Section Alignment
//                = 0004C000 + 00000506 + 1000 = 0004D506 -> 06 D5 04 00 (We use nearer 0004D000 > 00 D0 04 00)

New Raw Offset = Raw Offset + Raw Size
//                = 00049600 + 600 = 00049C00 -> 00 9C 04 00

Virtual Size and Raw size for the new section = 1000h -> 00 10 00 00


Flags = E00000E0 -> E0 00 00 E0
```

So we have calculated our new section's information , Now we have to add them to PE with Hex Editor




\*Tip: Vsize = Virtual Size , Rsize = Raw Size

Then insert 1000h bytes to the target.



Now check the target with *LordPE* then change *NumberOfSection* to 6. After that you can realize that our new section has been added.




Congratulation you have added a new section to the program by your own hand J .

Now we want to add *.BFNIGHT* section in an easy way that needs only a good PE Editor like LordPE.

Open the target with lordPE then click the Section button, next right click and after that you can see that we have a option which is called *Add Section Header* .

A new section will be added by this option , So click it then you have to edit the new section's information with *Edit Section Header* like this.



Then click ok and save. But now we need to insert 1000h bytes to the target with hex editor.

### IAT (Import Address Table):

Every PE has a list of functions that aren't originally part of that PE. These functions are called Import which is located in the OS DLLs while PE doesn't know where they are located, So every win32 executable has an *Import Table Address* or *IAT* inside PE.

*IAT* contains all of information of imports , It means it is used as a lookup table when a PE is calling a windows32 API. Briefly the windows loader has to find each address of API which is called by the PE before starting.

Now take a look at inside our target (again *firefox J*)

```

004015A0  E8 9B030000  CALL firefox!.00401940
004015A5  E9 26DFFFFF  JMP  firefox!.004012D0
004015AA  FF25 54204000  JMP  DWORD PTR DS:[&MOZCRT19.operator new] MOZCRT19.operator new
004015B0  3B00 00304000  CMP  ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[403000]
004015B6  75 02        JNZ  SHORT firefox!.004015BA
004015B8  F3         PREFIX REP:
004015B9  C3         RETN
004015BA  E9 31040000  JMP  firefox!.004019F0
004015BF  CC        INT3
004015C0  FF25 5C204000  JMP  DWORD PTR DS:[&MOZCRT19.operator delete] MOZCRT19.operator delete
004015C6  8B4424 04      MOV  EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4]
004015CA  8B00     MOV  EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]
004015CC  8138 63736DE0  CMP  DWORD PTR DS:[EAX], E06D7363
004015D2  75 2A     JNZ  SHORT firefox!.004015FE
004015D4  8378 10 03  CMP  DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+10], 3
004015D8  75 24     JNZ  SHORT firefox!.004015FE
004015DA  8B40 14     MOV  EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+14]
004015DD  3D 20059319  CMP  EAX, 19930520
004015E2  74 15     JE   SHORT firefox!.004015F9
004015E4  3D 21059319  CMP  EAX, 19930521
004015E9  74 0E     JE   SHORT firefox!.004015F9
004015EB  3D 22059319  CMP  EAX, 19930522
004015F0  74 07     JE   SHORT firefox!.004015F9
004015F2  3D 00409901  CMP  EAX, 1994000
004015F7  75 05     JNZ  SHORT firefox!.004015FE
004015F9  E8 FE040000  CALL <JMP.&MOZCRT19.terminate>
004015FE  33C0     XOR  EAX, EAX
00401600  C2 0400   RETN 4
00401603  68 C6154000  PUSH firefox!.004015C6
00401608  FF15 24204000  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[&KERNEL32.SetUnhandledExceptionFilter] C:\TopLevelFilter = firefox!.004015C6
                                         SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
0040160F  33C9     XOR  EAX, EAX
    
```

CALL function which is shown at the figure is a good example of an API. It calls *SetUnhandledExceptionFilter* API. Right click on the function then click Assemble. You can see that it's like **CALL DWORD PTR [XXXXXX],[XXXXXX]** is the address of values which are located in memory

Go to the 402024 in olly hex dump (right click -> go to -> expression).

Address	Hex dump	ASCII
00402024	50 49 84 7C 42 98 80 7C	1iã1Byç!
0040202C	46 24 80 7C 2E 98 80 7C	Fšç! çç!
00402034	00 00 00 00 60 ED 00 60	... φ ...
0040203C	F2 56 01 60 20 B5 00 60	≥U0 .L.
00402044	70 ED 00 60 90 2E 00 60	pl."0.
0040204C	90 B8 00 60 00 25 00 60	0 .0%.
00402054	00 06 02 60 A0 DC 04 60	..T0 .U+
0040205C	50 D7 02 60 C0 03 06 60	Pl0 .A++
00402064	40 17 00 60 00 1E 00 60	@# .0A.
0040206C	20 1C 00 60 00 1C 00 60	L .L.
00402074	20 BA 00 60 E0 1B 00 60	= .A+
0040207C	EC 57 0A 60 C0 17 00 60	Iv .A+
00402084	F0 17 00 60 60 D1 00 60	≡# .N.
0040208C	00 10 00 60 8C 65 0A 60	..# .CE.
00402094	20 22 00 60 70 22 00 60	" .p"
0040209C	10 2E 00 60 70 10 00 60	l .p"
004020A4	69 46 00 60 B0 24 00 60	lF .#\$.
004020AC	30 B9 00 60 00 00 00 00	00 .E....
004020B4	EA 07 45 7E 00 00 00 00	00 .E....
004020BC	C0 DE 00 60 00 8C 00 60	Lj .00E
004020C4	50 DF 00 60 30 6B 00 60	F0 .ok0
004020CC	00 00 00 00 E0 11 0F 60	... <4*"
004020D4	00 00 00 00 10 E0 60	... >A
004020DC	00 11 E0 60 70 10 E0 60	.lA p>A
004020E4	10 10 E0 60 00 00 00 00	>>A....
004020EC	1B 18 48 60 38 B9 5F 60	+tK .s.
004020F4	68 5A 65 60 31 C5 61 60	hZe' 1ta'
004020FC	E7 E1 62 60 00 00 00 00	rBb' .ita
00402104	00 00 00 00 30 12 40 00	... .E#0.
0040210C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....

As the figure shows the address of the API is 7C84495D in my system. Notice that most of the API addresses start like 7XXXXXXX.

Now let see how windows loader can find addresses for every API. First windows loader reads the header of PE, so bytes at RVA 3C are read. The VA of the bytes will be 40003C(imagebase is 400000). Then if we plus 80h to the value of VA, we will find Virtual Address of Import Table.

But what's the Import Table?

The Import Table contains all of the information that is needed for windows to link the APIs for PE.

The structure of Import Table is simple . A header for each imported DLL plus additional null header that marks the end of Import Table. For example if you import APIs from Kernel32.dll and User32.dll , you will find 3 headers. 2 of them are for Kernel32.dll and User32.dll and a zero-header for marking the end.

The header of each dll is called *IMPORT\_IMAGE\_DIRECOTRY*. 'IMAGE' word refers that all of this stuff is done in memory.

But data structure which stores the information import symbols called *IMAGE\_IMPORT\_DESCRIPTOR* that has 5 properties. I'd like to use exact description of *Identifying Malicious Reverse Engineering Code Through Book*.

**OriginalFirstThunk:** - This member contains the RVA (pointer) of an array of *IMAGE\_THUNK\_DATA* structures.

*IMAGE\_THUNK\_DATA* structures, is a union of dword size. This can be considered as a pointer to *IMAGE\_IMPORT\_BY\_NAME* structure. The structure of *IMAGE\_IMPORT\_BY\_NAME* structure is as follows: -

*IMAGE\_IMPORT\_BY\_NAME* STRUCT

Hint

Name1

**Time/Date Stamp:** - After the image is bound, this field is set to the time/data stamp of the DLL. This field is not mandatory; it can be zero.

**Forwarder Chain:** - The index of the first forwarder reference. This field is not mandatory; it can be zero.

**Name:** - This member contains the RVA (pointer) of an ASCII string that contains the name of the DLL.

**FirstThunk:-** As the name suggests the FirstThunk is very similar to that of OriginalFirstThunk . Similar to FirstThunk it also contains pointer (RVA) to array of *IMAGE\_THUNK\_DATA* structures. Although both the arrays contain same value, they are at different locations in the executable.

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Tip : (RVA = Relative Virtual Address , VA = Virtual Address)

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
I think those are some boring description that make you bored, so go through see above information in our target. First we have to find Import Table, so open firefox in ollydbg then click on **M** (Memory Map Button) and double-click on PE Header.

00400000	00001000	firefox!	PE header	Image 01001002	R
00401000	00001000	firefox!	code	Image 01001002	R
00402000	00001000	firefox!	imports	Image 01001002	R
00403000	00001000	firefox!	data	Image 01001002	R

Now you are able to see the header of firefox. Find RVA of 3C (ImageBase + 3C = 40003c). You can see the value is D8 now plus it with 80h that the RVA will be like: D8h + 80h + 400000h = 400158h. This RVA stores the VA of Import Table.

00400158	74230000	DD 00002374	Import Table address = 2374
0040015C	A0000000	DD 00000A00	Import Table size = A0 (160.)
00400160	00400000	DD 00004000	Resource Table address = 4000
00400164	38750400	DD 00047538	Resource Table size = 47538 (292152.)
00400168	00000000	DD 00000000	Exception Table address = 0
0040016C	00000000	DD 00000000	Exception Table size = 0
00400170	009C0400	DD 00049C00	Certificate File pointer = 49C00
00400174	F8150000	DD 000015F8	Certificate Table size = 15F8 (5624.)
00400178	00C00400	DD 0004C000	Relocation Table address = 4C000
0040017C	94010000	DD 00000194	Relocation Table size = 194 (404.)
00400180	20210000	DD 00002120	Debug Data address = 2120

The RVA of Import Table Address will be 402374. So go to 402374 like:



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Then enter 402374 in to the box and click ok then you need to Analyze Code(CTRL + A). If you consider you can find that we have 8 IMAGE\_IMPORT\_DESCRIPTORs and last one is a zero-header that marks the end then we have Import Lookup Table that stores the information of each dll that. Then we have the name of each function that is imported. These are Import's information that is pointed by IMAGE\_IMPORT\_DESCRIPTOR.

00402374	.	00250000	DD 00002500	Struct 'IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR'
00402378	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
0040237C	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
00402380	.	74250000	DD 00002574	
00402384	.	EC200000	DD 000023EC	
00402388	.	EC240000	DD 000024EC	
0040238C	.	00000000	DD 00000000	Struct 'IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR'
00402390	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
00402394	.	00250000	DD 00002500	
00402398	.	08200000	DD 00002008	
0040239C	.	00240000	DD 00002400	Struct 'IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR'
004023A0	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
004023A4	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
004023A8	.	14260000	DD 00002614	
004023AC	.	BC200000	DD 000020BC	
004023B0	.	E4240000	DD 000024E4	Struct 'IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR'
004023B4	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
004023B8	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
004023BC	.	2E260000	DD 0000262E	
004023C0	.	00200000	DD 00002000	
004023C4	.	C8240000	DD 000024C8	Struct 'IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR'
004023C8	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
004023CC	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
004023D0	.	46260000	DD 00002646	
004023D4	.	B4200000	DD 000020B4	Struct 'IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR'
004023D8	.	4C240000	DD 0000244C	
004023DC	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
004023E0	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
004023E4	.	76270000	DD 00002776	
004023E8	.	38200000	DD 00002038	
004023EC	.	14240000	DD 00002414	Struct 'IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR'
004023F0	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
004023F4	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
004023F8	.	48290000	DD 00002948	
004023FC	.	00200000	DD 00002000	
00402400	.	00000000	DD 00000000	Struct 'IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR'
00402404	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
00402408	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
0040240C	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
00402410	.	00000000	DD 00000000	

00402414	.	34290000	DD 00002934	Import lookup table for 'KERNEL32.dll'
00402418	.	18290000	DD 00002918	
0040241C	.	94290000	DD 00002904	
00402420	.	F0280000	DD 000028F0	
00402424	.	D6280000	DD 000028D6	
00402428	.	C0280000	DD 000028C0	
0040242C	.	A4280000	DD 000028A4	
00402430	.	9A280000	DD 0000289A	
00402434	.	80280000	DD 00002880	
00402438	.	62280000	DD 00002862	
0040243C	.	44280000	DD 00002844	
00402440	.	3C280000	DD 0000283C	
00402444	.	2E280000	DD 0000282E	
00402448	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
0040244C	.	10280000	DD 00002810	Import lookup table for 'MOZCRT19.dll'
00402450	.	00280000	DD 00002800	
00402454	.	EE270000	DD 000027EE	
00402458	.	D4270000	DD 000027D4	
0040245C	.	C2270000	DD 000027C2	
00402460	.	B2270000	DD 000027B2	
00402464	.	B0270000	DD 000027B0	
00402468	.	52260000	DD 00002652	
0040246C	.	62260000	DD 00002662	
00402470	.	70260000	DD 00002670	
00402474	.	80260000	DD 00002680	
00402478	.	8A260000	DD 0000268A	
0040247C	.	98260000	DD 00002698	
00402480	.	AA260000	DD 000026AA	
00402484	.	B4260000	DD 000026B4	
00402488	.	BC260000	DD 000026BC	
0040248C	.	CA260000	DD 000026CA	
00402490	.	D2260000	DD 000026D2	
00402494	.	E0260000	DD 000026E0	
00402498	.	EC260000	DD 000026EC	
0040249C	.	FA260000	DD 000026FA	
004024A0	.	10270000	DD 00002710	
004024A4	.	24270000	DD 00002724	
004024A8	.	34270000	DD 00002734	
004024AC	.	44270000	DD 00002744	
004024B0	.	52270000	DD 00002752	
004024B4	.	64270000	DD 00002764	
004024B8	.	84270000	DD 00002784	
004024BC	.	98270000	DD 00002798	
004024C0	.	A2270000	DD 000027A2	
004024C4	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
004024C8	.	38260000	DD 00002638	Import lookup table for 'USER32.dll'
004024CC	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
004024D0	.	E3250000	DD 000025E3	Import lookup table for 'nspr4.dll'
004024D4	.	F4250000	DD 000025F4	
004024D8	.	85250000	DD 00002585	
004024DC	.	DA250000	DD 000025DA	
004024E0	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
004024E4	.	1E250000	DD 0000251E	Import lookup table for 'pic4.dll'
004024E8	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
004024EC	.	C2250000	DD 000025C2	Import lookup table for 'kpcocom.dll'
004024F0	.	A6250000	DD 000025A6	
004024F4	.	84250000	DD 00002584	
004024F8	.	72250000	DD 0000257C	
004024FC	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
00402500	.	68250000	DD 00002568	Import lookup table for 'xul.dll'
00402504	.	54250000	DD 00002554	
00402508	.	42250000	DD 00002542	
0040250C	.	2C250000	DD 0000252C	
00402510	.	18250000	DD 00002518	
00402514	.	00000000	DD 00000000	
00402518	.	6703	DD 0367	

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```
0040251H . 58 52 45 5F 43 7 ASCII "XRE_CreateAppdat
0040252A . 61 00 ASCII "a",0
0040252C . 6A03 DW 036A
0040252E . 58 52 45 5F 47 6 ASCII "XRE_GetFileFromP"
0040253E . 61 74 68 00 ASCII "ath",0
00402542 . 6803 DW 0368
00402544 . 58 52 45 5F 46 7 ASCII "XRE_FreeAppData",0
00402554 . 6903 DW 0369
00402556 . 58 52 45 5F 47 6 ASCII "XRE_GetBinaryPat"
00402566 . 68 00 ASCII "h",0
00402568 . 7103 DW 0371
0040256A . 58 52 45 5F 6D 6 ASCII "XRE_main",0
00402573 . 00 DB 00
00402574 . 78 75 6C 2E 64 6 ASCII "xul.dll",0
0040257C . 2400 DW 0024
0040257E . 4E 53 5F 4C 6F 6 ASCII "NS_LogTerm",0
00402589 . 00 DB 00
0040258A . 0400 DW 0004
0040258C . 4E 53 5F 43 53 7 ASCII "NS_CStringContai"
0040259C . 6E 65 72 49 6E 6 ASCII "nerInit2",0
004025A5 . 00 DB 00
004025A6 . 0200 DW 0002
004025A8 . 4E 53 5F 43 53 7 ASCII "NS_CStringContai"
004025B8 . 6E 65 72 46 69 6 ASCII "nerFinish",0
004025C2 . 2200 DW 0022
004025C4 . 4E 53 5F 4C 6F 6 ASCII "NS_LogInit",0
004025CF . 00 DB 00
004025D0 . 78 70 63 6F 6D 2 ASCII "xpcocom.dll",0
004025DA . 7A01 DW 017A
004025DC . 50 52 5F 73 6D 7 ASCII "PR_smprintf",0
004025E8 . 9300 DW 0093
004025EA . 50 52 5F 47 65 7 ASCII "PR_GetEnv",0
004025F4 . 7B01 DW 017B
004025F6 . 50 52 5F 73 6D 7 ASCII "PR_smprintf_free"
00402606 . 00 ASCII 0
00402607 . 00 DB 00
00402608 . 3801 DW 0138
0040260A . 50 52 5F 53 65 7 ASCII "PR_SetEnv",0
00402614 . 6E 73 70 72 34 2 ASCII "nspr4.dll",0
0040261E . 0800 DW 0008
00402620 . 50 4C 5F 73 74 7 ASCII "PL_strerrorcmp",0
0040262E . 70 6C 63 34 2E 6 ASCII "plc4.dll",0
00402637 . 00 DB 00
00402638 . F801 DW 01F8
0040263A . 4D 65 73 73 61 6 ASCII "MessageBoxA",0
00402646 . 55 53 45 52 33 3 ASCII "USER32.dll",0
00402651 . 00 DB 00
00402652 . 0F00 DW 000F
00402654 . 3F 3F 32 40 59 4 ASCII "??2@YAPAPI02",0
00402661 . 00 DB 00
00402662 . 0404 DW 0404
00402664 . 5F 76 73 6E 70 7 ASCII "_vsnprintf",0
0040266F . 00 DB 00
00402670 . 1100 DW 0011
00402672 . 3F 3F 33 40 59 4 ASCII "??3@YAPAPI02",0
0040267F . 00 DB 00
00402680 . 8C05 DW 058C
00402682 . 77 63 73 6C 65 6 ASCII "wcslen",0
00402689 . 00 DB 00
0040268A . 1601 DW 0116
0040268C . 5F 61 6D 73 67 5 ASCII "_amsq_exit",0
00402697 . 00 DB 00
00402698 . F800 DW 00F8
0040269A . 5F 5F 77 67 65 7 ASCII "__wgetmainargs",0
004026A9 . 00 DB 00
004026AA . 2C01 DW 012C
004026AC . 5F 63 65 78 69 7 ASCII "_coexit",0
004026B3 . 00 DB 00
004026B4 . 7C01 DW 017C
004026B6 . 5F 65 78 69 74 0 ASCII "_exit",0
004026BC . 6300 DW 0063
004026BE . 5F 58 63 70 74 4 ASCII "_XcptFilter",0
004026CA . C704 DW 04C7
004026CC . 65 78 69 74 00 ASCII "exit",0
004026D1 . 00 DB 00
004026D2 . F900 DW 00F9
004026D4 . 5F 5F 77 69 6E 6 ASCII "__winitenv",0
004026DF . 00 DB 00
004026E0 . FF01 DW 01FF
004026E2 . 5F 69 6E 69 74 7 ASCII "_initterm",0
004026EC . 0002 DW 0200
004026EE . 5F 69 6E 69 74 7 ASCII "_initterm_e",0
004026FA . 3C01 DW 013C
004026FC . 5F 63 6F 6E 66 6 ASCII " _configthreadloc"
0040270C . 61 6C 65 00 ASCII "ale",0
00402710 . E400 DW 00E4
00402712 . 5F 5F 73 65 74 7 ASCII "__setusermatherr"
00402722 . 00 ASCII 0
```



## Inject A DLL:

I think now we have enough information to inject a dll to our target, but above all we need a framework, a paper & pencil.


Framework:

1. First we need to add a section then make jump to the main EP(Entry Point) and change EP to our section's EP.
2. Then all of firefox's IMAGE\_IMPORT\_DESCRIPTOR should be moved to the new section and Import Table Address's value should be changed to the New Section's Import Table Address
3. Next we have to add Import Lookup and a IMAGE\_IMPORT\_DESCRIPTOR for dll which you want to inject
4. Then call it.
5. ENJOY!

1<sup>st</sup> step

You need to Add a section by lordpe with 3000h size like I said, then you need to find the RVA of EP. easy way is value of .BFNIGHT's Voffset. So my EP would be "4D000 + 15F1 = 4E5F1" (consider EP should be a place that has lots of *Code Cave*). Before change the EP you need to write the main of EP in your paper because we want to make a jump to the main EP.


So main EP is 4015A0 and new EP is 4E5F1. So lets change it.



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Tip : Code Cave is Place of a PE which has null data


Now open target in ollydbg and assemble "JMP 4015A0" then compile it.




If you run target , It will work correctly.

2<sup>nd</sup> Step

Find IMAGE\_IMPORT\_DESCRIPTOR like I said then highlight them and Right click and Follow Value in Dump. Then Right click on the highlighted values and Binary then Binary Copy



Now paste them in to the our Null space in our new section like: (Then you have to compile the target again J)





3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> steps:


In this case I'd like to use Ashraf Cracker's DLL ([Password.dll](#)).

<http://www.4shared.com/file/112647070/69e44e47/Password.html>


So copy this dll in firefox's directory. Password.dll has a function that is called PasswordMain.

Now we need to make Import Lookup Table for the dll. Choose a Null Data Place like 44E6CD and find it in Value Dump view.

First you need to insert dll name (Password.dll)




Then you need to insert Function name



Next you need to insert the RVA that points to the function name and 20 10 00 10


RVA = 44E6DB – 400000 = 4E6DB à DB E6 04 00



So the final step in make a IMAGE\_IMPORT\_DESCRIPTOR witch this structure

```
OriginalFirstThunk = 44E6ED – 400000 = 4E6ED à ED E6 04 00
Time/Date Stamp and ForwarderChain = Zero
Name: 4E6CD à CD E6 04 00
FirstThunk: 4E6F5 à F5 E6 04 00
```

Find the values of the last IMAGE\_IMPORT\_DESCRIPTOR in the olly's Value Dump and insert those data which is calculated like:



Then save the target. Now if you assemble CALL DWORD PTR [44E6F5] , you can find that the dll has been injected correctly and it works perfectly.



The password is : 0128793089

Finally we have injected a dll in our target and now we know how to do it.

Our website: <http://b0frenzy.freehostia.com>

Special Thanks to Lena151 because of his perfect tutorials and website

GREAT IRAN

GREAT BLACK-OUT FRENZY

BE SAFE