Trustwave's SpiderLabs Security Advisory TWSL2010-003: Unauthorized access to root NFS export on EMC Celerra Network Attached Storage (NAS) appliance https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs/advisories/TWSL2010-003.txt Published: 2010-07-29 Version: 1.0 Vendor: EMC (http://www.emc.com) Product: Celerra Unified Storage products (http://www.emc.com/products/family/celerra-family.htm) Version(s) affected: All Product Description: The Celerra Unified Storage Platform provides Network Attached Storage (NAS) services through a combination of server appliances and software modules. Credit: Steve Ocepek of Trustwave's SpiderLabs CVE: CVE-2010-2860 Finding: The Celerra appliance's NFS server freely exports its "/" file system and enforces access using a factory-defined list of authorized IP addresses. The addresses found on a recent model are listed in the showmount example below, however this list may differ depending on product version. The IP addresses are intended for communication internal to the appliance, but are still accepted from external sources. An attacker can mount this file system by spoofing an authorized IP address. The NFS showmount command can be used to obtain a list of the IP addresses: # showmount -e <Celerra IP address> Export list for <Celerra IP address>: / 188.8.131.52,184.108.40.206,220.127.116.11,18.104.22.168 Because the appliance's NFS server does not enable the "rootsquash" feature, full access to the file system is possible by mounting the export using root (UID 0). Fully spoofing the source IP address (for sending and receiving packets) will usually require access to the local subnet or the ability to exploit some other network infrastructure vulnerability. On Linux, local IP address spoofing can be accomplished by creating an alias interface and using the "ip route" command to set the source IP accordingly. # ifconfig eth0:0 22.214.171.124 # ip route add <Celerra IP address> dev eth0 src 126.96.36.199 # mkdir nfs # mount <Celerra IP address>:/ nfs The flaw allows unauthorized access to files contained on the system, including all CIFS shares and iSCSI mounted drives. The "/" path does not correspond to the true root of the file system -- only the root of the user data directory is exposed. Vendor Response: The vendor has acknowledged this issue and issued the following workaround. Vendor has also published a knowledgebase article about the issue and mitigation so support can help any customers who call in with this issue until a permanent fix from EMC is available. Vendor estimated date for a code fix is Q3 2010. Remediation Steps: The following recommendations were provided by the vendor. 1. Hide NFS exports and show it only based on the configured access. Setting forceFullShowmount param to 0 (default is 1) will hide the "/" from the list since only Control Station have access to it for administration purpose: [root () virgil slot_3]# server_param server_3 -f mount -info forceFullShowmount server_3 : name = forceFullShowmount facility_name = mount default_value = 1 current_value = 1 configured_value = user_action = none change_effective = immediate range = (0,1) description = Forces response to showmount requests to fully populate response. [root () virgil slot_3]# server_param server_3 -f mount -modify \ forceFullShowmount -value 0 server_3 : done After the above change, client will see only the shares he have permissions to access to: /usr/sbin/showmount -e 172.24.97.3 Export list for 172.24.97.3: /fs1 (everyone) 2. Change default IP addresses (during install or after) for internal network along with first step above to further minimize the exploitability. Product team has provided additional mitigations steps that can be implemented by the customers to reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability: 1. Create IP-based access rules on the network equipment rejecting traffic for IP addresses belonging to internal Celerra network which do have own switch for that purpose. These addresses are listed in the /etc/hosts file of the Celerra Control Station. 2. Configure firewall(s) between Data Movers and NFS clients to reject traffic for IP addresses belonging to the internal Celerra network. 3. Hide NFS exports and show it only based on the configured access. Setting forceFullShowmount param to 0 (default is 1) will hide the ³/² from the list since only Control Station have access to it for administration purpose. 4. Disable IP reflect Vendor Communication Timeline: 05/07/10 - Initial communication 05/10/10 - Vulnerability details provided 05/18/10 - Vulnerability acknowledged, workaround and timeline provided 07/27/10 - Additional workaround details provided Revision History: 1.0 Initial publication About Trustwave: Trustwave is the leading provider of on-demand and subscription-based information security and payment card industry compliance management solutions to businesses and government entities throughout the world. For organizations faced with today's challenging data security and compliance environment, Trustwave provides a unique approach with comprehensive solutions that include its flagship TrustKeeper compliance management software and other proprietary security solutions. Trustwave has helped thousands of organizations--ranging from Fortune 500 businesses and large financial institutions to small and medium-sized retailers--manage compliance and secure their network infrastructure, data communications and critical information assets. Trustwave is headquartered in Chicago with offices throughout North America, South America, Europe, Africa, China and Australia. For more information, visit https://www.trustwave.com About Trustwave's SpiderLabs: SpiderLabs is the advance security team at Trustwave responsible for incident response and forensics, ethical hacking and application security tests for Trustwave's clients. SpiderLabs has responded to hundreds of security incidents, performed thousands of ethical hacking exercises and tested the security of hundreds of business applications for Fortune 500 organizations. For more information visit https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs Disclaimer: The information provided in this advisory is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Trustwave disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Trustwave or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Trustwave or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.
Related ExploitsTrying to match CVEs (1): CVE-2010-2860
Trying to match OSVDBs (1): 66893
Other Possible E-DB Search Terms: EMC Celerra NAS Appliance