Wireshark - hiqnet_display_data Static Out-of-Bounds Read

EDB-ID:

39325

CVE:

N/A




Platform:

Multiple

Date:

2016-01-26


Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=695

The following crash due to a static out-of-bounds read can be observed in an ASAN build of Wireshark (current git master), by feeding a malformed file to tshark ("$ ./tshark -nVxr /path/to/file"):

--- cut ---
==24377==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f7a3ce4efe0 at pc 0x7f7a39a5a121 bp 0x7ffe1fcb92e0 sp 0x7ffe1fcb92d8
READ of size 4 at 0x7f7a3ce4efe0 thread T0
    #0 0x7f7a39a5a120 in hiqnet_display_data wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-hiqnet.c:523:15
    #1 0x7f7a39a59354 in dissect_hiqnet_pdu wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-hiqnet.c:906:34
    #2 0x7f7a39a560b7 in dissect_hiqnet_udp wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-hiqnet.c:1031:9
    #3 0x7f7a38ab14a1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:619:8
    #4 0x7f7a38aa3e2a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:694:9
    #5 0x7f7a38aa35fd in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1151:9
    #6 0x7f7a38aa41a4 in dissector_try_uint wireshark/epan/packet.c:1177:9
    #7 0x7f7a3abc065d in decode_udp_ports wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-udp.c:536:7
    #8 0x7f7a3abce912 in dissect wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-udp.c:1031:5
    #9 0x7f7a3abc31a0 in dissect_udplite wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-udp.c:1044:3
    #10 0x7f7a38ab14a1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:619:8
    #11 0x7f7a38aa3e2a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:694:9
    #12 0x7f7a38aa35fd in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1151:9
    #13 0x7f7a39beae0b in ip_try_dissect wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ip.c:1976:7
    #14 0x7f7a39bf5a21 in dissect_ip_v4 wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ip.c:2468:10
    #15 0x7f7a39beb569 in dissect_ip wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ip.c:2491:5
    #16 0x7f7a38ab14a1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:619:8
    #17 0x7f7a38aa3e2a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:694:9
    #18 0x7f7a38aa35fd in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1151:9
    #19 0x7f7a38aa41a4 in dissector_try_uint wireshark/epan/packet.c:1177:9
    #20 0x7f7a3a3d1830 in dissect_ppp_common wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ppp.c:4346:10
    #21 0x7f7a3a3d0fec in dissect_ppp_hdlc_common wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ppp.c:5339:5
    #22 0x7f7a3a3c92a5 in dissect_ppp_hdlc wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ppp.c:5380:5
    #23 0x7f7a38ab14a1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:619:8
    #24 0x7f7a38aa3e2a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:694:9
    #25 0x7f7a38aa35fd in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1151:9
    #26 0x7f7a397e00d3 in dissect_frame wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-frame.c:491:11
    #27 0x7f7a38ab14a1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:619:8
    #28 0x7f7a38aa3e2a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:694:9
    #29 0x7f7a38aad96e in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2665:8
    #30 0x7f7a38a9f3df in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2678:8
    #31 0x7f7a38a9ea2b in dissect_record wireshark/epan/packet.c:502:3
    #32 0x7f7a38a4f9b9 in epan_dissect_run_with_taps wireshark/epan/epan.c:376:2
    #33 0x52856b in process_packet wireshark/tshark.c:3728:5
    #34 0x5219e0 in load_cap_file wireshark/tshark.c:3484:11
    #35 0x517e2c in main wireshark/tshark.c:2197:13

0x7f7a3ce4efe0 is located 32 bytes to the left of global variable '' defined in 'packet-hiqnet.c' (0x7f7a3ce4f000) of size 16
  '' is ascii string 'packet-hiqnet.c'
0x7f7a3ce4efe0 is located 16 bytes to the right of global variable 'hiqnet_datasize_per_type' defined in 'packet-hiqnet.c:282:19' (0x7f7a3ce4efa0) of size 48
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-hiqnet.c:523:15 in hiqnet_display_data
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x0fefc79c1da0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9
  0x0fefc79c1db0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 05 f9 f9
  0x0fefc79c1dc0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 f9 f9
  0x0fefc79c1dd0: f9 f9 f9 f9 06 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 07 f9 f9 f9
  0x0fefc79c1de0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 04 f9 f9
=>0x0fefc79c1df0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9[f9]f9 f9 f9
  0x0fefc79c1e00: 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0fefc79c1e10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0fefc79c1e20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0fefc79c1e30: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0fefc79c1e40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Heap right redzone:      fb
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack partial redzone:   f4
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
--- cut ---

The crash was reported at https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=11983. Attached are three files which trigger the crash.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39325.zip