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From: Moderators
Subject: A Few Observations on Prodigy
Date: 8 May, 1991

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***  CuD #3.16: File 6 of 6: A Few Observations on Prodigy       ***
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Prodigy customers can decide for themselves whether they are satisfied
with the service, and the internal policies of a commercial system are
normally of little direct CU interest.  Here, however, we see at least
two issues that potentially touch the rest of us.

First, whatever the inadequacy of Prodigy's software or the tarnish on
their public image, the stage.dat case raises the same issues that
"hackers" have been raising for over a year.  The legitimate concerns
of users regarding the potential danger to privacy seem over-ridden by
the same hysteria and "lynch mob" mentality that has accompanied law
enforcement attention to the CU. Prodigy may not be the most
sympathetic of victims, but they seem to be victimized by the same
excesses, this time from the private sector, as other individuals
received from law enforcement.  Prodigy management may not handle its
crises well, but this is not a crime, and using a flaw in a program to
impute broader motives reminds us of how prosecutors distorted the
significance of the E911 files, how AT&T fabricated the value of
"losses," or how prosecutors creatively misconstrued facts or legal
language to finagle a version of reality to their liking.

A second issue, one more chilling, was raised by Emmanuel Goldstein of
2600 Magazine. If user-interface software can access information ona
hard drive, consider this scenario: A serial killer is suspected of
being a computerophile. A "psychological profile" has narrowed down
possible suspects who may have an account on a system (like Prodigy)
that essentially takes temporary control of a system while the user is
logged on.  Under existing law, can investigators use such such
systems to "invade" the hard drives of suspects looking for potential
evidence? And, if so, how can this evidence be used? Now, substitute
"serial killer" for "hacker," "pirate," or "marijuana user."

Take another example. If the Secret Service engages in video taping of
the kind it did in Summercon '88 without significant public outcry,
how hard would it be to engage in comparable monitoring of "suspects"
hard drives? We have seen from Sun Devil and other operations (eg,
Steve Jackson Games) how easily search or seizure affidavits can
distort "reality." A year ago we would have thought the possibility of
hard drive snooping absurd.  But, we also would have disbelieved that
the SS would poke holes in motel rooms to video tape 15 hours of
people eating pizza and drinking beer.

The crucial question of Prodigy's stage.dat is not an individual
company's policies, but rather the ability for such programs to be
used by those with the power to abuse it.

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                         **END OF CuD #3.16**
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