Computer underground Digest Wed Aug 14, 1996 Volume 8 : Issue 59 ISSN 1004-042X Editor: Jim Thomas (cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu) News Editor: Gordon Meyer (gmeyer@sun.soci.niu.edu) Archivist: Brendan Kehoe Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish Field Agent Extraordinaire: David Smith Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala Ian Dickinson Cu Digest Homepage: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest CONTENTS, #8.59 (Wed, Aug 14, 1996) File 1--Paranoia and Brit hackers fuel infowar craze in spy agencies File 2--Nat'l Law Journal and The Independent on CWD and net-filters File 3--ACLU warns of G-7 international net-censorship efforts File 4--DiFi/Barr: Terrorist Handbook on Net File 5--Internet Domain Survey, July 1996 (fwd) File 6--Hackers Find Cheap Scotland Yard Phone Connection File 7--Re: - SPECIAL ISSUE: Anti Terrorism File 8--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 Apr, 1996) CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION ApPEARS IN THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 6 Aug 1996 20:12:06 -0500 (CDT) From: Crypt Newsletter To: Jim Thomas Subject: File 1--Paranoia and Brit hackers fuel infowar craze in spy agencies Electronic doom will soon be visited on U.S. computer networks by information warriors, hackers, pannational groups of computer-wielding religious extremists, possible agents of Libya and Iran, international thugs and money-mad Internet savvy thieves. John Deutch, director of Central Intelligence, testified to the truth of the matter, so it must be graven in stone. In a long statement composed in the august tone of the Cold Warrior, Deutch said to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on June 25, "My greatest concern is that hackers, terrorist organizations, or other nations might use information warfare techniques" to disrupt the national infrastructure. "Virtually any 'bad actor' can acquire the hardware and software needed to attack some of our critical information-based infrastructures. Hacker tools are readily available on the Internet, and hackers themselves are a source of expertise for any nation or foreign terrorist organization that is interested in developing an information warfare capability. In fact, hackers, with or without their full knowledge, may be supplying advice and expertise to rogue states such as Iran and Libya." In one sentence, the head of the CIA cast hackers -- from those more expert than Kevin Mitnick to AOLHell-wielding idiots calling an America On-Line overseas account -- as pawns of perennial international bogeymen, Libya and Iran. Scrutiny of the evidence that led to this conclusion was not possible since it was classified, according to Deutch. " . . . we have [classified] evidence that a number of countries around the world are developing the doctrine, strategies, and tools to conduct information attacks," said Deutch. Catching glimpses of shadowy enemies at every turn, Deutch characterized them as operating from the deep cover of classified programs in pariah states. Truck bombs aimed at the telephone company, electronic assaults by "paid hackers" are likely to be part of the arsenal of anyone from the Lebanese Hezbollah to "nameless . . . cells of international terrorists such as those who attacked the World Trade Center." Quite interestingly, a Minority Staff Report entitled "Security and Cyberspace" and presented to the subcommittee around the same time as Deutch's statement, presented a different picture. In its attempt to raise the alarm over hacker assaults on the U.S., it inadvertently portrayed the intelligence community responsible for appraising the threat as hidebound stumblebums, Cold Warriors resistant to change and ignorant or indifferent to the technology of computer networks and their misuse. Written by Congressional staff investigators Dan Gelber and Jim Christy, the report quotes an unnamed member of the intelligence community likening threat assessment in the area to "a toddler soccer game, where everyone just runs around trying to kick the ball somewhere." Further, assessment of the threat posed by information warriors was "not presently a priority of our nation's intelligence and enforcement communities." The report becomes more comical with briefings from intelligence agencies said to be claiming that the threat of hackers and information warfare is "substantial" but completely unable to provide a concrete assessment of the threat because few or no personnel were working on the subject under investigation. "One agency assembled [ten] individuals for the Staff briefing, but ultimately admitted that only one person was actually working 'full time' on intelligence collection and threat analysis," write Gelber and Christy. The CIA is one example. "Central Intelligence Agency . . . staffs an 'Information Warfare Center'; however, at the time of [the] briefing, barely a handful of persons were dedicated to collection and on [sic] defensive information warfare," comment the authors. " . . . at no time was any agency able to present a national threat assessment of the risk posed to our information infrastructure," they continue. Briefings on the subject, if any and at any level of classification, "consisted of extremely limited anecdotal information." Oh no, John, say it ain't so! The minority report continues to paint a picture of intelligence agencies that have glommed onto the magic words "information warfare" and "hackers" as mystical totems, grafting the subjects onto "pre-existing" offices or new "working groups." However, the operations are based only on labels. "Very little prioritization" has been done, there are few analysts working on the subjects in question. Another "very senior intelligence officer for science and technology" is quoted claiming "it will probably take the intelligence community years to break the traditional paradigms, and re-focus resources" in the area. Restated, intelligence director Deutch pronounced in June there was classified evidence that hackers are in league with Libya and Iran and that countries around the world are plotting plots to attack the U.S. through information warfare. But the classified data is and was, at best, anecdotal gossip -- hearsay, bullshit -- assembled by perhaps a handful of individuals working haphazardly inside the labyrinth of the intelligence community. There is no real threat assessment to back up the Deutch claims. Can anyone say _bomber gap_? The lack of solid evidence for any of the claims made by the intelligence community has created an unusual stage on which two British hackers, Datastream Cowboy and Kuji, were made the dog and pony in a ridiculous show to demonstrate the threat of information warfare to members of Congress. Because of a break-in at an Air Force facility in Rome, NY, in 1994, booth hackers were made the stars of two Government Accounting Office reports on network intrusions in the Department of Defense earlier this year. The comings and goings of Datastream Cowboy also constitute the meat of Gelber and Christy's minority staff report from the Subcommittee on Investigations. Before delving into it in detail, it's interesting to read what a British newspaper published about Datastream Cowboy, a sixteen year-old, about a year before he was made the poster boy for information warfare and international hacking conspiracies in front of Congress. In a brief article, blessedly so in contrast to the reams of propaganda published on the incident for Congress, the July 5 1995 edition of The Independent wrote, "[Datastream Cowboy] appeared before Bow Street magistrates yesterday charged with unlawfully gaining access to a series of American defense computers. Richard Pryce, who was 16 at the time of the alleged offences, is accused of accessing key US Air Force systems and a network owned by Lockheed, the missile and aircraft manufacturers." Pryce, a resident of a northwest suburb of London did not enter a plea on any of 12 charges levied against him under the British Computer Misuse Act. He was arrested on May 12, 1994, by New Scotland Yard as a result of work by the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations. The Times of London reported when police came for Pryce, they found him at his PC on the third floor of his family's house. Knowing he was about to be arrested, he "curled up on the floor and cried." In Gelber and Christy's staff report, the tracking of Pryce, and to a lesser extent a collaborator called Kuji -- real name Mathew Bevan, is retold as an eight page appendix entitled "The Case Study: Rome Laboratory, Griffiss Air Force Base, NY Intrusion." Pryce's entry into Air Force computers was noticed on March 28, 1994, when personnel discovered a sniffer program he had installed on one of the Air Force systems in Rome. The Defense Information System Agency (DISA) was notified. DISA subsequently called the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) at the Air Force Information Warfare Center in San Antonio, Texas. AFOSI then sent a team to Rome to appraise the break-in, secure the system and trace those responsible. During the process, the AFOSI team discovered Datastream Cowboy had entered the Rome Air Force computers for the first time on March 25, according to the report. Passwords had been compromised, electronic mail read and deleted and unclassified "battlefield simulation" data copied off the facility. The Rome network was also used as a staging area for penetration of other systems on the Internet. AFOSI investigators initially traced the break-in back one step to the New York City provider, Mindvox. According to the Congressional report, this put the NYC provider under suspicion because "newspaper articles" said Mindvox's computer security was furnished by two "former Legion of Doom members." "The Legion of Doom is a loose-knit computer hacker group which had several members convicted for intrusions into corporate telephone switches in 1990 and 1991," wrote Gelber and Christy. AFOSI then got permission to begin monitoring -- the equivalent of wiretapping -- all communications on the Air Force network. Limited observation of other Internet providers being used during the break-in was conducted from the Rome facilities. Monitoring told the investigators the handles of hackers involved in the Rome break-in were Datastream Cowboy and Kuji. Since the monitoring was of limited value in determining the whereabouts of Datastream Cowboy and Kuji, AFOSI resorted to "their human intelligence network of informants, i.e., stool pigeons, that 'surf the Internet.' Gossip from one AFOSI 'Net stoolie uncovered that Datastream Cowboy was from Britain. The anonymous source said he had e-mail correspondence with Datastream Cowboy in which the hacker said he was a 16-year old living in England who enjoyed penetrating ".MIL" systems. Datastream Cowboy also apparently ran a bulletin board system and gave the telephone number to the AFOSI source. The Air Force team contacted New Scotland Yard and the British law enforcement agency identified the residence, the home of Richard Pryce, which corresponded to Datastream Cowboy's system phone number. English authorities began observing Pryce's phone calls and noticed he was making fraudulent use of British Telecom. In addition, whenever intrusions at the Air Force network in Rome occurred, Pryce's number was seen to be making illegal calls out of Britain. Pryce travelled everywhere on the Internet, going through South America, multiple countries in Europe and Mexico, occasionally entering the Rome network. From Air Force computers, he would enter systems at Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, and the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. Since Pryce was capturing the logins and passwords of the Air Force networks in Rome, he was then able to get into the home systems of Rome network users, defense contractors like Lockheed. By mid-April of 1994 the Air Force was monitoring other systems being used by the British hackers. On the 14th of the month, Kuji logged on to the Goddard Space Center from a system in Latvia and copied data from it to the Baltic country. According to Gelber's report, the AFOSI investigators assumed the worst, that it was a sign that someone in an eastern European country was making a grab for sensitive information. They broke the connection but not before Kuji had copied files off the Goddard system. As it turned out, the Latvian computer was just another system the British hackers were using as a stepping stone; Pryce had also used it to cover his tracks when penetrating networks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, via an intermediate system in Seattle, cyberspace.com. The next day, Kuji was again observed trying to probe various systems at NATO in Brussels and The Hague as well as Wright-Patterson. On the 19th, Pryce successfully returned to NATO systems in The Hague through Mindvox. The point Gelber and Christy seem to be trying to make is that Kuji, a 21-year old, was coaching Pryce during some of his attacks on various systems. By this point, New Scotland Yard had a search warrant for Pryce with the plan being to swoop down on him the next time he accessed the Air Force network in Rome. In April, Pryce penetrated a system on the Korean peninsula and copied material off a facility called the Korean Atomic Research Institute to an Air Force computer in Rome. At the time, the investigators had no idea whether the system was in North or South Korea. The impression created is one of hysteria and confusion at Rome. There was fear that the system, if in North Korea, would trigger an international incident, with the hack interpreted as an "aggressive act of war." The system turned out to be in South Korea. During the Korean break-in, New Scotland Yard could have intervened and arrested Pryce. However, for unknown reasons, the agency did not. Those with good memories may recall mainstream news reports concerning Pryce's hack, which was cast as an entry into sensitive North Korean networks. It's worth noting that while the story was portrayed as the work of an anonymous hacker, both the U.S. government and New Scotland Yard knew who the perpetrator was. Further, according to Gelber's report English authorities already had a search warrant for Pryce's house. Finally, on May 12 British authorities pounced. Pryce was arrested and his residence searched. He crumbled, according to the Times of London, and began to cry. Gelber and Christy write that Pryce promptly admitted to the Air Force break-ins as well as others. Pryce confessed he had copied a large program that used artificial intelligence to construct theoretical Air Orders of Battle from an Air Force computer to Mindvox and left it there because of its great size, 3-4 megabytes. Pryce paid for his Internet service with a fraudulent credit card number. At the time, the investigators were unable to find out the name and whereabouts of Kuji. A lead to an Australian underground bulletin board system failed to pan out. On June 23 of this year, Reuters reported that Kuji -- 21-year-old Mathew Bevan -- a computer technician, had been arrested and charged in connection with the 1994 Air Force break-ins in Rome. Rocker Tom Petty sang that even the losers get lucky some time. He wasn't thinking of British computer hackers but no better words could be used to describe the two Englishmen and a two year old chain of events that led to fame as international computer terrorists in front of Congress at the beginning of the summer of 1996. Lacking much evidence for the case of conspiratorial computer-waged campaigns of terror and chaos against the U.S., the makers of Congressional reports resorted to telling the same story over and over, three times in the space of the hearings on the subject. One envisions U.S. Congressmen too stupid or apathetic to complain, "Hey, didn't we get that yesterday, and the day before?" Pryce and Bevan appeared in "Security in Cyberspace" and twice in Government Accounting Office reports AIMD-96-84 and T-AIMD96-92. Jim Christy, the co-author of "Security in Cyberspace" and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations' source for the Pryce case supplied the same tale for Jack Brock, author of the GAO reports. Brock writes, ". . . Air Force officials told us that at least one of the hackers may have been working for a foreign country interested in obtaining military research data or areas in which the Air Force was conducting advanced research." It was, apparently, more wishful thinking. Notes: 1. The Federation of American Scientists has made available on its Web site electronic copies of all the reports mentioned previously. The URL is http://www.fas.org/ . The FAS Web site also features an easy to use search engine which can be used to pull up the Congressional testimony on hackers and network intrusion. These example key words are effective: "Jim Christy," "Datastream Cowboy". Crypt Newsletter 38 http://www.soci.niu.edu/~crypt ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 30 Jul 1996 16:06:06 -0500 From: Declan McCullagh Subject: File 2--Nat'l Law Journal and The Independent on CWD and net-filters Attached are portions of two articles from the National Law Journal and London's The Independent following up on the CyberWire Dispatch that Brock and I put out earlier this month on the rather unusual behavior of net-filtering software. The original CWD is at: http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/Declan_McCullagh/ http://cyberwerks.com:70/cyberwire/cwd/ (eventually) -Declan =========================================================================== The National Law Journal Monday, August 5, 1996 Page A13 By Ann Davis ...Civil libertarians are demanding to know: since when were the National Organizaton for Women or the Endangered Species Coalition in the same class as devil worshippers? How can photos posted by animal rights groups be categorized as "gross depictions"? Caught in a dragnet of blocking software are web sites on everything from the safe use of fireworks to safe sex, according to a report by the Internet-based news service CyberWire Dispatch. To blocked groups' disappointment, however, Internet legal experts say any lawsuit against private computer censors may be a losing proposition... [Mike Godwin is quoted.] ...A cyber-Deep Throat recently leaked the lists to two Internet investigative reporters, Brock N. Meeks and Declan B. McCullagh. Blacklisted sites include a Silicon Valley council of the National Rifle Association and Cyber High School, whose web address is similar to that of a gay video site... [Snapshot of CyberHigh's web page included] As a lawyer for CompuServe, Inc., Mr. Cunard meets potential legal challenges with skepticism. The free speech angle? Implausible against a private entity, he said. Discrimination claims? Difficult, unless you can prove the Internet is a place of public accomodation. Tortious interferrence? not likely, because most web site operators don't require subscriptions and therefore don't have a duty to those who access their sites. =========================================================================== The Independent (London) Monday, July 22, 1996 By Charles Arthur REAL ALE IS TOO STRONG FOR THE AMERICAN MORALISTS Programs to protect children from Net porn are keeping them out of a vast range of sites, says Charles Arthur [...] Since last July, programs such as Cyber Patrol, NetNanny and Cybersitter have sold thousands of copies. Some have distribution agreements with organisations such as BT and CompuServe. The makers boast that their products "includes a bad site list of thousands of Wed sites that are not suitable for children" and "allow parents to censor what their children access on the Internet." So far, so good - except that many of those "banned" sites include many British sources holding very useful or entirely innocent information. And the morality underlying many of the bannings is very American, and quite unlike that which a British parent might be expected to apply. Among the British sites on the World Wide Web which your child would be unable to access when using the programs are the Campaign for Real Ale (Camra), the Prison Lexicon (which provides information about penal reform), the computing department of Queen Mary and Westfield College, Imperial College, the University of Stirling, the Internet connection companies Demon and Zetnet, and Telephone Information Services - which offers weather and share reports but not sex lines. Between them, the programs prevent access to tens of thousands of sites on the Internet. But they effectively apply an American system of morals - on religion, weapons, drugs, alcohol and sex - to the data which British children might be expected to know about, or could obtain from newspapers. None of the operators of any of the sites mentioned above was aware that they were "blocked", and all were mystified by it. "Which self-selected Mary Whitehouse put us on their list?" asked Iain Lowe, research manager of Camra. In Camra's case, the answer is a team of researchers at Microsystems Software, based in Farmingham, Massachusetts, which has been selling Cyber Patrol since July 1995, and now claims 80 per cent of a fast-growing market. "Camra's site is blocked under our code for beer, alcohol, wine and tobacco," said Dick Gorgens, the company's chief executive. "It was added on June 10 when it was advertising a beer festival." Mr Lowe responded, "We don't promote underage drinking. But pubs in this country are allowed to apply for childrens' certificates: all the family can go. And we have had inquiries to our site from GCSE students doing projects on the economics of the brewing industry." Mr Gorgens denied that the program was imposing American morals onto British users. However, the panel which reviews the banning of sites includes no Britons, although it does include representatives from the National Rifle Association and the right-wing anti-pornography Morality in Media group. [...] "A close look at the actual range of sites blocked by these programs shows they go far beyond just restricting 'pornography'," said Brock Meeks, an Internet journalist and consultant who, with fellow journalist Declan McCullough, obtained a decoded list of the sites banned by the programs earlier this month, July, and revealed their indiscriminate breadth in an Internet mailing list, Cyberwire Dispatch. Steve Robinson-Grindey, who runs the Prison Lexicon site, said "It is effectively an electronic encyclopaedia of everything concerning prisons and penal affairs in England and Wales. It is extensively used by schools and universities for information. Even the People's Republic of China allow access to the site." He thought it might be banned because "obviously they rely on search words for filtering - in which case they would discover the words sex, AIDS, homosexual, and so on. But they failed to realise these words were being used in serious material." [...] ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 31 Jul 1996 18:24:14 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh Subject: File 3--ACLU warns of G-7 international net-censorship efforts ACLU Warns of Latest Government Efforts to Regulate Cyberspace; New Global Campaign Will Monitor National, International Threats FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Wednesday, July 31, 1996 NEW YORK, NY--Despite a second federal court decision affirming that censorship in cyberspace is unconstitutional, the ACLU today warned of persistent government attempts, in the U.S. and internationally, to censor electronic communications and regulate privacy technology. At a meeting in Paris yesterday of the major U.S. allies known as "G-7," government leaders announced plans to strictly regulate the Internet and other electronic communications in an effort to combat terrorism. The meeting came in the wake of the bombing incident at the Atlanta Olympics and the explosion of TWA Flight 800, which is being investigated as a possible terrorist bombing. Participants included France, Italy, Japan, Britain, Germany, Canada, Russia and the United States. Although not all details were made public, proposed measures apparently include investigations of charities and political organizations with radical political points of view -- threatening their rights to free speech -- and using the Internet to "monitor" terrorist communications. There was also agreement to adopt a U.S. plan to prohibit non-key-escrowed encryption, which would mean that individuals and companies would be barred from using encryption technology to electronically lock up their most private and sensitive information unless they make the keys available to their government. In response to these and other threats to limit Internet and electronic privacy, the Global Internet Liberty Campaign was formed last month at a meeting of the Internet Society in Montreal. The group, which announced its formation today, will work in coalition with organizations from around the world to share information and protect free speech, privacy, equality of access and liberty on the global Internet. GILC members include the ACLU, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, Human Rights Watch, the Internet Society, Privacy International, and other civil liberties and human rights organizations. The ACLU is a founding member of the group. "GILC recognizes that there are no borders in cyberspace and that decisions made by international bodies like the G-7 nations affect all Internet users," said Barry Steinhardt, associate director of the ACLU. "The U.S. government may not accomplish through an international end-run what the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Courts have rejected." Steinhardt cited a recent ruling by a panel of federal judges in New York declaring that censorship in cyberspace is unconstitutional. The decision marked another win in the ongoing battle for free speech in cyberspace, which saw its first major victory last month in ACLU v. Reno, when a Philadelphia court granted a motion for preliminary injunction on "indecency" provisions of the Communications Decency Act. The ACLU filed its challenge on February 8 of this year, the day the CDA was signed into law. "We are delighted that the New York judges have joined their Philadelphia colleagues in protecting the Internet from governmental intrusion," said Steinhardt, who testified in the Philadelphia case. "But we remain concerned about the government's continuing efforts to censor electronic speech, not only in the United States but internationally." In the U.S., Congress is now attempting to revive a proposal that would make it a felony to disseminate information on bomb- making in print, radio, television or in cyberspace. Violations would be punishable by up to 20 years in prison, a $250,000 fine, or both. "This unconstitutional bill, rightly rejected by Congress last year, would criminalize everything from a high school chemistry teacher explaining basic scientific principles, to a newspaper carrying an illustration of a bomb's construction, to a U.S. Department of Agriculture manual describing how to make fertilizer bombs for removing tree stumps," the ACLU's Steinhardt said. In addition, President Clinton this week announced an initiative to increase the powers of federal investigators, including an expanded wiretapping authority. While the ACLU has commended the Clinton Administration and law enforcement authorities for their investigation into recent tragic incidents, it urged President Clinton and Congress in a letter sent to the White House on Monday to "preserve the American spirit" by safeguarding constitutional principles. The ACLU has asked for a meeting with the President and Congressional leaders to discuss continuing civil liberties concerns in light of recent events. [Note to Editors: A temporary web page for the Global Internet Liberty Campaign has been established at < http://www.aclu.org/gilc/inde x1.html >.] -- 30 -- Contact: Emily Whitfield, (212) 944-9800 ext. 424 ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 30 Jul 1996 10:27:04 -0400 From: Bob Palacios Subject: File 4--DiFi/Barr: Terrorist Handbook on Net Excerpt of interview with Sen. Feinstein and Rep. Barr on CNN, 7/28: [Full transcript at http://prod.lexis-nexis.com/trackers/html/11000/11032.1693817.1.html] ------------------ Sen. DIANNE FEINSTEIN: .... But I'd like to say something else, and this is very disturbing. Right now on the Internet, you can take off of the Internet something called the terrorist handbook, the anarchist's cookbook, both of which have the recipe- FRANK SESNO: What you're holding is off the Internet? Sen. DIANNE FEINSTEIN: This is off the Internet. FRANK SESNO: I don't know if people can see it, but it says, 'Stuff You Are Not Supposed To Know About' right across the top there. Sen. DIANNE FEINSTEIN: Yes. 'Whether you're planning to blow up the World Trade Center or merely explode a few small devices on the White House Lawn, the terrorist handbook is an invaluable guide to having a good time.' And then it goes on and it tells you how to make a pipe bomb here with a design, with the words 'How to make a book bomb, a light bulb bomb, bombs in baby food, how to use nails and screws in bombs.' FRANK SESNO: You can also get this sort of thing in bookstores. Isn't that right? Sen. DIANNE FEINSTEIN: That's right. FRANK SESNO: What do you want to do with this? Sen. DIANNE FEINSTEIN: Well, what I want to do- and this passed the Senate again in the terrorism bill; it was taken out by the House. I have put it back in the defense authorization bill. It passed the Senate unanimously. It is now in conference, and from what I understand, some are going to try to take it out. What it would do is say, 'If you know or have reason to believe that this information will be used for criminal purposes, it is illegal to put it on.' Let me make one other point. FRANK SESNO: Quickly, because I want to get back to Congressman Barr. Sen. DIANNE FEINSTEIN: There is no legal purpose for a pipe bomb, a book bomb, a light bulb bomb. FRANK SESNO: Congressman Barr, is it time to ban this kind of document, documentation, from the Internet, from America's bookstores? Is this something that the House will now support? Rep. BOB BARR: Well, Frank, the problem is not the House. The problem is our courts. We made efforts in the telecommunications bill earlier this year to restrict certain information over the Internet, and the courts do not allow it. The problem really is working out language that meets First Amendment challenges through the courts, and that's something that we do need to work on. But it's not as simple as simply sending something o