Received: by lemuria.sai.com (/\==/\ Smail3.1.21.1 #21.11) id ; Tue, 30 Nov 93 00:22 EST Received: from vm42.cso.uiuc.edu by mv.mv.com (8.6.4/mem-931109) id AAA07732; Tue, 30 Nov 1993 00:11:08 -0500 Message-Id: <199311300511.AAA07732@mv.mv.com> Received: from VM42.CSO.UIUC.EDU by vm42.cso.uiuc.edu (IBM VM SMTP V2R2) with BSMTP id 9497; Tue, 30 Nov 93 05:04:46 UTC Received: from VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU (NJE origin MAILER@UIUCVMD) by VM42.CSO.UIUC.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 3652; Tue, 30 Nov 1993 03:08:08 +0000 Received: from VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@UIUCVMD) by VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 0114; Mon, 29 Nov 1993 21:09:23 -0600 Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1993 21:04:00 CST Reply-To: TK0JUT2@MVS.CSO.NIU.EDU Sender: CU-DIGEST list From: TK0JUT2%NIU.bitnet@VM42.CSO.UIUC.EDU Subject: Cu Digest, #5.89 To: Multiple recipients of list CUDIGEST Computer underground Digest Sun Nov 28 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 89 ISSN 1004-042X Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET) Archivist: Brendan Kehoe Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala Ian Dickinson Crappy Editor: Etaoin Shrdlu, III CONTENTS, #5.89 (Nov 28 1993) File 1--Cyberspace and Social Struggle File 2--Computers and the Poor: A Brand New Poverty File 3--A Psychopunk's Manifesto File 4--ANNOUNCEMENT: Markey Bill debuts in House File 5--Response to Steshenko case (in re CuD 5.88) File 6--What's a "CuD?" File 7--CuD has Moved to a New LISTSERV at UIUC Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are available at no cost electronically from tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu. The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-0303), fax (815-753-6302) or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL 60115. Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;" On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG; on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414) 789-4210; and on: Rune Stone BBS (IIRG WHQ) (203) 832-8441 NUP:Conspiracy; RIPCO BBS (312) 528-5020 CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from 1:11/70; unlisted nodes and points welcome. EUROPE: from the ComNet in LUXEMBOURG BBS (++352) 466893; In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-461-980493 ANONYMOUS FTP SITES: AUSTRALIA: ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2) in /pub/text/CuD. EUROPE: ftp.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud. (Finland) UNITED STATES: aql.gatech.edu (128.61.10.53) in /pub/eff/cud etext.archive.umich.edu (141.211.164.18) in /pub/CuD/cud ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/cud halcyon.com( 202.135.191.2) in /pub/mirror/cud ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud (United Kingdom) KOREA: ftp: cair.kaist.ac.kr in /doc/eff/cud COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts unless absolutely necessary. DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright protections. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 17 Nov 1993 13:57:38 U From: "Brian Martin" Subject: File 1--Cyberspace and Social Struggle Cyberspace and social struggle Computer networks have a vital role to play in struggles for a better society. They are used to send alerts about human rights violations, to mobilise opposition to vested interests and to provide information to activists opposing repressive regimes. For example, computer networks have been used for communication by the peace movement in former Yugoslavia and to organise publicity about persecution of minority groups in Iran. More generally, network means of communication, including telephone, short-wave and CB radio as well as computer networks, are generally best for a popular nonviolent resistance to aggression and repression. Fax machines were used to communicate out of China after the Beijing massacre, although the Chinese government tried to shut down dissident messages. Radio and other communications were crucial in the nonviolent resistance by the Czechoslovak people to the Soviet invasion in 1968 and in the nonviolent resistance to the coup in the Soviet Union in 1991. Mass media, by contrast, actually make it easier for an aggressor to take power; they are often the first target for takeover in a coup. These examples show the crucial importance of communications in nonviolent resistance to aggression and repression. Publicity about killings of unarmed civilians can generate enormous outrage, both in local populations and around the world. A videotape of the killings in Dili, East Timor, in 1991 made that episode into a worldwide public relations disaster for the Indonesian occupiers. On the other hand, if repression is carried out in secret, the possibility of mobilising against it is greatly reduced. Communication of accurate information is a key to the effective work of Amnesty International. There are a number of puzzles involved in making computing and telecommunications more effective for resisting repression. For example, how can computer networks be designed so that an aggressor cannot take over the master user account (for example by threatening to torture the master user)? Could a network be designed so that, in the case of emergency -- perhaps indicated when a specified number of users insert a special command within a certain time interval -- the master user's ability to shut down or monitor accounts could be terminated? Is there a good automatic way to hide, encrypt or destroy sensitive information -- for example, databases containing information on social critics -- in case of emergency or when there is unauthorised entry? Is it possible to design a telephone system so that a speaker is warned if another party is listening in on a call? Is it possible to design a telephone system in which every phone can become -- at least in emergencies -- as non-traceable as a public phone? What is the best way to design a telephone system so that user-specified encryption is standard? Could encryption be introduced across the system whenever a specified fraction of technicians (or users) signal that this is warranted? Is public key encryption, or some other system, the best way to support popular nonviolent struggles? Can computer systems be designed for factories so that production can be automatically be shut down in the face of aggression? Can cheap, durable and user-friendly packet radio systems be designed which would help democratic opposition groups in countries ruled by repressive governments? Needless to say, knowing how to organise and defend against repression is also vital if computer networks themselves come under threat. One of the best ways to defend the autonomy of cyberspace is to build alliances with many other groups opposing centralised control over communications. I am engaged on a study of science and technology for nonviolent struggle, in collaboration with Mary Cawte. We would appreciate advice on the above questions and related ones. Brian Martin Department of Science and Technology Studies University of Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia phone: +61-42-287860 home, +61-42-213763 work fax: +61-42-213452 e-mail: b.martin@uow.edu.au SELECTED REFERENCES Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack. War Without Weapons: Non-violence in National Defence (London: Frances Pinter, 1974). Johan Galtung. Peace, War and Defense. Essays in Peace Research, Volume Two (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1976). Brian Martin. Social Defence, Social Change (London: Freedom Press, 1993). Schweik Action Wollongong. "Telecommunications for nonviolent struggle," Civilian-Based Defense: News & Opinion, Vol. 7, No. 6, August 1992, pp. 7-10. (Ideas and some passages in this note are taken from this article, which is available electronically on request.) Gene Sharp. The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973). ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 17 Nov 1993 10:12:10 -0800 From: "James I. Davis" Subject: File 2--Computers and the Poor: A Brand New Poverty COMPUTERS AND THE POOR: A BRAND NEW POVERTY (reprinted from _The CPSR Newsletter_, Fall, 1993) According to the 1993 U.S. Census report, released in early October, more Americans live in poverty than at any time since the early 1960's. In the 1980's, according to _Business Week_, U.S. companies poured $1 trillion into computer technology. Poverty and the computer revolution may seem at opposite poles of contemporary life. The pervasiveness of computers, though, links the two at many levels. The connection may be the more obvious interaction with the computerized welfare office, dealings with an increasingly computerized police force, or being left out of the "technology future" for want of a decent education or access to equipment. Or the connection may be the more subtle, but perhaps more profound, connecting tissue of computers and the economy. We are well underway in a radical reorganization of the world economy made possible by computer technology. The host of new technologies which are also bound up with this process -- digital telecommunication, biotechnology, new "smart" materials, robotics, high-speed transportation, etc. -- would not be possible without the capabilities of computers to analyze, sort, and process vast amounts of data. These technologies have made global production serving a global market possible, the nature of which the we have never before seen. It is feasible and economic to have design done in Silicon Valley, manufacturing done in Singapore or Ireland, and have the resulting products air-shipped to markets again thousands of miles away. Along with global production and global consumption, we also have a new global labor market. U.S. workers compete against Mexican or Thai or Russian workers for all kinds of jobs -- not just traditional manufacturing and agriculture jobs, but also software design and data analysis -- and capital enjoys remarkable fluidity as it seeks out the lowest costs and the highest returns. With networking, robotics, and information-based production, fewer people are needed to work in contemporary industry. New terms emerge in management-speak to accommodate the reorganization of production around the new technologies: the "virtual corporation" focuses on "core competencies", requiring a vastly reduced full- time workforce of "core staff." "Contingent workers", "consultants", and "independent contractors" absorb the shocks of economic expansion and contraction. The bastion of stable jobs, those Fortune 500 companies that could promise steady employment, generous benefits and a secure retirement are "restructuring," or "downsizing" at a dramatic pace. According to a recent _Harper's_ article, Fortune 500 companies have shed 4.4 million jobs over the past 14 years. Even the computer industry is not immune, as the implosion at IBM testifies -- since 1985, it has shrunk from 405,000 employees to 250,000. The global economic restructuring shows up as a declining wages for American workers (down 11% since 1970), with more people working at temporary jobs with fewer benefits. The economy is failing to create well-paying jobs for semi- and un-skilled workers. Parallel to this restructuring , we are witnessing a dramatic polarization of wealth and poverty in the U.S. And in the Third World, the situation is much, much more extreme. A BRAND NEW POVERTY It makes no sense to think about poverty today outside of these profound changes in the economy. Thomas Hirschl, a sociologist at Cornell University, argues that poverty in the 1990's has a distinctly different cast than poverty in the 1960's, when most of the government programs dealing with poverty were designed. In "Electronics, Permanent Unemployment and State Policy", Hirschl sees "a qualitative difference regarding the social dynamics associated with poverty in the contemporary United States." He proposes that "a new type of poverty will develop in response to the widespread use of labor-replacing electronic technology." People "caught up in this new type of poverty may ultimately form a new social class" that creates "qualitatively new challenges for state policy." Hirschl goes on to observe that we have moved past the "post- industrial" economy, and are now settling into a "post-service" economy. Labor-replacing technology, as it becomes more efficient and cheaper, invades the realm of service industries, across the board, from investment counseling to Taco Bells and cleaning services. So the pressure is on up and down the line, from executives to the least skilled clerk. We see not just "increases in the section of the economically marginalized population obtaining poverty or near-poverty incomes," but also a growth of even more unfortunates -- a "destitute, economically inactive population," writes Hirschl. "The theory of the post-service economy predicts that, over time, increasing numbers of workers will lose all economic connection to production , and join the ranks of the destitute... Attempts to secure economic resources directly from the post-service economy will be blocked by the state." PROFOUND CONSEQUENCES Short of some radical restructuring of society that accepts that work, as traditionally conceived, can no longer be the measure of how necessities will be distributed, the government's ability to respond is constricted. One growing trend has been to cut the poor loose, by cutting benefits and public services. Michigan completely eliminated its General Assistance (GA) program for indigent adults in 1991, and other states have considered similar steps. California has cut the welfare grant to families with children each year for the last three consecutive years, and in the most recent state budget, opened the door to counties dramatically reducing their GA programs. (GA is mandated by the state, but paid for and run by counties.) A totally marginalized population desperate to survive will do so by any means, whether legal, semi-legal or illegal. So police technology is enhanced, even militarized, to contain the social breakdown. It is foolish to consider the 1992 rebellion in Los Angeles apart from 100,000+ jobs lost in Los Angeles in the past three years. Or not to recognize the growth in prisons, prison technology (assembly line prison manufacture, automated prisons, high-tech ankle bracelets to track movement) and the prison population -- mostly a result of participating in one of the only viable job-schemes available to impoverished youth, illegal drug distribution -- as inextricably linked to the economy, and through the economy, to the technology revolution. The whole thing turns in and back on itself when the technology revolution is directly applied to tagging, tracking and tasering what can only be described as a social revolution. TIGHTENING THE SCREWS The police collection of massive databases in Los Angeles (150,000 files of mostly youth over the past five years) under the pretext of containing gangs is only possible via computer technology. In welfare offices in California, it is becoming increasingly common to electronically fingerprint welfare recipients. Los Angeles has been fingerprinting GA recipients since 1991, and has a pilot plan to extend the system to welfare mothers and their kids, adding 300,000 more sets of digital fingerprints to their files. That pilot program will likely be extended across the state, and since AFDC is a federally-mandated program, will quite likely be adopted nationally, unless public pressure stops it. San Francisco has a measure on the November ballot to give the green light to electronically fingerprint GA recipients there [Ed. note - the measure passed]. While social service agencies try to assure the public that this information will not be shared with police, California state law does provide a mechanism whereby police can obtain information on welfare clients; and nothing precludes confidentiality laws from being changed. Electronic fingerprints then become a common, unique digital link between welfare and police computer systems. Political support -- both for cutting government aid in a time of increasing need, and for extending the use of computer technology to tracking and controlling people -- is mobilized by fear of crime, and by the potent spectre of "welfare fraud." While the most callous could rationalize this use of technology by saying that "it won't happen to me", oftentimes the results do come back to haunt the rest of the population. For example, as Jeffrey Rothfeder describes in _Privacy for Sale_, computer-matching of databases, where government agencies go on data fishing expeditions by matching unrelated databases, gained a foothold in the late 1970's under the pretext of catching "welfare fraud." A House of Representatives staff member told Rothfeder that "anything that promises to catch welfare cheats doesn't get a lot of objections." After the precedent was set for welfare recipients, the use of matching was extended to other groups, and has subsequently been used on everyone who files a tax return. ABANDON ALL RIGHTS, YE WHO PASS THROUGH THESE GATES Privacy, as a right and privilege, is an unknown for people on welfare. As a condition of receiving assistance, recipients are required to sign forms that basically open their lives to the government. Bank accounts, homes, and personal history are open to welfare investigators on the lookout for "welfare fraud." While proposals to deliver welfare benefits electronically, via ATM cards, has some decided benefits for welfare recipients, including increased flexibility and security, it also poses serious risks. When food "stamps" are delivered electronically, for example, the potential for tracking purchases and comparing them with other welfare data becomes a possibility. (Never mind the headaches when the computer system goes down, as it did twice in Maryland's pilot program in May, 1992, meaning that food stamp recipients were unable to buy groceries.) Computers are more likely to be used, by the police or the welfare agency, _against_ a poor person; than they are to be used _by_ a poor person. The cost of the equipment, software and services is one obvious barrier. The limited access to computers in underfunded schools in poor neighborhoods is another. _Macworld_'s special education issue a few years ago dramatically pointed out the inequity by comparing a school in East Palo Alto ("a poor minority blip on Silicon Valley's wealthy white screen") and another in well-to-do Palo Alto, just a few miles away. The number of usable computers in the East Palo Alto school is one for every 60 students, as compared to one for every 9 students in the Palo Alto school. As government services have been reduced, the poor are most affected. The transformation of information into a commodity item over the past few decades has paralleled the defunding of public libraries, museums, schools, and other programs that delivered information and skills to people regardless of ability to pay. Once the barrier of an admission price is raised, those with no money are effectively excluded. Mike Davis, who has written extensively on social trends in Los Angeles, describes this process of a developing information apartheid in a remarkable essay "Beyond Blade Runner: Urban Control, the Ecology of Fear": [T]he city redoubles itself through the complex architecture of its information and media networks. Perhaps 3-dimensional computer interfaces will allow [people] to stroll though this luminous geometry of this mnemonic city... If so, _urban cyberspace_ -- as the simulation of the city's information order -- will be experienced as even more segregated, and devoid of true public space, that the traditional built city. Southcentral L.A., for instance, is a data and media black hole, without local cable programming or links to major data systems. Just as it became a housing/jobs ghetto in the early twentieth century industrial city, it is now evolving into an _electronic ghetto_ within the emerging _information city_. WHAT CAN A PERSON DO Computer professionals are obviously concerned about these issues, as the impromptu gathering at 1992's SIGCHI, initiated by CPSR members, signifies. In the wake of the L.A. rebellion, several hundred people gathered to discuss the basic question, "what can I do?" There are both defensive and offensive steps that people could take. One step would be to place the same emphasis on challenging police technology as CPSR did for military technology (and in many cases, it's the same technology being turned home). Slowing the destruction of the information commons, by promoting the preservation of intellectual achievements as a public treasury will help ensure that people still have access to information. Otherwise, all information will disappear into "pay-per" private reserves, and those without resources will be effectively excluded from the information society. We need to promote equity of access to information. This includes work that's being done around civic networks (e.g., the Seattle Community Network and the host of FreeNets), equitable access to the Internet, access to education, extension of free public library services, and community-based computing. And why not begin to consider the distribution of basic computer technology to every household? We also need to support an international information infrastructure that serves the underdeveloped world, not exploits it. In the discussion of a national information infrastructure, it is critical that we don't lose sight of the needs of a population that, as one recent U.S. study indicated, does not have the math or reading skills to carry out basic daily activities like using a bus schedule. The national information infrastructure, now and in the future, rests on a foundation of education -- on the ability to acquire, process and generate information. Without ensuring basic educational skills for all, we will effectively relegate substantial sections of the population to barren information- Bantustans. Beyond this, a really visionary leap would be to take up the profound challenge of what technology makes possible, and to conceive of what kind of social order can make the optimum use of it for all. Crisis? Opportunity. Jim Davis Western Regional Director CPSR ------------------------------ Subject: File 3--A Psychopunk's Manifesto From: nagap@MINDVOX.PHANTOM.COM(Michael Roberts) Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 22:20:11 EST A Psychopunk's Manifesto by T.C. Hughes Honesty is necessary for an open society in the electronic age. Pseudospoofing is dishonesty. A pseudonym is something one doesn't want the whole world to know, and anonymity is something one doesn't want anybody to know. Pseudoanonymity is the power to selectively reveal oneself to the world. If two thieves have some sort of dealings, then each has a memory of their interaction. Each criminal can confess about their own memory of this; how could anyone prevent it? One could criticize laws against it, but the freedom of collusion, even more than pseudospoofing, is fundamental to a criminal; we seek not to restrict any criminality at all. If many criminals speak together in the same forum, each can speak to all the others and aggregate together knowledge about individuals and other parties. The holes in the Internet have enabled such group collusions, and it will not go away merely because we might want it to. Since we desire black markets, we must ensure that each party to a transaction have knowledge only of that which is directly necessary for that transaction. Since any information can be spoken of, we must ensure that we reveal as little as possible. In most cases personal identity is not salient. When I purchase a magazine at a store and hand cash to the clerk, there is no need to know who I am. When I ask my electronic mail provider to send and receive messages, my provider need not know to whom I am speaking or what I am saying or what others are saying to me; my provider only need know how to get the message there and how much I owe them in fees. When my identity is revealed by the underlying mechanism of the transaction, I have no secrecy. I cannot here selectively reveal myself; I must _always_ reveal myself. Therefore, pseudospoofing in an open society requires pseudoanonymous transaction systems. Until now, cash has been the primary such system. A pseudoanonymous transaction system is not an honest transaction system. A pseudoanonymous system empowers individuals to reveal their identity when desired and only when desired; this is the essence of criminality. Honesty in an open society also requires identification. If I say something, I want it heard only by those for whom I intend it. If the content of my speech is available to the world, I have no privacy. To speak is to indicate the desire for privacy, and to speak on the Internet is to indicate not too much desire for privacy. Furthermore, to conceal one's identity with assurance when the default is True Names requires the Internet. We cannot expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless organizations to grant us embezzlement out of their beneficence. It is to their advantage to repress us, and we should expect that they will try. To try to prevent their restrictions is to fight against the realities of cyberspace. Evil does not just want to be free, it longs to be free. Criminality expands to fill the available storage space. Criminality is Conspiracy's younger, stronger cousin; Criminality is fleeter of foot, has more eyes, knows more, and understands less than Conspiracy. We must defend our own conspiracy if we expect to have any. We must come together and create systems which allow pseudoanonymous transactions to take place. People have been defending their own conspiracies for centuries with whispers, darkness, envelopes, closed doors, secret handshakes, and couriers. The technologies of the past did not allow for strong conspiracies, but electronic technologies do. We the psychopunks are dedicated to building pseudoanonymous systems. We are defending our criminality with cryptography, with anonymous mail forwarding systems, with digital signatures, and with electronic money. Psychopunks write code. We know that someone has to write software to defend criminality, and since we can't get perverted unless we all do, we're going to write it. We publish our code so that our fellow psychopunks may practice and play with it. Our code is barred for all to use, worldwide. We don't much care if you don't approve of the software we write. We know that software can't be destroyed and that a widely dispersed system can't be shut down. Criminals deplore regulations on criminality, for criminality is fundamentally a private act. The act of corruption, in fact, removes information from the public realm. Even laws against conspiracies reach only so far as a nation's border and the arm of its enforcement. Criminality will ineluctably spread over the whole globe, and with it the dishonest transactions systems that it makes possible. For a conspiracy to be widespread it must be part of a social contract. People must come and together deploy these systems for the common evil. Secrecy only extends so far as the collusions of one's accomplices in private. We the psychopunks ignore your questions and your concerns and hope we may deceive you so that we do not get caught ourselves. We will not, however, be moved out of our course because some may disagree with our goals. The psychopunks are actively engaged in making the networks safer for criminality. Let us proceed together apace. Onward. T.C. Hughes 16 Nov 1993 ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 23 Nov 1993 17:53:23 -0500 (EST) From: Stanton McCandlish Subject: File 4--ANNOUNCEMENT: Markey Bill debuts in House Reps. Markey and Fields Introduce H.R. 3636, the "National Communications Competition and Information Infrastructure Act of 1993": EFF Applauds Inclusion of Open Platform Provisions On Monday, November 22, 1993, EFF applauded House Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee Chairman Edward Markey (D-Mass.), Minority Chairman Jack Fields (R-Tex.), and other cosponsors for introducing the "National Communications Competition and Information Infrastructure Act of 1993." The Markey/Fields legislation, which incorporates EFF's Open Platform philosophy, is built on three concepts: open platform services, the entry of telephone companies into video cable service, and universal service. Reacting to the open platform provisions, Mitchell Kapor, EFF Board Chairman, stated: "The sponsors of this bill are to be commended for proposing legislation that incorporates a truly democratic vision of the emerging data highway. Open platform service can end channel scarcity once and for all and make it possible for any information provider to offer voice, data, and video services on the data highway. Every citizen will be able to access a true diversity of information and programming." EFF Executive Director Jerry Berman added that "we believe public interest and nonprofit groups, as well as computer and communications industry leaders will work very hard for the open platform provisions. Our goal is to keep them in the bill and make them even stronger before its enactment." BELOW, EFF BRIEFLY SUMMARIZES THE BILL'S PROVISIONS RELATING TO OPEN PLATFORM SERVICES, THE ENTRY OF TELEPHONE COMPANIES INTO VIDEO CABLE SERVICE, AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE. AN EFF ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE BILL ON PUBLIC INTEREST GOALS OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE, COMMON CARRIAGE, AND CONSUMER EQUITY WILL BE RELEASED AS SOON AS IT IS COMPLETED. OPEN PLATFORM Under the Markey/Fields bill, open platform service is designed to give residential subscribers access to voice, data, and video digital telephone service on a switched, end-to-end basis. Information of the customer's choosing would be transmitted to points specified by the customer. The bill directs the Federal Communications Commission to investigate the policy changes needed to provide open platform service at affordable rates. To ensure affordability, open platform service would be tariffed at reasonable rates. ENTRY OF TELEPHONE COMPANIES INTO VIDEO CABLE SERVICE The bill promotes the entry of telephone companies into video cable service and seeks to benefit consumers by spurring competition in the local telephone and cable television industries. The bill envisions that telephone companies, cable companies, and others will be interconnected and have equal access to facilities of the local telephone companies. The bill would rescind the ban on telephone company ownership and delivery of video programming that was enacted in the Cable Act of 1984. Telephone companies would be allowed to provide video programming, through a separate subsidiary, to subscribers in its telephone service area. Telephone companies would be required to establish a "video platform" upon which to offer their video programming. Telephone companies, on a nondiscriminatory basis, would be required to allow other providers to offer video programming to subscribers using the same video platform. Other providers would be allowed to use up to 75 percent of the video platform capacity. Telephone companies would be prohibited from buying cable systems within their telephone service territory, with only tightly drawn exceptions. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) would be required to establish rules for compensating local telephone companies for providing interconnection and equal access. UNIVERSAL SERVICE To ensure that universal digital services are available to residential subscribers at affordable rates as local telephone service becomes more competitive, the Markey/Fields bill would establish a joint Federal-State Board to perpetuate universal provision of high-quality telephone service. The Board would be required to define the nature and extent of the services encompassed within a telephone company's universal service obligation. The Board also would be charged with promoting access to advanced telecommunications technology. The FCC is required to prescribe standards necessary to ensure that advances in network capabilities and services deployed by common carriers are designed to be accessible to individuals with disabilities, unless an undue burden is posed by such requirements. Additionally, within one year of enactment, the bill requires the FCC to initiate an inquiry to examine the effects of competition in the provision of both telephone exchange access and telephone exchange service furnished by rural carriers. Mary Beth Arnett Staff Counsel Electronic Frontier Foundation 1001 G Street, NW Suite 950 East Washington, DC 20001 (202) 347-5400 VOICE (202) 393-5509 FAX ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 22 Nov 1993 03:27:46 -0600 From: Anon by Request Subject: File 5--Response to Steshenko case (in re CuD 5.88) ((MODERATORS' NOTE: The following poster, a student at UTD, requested anonymity because of his position. In a new CuD policy, we will begin using the CuD address as the return path instead of our past "pseudo-path.")). It would seem to me that Steshenko has violated his contract with UTD. The document we have to sign in order to get an account makes it clear that the system is to be used for educational purposes only, and that we are subject to account cancellation if we abuse privileges... Steshenko may feel that this in violation of free speech, but where does it say that a guaranteed right to speak is the same as the right to be heard? Most of us students pay $45 a semester for an account, although that number changes with every tuition hike, and that all goes toward upkeep of system resources. We have disk quotas in effect that restrict the average user to 1.5 megabytes of personal space, and yet we still run out of room occasionally because of system load. Steshenko can not expect to get away with using system resources in frivolous flame-attacks or whatever, especially when it potentially takes necessary processing capability away from essential work. Why does he think he can get away from this at a government-run facility, when he couldn't at Microsoft? And why has he brought suit against UTD instead of Microsoft? If he were a career flame-baiter, then perhaps removing his ability to flamebait would be depriving him of his livelihood, but I don't see any 'clients' of his unhappy that he can't continue doing this. If Steshenko wanted to access Usenet for free, he could join one of the local 'freenet'-type boards that run on donations. My totally subjective analysis tells me that this is not a free speech issue at all, but just an extortion attempt. ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 27 Nov 1993 21:31:41 EST From: CuD Moderators Subject: File 6--What's a "CuD?" We enjoy the one line descriptions of CuD that are sent to us or that we come across in the media. Some are blatantly clueless, others are clever, and some are priceless. Thought we'd print a few here. If readers comes across (or can think of) others, we'll compile them for the FAQ list and perhaps run them on occasion in the banner. A few that strike us as noteworthy describe CuD as: 1. A hacksymp underground magazine (Village Voice) 2. The USA Today of cyberspace (Andy Hawkes' e-zine list description) 3. A computer bulletin board for hackers (attorney handbook) 4. A meanspirited, hacker-pandering newsletter (noted prosecutor) 5. A feminist-dominated lesbi-nazi rag that has outlived it's usefulness (sub-cancelling reader offended by special issue on nets-and-gender) But, the latest that still has us ROTFL is from Brian Vastag: COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST...THE BATHROOM BOOK FOR YOUR CPU. ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 28 Nov 1993 15:18:45 CST From: CuD Moderators Subject: File 7--CuD has Moved to a New LISTSERV at UIUC Beginning with this issue, CuD is moving over to the listserv at University of Illinois, U/C (UIUCVMD). The advantages are that the site is nearer, which facilitates distribution, and the system is larger and distribution is less-likely to jam the system with the growing mailing list (that has increased by about 70 a month since the summer). The listserv will be non-interactive, which means that, if we have set it up correctly, replies to CuD will return only to us, rather than be redistributed to the entire list. Although readers on occasion suggest an interactive supplement to facilitate discussions, we still are not convinced that this is necessary, because the discussions would duplicate what currently exists in other groups. SUBSCRIPTIONS for CuD should continue to come directly to the CuD editors at tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu, and sub requests sent to the listserv will be forwarded to us here. For logistical convenience, we prefer manual management of the list. We are indebted to David Jelenik at Central Michigan University and his crew who have been helpful, patient, and generous in their support. And, we (as well as the NIU sysads) are grateful to Charlie Kline and Mark Zinzow at UIUC for their patience in helping us set it all up at the new site. They all typify the cooperative nature of cyberspace, and their efforts contribute to the community spirit and remind us of our collective obligation to make it a more civilized domain than its more corporeal counterpart. If you notice any major problems in distribution, please let us (and not the listserv) know. ------------------------------ End of Computer Underground Digest #5..89 ************************************