THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN UNDERGROUND COMPUTING / Published Quarterly =================================================================== ISSN 1074-3111 Volume One, Issue One March 19, 1994 =================================================================== Editor-in-Chief: Scott Davis NetSurfer: John Logan It's A Conspiracy!: Gordon Fagan E-Mail - editors@fennec.com ** ftp site: etext.archive.umich.edu /pub/Zines/JAUC U.S. Mail: The Journal Of American Underground Computing 10111 N. Lamar #25 Austin, Texas 78753 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% To Subscribe to "TJOAUC", send mail to: sub@fennec.com All questions/comments about this publication to: comments@fennec.com Send all articles/info that you want published to: submit@fennec.com Commercial Registration for Profitable Media: form1@fennec.com "The underground press serves as the only effective counter to a growing power, and more sophisticated techniques used by establishment mass media to falsify, misrepresent, misquote, rule out of consideration as a priori ridiculous, or simply ignore and blot out of existence: data, books, discoveries that they consider prejudicial to establishment interest..." (William S. Burroughs and Daniel Odier, "The Job", Viking, New York, 1989) %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Contents Copyright (C) 1994 The Journal Of American Underground Computing and/or the author of the articles presented herein. All rights reserved. Nothing may be reproduced in whole or in part without written permission of the Editor-In-Chief and/or the author of the article. This publication is made available quarterly to the amateur computer hobbyist free of charge. Any commercial usage (electronic or otherwise) is strictly prohibited without prior consent of the Editor, and is in violation of applicable US Copyright laws. To subscribe, send email to sub@fennec.com %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% DISCLAIMER AND NOTICE TO DISTRIBUTORS - NOTE: This electronic publication is to be distributed free of charge without modifications to anyone who wishes to have a copy. Under NO circumstances is any issue of this publication, in part or in whole, to be sold for money or services, nor is it to be packaged with other computer software, including, but not limited to CD Rom disks, without the express written or verbal consent of the author and/or editor. To obtain permission to distribute this publication under any of the certain circumstances stated above, please contact the editor at one of the addresses above. If you have intentions of publishing this journal in any of the ways described above, or you are in doubt about whether or not your intentions conflict with the restrictions, please contact the editor. FOR A COPY OF THE REGISTRATION FORM, MAIL - form1@fennec.com This publication is provided without charge to anyone who wants it. This includes, but is not limited to lawyers, government officials, cops, feds, hackers, social deviants, and computer hobbyists. If anyone asks for a copy, please provide them with one, or mail the subscription list so that you may be added. The articles and information printed herein are the property of the author and / or The Journal Of American Underground Computing. An electronic mail address of the author will be provided when made available to us so that you can contact the author with your comments. No article in this publication can be reprinted without the permission of the author / editor. Any attempt to do so will be in direct violation of United States Copyright laws. Any attempt to sell this publication in part or in whole, on CD Rom or while packaged with any other software bundle without the express consent of the editor is also a direct violation of United States Copyright laws. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN UNDERGROUND COMPUTING - Volume 1, Issue 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1) Introduction To TJOAUC Editors 2) Control Of Information In The Mass Media Gordon Fagan 3) Some Thoughts On Clipper, NSA, ... Jim Bidzos 4) CIA Corrupt, Stupid, Should Be Abolished Mark Lane 5) Legion Of Doom T-Shirts...get 'em!! Chris Goggans %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Introduction To The Journal Of American Underground Computing By The Editors (editors@fennec.com) First of all, I want to personally thank you for taking the time to read this electronic publication. The editors of this publication had a large hand in The World View Magazine, a publication that became defunct as of January 1, 1993. We had become stagnant with that publication, so we jointly agreed to ditch it. Since then, we have received hundreds of subscription requests for the magazine. After consulting with each other for several months, we have decided to do a "new-and-improved" version of that popular magazine...but under a different name. And in a more official capacity I might add. So here it is...Issue one, Volume one. The format for this magazine is totally undefined. The decision to do it this way is better than focusing on a certain area in the sense that we can cover anything and everything...and people will not be suprised when they see an article that is "out of character". Also, I hope that it will inspire people to write about whatever they feel intimate with...be it politics, computer networking, hacking, etc...or any remote aspect of such topics. So please read on, and keep in mind that we encourage you to comment on anything you agree with, disagree with, like, dislike, etc...we will print comments like that. Your input is necessary. Thanks for reading, and enjoy. A special thanks goes to "The Spotlight", a weekly publication in our nation's capital for permission to reprint, etc...Thanks to Don Markey! Editors %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% CONTROL OF INFORMATION IN THE MASS MEDIA By Gordon Fagan (fagang@ccmail.us.dell.com) The Public's right to know is not always what the Public ends up getting. The Public frequently gets one-sided, biased information and not just from the mass media. It's easy to have a long arm that protects the special interest groups: this kind of a "one world family" of insiders that is capable of affecting federal judges, U.S. attorneys, to slant or obstruct justice, to hide or cover up crucial information, and to interfere with our liberties. There has been a major campaign on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency to place Central Intelligence Agency agents, in various news media posts. Documents have been found on this. It was called "Operation Mocking Bird". They placed operatives in places like TIME Magazine and LIFE Magazine, the New York Times, inside CBS and ABC News. The National Student Association and other student groups were also targeted. Originally, the intent of "Operation Mocking Bird" was to make certain that these major media outlets and student organizations reflected an adequately anti-communist perspective. And then, of course, as they became entrenched and in-place, any time the Central Intelligence Agency wanted a story killed or distorted they would contact their agents inside. They have bragged openly in private memos back and forth inside the Agency about how proud they are of having very important "assets" inside virtually every major news media in the United States. For example, the Chief National Security Correspondent for TIME Magazine, Bruce Van Voorst, is a regular Central Intelligence Agency officer. It turns out that Ben Bradlee from the Washington Post was a regular Central Intelligence Agency officer prior to coming to his post at the Washington Post. Bob Woodward at the Washington Post was the Point-Briefer for U.S. Naval Intelligence of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff before he went over to the Washington Post. What we're told in the media (and what we're told officially from Government sources) and what is the truth are frequently at varying degrees against each other. We find these people constantly in the news media. When the New York Times was refusing to print any information about Oliver North, Richard Secord, Albert Hakim and Rob Owen, and all of the other men who, throughout 1985 and 1986, were engaged in a massive criminal conspiracy to violate the Boland Amendment prohibiting any weapons shipments to the Contras, and who were involved in smuggling TOW missiles to Iran. Keith Schneider, who was one of the reporters assigned to look into the issue, said that the Times was refusing to print any of it because their high-level sources inside the Central Intelligence Agency refused to confirm the stories. This kind of relationship between self-conscious "assets" of the Covert Operations Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is a political police force on an international level to protect the ostensible economic interests of United States industries by placing these people inside a news media which, under the First Amendment, ostensibly has the responsibility to critique and investigate potential injustices on the part of the State, inside the Government is an extraordinarily dangerous development here in the United States. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Article printed with permission of the author, Jim Bidzos Jim Bidzos is the President and CEO of RSA Data Security, and is a well respected authority in the area of security and encryption. SOME THOUGHTS ON CLIPPER, NSA, AND ONE KEY ESCROW ALTERNATIVE By Jim Bidzos (bidzos@rsa.com) In a recent editorial, Dr. Dorothy Denning of Georgtown University argued in support of the U.S. government's proposed Clipper Chip, a security device that would allow law enforcement to decipher the communications of users of such devices. Dr. Denning attempts to argue that Clipper is necessary for law enforcement agencies to be able to do their job. I'm not going to argue that one; there are plenty of people who can argue that compromising privacy for all citizens in order to aid law enforcement is a bad idea more effectively than I, particularly in the Clipper case, where the arguments from law enforcement are dubious at best. (The current justification is inadequate; there may be better reasons, from a law enforcement perspective, but we haven't heard them yet.) Without doubt, law enforcement and intelligence are huge stakeholders in the debate over encryption. But every individual and corporation in the U.S. must be included as well. Are NSA's actions really in the best interests of all the stakeholders? Are there alternatives to the current key escrow program? If one steps back and looks at what has happened over the last few years, one might well question the government's approach with Clipper, if not its motivation, for dealing with this problem. (I believe it may even be possible to conclude that Clipper is the visible portion of a large-scale covert operation on U.S. soil by NSA, the National Security Agency.) Over a number of years, through their subversion of the Commerce Department (who should be championing the causes of U.S. industry, not the intelligence agencies), NSA has managed to put many U.S. government resources normally beyond their control, both legally and practically, to work on their program of making U.S. and international communications accessible. The first step was the MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) between the Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Defense Department's NSA. This document appears to contravene the provisions of the Computer Security Act of 1987, the intent of which was to give NIST control over crypto standards-making for the unclassified government and commercial sectors. The MOU essentially gave NSA a veto over any proposals for crypto standards by NIST. By using the standards making authority of NIST, NSA is attempting to force the entire U.S. government to purchase Clipper equipment since only NIST-standard equipment may be purchased by government agencies. This purchasing power can then be used to force U.S. manufacturers to build Clipper products or risk losing government business. (GSA is currently questioning NSA's authority to control government-wide procurement, and should continue to do so.) This of course not only subsidizes Clipper products, but could make Clipper a de facto standard if the costs associated with alternatives are too high. These costs to industry, of ignoring Clipper, come in the form of lost government market share, costly support for multiple versions of incompatible products, and non-exportability of non-Clipper products. It also appears that NSA is desperately seeking a digital signature standard that would force users to take that signature capability wrapped up with a Clipper chip. If this is the case, as it appears to be, then NSA has is trying to use what is probably the most powerful business tool of the information age as a means to deny us its benefits unless we subsidize and accept Clipper in the process. This would, if true, be an unprecedented abuse of government power to influence U.S. industry and control individual privacy. (Clipper is part of a chip called Capstone, which is where their proposed digital signature standard would be used.) The overall cost of these policies is unknown. We only know that NSA has spent a considerable amount of money on the program directly. Other costs are not so obvious. They are: - A burdened U.S. industry, which will have to build multiple products or more expensive products that support multiple techniques; - A low-intensity "trade war" with the rest of the world over encryption; - Lost sales to U.S. companies, since international buyers will surely go to non-U.S. suppliers for non- Clipper encryption, as may buyers in the U.S.; - Potential abuses by government and loss of privacy for all citizens. Does NSA truly believe they can displace other methods with Clipper? With over three million licensed, documented RSA products, the technology they feel threatened by, in use in the U.S. today? Not likely; therefore, they have already decided that these costs are acceptable even if they only delay the inevitable, and that U.S. industry and U.S. taxpayers should bear these costs, whatever they are. This policy was apparently developed by unelected people who operate without oversight or accountability. Does the White House really support this policy? It has been reported that NSA is attempting to gain support from foreign governments for escrow technology, especially if "local control" is provided. Even if NSA can convince their sister organizations around the world to support key escrow (by offering Clipper technology with a do-your-own-escrow option), will these other organizations succeed in selling it to their government, industry and citizens? Most countries around the world have much stronger privacy laws and a longer history of individual privacy than the U.S. WHY AGAIN WHEN IT DIDN'T WORK THE FIRST TIME? Many seem to have forgotten or are not aware that the Clipper program is not new, and it's also not the first time NSA has attempted to force communications security on U.S. industry that it could compromise. In the mid-80's, NSA introduced a program called the Commercial COMSEC Endorsement Program, or CCEP. CCEP was essentially Clipper in a black box, since the technology was not sufficiently advanced to build lower-cost chips. Vendors would join CCEP (with the proper security clearances) and be authorized to incorporate classified algorithms into communications systems. NSA had proposed that they themselves would actually provide the keys to end-users of such systems. The new twist is access by key escrow. To see how little things have changed, consider this quote: "...RSA Data Security, Inc. asserts that since CCEP-2 is not published and therefore cannot be inspected by third parties, the NSA could put a 'trap door' in the algorithm that would enable the agency to inspect information transmitted by the private sector. When contacted, NSA representative Cynthia Beck said that it was the agency's policy not to comment on such matters." That was in 1987. ("The Federal Snags in Encryption Technology," Computer and Communications Decisions, July 1987, pp. 58-60.) To understand NSA's thinking, and the danger of their policies, consider the reply of a senior NSA official when he was asked by a reporter for the Wall Street Journal if NSA, through the CCEP program, could read anyone's communications: "Technically, if someone bought our device and we made the keys and made a copy, sure we could listen in. But we have better things to do with our time." (The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 1988, page 1, column 1, "A Supersecret Agency Finds Selling Secrecy to Others Isn't Easy," by Bob Davis.) Another NSA official, in the same Journal story, said "The American Public has no problem with relying on us to provide the technology that prevents the unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons. If you trust us to protect against that, you can trust us to protect private records." Remember that the Cold War was still on at that time. Law enforcement and intelligence gathering are certainly impeded by the use of cryptography. There are certainly legitimate concerns that these interests have. But is the current approach really the way to gain support from industry and the public? People with a strong military and intelligence bias are making all the decisions. There seem to be better ways to strike a balance. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL One approach would be to have NIST develop a standard with three levels. The first level could specify the use of public-key for key management and signatures without any key escrow. There could be a "Level II" compliance that adds government key escrow to message preparation. "Level III" could be key escrow controlled by the user, typically a corporation. Would this work? The first level, meeting the standard by itself, would back up the government's claim that key escrow is voluntary; if I want privacy and authentication without key escrow, then I can have it, as the government has claimed I can. Actions speak louder than words. Why would any vendors support Level II? There would be several reasons. They would find a market in the government, since the government should purchase only Level II products. (I would certainly like our public servants to use key escrow, just as I want work product paid for by my corporation to be accessible. Of course, anyone can buy Level I products for home and personal use.) So the government can still influence the private sector by buying only products that include Level II compliance. Also, Level II products would be decontrolled for export. This way the market can decide; vendors will do what their customers tell them to. This satisifies the obvious desire on the part of the government to influence what happens with their purchasing power. Level III would allow any user to insert escrow keys they control into the process. (Level II would not be a prerequisite to Level III.) My company may want key escrow; I, as an individual, may want to escrow my keys with my attorney or family members; a standard supporting these funtions would be useful. I don't necessarily want or need the government involved. NIST already knows how to write a FIPS that describes software and hardware implementations, and to certify that implementations are correct. This approach cetainly isn't perfect, but if the administration really believes what it says and means it, then I submit that this is an improvement over a single key escrow FIPS foisted on everyone by NSA, and would stand a much better chance of striking a workable balance between the needs of the government and the right of individuals to privacy. Therefore, it RISKS much less than the current plan. The real problem with the way NSA works is that we don't find out what they're really doing and planning for decades, even when they're wrong. What if they are? In the 60's and 70's, the CIA was out of control, and the Congress, after extensive hearings that detailed some of the abuses of power by the CIA, finally moved to force more accountability and oversight. In the 80's and 90's, NSA's activities should be equally scrutinized by a concerned Congress. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SYSOPS: CAN YOU GO TO JAIL ? By Jeff A. Heyens Additional Comments By chris@eastern.eastern.com We have a new problem. Everyone knows that lately there has been a crackdown on Bulletin Boards which carry pornography, pirated software, etc. There is, however, a new and much more powerful threat which is threatening to stop all privately run BBS's. The Canadian Radio and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) is currently in the process of setting itself up to regulate Public bulletin boards. They want to make it an offense to run a BBS without a CRTC license. If licensing comes into effect, the BBS scene will quite literally shrivel up and die. Consider the example of radio in the 40's and 50's. Before the CRTC was formed, anyone could broadcast radio signals legally from their home on any bandwidth. Fearing obscenity and extreme access to information, the CRTC was formed to sell licenses to broadcasters. Without such a license, you could be prosecuted for broadcasting. The result of this action can be seen today: the only radio stations we see are totally mainstream and are hell-bent on making profit, not pleasing listeners or informing the public. We all know that the bulletin board systems are a great way to get alternative information. We can get information on the Paul Teele / Karla Homolka trials. We can get new insights as to what is really happening in the former Yugoslavia through the giant Internet. We currently have access to multitudes of information that isn't available through the mainstream media. If licensing comes into affect, we will LOSE this access. Not only will the pirate boards be hunted down and exterminated, but all currently LEGAL PUBLIC DOMAIN BBS's will also be made illegal unless they can afford a license. And who do you think will get licenses? Only those willing to follow the CRTC guidelines for radio and television. Corporations and rich executives. The BBS world, our underground paradise (if you will) is in great danger of becoming a commercial hell like the rest of today's media. We don't yet know what the proposed licensing fee will be, but it could anywhere in the area of $300-$5,000. This could also depend on the size of the BBS. However, most BBS's will simply close up shop if the government wants a license. The government will simply weed out all the little guys and support the big guys. This WILL HAPPEN, and sooner than you think! The U.S. Government has already started doing this, with the new Information SuperHighway being the flag-ship of government regulated systems. The Canadian government is going farther, and must be stopped now. Before I go into my plan of action, I want to tell you that if licensing comes into effect, if will be basically impossible to beat the system. All pirate radio stations in North America have been crushed by the government in a matter of months. Imagine how easy it will be to crush pirate bulletin board systems (and by that I simply mean BBS's without a license) with traceable phone numbers. Bell Canada would be sure to help the CRTC bust those boards. And the RCMP would have a real easy time busting any boards with illegal software, because those boards would not have licenses. The CRTC finds the board through Bell, arrests the sysop for running a board without a license, then informs the RCMP that this sysop was allowing copyrighted material to be transferred through his/her bbs. That sysop, for the first time in his/her life, is suddenly looking at a possible jail term. COULD YOU IMAGINE GOING TO JAIL FOR RUNNING A BBS???????? That, I admit, is the extreme case, but it is looking more and more likely as time goes on. If you're as pissed off about this as I am, then keep reading, because I have a plan of action/protest to stop this from happening. WE are the only people out there who can stop this from transpiring. Only the extremely computer literate, those of us who know the ins and outs of the BBS scene and computers generally, will be able to generate an argument strong enough to counter the argument of the government and the CRTC. I've been a user in different parts of Ontario for about six years. I currently go to York University for Computer Science and my plan is to organize a campaign of users who will be willing to petition the government to stop this craziness. My sister is a lawyer and also an occasional user of the boards. She would be willing to confront the CRTC on legal grounds if we have enough support from YOU. I have to hear from you. In order to force the CRTC to at least seriously listen to our argument, we need a lot of names, and a lot of letters to your local MP and to the CRTC. If I have enough support, I will set up a BBS which is dedicated to keeping you informed. I will keep up to date as to what the CRTC is doing and open up discussion concerning what we should do about it. I would also print out all the messages on the board and send them off to the prime minister, the CRTC and our local MP's. At the same time, my sister and I will prepare a legal argument to present to the government and the CRTC. IF we have the support of your names and your letters behind us, the CRTC will be forced to stop. OUR GOAL: To stop the CRTC from requiring the licensing of bulletin board systems and get it written into the law books that private, home run bbs's are totally legal and should never be regulated, in the interests of free information. PLEASE send me E-mail or letter mail with your thoughts. I WILL set up the bbs and get this ball rolling if we have enough support! Please send this file to other BBS's and get this information out. Contact me if you want to be involved. We need all your support! Support USERS AGAINST THE LICENSING OF BBS's (UALBBS). KEEP PRIVATE BBS's LEGAL! *** Begin Additional Comments: *** Reading the preceding document has brought a few thoughts to my mind. First of all, there has been much apprehension about what the computerization of society holds for the freedom of the common citizen. It seems that the more powerful a thing is, the more potential it has for both good and bad; and there is no doubt that the computerization of information is powerful indeed. On one side, the computerization of society holds the potential for a centralized authoritarian regime that could not have been dreamed of previously. In the near future, there will be no further need for cash money and there will be no economic activity beyond the reach central intelligence and control. And there will be no personal information that will be kept secret from the authorities. Even the USSR, with the model of central authority we feared most, could could not have been capable of realizing the degree of control, the dawn of which, we now witness. But the evil that we feared in Communism infects our own society. Abstract concepts such as truth and justice are minimum requirements for spiritual beings, yet we deny the spiritual and cling to the material. If we assert that we are but material beings, how real can the spiritual necessities really be? And yet, in order for us to have any hope of happiness, these must be acknowledged in any formula for a culture and society we might propose. Even So, we increasingly embrace a purely materialist interpretation of existence in which such things as truth and justice, if not outright delusional, are relative. If we continue to embrace the same cosmology as drove the Soviet repression, and the tools of a police state become available, what of government's temptation to become the definer of truth and justice and all the things which are the very breath of life for the human soul? Even one who is completely seduced by materialism would have to be blind indeed not to perceive what an enormous poison this is. On the other side, the proliferation of information technology has the same sort of potential as the cheap portable video camera. The particular aspect of this potential I'm addressing has been made most obvious by the effect the video camera has had in totalitarian countries, namely, that it is increasingly difficult for these governments to suppress the truth of events by simple denial and propaganda. The proliferation of information technology can have a parallel with the advent of the Guttenberg press, which made it more difficult for the Inquisition to suppress the works of heretics-- but only if it is allowed. If the Church had tried to regulate the press, it would have been possible to operate them underground. This is not the case with BBSs because the telephone network can be programmed to log all modem communications. From the positive aspect of information technology, there comes the potential for a democratic process that has not been practical until now. As information technology becomes more accessible, there could come a world in which an average Joe might write an article about picking his nose, and it would have no less distribution than if it had been published in MacLean's or Newsweek. Although the suppression of pornography and other abuses has its attractiveness, the complete and unregulated liberation of information is our only defense against its dark side. The scope of the suffering that information enslavement can inflict upon us is so great that "preventing misuse" can only be an excuse of those who would enslave us. Any move that leaves the dark potential of the new technology in place, while invalidating its positive aspects, leaves the potential for authoritarian abuse in place, while invalidating our only true defense. Any such move is quite obviously a move toward enslaving us. If any cause is worthy of struggle, the preservation of information liberty is indeed such a cause. Three other thoughts: 1) If the traditional media loses its preeminence to the "new" media, it shows a flaw in the traditional media. Then, the success of the alternative media will be the excuse for imposing the same regulation on the alternative media as on the traditional. But this will have the effect of imposing the same mediocrity into the alternative media as made the traditional media less attractive. Such are the politics of information enslavement. 2) Radio and television are vulnerable to interference from the incompetent and abusive. But private BBSs must be explicitly dialled into. Can the regulators seriously contend that they might protect us from information that we must access in such a deliberate and specific manner? 3) If private BBSs are regulated, uucp and FidoNet, which amount to networks of BBSs for machines, will also be. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% The following article reprinted from "The Spotlight" in Washington D.C with permission from Asst. Editor Don Markey. CIA CORRUPT, STUPID, SHOULD BE ABOLISHED We're spending untold billions on any international spying operation that can't figure out what it's own people are doing. It's time for a change. By Mark Lane The arrest of Aldrich Hazen Ames, former head of the CIA's Soviet counterintelligence branch, as a Soviet spy, raises some seminal questions about the value of the CIA. With the fox and his wife, Maria del Rosario Casas Ames, also charged as a Soviet spy, in charge of the henhouse, it is time to wonder about the fate of the chickens. During September, 1985, Vitaly Yurchenko, a senior KGB official, defected. Ames was assigned to debrief him. Yurchenko, after that debriefing, escaped from his CIA controllers while having dinner with them in a restaurant in Georgetown and then returned to the Soviet Union. Edward Lee Howard, a CIA officer, was under secret FBI surveillance during the same period. He too fled to the Soviet Union after he learned that he was about to be arrested. Until now the CIA and FBI have been unable to figure out how Howard learned of his imminent incarceration. There is a simple rule employed by police departments throughout the United States to spot a possibly corrupt cop. Is he living beyond his means? Even unsophisticated local police organizations which do not regularly spy on their own colleagues or subject them to lie detector tests, as does the CIA, have established a relatively sound and simple method to locate potentially corrupt officers. Did he buy a Cadillac instead of a Ford? How can he afford to build a garage or construct an addition to his house? During his highest paid year with the CIA, Ames earned under $70,000. His wife was a student. Last year he bought a new Jaguar -- which cost about his annual income after taxes, unless it was loaded with extras. He also bought a house in Arlington, Virginia (a Washington suburb) worth well over half-a-million dollars, a large farm and a number of condominiums in Columbia, his wife's country of birth. He paid for the Virginia house -- $540,000 -- in cash. Apparently he was paid approximately $1.5 million by the Soviet Union during the last several years and spent it all on a luxurious life style. And now, we are informed by the CIA that no one at the agency noticed the improved Ames lifestyle during the past decade. The Ames case is reminiscent of the case of CIA officer Edwin P. Wilson who engaged in a similar grand life, while earning a relatively meager salary at the CIA. He was subsequently charged and convicted of illegally shipping explosives to Libya. For years Wilson lived on a huge baronial estate in Virginia, kept horses and permitted other CIA officers, including his superiors, to send their children over to his mansion and stables to ride the horses. The CIA later claimed to be astonished that Wilson had some other income. He claimed the agency knew it all along and that he was the victim of a change in policy toward Libya in the smoke-filled rooms in Langley, Virginia (headquarters of the CIA) where the resident scholars engage in thinking too convoluted and too secret thoughts for ordinary Americans to comprehend. Wilson is now in prison and the CIA is newly astonished by Ames. Most Americans have not yet decided to forgive the CIA for murdering President John F. Kennedy and the leaders of other states. The only justification for its existence, immoral though it may be, is that at least it is effective. That excuse has now expired. So should the CIA. The American people deserve an intelligence agency created in the post-Communist world, one designed not to plot, overthrow and kill, but to inquire and determine. An organization which can predict, based on work on the ground and contacts, trouble spots such as in Bosnia before they erupt, a financial crisis in Japan secured through evaluation and study of trends by competent scientists, the uprising of Mexican indigenous people before we enter into a NAFTA which makes us partners of their oppressors -- all of these would be of great value to America. Above all, a democratic society deserves an intelligence agency designed to meet the needs of such a country, not designed for a totalitarian state. This portion of the story ends on a light note. The "Washington Times" reported in front page headlines that the Russians may lose billions of dollars in U.S. aid due to their perfidy of spying on us. Just recently Philip Heyman, a Justice Department high official, over the objection of Janet Reno, the attorney general and his superior, demanded that Jonathan Pollard, the American who spied for Israel, be freed. Pollard was paid in dollars which the United States had sent to Israel as part of its enormous contribution to that state. I am still looking for the headline that suggests that Israel may lose billions of dollars in U.S. aid. *** An internationally known attorney and recognized authority on the *** assassination of John F. Kennedy, Mark Lane is the author of "Rush to *** Judgment", the definitive critique of the Warren Commission, and *** "Plausible Denial", which links the CIA to the JFK assassination. Both *** books are available from Liberty Lobby, 300 Independence Avenue SE, *** Washington, D.C. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% LEGION OF DOOM T-SHIRTS!! Get 'em By Chris Goggans After a complete sellout at HoHo Con 1993 in Austin, TX this past December, the official Legion of Doom t-shirts are available once again. Join the net luminaries world-wide in owning one of these amazing shirts. Impress members of the opposite sex, increase your IQ, annoy system administrators, get raided by the government and lose your wardrobe! Can a t-shirt really do all this? Of course it can! -------------------------------------------------------------------------- "THE HACKER WAR -- LOD vs MOD" This t-shirt chronicles the infamous "Hacker War" between rival groups The Legion of Doom and The Masters of Destruction. The front of the shirt displays a flight map of the various battle-sites hit by MOD and tracked by LOD. The back of the shirt has a detailed timeline of the key dates in the conflict, and a rather ironic quote from an MOD member. (For a limited time, the original is back!) "LEGION OF DOOM -- INTERNET WORLD TOUR" The front of this classic shirt displays "Legion of Doom Internet World Tour" as well as a sword and telephone intersecting the planet earth, skull-and-crossbones style. The back displays the words "Hacking for Jesus" as well as a substantial list of "tour-stops" (internet sites) and a quote from Aleister Crowley. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- All t-shirts are sized XL, and are 100% cotton. Cost is $15.00 (US) per shirt. International orders add $5.00 per shirt for postage. Send checks or money orders. Please, no credit cards, even if it's really your card. Name: __________________________________________________ Address: __________________________________________________ City, State, Zip: __________________________________________ I want ____ "Hacker War" shirt(s) I want ____ "Internet World Tour" shirt(s) Enclosed is $______ for the total cost. Mail to: Chris Goggans 603 W. 13th #1A-278 Austin, TX 78701 These T-shirts are sold only as a novelty items, and are in no way attempting to glorify computer crime. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% In the super-state, it really does not matter at all what actually happened. Truth is what the government chooses to tell you. Justice is what it wants to happen. --Jim Garrison, New Orleans District Attorney %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Download Complete. 40708 total bytes, 2035 bytes/sec