EMC Celerra NAS Appliance - Unauthorized Access to Root NFS Export







Trustwave's SpiderLabs Security Advisory TWSL2010-003:
Unauthorized access to root NFS export on EMC Celerra Network Attached
(NAS) appliance


Published: 2010-07-29 Version: 1.0

Vendor: EMC (http://www.emc.com)
Product: Celerra Unified Storage products
Version(s) affected: All

Product Description:
The Celerra Unified Storage Platform provides Network Attached Storage (NAS)
services through a combination of server appliances and software modules.

Credit: Steve Ocepek of Trustwave's SpiderLabs

CVE: CVE-2010-2860

The Celerra appliance's NFS server freely exports its "/" file system and
enforces access using a factory-defined list of authorized IP addresses.
addresses found on a recent model are listed in the showmount example below,
however this list may differ depending on product version. The IP addresses
are intended for communication internal to the appliance, but are still
accepted from external sources. An attacker can mount this file system by
spoofing an authorized IP address.

The NFS showmount command can be used to obtain a list of the IP addresses:

     # showmount -e <Celerra IP address>
     Export list for <Celerra IP address>:

Because the appliance's NFS server does not enable the "rootsquash" feature,
full access to the file system is possible by mounting the export using root
(UID 0).

Fully spoofing the source IP address (for sending and receiving packets)
usually require access to the local subnet or the ability to exploit some
other network infrastructure vulnerability. On Linux, local IP address
spoofing can be accomplished by creating an alias interface and using the
"ip route" command to set the source IP accordingly.

     # ifconfig eth0:0
     # ip route add <Celerra IP address> dev eth0 src
     # mkdir nfs
     # mount <Celerra IP address>:/ nfs

The flaw allows unauthorized access to files contained on the system,
including all CIFS shares and iSCSI mounted drives. The "/" path does not
correspond to the true root of the file system -- only the root of the user
data directory is exposed.

Vendor Response:
The vendor has acknowledged this issue and issued the following workaround.

Vendor has also published a knowledgebase article about the issue and
mitigation so support can help any customers who call in with this issue
a permanent fix from EMC is available.

Vendor estimated date for a code fix is Q3 2010.

Remediation Steps: 

The following recommendations were provided by the vendor.

1. Hide NFS exports and show it only based on the configured access. Setting
forceFullShowmount param to 0 (default is 1) will hide the "/" from the list
since only Control Station have access to it for administration purpose:

[root () virgil slot_3]# server_param server_3 -f mount -info

server_3 : 
name                    = forceFullShowmount
facility_name           = mount
default_value           = 1
current_value           = 1
configured_value        =
user_action             = none
change_effective        = immediate
range                   = (0,1)
description             = Forces response to showmount requests to fully
                          populate response.

[root () virgil slot_3]# server_param server_3 -f mount -modify \
forceFullShowmount -value 0

server_3 : done

After the above change, client will see only the shares he have permissions
access to:

/usr/sbin/showmount -e
Export list for
/fs1 (everyone)

2. Change default IP addresses (during install or after) for internal
along with first step above to further minimize the exploitability.

Product team has provided additional mitigations steps that can be
by the customers to reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability:

1. Create IP-based access rules on the network equipment rejecting traffic
IP addresses belonging to internal Celerra network which do have own switch
for that purpose. These addresses are listed in the /etc/hosts file of the
Celerra Control Station.

2. Configure firewall(s) between Data Movers and NFS clients to reject
for IP addresses belonging to the internal Celerra network.

3. Hide NFS exports and show it only based on the configured access. Setting
forceFullShowmount param to 0 (default is 1) will hide the ³/² from the list
since only Control Station have access to it for administration purpose.

4.    Disable IP reflect

Vendor Communication Timeline:
05/07/10 - Initial communication
05/10/10 - Vulnerability details provided
05/18/10 - Vulnerability acknowledged, workaround and timeline provided
07/27/10 - Additional workaround details provided

Revision History: 
1.0 Initial publication

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