Inim Electronics Smartliving SmartLAN 6.x - Unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery









# Exploit Title: Inim Electronics Smartliving SmartLAN 6.x - Unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery
# Author: LiquidWorm
# Date: 2019-12-09
# Product web page:
# Link:
# Version: 6.x
# Advisory ID: ZSL-2019-5545
# Advisory URL:

Inim Electronics Smartliving SmartLAN/G/SI <=6.x Unauthenticated SSRF

Vendor: INIM Electronics s.r.l.
Product web page:
Affected version: <=6.x
Affected models: SmartLiving 505
                 SmartLiving 515
                 SmartLiving 1050, SmartLiving 1050/G3
                 SmartLiving 10100L, SmartLiving10100L/G3

Summary: SmartLiving anti-intrusion control panel and security system provides
important features rarely found in residential, commercial or industrial application
systems of its kind. This optimized-performance control panel provides first-rate
features such as: graphic display, text-to-speech, voice notifier, flexible hardware,
end-to-end voice transmission (voice-on-bus), IP connectivity.

The system-on-chip platform used in the SmartLAN/SI accessory board provides point-to-point
networking capability and fast connectivity to the Internet. Therefore, it is possible
to set up a remote connection and program or control the system via the SmartLeague
software application. In effect, the SmartLAN/SI board grants the same level of access
to the system as a local RS232 connection.

The SmartLAN/G board operates in the same way as the SmartLAN/SI but in addition provides
advanced remote-access and communication functions. The SmartLAN/G board is capable of
sending event-related e-mails automatically. Each e-mail can be associated with a subject,
an attachment and a text message. The attachment can be of any kind and is saved to an
SD card. The message text can contain direct links to domains or IP addressable devices,
such as a security cameras. In addition to e-mails, the SmartLAN/G board offers users
global access to their control panels via any Internet browser accessed through a PC,
PDA or Smartphone. In fact, the SmartLAN/G has an integrated web-server capable of
distinguishing the means of connection and as a result provides an appropriate web-page
for the tool in use. Smartphones can control the system in much the same way as a
household keypad, from inside the house or from any part of the world.

Desc: Unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the
SmartLiving SmartLAN within the GetImage functionality. The application parses user
supplied data in the GET parameter 'host' to construct an image request to the service
through onvif.cgi. Since no validation is carried out on the parameter, an attacker
can specify an external domain and force the application to make an HTTP request to
an arbitrary destination host. This can be used by an external attacker for example
to bypass firewalls and initiate a service and network enumeration on the internal
network through the affected application.

Tested on: GNU/Linux 3.2.1 armv5tejl
           BusyBox v1.20.2

Vulnerability discovered by Sipke Mellema

Advisory ID: ZSL-2019-5545
Advisory URL:


curl -X POST -d"mod=GetImage&host="