==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 26, File 1 of 11
Phrack Inc. Newsletter Issue XXVI Index
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
April 25, 1989
Greetings and welcome to Issue 26 of Phrack Inc. Things are really
beginning to heat up as SummerCon '89 rapidly approaches. Be sure to check out
Phrack World News for further information concerning this incredible event.
You do not want to miss it.
This issue we feature The Disk Jockey's personal rendition of the events
that can occur in the criminal legal process (after all he should know). Some
of the terms and situations may vary from state to state due to slight
differences in state laws.
We also present to you a file on COSMOS that is written from more of a
security standpoint rather than hacker intrusion tips. The Future Transcendent
Saga continues in this issue with a file on NSFnet and the third appendix of
the never ending series. This particular appendix is geared to be used as a
general reference to chapter three of the FTSaga, "Limbo To Infinity." As this
file is more of a complied directory than actual "how to" knowledge, we just
consider it a Phrack Inc. release.
As always, we ask that anyone with network access drop us a line to either
our Bitnet or Internet addresses...
Taran King Knight Lightning
C488869@UMCVMB.BITNET C483307@UMCVMB.BITNET
C488869@UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU C483307@UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU
_______________________________________________________________________________
Table of Contents:
1. Phrack Inc. XXVI Index by Taran King and Knight Lightning
2. Computer-Based Systems for Bell System Operation by Taran King
3. Getting Caught: Legal Procedures by The Disk Jockey
4. NSFnet: National Science Foundation Network by Knight Lightning
5. COSMOS: COmputer System for Mainframe OperationS (Part One) by King Arthur
6. Basic Concepts of Translation by The Dead Lord and Chief Executive Officers
7. Phone Bugging: Telecom's Underground Industry by Split Decision
8. Internet Domains: FTSaga Appendix 3 (Limbo To Infinity) by Phrack Inc.
9. Phrack World News XXVI/Part 1 by Knight Lightning
10. Phrack World News XXVI/Part 2 by Knight Lightning
11. Phrack World News XXVI/Part 3 by Knight Lightning
_______________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 26, File 2 of 11
Computer-Based Systems for Bell System Operations
by
Taran King
This file contains a variety of operating systems in the Bell System.
Some of them are very familiar to most people and others are widely unknown.
Each sub-section gives a brief description of what the computer system's
functions are.
Table Of Contents:
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
I. TIRKS
a. COC
b. E1
c. F1
d. C1
e. FEPS
II. PICS
III. PREMIS
IV. TNDS
a. EADAS
b. EADAS/NM
c. TDAS
d. CU/EQ
e. ICAN
f. LBS
g. 5XB COER
h. SPCS COER
i. SONDS
j. CU/TK
k. TSS
l. TFS
m. CSAR
V. SCCS
VI. COEES
VII. MATFAP
VIII. Various Operating Systems
IX. Acronym Glossary
TIRKS (Trunks Integrated Records Keeping System)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
TIRKS is the master record-keeping system for the network. It
supports network operations related to growth and change in the network by
providing accurate records of circuits and components that are in use and
available for use. It was developed to mechanize the circuit-provisioning
process. Two circuit-provisioning aspects are applied: daily circuit
provisioning and current planning.
Daily circuit provisioning is processing orders to satisfy customer
needs for special service circuits and processing orders initiated for message
trunks and carrier systems for the PSTN. The process begins at various
operations centers and ends up at the CPCs (Circuit Provision Centers) which
track orders, design circuits, and assign the components using TIRKS. It also
prepares work packages and distributes them to technicians working in the field
who implement them.
Current planning determines the equipment and facility requirements
for future new circuits. It apportions forecasts for circuits among the circuit
designs planned for new circuits.
TIRKS consists of five major interacting component systems: COC
(Circuit Order Control system), E1 (Equipment system), F1 (Facility system), C1
(Circuit system), and FEPS (Facility and Equipment Planning System).
o COC controls message trunk orders, special-services orders, and
carrier system orders by tracking critical dates throughout the
existence of an order as it flows from the source to the CPC and on
to the field forces. It provides management with the current status
of all circuit orders and provides data to other TIRKS component
systems to update the assigned status of equipment, facilities, and
circuits as orders are processed.
o C1 is the heart of TIRKS. It automatically determines the types of
equipment required for a given circuit, assigns the equipment and
facilities needed, determines levels at the various transmission
level points on the circuit, specifies the test requirements, and
establishes circuit records for the circuits. All records of
circuits already installed are kept in C1 for future additions or
changes.
o E1 is one of the two major inventory component systems in TIRKS.
It contains equipment inventory records, assignment records, and
pending equipment orders. The records show the amount of spare
equipment that is available and equipment's circuit identification.
o F1 is the other of the major inventory component systems. It
contains cable and carrier inventory and assigns records.
o FEPS supports the current planning process which determines the
transmission facilities and equipment that will be required for new
service. It uses data in E1, F1, and C1 as well as other forecasts
to allocate existing inventories efficiently, to determine future
facility and equipment requirements, and to update planning
designs.
TIRKS uses IBM-370 compatible hardware and direct-access storage
devices. It provides benefits to the BOCs through improved service to
customers, capital and expense savings, and better management control.
PICS (Plug-in Inventory Control System)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
PICS is the mechanized operations system developed for the efficient
management of large amounts of equipment inventories. It assists with both
inventory and materials management. Inventory managers establish corporate
policies for the types of equipment and for equipment utilization, assist
engineering organizations in introducing new types of equipment while phasing
out older types, and set utilization goals that balance service objectives and
carrying charges on spare equipment. Material managers work to achieve
utilization goals by acquiring spare equipment for growth and maintenance
purposes. They also administer a hierarchy of locations used for storing spare
equipment.
PICS/DCPR (PICS with Detailed Continuing Property Records) administers
all types of CO equipment. The DCPR portion of PICS/DCPR serves as a detailed
investment database supporting accounting records for all types of CO plug-in
and "hardwired" equipment. PICS/DCPR accomplishes its goals of increasing
utilization, decreasing manual effort, and providing a detailed supporting
record for phone company investment through software, databases, administrative
procedures, and workflows.
Two new functional entities are created in the BOC first: PIA
(Plug-In Administration) and the central stock. PIA is the materials manager
and is responsible for acquiring equipment, distributing it as needed to field
locations, repairing it, and accounting for it. The central stock is a
warehouse where spare equipment is consolidated and managed.
There are five subsystems in PICS/DCPR:
o Plug-in inventory subsystem - maintains order, repair, and
inventory records for all types of plug-in equipment.
o Inventory management subsystem - provides the PIA with mechanized
processes to assist in various tasks.
o Plug-in DCPR subsystem - provides processes required to maintain
investment records for plug-in units.
o Hardwired DCPR subsystem - maintains detailed accounting records
for hardwired CO equipment.
o Reference file subsystem - provides and maintains reference data
used by all other subsystems.
PICS/DCPR runs on IBM-compatible equipment with the IBM Information
Management System database manager. It interfaces with TIRKS as well as a few
other circuit-provisioning systems.
PREMIS (PREMises Information System)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
PREMIS provides fast, convenient access to information needed to
respond to service requests. It was developed in response to the need for
address standardization. It has three mechanized databases: address data, a
credit file, and a list of available telephone numbers. It also serves a
function to the LAC (Loop Assignment Center), called PREMIS/LAC. PREMIS/LAC is
an extension of the address database and provides for the storage of outside
plant facility data at each address entry.
PREMIS supports the following service representative tasks:
o Determining the customer's correct address. The address related-
and address-keyable information is the major feature of PREMIS.
If an input request does not contain an accurate or complete
address, PREMIS displays information that can be used to query the
customer. The address database allows PREMIS to give the full
address and information about the geographic area which includes WC
(Wire Center), exchange area, tax area, directory group, and the
service features available for that area. It also displays
existing or previous customer's name and telephone number, modular
jacking arrangement at the address, and an indication of whether a
connect outside plant loop from the address back to the CO was left
in place. If service was discontinued at the site, the reason for
disconnect and the date of disconnect are also displayed.
o Negotiating service features. PREMIS indicates the service
features that can be sold at that address, providing useful
information for discussing these with a customer.
o Negotiating a service date. If it indicates that an outside plant
loop back to the CO has been left in place, PREMIS allows for
earlier installation as no installer will need to visit the site.
o Checking a customer's credit status. PREMIS maintains a
name-keyable file of customers with outstanding debts to the
telephone company. If there is a match in the database, the
customer's file is displayed.
o Selecting a telephone number. There is a file in PREMIS listing
all available telephone numbers from which service representatives
request numbers for a specific address. The available telephone
numbers are read from COSMOS (COmputer System for Mainframe
OperationS) magnetic tape.
PREMIS/LAC has a feature called DPAC (Dedicated Plant Assignment
Card). Records of addresses where outside plant loop facilities are dedicated
are organized and accessed by address by the LAC through DPAC.
PREMIS is an on-line interactive system whose prime users are service
representatives interacting with customers. It uses the UNIVAC 1100 as its
main computer. It has network links to various other computer systems, too,
to obtain various pieces of information that are helpful or necessary in
efficiently completing service functions.
TNDS (Total Network Data System)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
TNDS is actually a large and complex set of coordinated systems which
supports a broad range of activities that depend on accurate traffic data. It
is more of a concept that incorporates various subsystems as opposed to a
single computer system. It consists of both manual procedures and computer
systems that provide operating company managers with comprehensive, timely, and
accurate network information that helps in analysis of the network. TNDS
supports operations centers responsible for administration of the trunking
network, network data collection, daily surveillance of the load on the
switching network, the utilization of equipment by the switching network, and
the design of local and CO switching equipment to meet future service needs.
TNDS modules that collect and format traffic data usually have
dedicated minicomputers which are at the operating company's Minicomputer
Maintenance (Operations) Center (MMOC/MMC). Other modules generate engineering
and administrative reports on switching systems and on the trunking network of
message trunks that interconnects them. These mostly run on general-purpose
computers. Still others are located in AT&T centers and are accessed by
various operating companies for data.
The functions of TNDS are carried out by various computer systems
since TNDS itself is just a concept. These subsystems include EADAS, EADAS/NM,
TDAS, CU/EQ, LBS, 5XB COER, SPCS COER, ICAN, SONDS, TSS, CU/TK, TFS, and CSAR.
The following sections cover these systems briefly.
EADAS (Engineering and Administrative Data Acquisition System)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
EADAS is the major data collecting system of TNDS and runs on a
dedicated minicomputer at the NDCC (Network Data Collection Center). Each
EADAS serves up to fifty switching offices. The 4ESS and No. 4 XBAR both have
their own data acquisition systems built into the switch and they feed their
data directly to other TNDS component systems that are downstream from EADAS,
thereby bypassing the need for EADAS on those switches. EADAS summarizes data
collected for processing by downstream TNDS systems and does so in real-time.
EADAS is used by network administrators to determine quality of service and to
identify switching problems. It also makes additional real-time information
available to these administrators by providing traffic data history that covers
up to 48 hours. This data history is flexible through the module NORGEN
(Network Operations Report GENerator) so that administrators can tailor their
requests for information to determine specifics. Information from EADAS is
forwarded to other downstream systems in TNDS via data links or magnetic tape.
EADAS/NM (EADAS/Network Management)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
EADAS/NM is one of the three TNDS systems that EADAS forwards traffic
data downstream to either by data links or magnetic tape. EADAS/NM uses data
directly from EADAS as well as receiving data from those switching systems
which do not interface with EADAS previously mentioned. It monitors switching
systems and trunk groups designated by network managers and reports existing or
anticipated congestion on a display board at local and regional NMCs (Network
Management Centers). It is used to analyze problems in near real-time to
determine their location and causes. EADAS/NM provides information that
requires national coordination to the AT&T Long Lines NOC (Network Operations
Center) in Bedminster, NJ which uses it's NOCS (NOC System) to perform
EADAS/NM-like functions on a national scale. Like EADAS, EADAS/NM uses
dedicated minicomputers to provide interactive real-time response and control.
TDAS (Traffic Data Administration System)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
The second of three TNDS systems that is downstream from EADAS is TDAS
which formats the traffic data for use by most of the other downstream systems.
It accepts data from EADAS, local vendor systems, and large toll switching
systems on a weekly basis as magnetic tape. It functions basically as a
warehouse and distribution facility for the traffic data and runs a batch
system at the computation center. Correct association between recorded traffic
data and the switching or trunking elements is the result of shared information
between TDAS and CU/EQ. Data processed through TDAS is matched against that
stored in CU/EQ. The data is summarized weekly on magnetic tape or printout
and is sent for use in preparation of an engineering or administrative report.
CU/EQ (Common Update/EQuipment)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
CU/EQ is a master database which stores traffic measurements taken by
TDAS and it shares information with TDAS, ICAN and LBS. As said before,
correct association between recorded traffic data and the switching or trunking
elements is due to the shared information between CU/EQ and TDAS. It runs as a
batch system in the same computer as TDAS and is regularly updated with batch
transactions to keep it current with changes in the physical arrangement of CO
switching machines which ensures that recorded measurements are treated
consistently in each of the reporting systems that use CU/EQ records.
ICAN (Individual Circuit ANalysis)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
The final of the three systems downstream from EADAS is ICAN, which
also uses data directly from EADAS but uses CU/EQ for reference information.
It is a CO reporting system which detects electromechanical switching system
faults by identifying abnormal load patterns on individual circuits within a
circuit group. ICAN produces a series of reports used by the NAC (Network
Administration Center) to analyze the individual circuits and to verify that
such circuits are being correctly associated with their respective groups.
LBS (Load Balance System)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
LBS is a batch-executed system that helps assure the network
administrator that traffic loads in each switching system are uniformly
distributed. It analyzes the traffic data to establish traffic loads on each
line group of the switching system. The NAC uses the resulting reports to
determine the lightly loaded line groups to which new subscriber lines can be
assigned. LBS also calculates load balance indices for each system and
aggregates the results for the entire BOC.
5XB COER (No. 5 Crossbar Central Office Equipment Reports)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
The 5XB COER provides information on common-control switching
equipment operation for different types of switching systems. It is a
batch-executed system that runs on a BOC mainframe that analyzes traffic data
to determine how heavily various switching system components are used and
measures certain service parameters. It calculates capacity for the No. 5
Crossbar. Network administrators use 5XB COER reports to monitor day-to-day
switching performance, diagnose potential switching malfunctions, and help
predict future service needs. Traffic engineers rely on reports to assess
switching office capacity and to forecast equipment requirements. It produces
busy hour and busy season reports so service and traffic load measurements can
be most useful in predictions.
SPCS COER (Stored-Program Control Systems Central Office Equipment Reports)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
The SPCS COER is basically the same as the 5XB COER as it too monitors
switching system service and measures utilization in the same manners as
mentioned above. The essential differences between the 5XB COER and the SPCS
COER are that the latter calculates capacity for 1ESS, 2ESS, and 3ESS switching
offices as opposed to the No. 5 Crossbar switch and SPCS COER is an interactive
system that runs on a centralized AT&T mainframe computer.
SONDS (Small Office Network Data System)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
SONDS collects its own data from small step-by-step offices
independently of EADAS and TDAS. It performs a full range of data manipulation
functions and provides a number of TNDS features economically for smaller
electromechanical step-by-step offices. The data collected is directly from
the offices being measured. It processes the data and automatically
distributes weekly, monthly, exception, and on-demand reports to managers at
the NACs via dial-up terminals. SONDS runs on an interactive basis at a
centralized AT&T mainframe computer.
CU/TK (Common Update/TrunKing)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
CU/TK is a database system that contains the trunking network
information and as well as other information required by TSS (Trunking
Servicing System) and TFS (Trunk Forecasting System). The CU/TK is regularly
updated by CAC (Circuit Administration Center) by personnel to keep it current
with changes in the physical arrangements of trunks and switching machines in
the CO. For correct trunking and switching configuration in the processing by
TSS and TFS, this updating process, which includes maintaining office growth
information and a "common-language" circuit identification of all circuits for
individual switching machines, ensures that traffic data provided by TDAS will
be correctly associated.
TSS (Trunk Servicing System)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
TSS helps trunk administrators develop short-term plans and determine
the number of circuits required in a trunk group. Data from TDAS is processed
in TSS and the offered load for each trunk group is computed. Through offered
load calculation on a per-trunk-group basis, TSS calculates the number of
trunks theoretically required to handle that traffic load at a designated grade
of service. TSS produces weekly reports showing which trunk groups have too
many trunks and which have too few that are performing below the
grade-of-service objective. Trunk orders to add or disconnect trunks are made
by the CAC after they use the information provided through TSS.
TFS (Trunk Forecasting System)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
TFS uses traffic load data computed by TSS as well as information on
the network configuration and forecasting parameters stored in the CU/TK
database for long-term construction planning for new trunks. TFS forecasts
message trunk requirements for the next five years as the fundamental input to
the planning process that leads to the provisioning of additional facilities.
CSAR (Centralized System for Analysis and Reporting)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
CSAR is designed to monitor and measure how well data is being
processed through TNDS. It collects and analyzes data from other TNDS systems
and provides operating company personnel at NDCCs, NACs, and CACs with
quantitative measures of the accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of the TNDS
data flow as well as the consistency of the TNDS record bases. CSAR also
presents enough information to locate and identify a data collection problem.
CSAR summarizes the results of its TNDS monitoring for the company as input to
the TPMP (TNDS Performance Measurement Plan) which is published monthly by
AT&T. CSAR runs as a centralized on-line interactive system at an AT&T
computer center. Its data is placed into special files, which, at the end of a
CSAR run, are merged and transferred to the AT&T computer center. CSAR
performs the proper associations and analyzes each system's results. These
results are obtained by company managers via dial-up and they can be arranged
in a number of formats that provide details on overall TNDS performance or
individual system effectiveness. Specific problems can also be identified
through these reports.
The following is a diagram of data flow among TNDS systems:
*Trunk Network Reporting Systems*
|-> TSS ----------------------> TFS
* Data*| ^ ^
*Acquisition*| %_______ _______/
* Systems*| %-CU/TK-/
_________ |
| |-->EADAS |
|Switching| Alt. |
|Systems | Systems| * Central Office *
|_________|% | / *Reporting Systems* *System Performance *
| % %->TDAS-------------------------- *Measurement Systems*
| % | %_______ | | |
| % EADAS | LBS 5XB SPCS .............CSAR
| % | | / COER COER .
| EADAS/NM CU/EQ-< .
| % .
| ICAN SONDS .
| ^ .
|__________________________________| Selected data from
other TNDS Systems
SCCS (Switching Control Center System)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
The Switching Control Center (SCC) was created to centralize the
administration, maintenance, and control of the 1ESS switching system. By
using the remote-interaction interfacing of the MCC (Master Control Center),
which is a frame of equipment in a 1ESS system that indicates the current state
of the office equipment, the SCC functions as the centralized maintenance
center for the switch.
At the SCC, a minicomputer system called the CSS (Computer Sub-System)
is added and along with the equipment units that remote the MCC, it makes up
the SCCS. The CSS can support a number of SCCs. Generally, the CSS is located
in the MMOC. Basically, a number of switches are handled by each SCC and the
various SCCs are handled by the CSS.
The SCCS contains maintenance and administrative data that is sent
directly from the switches. Through the SCCS, a technician can remotely operate
the MCC keys on the switches hooked up to it as well as perform any available
command or task supported by the switch. The SCCS can handle up to 30 or more
offices although usually only 15 or so are handled per SCC. This number
depends also on the size of the offices and the amount of data that is
transmitted.
Major alarms that sound at a switching office set off alarms at the
SCC within seconds and it also causes an update of the status of the office on
the critical indicator panel and it displays a specific description of the
alarm condition on a CRT alarm monitor at a workstation. Software enhancements
to the SCCS fall into four broad classes:
o Enhanced Alarming - Besides alarms sounding, incoming data can
generate failure descriptions for easy interpretation and
real-time analysis techniques.
o Interaction with Message History - Using past information on a
switch's troubles, the SCCS allows pertinent information on a
specific switch to be provided in case of an alarm.
o Mechanization of Craft Functions - Certain conditions no longer
need to be looked into directly. If an alarm goes off, the SCCS
can perform routine tests and fix the problem as best it can or
else, if that doesn't work, a trouble ticket is issued.
o Support for Switch Administration - Through the SCCS, data can be
sent automatically to different operations centers as well as
other operations systems which require data from the switches.
Since the original SCCS came into operation, many changes have taken
place. The current SCCS supports all of the entire ESS family of switches as
well as network transmission equipment and it also can maintain several
auxiliary processor systems, like TSPS (Traffic Service Position System) and
AIS (Automatic Intercept System), and supports network transmission equipment.
COEES (Central Office Equipment Engineering System)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
COEES is a time-sharing system that runs on a DEC PDP-10. It is the
standard system for planning and engineering local switching equipment. COEES
contains component systems for Step-By-Step, Crossbar, 1/1AESS, and 2/2BESS
switching systems, each of which has a different capability.
The COEES database stores information obtained from forecasts for each
local switching office on number of lines of all types, number of trunks of all
types, average call rate per line and trunk, average usage per line and trunk,
and all features, signaling types, etc. that are required. COEES determines
the quantity of each type of equipment in the office needed to satisfy the
forecasted load at objective service levels, determines an estimated price for
engineering, procuring, and installing the equipment addition needed to reach
the require level, and then it sums up the costs of doing it eight different
ways for the network designer to review. The system also takes into account
varying parameters like call rate or proportion of lines with certain features
which is called sensitivity analysis.
With the information provided by the COEES forecast, the designer can
then make a recommendation. After a decision is made on the recommendation,
COEES prints out an order so that the additional equipment can more quickly and
easily be obtained.
COEES also puts out a report called call store on a 1ESS, which tells
the engineer and the equipment supplier how much memory to allocate to
different functions in the switch depending on inputs that the engineer
provides to the system.
MATFAP (Metropolitan Area Transmission Facility Analysis Program)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
MATFAP is a computer program that aids in facility planning. It
analyzes the alternatives available to the operating company for its future
transmission equipment and facilities using present worth of future expenses
and other measures.
By combining trunk and special-service circuit forecasts with
switching plans, network configuration, cost data, and engineering rules,
MATFAP can identify what transmission plant will be needed at various locations
and when it will be needed. It also determines economic consequences of
specific facility and/or equipment selections as well as routing choices and it
provides the least-cost assignment of circuits to each facility as a guide to
the circuit-provisioning process. It is oriented towards metropolitan networks
and facilities/equipment found in those regions.
MATFAP provides two benefits. It helps automate the transmission-
planning process and it takes into account economies that cannot be identified
by restricted analysis. It also balances circuit loads on high-capacity
digital lines with additional multiplex equipment. Data from MATFAP is edited
through RDES (Remote Data Entry System).
Various Operating Systems
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
The following is a list of other operating systems used by the Bell System with
brief descriptions:
ATRS (Automated Trouble Reporting System) - aids in the analysis of trouble
%%%% reports by sorting, formatting, forwarding, and examining them from
the entire country for standard errors
BOSS (Billing and Order Support System) - allows access to customer records,
%%%% CN/A, bill adjustments, and information routing
CAROT (Centralized Automatic Reporting On Trunks) - operations system that
%%%%% tests a trunk on electromechanical and electronic switching systems
and sends its findings to a remote computer terminal
CATLAS (Centralized Automatic Trouble Locating and Analysis System) - an
%%%%%% operations system that automates trouble location procedures that
identify faulty circuit packs in a switch when trouble is detected
and diagnosed
CMDS (Centralized Message Data System) - analyzes the AMA tapes to determine
%%%% traffic patterns
COSMOS (COmputer System for Mainframe OperationS) - stores the full inventory
%%%%%% of telephone numbers
CRIS (Customer Records Information System) - contains the customer billing
%%%% database
CRS (Centralized Results System) - a management information system that
%%% automates the collection, analysis, and publication of many
measurement results
CUCRIT (Capital Utilization CRITeria) - used mainly for project economic
%%%%%% evaluation and capital budgeting and planning
DACS (Digital Access Cross-connect System) - remote digital access for testing
%%%% of special-service circuits in analog or digital form
EFRAP (Exchange Feeder Route Analysis Program) - used in planning of the loop
%%%%% network
IFRPS (Intercity Facility Relief Planning System) - also like MATFAP but deals
%%%%% with radio and coaxial cable as opposed to voice-frequency facilities
IPLAN (Integrated PLanning And Analysis system) - used mainly for project
%%%%% economic evaluation
LMOS (Loop Maintenance Operations System) - maintenance outages on loops
%%%% remotely by a service employee
LRAP (Long Route Analysis Program) - like EFRAP, used in planning of the loop
%%%% network
LSRP (Local Switching Replacement Planning system) - a system used in the
%%%% planning of wire centers
NOTIS (Network Operations Trouble Information System) - aids in the analysis
%%%%% of trouble reports
NSCS (Network Service Center System) - at the NSC, aids in the analysis of
%%%% trouble reports
OFNPS (Outstate Facility Network Planning System) - similar to MATFAP but
%%%%% contains a decision aid that identifies strategies for the
introduction of digital facilities in a predominantly analog network;
rural transmission facility network planning
RDES (Remote Data Entry System) - allows for remote editing of on-line
%%%% computer data
RMAS (Remote Memory Administration System) - changes translations in the
%%%% switching systems
SARTS (Switched Access Remote Test System) - accessed to perform sophisticated
%%%%% tests on most types of special-service circuits
SMAS (Switched Maintenance Access System) - through the use of relays,
%%%% provides concentrated metallic access to individual circuits to
permit remote access and testing by SARTS
TASC (Telecommunications Alarm Surveillance and Control System) - an alarm
%%%% program that identifies the station and transmits it back to the
central maintenance location
TCAS (T-Carrier Administration System) - an operations system responsible for
%%%% T-carrier alarms
TCSP (Tandem Cross Section Program) - a program for analysis of traffic
%%%% network planning
TFLAP (T-carrier Fault-Locating Application Program) - a subprogram of
%%%%% Universal Cable Circuit Analysis Program which analyzes networks with
branches, multiple terminations and bridge taps
Acronym Glossary
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
AIS Automatic Intercept System
AMA Automatic Message Accounting
ATRS Automated Trouble Reporting System
BOSS Billing and Order Support System
C1 Circuit system
CAC Circuit Administration Center
CAROT Centralized Automatic Reporting On Trunks
CATLAS Centralized Automatic Trouble Locating and Analysis System
CMDS Centralized Message Data System
CPC Circuit Provision Center
CO Central Office
COC Circuit Order Control
COEES Central Office Equipment Engineering System
COSMOS COmputer System for Mainframe OperationS
CRIS Customer Records Information System
CRS Centralized Results System
CRT Cathode-Ray Tube
CSAR Centralized System for Analysis and Reporting
CSS Computer SubSystem
CUCRIT Capital Utilization CRITeria
CU/EQ Common Update/EQuipment system
CU/TK Common Update/TrunKing system
DACS Digital Access and Cross-connect System
DPAC Dedicated Plant Assignment Card
E1 Equipment system
EADAS Engineering and Administrative Data Acquisition System
EADAS/NM EADAS/Network Management
EFRAP Exchange Feeder Route Analysis Program
ESS Electronic Switching System
F1 Facility system
FEPS Facility and Equipment Planning System
5XB COER No. 5 Crossbar Central Office Equipment Report system
ICAN Individual Circuit ANalysis
IFRPS Intercity Facility Relief Planning System
IPLAN Integrated PLanning and ANalysis
LAC Loop Assignment Center
LBS Load Balance System
LMOS Loop Maintenance Operations System
LRAP Long Route Analysis Program
LSRP Local Switching Replacement Planning system
MATFAP Metropolitan Area Transmission Facility Analysis Program
MCC Master Control Center
MMC Minicomputer Maintenance Center
MMOC Minicomputer Maintenance Operations Center
NAC Network Administration Center
NDCC Network Data Collection Center
NMC Network Management Center
NOC Network Operations Center
NOCS Network Operations Center System
NORGEN Network Operations Report GENerator
NOTIS Network Operations Trouble Information System
NSCS Network Service Center System
OFNPS Outstate Facility Network Planning System
PIA Plug-In Administrator
PICS Plug-in Inventory Control System
PICS/DCPR PICS/Detailed Continuing Property Records
PREMIS PREMises Information System
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
RDES Remote Data Entry System
RMAS Remote Memory Administration Center
SARTS Switched Access Remote Test System
SCC Switching Control Center
SCCS Switching Control Center System
SMAS Switched Maintenance Access System
SONDS Small Office Network Data System
SPCS COER Stored-Program Control System/Central Office Equipment Report
TASC Telecommunications Alarm Surveillance and Control system
TCAS T-Carrier Administration System
TCSP Tandem Cross Section Program
TDAS Traffic Data Administration System
TFLAP T-Carrier Fault-Locating Applications Program
TFS Trunk Forecasting System
TIRKS Trunks Integrated Records Keeping System
TNDS Total Network Data System
TPMP TNDS Performance Measurement Plan
TSPS Traffic Service Position System
TSS Trunk Servicing System
WC Wire Center
______________________________________________________________________________
Recommended reference:
Bell System Technical Journals
Engineering and Operations in the Bell System
Phrack IX LMOS file by Phantom Phreaker
Phrack XII TNDS file by Doom Prophet
Various COSMOS files by LOD/H, KOTRT, etc.
Completed 3/17/89
______________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 26, File 3 of 11
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
- -
= %> The Disk Jockey <% =
- -
= Presents =
- -
= Getting Caught =
- - Legal Procedures - -
= =
- March 24, 1989 -
= =
- An Unbiased Look Into The Ways Of Criminal Proceedings -
= =
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Preface
%%%%%%%
Through this file, I hope to explain what legal action is followed during
an investigation of toll fraud. All of the contained information is based upon
actual factual information, and although it differs slightly from state to
state, the majority of it is applicable anywhere. There seems to be a lot of
misconception as to the actual legal happenings during and after an
investigation, so hopefully this will answer some of the too often unasked
questions.
Initiation
%%%%%%%%%%
In our particular story, the whole investigation is tipped off from a
phone call by someone to the U.S. Sprint security office. The volume of calls
of "hackers" calling in on other "hackers" is incredible. It is amazing how
when one user is mad at another and seeks some "revenge" of sorts, he calls a
security office and advises them that they know of a person who is illegally
using said company's long distance services. Usually the person will talk to
either a regular customer service representative, or someone from the security
office. Typically they will merely say "Hey, a guy named 'Joe' is using your
codes that he hacks, and his home phone number is 312-xxx-xxxx."
Next our security person has to decide if this may indeed be a somewhat
legitimate call. If all seems fairly reasonable, they will start their own
in-house investigation. This could mean just doing a CN/A on the phone number
in question to see who the phone is registered under, and check to see if this
person is a legitimate subscriber to their system.
A call is placed to the person in question's home telco office. Usually
they will talk to someone in the security office, or a person whom would carry
such a capacity in the area of security. They will usually coordinate an
effort to put some type of DNR (Dialed Number Recorder) on the subscriber's
telephone line, which will record on an adding machine type of paper all data
pertaining to: Numbers dialed, DTMF or pulse modes, any occurrence of 2600hz,
codes and other digits dialed, incoming calls including number of rings before
answer, time the line was picked up and hung up, etc.
This DNR may sit on the subscriber's phone line from merely a few weeks,
to several months.
At some point either the U.S. Sprint security representative or the telco
security person will decide that enough time has passed, and that an analysis
of the DNR tape is due. The Sprint official may visit the telco site and go
over the tapes in person, or they may be sent from the telco to the Sprint
office.
After going over the tapes and finding dialups and codes that were used
that may possibly be used illegally, Sprint will find the actual owners of
the codes in question and verify that the codes were indeed used without any
knowledge or permission of the legitimate owner. They will also put together
an estimate of "damages," which can include cost of dialup port access, cost
of investigation, as well as the actual toll charges incurred from the
usage.
The Sprint security representative and the local telco security person
will then go to the local police, usually either state or whatever has the real
power in that area. They will present the case to the detective or other
investigator, display all findings, and provided that the case findings seem
pretty plausible, a search warrant will be composed. After the warrant is
fully written out (sometimes it is merely a short fill-in-the-blank form) the
three people investigating the case (the police detective, the local telco
security representative, and the Sprint security investigator) will go in front
of a judge and under oath state the evidence and findings that they have as to
date contained in a document called a "discovery" which justify the need for a
search warrant. Assuming that the findings seem conclusive, the judge will
sign the warrant and it will then be active for the time specified on the
warrant. Usually they are valid for 24 hours a day, due to the circumstances
that more than likely calls were being made at all hours of the day and night.
On some agreed date, all the above parties will show up at the suspect's
house and execute the search warrant and more than likely collect all the phone
and computer equipment and bring it to the state police post for further
investigation.
All information and evidence as well as all the reports will then be
forwarded to the prosecutor's office to determine what, if any, charges are
going to be pursued.
Once charges are finalized through the prosecutor, another discovery
document is made, listing all the charges and how those charges were derived.
It is then brought in front of the judge again and if approved, warrants will
be issued for the individual(s) listed.
The warrants are usually served by sending over one of the local officers
to the suspect's house, and he will knock, introduce himself and ask for the
individual, and then present the warrant to the individual and take them in to
the station.
The individual will be processed, which usually means being photographed
and fingerprinted twice (once for the FBI and once for the state records), and
then is put into either a holding cell or regular jail.
Sometimes the bond is already set before the individual is arrested, but
sometimes it is not. If not, it will be at the arraignment.
Within 72 hours, the suspect must be arraigned. The arraignment is a time
when the formal charges are read to the suspect in front of the judge, bail is
set if it has not been already, and the suspect may pick if he wants a jury
trial or a trial by judge. This, of course, assumes that the suspect is going
to plead not guilty, which is the best thing to do in most cases of somewhat
major capacity. Further court dates are also set at this time. If the suspect
is unable to afford to retain an attorney, the court will assign a court
appointed lawyer at this time.
After the arraignment, the suspect is either allowed to post bail, or is
returned to the jail to await the next court date. His next court date,
which is the omnibus, is usually slated for about a month away.
If the set bail seems unreasonably high, your attorney can file for a
"bond reduction." You will go in front of the judge and your lawyer will argue
as to why your bond should be reduced, and how you have a stable life and
responsibilities and would not try to skip bail. The prosecutor will argue as
to why your bail should not be dropped.
At the omnibus hearing, also known as a "fact-finding" hearing (or in some
states, this is known as the "preliminary hearing."--Ed.) the suspect is again
brought in front of a judge, along with his own attorney, and the prosecuting
attorney. At this time the state (meaning the prosecutor) will reveal evidence
against the suspect, and the judge will decide if the evidence is enough to
hold the suspect in jail or to continue the case to trial. Nearly always there
is enough, as warrants would not be issued if there was not, since the state
could be opening themselves up to a false arrest suit if they were wrong. From
here a "pre-trial" date is slated, again usually about a month down the road.
The pre-trial is the last chance for the suspect to change his mind and
enter a guilty plea, or to continue to trial. It is also the last point in
which the prosecutor will offer the suspect any type of plea-bargain, meaning
that the suspect enters a guilty plea in exchange for an agreed upon set of
reduced charges or sentencing. Assuming the suspect still wishes to enter a
plea of "not-guilty," the date for jury selection will be slated.
During the jury selection, your lawyer and you as well as the prosecutor
will get to meet as many prospective jury members as you wish, and you can each
ask them questions and either accept or reject them based on if you think that
they would be fair towards you. This eliminates most possibilities of any jury
members that are biases before they every sit down to hear your case. After
the prosecutor and your attorney agree on the members, your trial date is set,
usually about a week later.
At trial, the prosecutor will present the case to the jury, starting with
questioning detectives and investigators on how the case was first discovered
and how things lead to you, and in each instance, your attorney will be able to
"cross-examine" each witness and ask questions of their own, hopefully making
the jury questionable as to the validity of everything that is said. After
that, your attorney is allowed to call witnesses and the prosecutor will be
allowed to ask questions as well. By rights you do not have to go to the stand
if you do not want to, as you have the right to not incriminate yourself. After
all is said and done, the prosecutor will get to state his "closing arguments,"
a basic summary of all that was presented and why you should be considered
guilty, and your lawyer will give his arguments to the jury, as to why you
should not be judged guilty.
The jury will go into deliberation, which can last a few minutes, or
several days. They must all vote and decide if you should be judged guilty or
not guilty. After the deliberation, court is called back in and the jury will
announce the results.
If it is decided that you are guilty, you normally have about 10 days to
file an appeal, which would have your case sent to a higher court. Otherwise
your date for sentencing will be set, again usually about a month away.
At the sentencing, your lawyer will argue why you should be let off easy,
and the prosecutor will argue why you should be given a hard sentence. The
judge will come to a decision based on the arguments and then make a decision
on your sentence. You will then be released to the agency that you are
assigned to, be it the probation department, the prison system, or the county
jail.
I hope this file gives you a more clear view on what happens in the legal
system, in future files I hope to discuss the actual dos and don'ts of the
legal system and advise as to what tricks of the trade are used by legal
authorities.
Any questions/comments/threats can be directed to me at;
Lunatic Labs 415.278.7421
-The Disk Jockey
Written exclusively for Phrack Newsletter, 1989. This document may be used in
whole or part as long as full credit for work cited is given to the author.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 26, File 4 of 11
The Future Transcendent Saga continues...
___________________________________________________
| | | |
| | NSFnet | |
| | | |
| | National Science Foundation Network | |
| | | |
| | brought to you by | |
| | | |
| | Knight Lightning | |
| | | |
| | April 16, 1989 | |
|_|_______________________________________________|_|
NSF Network Links Scientific Community And SuperComputer Centers
When the National Science Foundation (NSF) established its national
supercomputer centers in 1985, it also planned to create a communications
network that would give remote locations access to these state-of-the-art
facilities. NSF planners envisioned a system they dubbed "NSFNET." Based on a
"backbone" connecting the supercomputer centers, NSFNET would combine existing
networks and newly created ones into an InterNet, or network of networks, to
serve the centers and their users. In addition to gaining access to the
centers' computing technology, researchers at geographically dispersed
locations would be part of a nationwide research network across which they
could exchange scientific information. Although the primary role of NSFNET
remains access to NSF-funded supercomputers and other unique scientific
resources, its use as a general-purpose network, which enables scientists to
share research findings, is becoming increasingly important.
NSFnet Components
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
NSFNET is organized as a three-level hierarchy: The backbone; autonomously
administered wide-area networks serving communities of researchers; and campus
networks. The backbone has been in use since July 1986 and is fully
operational. It provides redundant paths among NSF supercomputer centers.
While several wide-area networks are already connected to the NSFNET backbone,
more are being built with partial funding from NSF and will be connected as
they are completed (see the section on NSFnet Component Networks).
SuperComputer Centers
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
NSF created the supercomputer centers in response to a growing concern that a
lack of access to sophisticated computing facilities had severely constrained
academic research. A project solicitation in June 1984 resulted in the
creation of the following centers -- the John Von Neumann National
Supercomputer Center in Princeton, New Jersey, the San Diego Supercomputer
Center on the campus of the University of California at San Diego, the National
Center for Supercomputing Applications at the University of Illinois, the
Cornell National Supercomputer Facility at Cornell University, and the
Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center under joint operation by Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, Carnegie-Mellon University, and the University of Pittsburgh. All
the centers are multi-disciplinary and are available to any researcher who is
eligible for NSF support. They offer access to computers made by Cray
Research, Inc., Control Data Corporation, ETA, and IBM. The Scientific
Computing Division of the National Center for Atmospheric Research is the sixth
center which is part of NSFNET. The SCD has been providing advanced computing
services to the atmospheric sciences community since the late 1960s.
Protocols
%%%%%%%%%
NSFNET is using the TCP/IP protocols of the DARPA InterNet as the initial
standard. The system will work toward adopting international standards as they
become established. The protocols link networks that are based on different
technologies and connection protocols, and provide a unified set of transport
and application protocols. As the NSFNET system continues to evolve, the
typical user working at a terminal or work station will be able to connect to
and use various computer resources -- including the supercomputer centers -- to
run interactive and batch jobs, receive output, transfer files, and communicate
with colleagues throughout the nation via electronic mail. Most researchers
will have either a terminal linked to a local super-minicomputer or a graphics
work station. These will be connected to a local area network that is
connected to a campus network, and, via a gateway system, to a wide-area
network.
Management
%%%%%%%%%%
Four institutions are sharing the interim management of NSFNET: The University
of Illinois (overall project management and network engineering), Cornell
University (network operations and initial technical support), the University
of Southern California Information Sciences Institute (protocol enhancement and
high-level technical support), and the University Corporation for Atmospheric
Research (management of the NSF Network Service Center through a contract with
BBN Laboratories, Inc.).
NSF Network Service Center
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
The NSF Network Service Center (NNSC) is providing general information about
NSFNET, including the status of NSF-supported component networks and
supercomputer centers. The NNSC, located at BBN Laboratories Inc. in
Cambridge, MA, is an NSF-sponsored project of the University Corporation for
Atmospheric Research.
The NNSC, which currently has information and documents on line and in printed
form, plans to distribute news through network mailing lists, bulletins,
newsletters, and on-line reports. The NNSC also maintains a database of
contact points and sources of additional information about the NSFNET component
networks and supercomputer centers.
When prospective or current users do not know whom to call concerning their
questions about NSFNET use, they should contact the NNSC. The NNSC will answer
general questions, and, for detailed information relating to specific
components of NSFNET, will help users find the appropriate contact for further
assistance.
In addition the NNSC will encourage the development and identification of local
campus network technical support to better serve NSFNET users in the future.
Connecting To NSFnet
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
NSFNET is part of a collection of interconnected IP-networks referred to
as the InterNet. IP, the Internet Protocol, is a network protocol which allows
heterogeneous networks to combine into a single virtual network. TCP, the
Transmission Control Protocol, is a transport protocol which implements the
packet loss and error-detection mechanisms required to maintain a reliable
connection between two points on the network. TCP/IP therefore offers reliable
delivery of data between heterogeneous computers on diverse networks. An
example of an application which uses TCP/IP is TELNET, which provides virtual
terminal service across the network.
Only IP-based networks can connect to the Internet; therefore, an organization
that plans to use NSFnet either must have an existing IP network or have access
to one. Many large universities and technical firms have links to the InterNet
in place. The computer science department of a university or the engineering
support division of a company are most likely to have IP connectivity or to
have information on the local connections that exist. Prospective users can
ask the NNSC to determine whether an organization is already connected to the
Internet.
If an organization does not have an IP link, it can obtain one in several ways:
*NSF has a program that funds the connecting of organizations to the
NSF regional/state/community networks that are part of NSFNET. The
NNSC has more information on this program.
*The Computer Science Network, CSNET, provides gateway service to
several IP-networks, including NSFNET. To get CSNET service, an
organization must become a CSNET member.
*Users may be able to get access to NSFNET through time-share
accounts on machines at other organizations, such as local
universities or companies.
Some supercomputer centers support access systems other than NSFNET,
such as Bitnet, commercial X.25 networks, and dial-up lines, which do not
use IP-based protocols. The Supercomputer Centers' user services
organizations can provide more information on these alternatives (see
list).
NSF COMPONENT NETWORKS
STATE AND REGIONAL NETWORKS
BARRNET (California's Bay Area Regional Research Network)
MERIT ( Michigan Educational Research Network)
MIDNET (Midwest Network)
NORTHWESTNET (Northwestern states)
NYSERNET (New York State Educational and Research Network)
SESQUINET (the Texas Sesquicentennial Network)
SURANET (the Southeastern Universities Research Association Network)
WESTNET (Southwestern states)
CONSORTIUM NETWORKS
JVNCNET connects the John Von Neumann National Supercomputer Center
at Princeton, NJ, with a number of universities.
PSCAANET is the network of the Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center
Academic Affiliates group.
SDSCNET is centered at the San Diego Supercomputer Center.
_______________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 26, File 5 of 11
COSMOS
COmputer System for Mainframe OperationS
Part One
by King Arthur
Introduction
%%%%%%%%%%%%
Throughout the last decade, computers have played an ever growing role in
information storage and retrieval. In most companies, computerized databases
have replaced a majority of all paper records. Where in the past it would take
10 minutes for someone to search through stacks of paper for some data, the
same information can now be retrieved from a computer in a fraction of a
second.
Previously, proprietary information could be considered "safe" in a file
cabinet; the only way to see the data would be to have physical access to the
files. Now, somebody with a computer terminal and a modem can make a quick
phone call and access private records. It's unfortunate that there are
"hackers" who try to gain unauthorized access to computers. Yet, it is just as
unfortunate that most reported computer break-ins could have been prevented if
more thought and common sense went into protecting computers.
Hackers
%%%%%%%
There have been many cases of computer crime reported by the Bell
Operating Companies (BOCs), but it is hard to say how many actual break-ins
there are. Keep in mind that the only reported cases are those which are
detected. In an interview with an anonymous hacker, I was told of one of the
break-ins that may not have ever been reported. "My friend got the number when
he misdialed his business office -- that's how we knew that it was the phone
company's. It seems this Unix was part of some real big Bellcore computer
network," says the hacker.
The hacker explains that this system was one of many systems used by the
various BOCs to allow large Centrex customers to rearrange their Centrex
groups. It seems he found a text file on the system with telephone numbers and
passwords for some of Bellcore's development systems. "On this Bellcore system
in Jersey, called CCRS, we found a list of 20 some-odd COSMOS systems....
Numbers, passwords, and wire centers from all over the country!" He adds,
"Five states to be exact."
The hacker was able to gain access to the original Unix system because, as
he says, "Those guys left all the default passwords working." He was able to
login with a user name of "games" with the password being "games." "Once we
were on we found that a large number of accounts didn't have passwords. Mary,
John, test, banana, and system were some, to name a few." From there he was
able to eventually access several COSMOS database systems -- with access to ALL
system files and resources.
COSMOS
%%%%%%
COSMOS, an acronym for the COmputer System for Mainframe OperationS, is a
database package currently supported by Bellcore. COSMOS is presently being
used by every BOC, as well as by Cincinnati Bell and Rochester Telephone.
COSMOS replaces paper record-keeping and other mechanized record systems for
plant administration. COSMOS' original purpose was to alleviate congestion in
the Main Distributing Frame (MDF) by maintaining the shortest jumpers.
It can now maintain load balance in a switch and assign office equipment,
tie pairs, bridge lifters and the like. Additional applications allow COSMOS
to aid in "cutting-over" a new switch, or even generate recent change messages
to be input into electronic switches. COSMOS is most often used for
provisioning new service and maintaining existing service, by the following
departments: The frame room (MDF), the Loop Assignment Center (LAC), the
Recent Change Memory Assistance Center (RCMAC), the network administration
center, and the repair service.
Next year COSMOS will celebrate its 15th birthday, which is quite an
accomplishment for a computer program. The first version or "generic" of
COSMOS was released by Bell Laboratories in 1974. In March 1974, New Jersey
Bell was the first company to run COSMOS, in Passaic, New Jersey. Pacific
Telesis, NYNEX, Southern Bell, and many of the other BOCs adopted COSMOS soon
after. Whereas Southwestern Bell waited until 1977, the Passaic, NJ Wire
Center is still running COSMOS today.
Originally COSMOS ran on the DEC PDP 11/45 minicomputer. The package was
written in Fortran, and ran the COSNIX operating system. Later it was adapted
to run on the DEC PDP 11/70, a larger machine. Beverly Cruse, member of
Technical Staff, COSMOS system design at Bellcore, says, "COSNIX is a
derivation of Unix 1.0, it started out from the original Unix, but it was
adapted for use on the COSMOS project. It bears many similarities to Unix, but
more to the early versions of Unix than the current... The COSMOS application
now runs on other hardware understandard Unix."
"The newest version of COSMOS runs on the standard Unix System V operating
system. We will certify it for use on particular processors, based on the
needs of our clients," says Ed Pinnes, the District Manager of COSMOS system
design at Bellcore. This Unix version of COSMOS was written in C language.
Currently, COSMOS is available for use on the AT&T 3B20 supermini computer,
running under the Unix System V operating system. "There are over 700 COSMOS
systems total, of which a vast majority are DEC PDP 11/70's. The number
fluctuates all the time, as companies are starting to replace 11/70's with the
other machines," says Cruse.
In 1981 Bell Laboratories introduced an integrated systems package for
telephone companies called the Facility Assignment Control System (FACS). FACS
is a network of systems that exchanges information on a regular basis. These
are: COSMOS, Loop Facilities Assignment and Control System (LFACS), Service
Order Analysis and Control (SOAC), and Work Manager (WM). A service order from
the business office is input in to SOAC. SOAC analyzes the order and then
sends an assignment request, via the WM, to LFACS. WM acts as a packet switch,
sending messages between the other components of FACS. LFACS assigns
distribution plant facilities (cables, terminals, etc.) and sends the order
back to SOAC. After SOAC receives the information form LFACS, it sends an
assignment request to COSMOS. COSMOS responds with data for assigning central
office equipment: Switching equipment, transmission equipment, bridge lifters,
and the like. SOAC takes all the information from LFACS and COSMOS and appends
it to the service order, and sends the service order on its way.
Computer Security
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Telephone companies seem to take the brunt of unauthorized access
attempts. The sheer number of employees and size of most telephone companies
makes it very difficult to keep tabs on everyone and everything. While
researching computer security, it has become evident that COSMOS is a large
target for hackers. "The number of COSMOS systems around, with dial-ups on
most of the machines... makes for a lot of possible break-ins," says Cruse.
This is why it's all the more important for companies to learn how to protect
themselves.
"COSMOS is power, the whole thing is a big power trip, man. It's like Big
Brother -- you see the number of some dude you don't like in the computer. You
make a service order to disconnect it; COSMOS is too stupid to tell you from a
real telco dude," says one hacker. "I think they get what they deserve:
There's a serious dearth of security out there. If kids like us can get access
this easily, think about the real enemy -- the Russians," jokes another.
A majority of unauthorized access attempts can be traced back to an
oversight on the part of the system operators; and just as many are the fault
of the systems' users. If you can keep one step ahead of the hackers,
recognize these problems now, and keep an eye out for similar weaknesses, you
can save your company a lot of trouble.
A hacker says, "In California, a friend of mine used to be able to find
passwords in the garbage. The computer was supposed to print some garbled
characters on top of the password. Instead the password would print out AFTER
the garbled characters." Some COSMOS users have half duplex printing
terminals. At the password prompt COSMOS is supposed to print a series of
characters and then send backspaces. Then the user would enter his or her
password. When the password is printed on top of the other characters, you
can't see what it is. If the password is being printed after the other
characters, then the printing terminal is not receiving the back space
characters properly.
Another big problem is lack of password security. As mentioned before,
regarding CCRS, many accounts on some systems will lack passwords. "On COSMOS
there are these standardized account names. It makes it easier for system
operators to keep track of who's using the system. For instance: all accounts
that belong to the frame room will have an MF in them. Like MF01, you can tell
it belongs to the frame room. (MF stands for Main Frame.) Most of these names
seem to be common to most COSMOS systems everywhere. In one city, none of
these user accounts have passwords. All you need is the name of the account
and you're in. In another city, which will remain unnamed, the passwords are
the SAME AS THE DAMN NAMES! Like, MF01 has a password of MF01. These guys
must not be very serious about security."
One of the biggest and in my eyes one of the scariest problems around is
what hackers refer to as "social engineering". Social engineering is basically
the act of impersonating somebody else for the sake of gaining proprietary
information. "I know this guy. He can trick anybody, does the best BS job
I've ever seen. He'll call up a telco office, like the repair service bureau,
that uses COSMOS. We found that most clerks at the repair service aren't too
sharp." The hacker said the conversation would usually take the following
course:
Hacker: Hi, this is Frank, from the COSMOS computer center. We've had a
problem with our records, and I'm wondering if you could help me?
Telco: Oh, what seems to be the problem?
H: We seem to have lost some user data. Hopefully, if I can correct the
problem, you people won't lose any access time today. Could you tell me
what your system login name is?
T: Well, the one I use is RS01.
H: Hmm, this could present a problem. Can you tell me what password and wire
center you use that with?
T: Well, I just type s-u-c-k-e-r for my password, and my wire centers are: TK,
KL, GL, and PK.
H: Do you call into the system, or do you only have direct connect terminals?
T: Well, when I turn on my machine I get a direct hook up. It just tells me
to login. But I know in the back they have to dial something. Hold on,
let me check. (3 Minutes later...) Well, she says all she does is call
555-1212.
H: OK, I think I have everything taken care of. Thanks, have a nice day.
T: Good, so I'm not gonna have any problems?
H: No, but if you do just give the computer center a call, and we'll take care
of it.
T: Oh, thank you honey. Have a nice day now.
"It doesn't work all the time, but we get away with it a good part of the
time. I guess they just don't expect a call from someone who isn't really part
of their company," says the hacker. "I once social engineered the COSMOS
control center. They gave me dial-ups for several systems, and even gave me
one password. I told them I was calling from the RCMAC and I was having
trouble logging into COSMOS," says another.
This last problem illustrates a perfect example of what I mean when I say
these problems can be prevented if more care and common sense went into
computer security. "Sometimes, if we want to get in to COSMOS, but we don't
have the password, we call a COSMOS dial-up at about 5 o'clock. To logoff of
COSMOS you have to hit a CONTROL-Y. If you don't, the next person who calls
will resume where you left off. A lot of the time, people forget to logoff.
They just turn their terminals off, in the rush of going home."
The past examples do not comprise the only way hackers get into systems,
but most of the problems shown here can exist regardless of what types of
systems your company has. The second article deals with solutions to these
problems.
_______________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 26, File 6 of 11
+-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-+
Basic Concepts of Translation
Brought to you by
The Dead Lord
and
The Chief Executive Officers
February 17, 1989
+-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-+
This tutorial is meant for the hardcore hackers who have entered the world of
ESS switches. The information here is useful and valuable, although not
invaluable. You can easily reap the benefits of access to a switch even if you
only know RC:LINE, but to really learn the system in and out, the concepts
about translation are ones that need to be mastered.
In electromechanical switches, switching was directly controlled by whatever
the customer dialed. If a 5 were dialed, the selector moved across 5
positions, and so on. There were no digit storing devices like registers and
senders. As the network grew larger, this became inefficient and switching
systems using digit storage and decoding devices were put into use. In this
type of setup, the customer dials a number, which is stored in a register, or
sender. The sender then uses a decoder and gives the contents of the register
as input. The decoder translates the input into a format that can be used to
complete the call, and sends this translation back to the digit storage device.
This is a simplified example of translation, since the only input was dialed
digits and the only output was routable information, but it shows what
translation is: The changing of information from one form to another.
When 1 ESS was first tested in Morris, Illinois in 1960, it introduced a
switching method called Stored Program Control. Instead of switching and logic
functions being handled by hardware, it was done through computer programs.
This greatly expanded the translation function. Because calls are handled by
many programs, information must be provided for each program. For example,
when a customer picks up a phone, the switch needs to know if outgoing service
is being denied, if the line is being observed, line class, special equipment
features, etc. The line equipment number is given to the translation program
as input. The translator translates the LEN and produces the answers to these
and other pertinent questions in a coded form that can be used by the central
processor of the switch.
If the call is an interoffice call, the first three dialed digits are given to
a translator as input and they translate into a route index and, possibly,
other information. The route index, in turn, is given as input to another
translator, which translates into: Which trunk to use (trunk identity),
transmitter identity, the alternate route, etc. So actually, in early systems,
translation was a single shot thing, and in Stored Program Control Systems
(SPCS), the translation function is used many many times.
In the 1 ESS, translation data is stored on magnetic memory cards in the
program store. However, since translation data is constantly being changed,
there is a provision made to store the changes in an area of the call store
memory. The area of call store is called the recent change (RC) area. The
changes are eventually transcribed from the call store into the program store
by a memory card writer.
In the 1A ESS, translation data is stored in the unduplicated call store, with
backup in the form of disk memory called file store. Additionally, magnetic
tapes are made of the translation area of call store. When a change in
translation is made, the change is entered in a duplicated copy of call store.
After checks are made as to the validity of the change (format and everything),
the change is then placed in the unduplicated copy of call store. After that,
the change is also written to a set of disk files in file store. Before the
new data is written, the old data is written to a part of the disk file called
"rollback."
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| DATA | 1 ESS | 1A ESS |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| Transient | Duplicated | Duplicated |
|Information | Call Store | Call Store |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| Generic | Duplicated |Program Store|
| Program |Program Store| |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| Parameter | Duplicated |Unduplicated |
| Table |Program Store| Call Store |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
|Translation | Duplicated |Unduplicated |
|Information |Call Store + | Call Store |
| |Program Store| |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
Transient Information: Telephone calls or data messages in progress; present
state of all lines, junctors, and trunks in the
office.
Generic Program: The operating intelligence of the system. It
controls actions like line and trunk scanning,
setting up and taking down connections, etc.
Parameter Table: Informs the generic program of the size and makeup of
the office. This information includes equipment
items (frames and units), call store allocation (call
registers, hoppers, queues, etc.) and office options
(days AMA tapes will be switched, etc.).
Translation Information: Day to day changeable info which is accessed by
translator programs. Also includes form tables,
lists called "translators" which are linked in an
hierarchical pattern.
This is a quote from Engineering and Operations in the Bell System, pages
415-416:
"The 1 ESS includes a fully duplicated No. 1 Central Processor Unit
(Central Control includes the generic program), program store bus,
call store bus, program stores, and call stores. The 1 ESS uses
permanent magnet twister program store modules as basic memory
elements. These provide a memory that is fundamentally read only,
and have a cycle time of 5.5 microseconds. The call store provides
"scratch pad," or temporary duplicated memory.
As with the 1 ESS, the 1A CPU has a CPU, prog store bus, and call
store bus that are fully duplicated. However, the 1A processor uses
readable and writable memory for both prog and call stores, and has
a cycle time of 700 nanoseconds. However, the program stores aren't
fully duplicated, but 2 spare stores are provided for reliability.
A portion of the call store is duplicated, but only one copy of
certain fault recognition programs, parameter information, and
translation data is provided. An extra copy of the unduplicated
prog and call store is provided for in file store."
The program store translation area in the 1 ESS and the unduplicated call store
translation area in the 1A ESS contain all the info that can change from day to
day for that office. Here is a list of things that are stored in the
translation area:
+ Line Equipment Number (LEN), Directory Number (DN), trunk assignments (all
explained later).
+ Office codes.
+ Rate and route information.
+ Traffic measurement information.
+ Associated miscellaneous info for call processing and charging.
Call store can be thought of as RAM; it is filled as long as the ESS is
powered.
Program store is like ROM; it is physically written onto magnetic cards. File
store is simply information stored on magnetic tapes (or disk drives). All
data that's changeable (rate and route, customers' features, trunk selection,
alternate paths, etc.) is called translation data and is stored in the
translation area.
Changes in translation are called recent changes and are stored in an area
called the recent change area.
Once again, I stress that this article is sort of a "masters" file for hackers
who are interested in ESS. If the concepts are too difficult, don't panic.
Knowledge comes with time. Don't feel bad if you don't catch on right away.
Translation data is stored in the form of tables or lists. Each table is
linked in a hierarchical pattern. Tables high in the hierarchy contain
pointers (addresses) to the lower tables. Tables low in the hierarchy contain
the actual data.
Most translators are broken down into subtranslators, which are linked by a
Head Table, or "HT". The HT points to the different ST's stored in memory, in
the same way that a table of contents in a book points to the pages of each
chapter. This way, when a new feature is added, it's just a matter of adding a
new entry in the HT, and having the entry point to a newly stored ST.
Translation input is divided into 2 parts: the selector and the index. The
selector determines which ST to access, and the index determines which item
(word number) in that particular ST to access. In some cases, the translation
information may not fit into the space allotted to an ST, so pointers to
auxiliary blocks and/or expansion tables may have to be given. You can think
of a BASIC program, where a GOSUB points to a subroutine at location 4000.
Now, if the subroutine is 100 bytes long, but you only have room for 75,
another GOSUB must be issued to point to the rest of the subroutine. So a full
translator is quite a large unit -- it can have a head table, subtranslators,
auxiliary blocks, abbreviated codes, lists, subauxiliary blocks and expansion
tables. The example below shows a custom calling feature that exists on 5 ESS:
Dog Control Frequency, "DCF". In the e below diagram, DCF represents the Head
Table, and has a list of pointers that identify the location of subtranslators
"A" through "D". The data field "2" in subtranslator "D" is too small to store
the entire subroutine, so an expansion table "2A" was produced to house the
entire program.
* D.C.F. * head table
|
|
|------|-----------|--------|
| | | |
A B C D subtranslators
|
---1 data: tables
|or
---2 ---->| lists
| |
---3 |
| |
etc % / expansion
2-Atable
ESS programs access translators by locating their octal address in the Master
Head Table, which is also called the Base Translator.
1 ESS MHT
%%%%%%%%%
The 1 ESS has 2 copies of the MHT: One in program store, and one in call
store. The copy in call store is the one that's used normally, since call
store memory has a faster cycle time. The one in program store is there for
backup. The MHT is 338 bytes long (23 bit bytes), and as we mentioned, is used
as a sort of directory for locating translators. The MHT can point to starting
addresses of Head Tables (which point to translators), or to tables and lists.
Head Tables point to subtranslators. Subtranslators can point to auxiliary and
expansion blocks, lists, or tables.
There is another Master Head Table called the Auxiliary Master Head Table,
which points to other translators. There are 2 copies of the AMHT, one in
program and one in call store. The AMHT is found by accessing the MHT, and for
those interested, the address of the AMHT is located in the 28th byte of the
MHT. The MHT is fixed; meaning that the first byte will ALWAYS be the address
of the DN translator. The last byte will ALWAYS be the address to the JNNL to
JNNT/JCN Head Table (explained later). ESS needs a table to read this table.
Otherwise, how would it know what byte leads where? There is a "T-reading
octal program" located at (octal address) 1105615 in the parameter area in the
program store.This address is stored in the generic program and is used to read
the Master Head Table.
1A ESS
%%%%%%
A 1A ESS switch call store byte contains 26 bits, named 0 through 25, which is
a lot more than I can say about an Apple... Bits 24 and 25 are used for parity,
and are not used for data. This leads to what is known as a K-code. No, a
K-code is not used by lowly software K-rad pirates, but it is used by us ESS
hackers. Each call store K-code contains 65,536 bytes, and can be thought of
as a "page" of memory.
Anyway, translation data is stored in the unduplicated call store. Remember,
we're still talking about 1A ESS. In generic 1AE6 and earlier, unduplicated
call store starts at K-code 17, and as more translation data is fed into the
system, it pushes down into K-code 16, 15, 14, etc. In generic 7 and above,
call store has been increased by a great deal, because of a huge memory
expansion unit. On the early generics, the entire call store and program store
had to fit in 38 K-codes. In the later generics, there are 38 K-codes assigned
to call store (that's split between duplicated and unduplicated), and another
38 K-codes for program store.
Not all K-codes may be used, so it's not really a full 38 K-codes, but hey, you
can't have all your memory and use it too. Anyhow, because generics 1A E7 and
higher have such huge call store memories, it's convenient to divide call store
into 3 parts: The "duplicated call store" (DCS), which is located at the very
top of the memory map, the "low unduplicated call store," (LUCS), which is
located in the middle of call store, and the "high unduplicated call store,"
(HUCS). The LUCS area starts at K-code 17 and goes down as it fills up (being
very watchful about not going into the DCS area. The HUCS area starts at
K-code 37 and goes down as it fills up to K-code 20, being mindful not to step
on LUCS's toes. Translators are classified as being either HUCS or LUCS
translators, (but not both).
LUCS translators aren't fixed; they can exist anywhere in the area as long as
they're identified by the MHT. HUCS translators can either be fixed or not
fixed. Note that in generics 1AE6 and earlier, there is no such distinction,
because there's not enough memory to make such a distinction feasible. As for
the location of the MHT, in generic 1AE6 and earlier, it's located in K-code 17
at octal address 3724000, and is 1376 bytes long. The later MHT's were moved
to K-code 37 at octal address 7720000, and is 3424 bytes long.
Translator Types
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
As I said, translators take data as input and change it into another form for
output. All translators exist in the form of hierarchical lists and tables.
They reside in call store on 1A's and program store on 1's. The higher data in
a translator points to the location of the lower data. The lower data contains
the actual information. The different translators are located by the Master
Head Table, which contains pointers to all the translators in the system. The
kind of data that needs to be translated is changeable data.
For example:
o line equipment number
o directory number
o 3/6 digit codes
o trunk network number to trunk group number
o trunk network number to peripheral equipment number
Now, there are two types of translators: Multilevel and expansion. The
multilevel translators contain a maximum of six levels of information in the
form of linked hierarchical tables:
1- Head Table
2- Subtranslator
3- Primary translator word
4- Auxiliary block or expansion table
5- List
6- Subauxiliary block
(1) Head Table: The HT is the "directory" for the translator. It contains
addresses or pointers to each subtranslator.
(2) Subtranslator: The ST's are the main subdivisions, so as an office grows
larger, or as more features are added, the number of ST's grows larger.
For example, there is a translator for every 1,000 directory numbers, so if
an office grows from 3,000 to 8,000 lines, an extra 5 subtranslators must
be added. Input for translation must contain 2 things: A selector and an
index. The selector contains the information as to which subtranslator to
use (in the case of DCF, the selector would either be an A, B, C, or D).
The index shows which item or word in that particular subtranslator to
access. In the DCF example, if the selector were "D", the index could be
1, 2, 3, etc.
(3) Primary Translation Word (PTW): Each index points to a PTW, which is a
byte of information. Often, all you need is 1 byte of information
(remember that each byte is 23 bits!). If the data isn't stored in the
PTW, an address will be there to point to an auxiliary block or expansion
table, where the data will be found. The ESS can recognize whether the
byte contains data or an address by:
1 ESS) The 3 most significant bits will be 0.
1A ESS) The 4 most significant bits will be 0.
So, if all the 3 (or 4 for 1A) most significant bits contain 0's, the word
will be interpreted as an address. (Anyone want to throw the ESS switch
into an endless loop????)
(4) Auxiliary Block: The first byte in the AB contains the length of the
block. This byte is called the word number (WRDN), and is used by the ESS
so it knows where the auxiliary block ends. Remember that when the ESS
reads data, all it sees is:
110001011000101010100100101110010010101000101010100100101111
So, in order to stop at the end of the block, the WRDN number must be
present.
(5) List: The list is used when additional information other than the standard
found in the auxiliary block is needed. The list, like the ST, has an
associated index. The address of the list is found in the AB and the index
shows which item of data in the list should be looked at. A good example
of what kind of information is found in the list would be a speed calling
list.
(6) Subauxiliary Block: The list is only large enough to hold a 7 digit phone
number, and if more information has to be stored (like a 10 digit phone
number or a trunk identity), an address is stored in the list that points
to an SB, which acts very much like an AB.
Expansion Translator
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
The expansion translator has one table (called an expansion table). This type
of translator gets only an index as input, since this type of translator is
only a bunch of words. It could have auxiliary blocks, if the space allocated
to a word is too small.
RECENT CHANGE AREA OF CALL STORE (1 ESS)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
The recent change area consists of:
+ primary recent change area
+ auxiliary recent change area
+ customer originated recent change (CORC)
The starting and ending addresses for these rc areas are stored in the MHT.
The primary recent change area is used to store changes affecting primary
translation words. Each change is stored in a primary RC register, which
consists of two 23 bit bytes. These two bytes contain status bits, primary
translation address in the program store, and the primary translation word
(PTW) address in call store. The first byte in the register is the "address
word" (AW) and the second is the new primary translation word. When looking
through the AW, bits 22 and 21 can tell you what kind of recent change is being
implemented:
11: temporary (not to be put into PS)
10: permanent (to be put into PS)
01: delayed (not active yet)
00: deleted (this space is available)
The PTW (abbreviations make things SO much easier) contains the translation
data or the address of the auxiliary RC (TAG). You can tell whether the data
is an RC or an address by looking at bits 22 to 18. If they are 0, then this
byte contains an address, which is stored in bits 17 to 0.
_______________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 26, File 7 of 11
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
<> <>
<> PHONE BUGGING <>
<> <>
<> Telecom's Underground Industry <>
<> <>
<> By Split Decision <>
<> <>
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
In today's landscape of insider trading, leveraged buyouts and merger mania,
it is no great shock that a new underground industry has developed within
telecom -- eavesdropping.
Bugs are cheap (starting at $30) and can be installed in as little as 10
seconds. And you can bet your bottom $1 million that this expense pales in
comparison to the rewards of finding out your takeover plans, marketing
strategies, and product developments.
According to Fritz Lang of Tactical Research Devices (Brewster, NY), there is a
virtual epidemic of bugging going on in the American marketplace. Counter-
surveillance agencies like TRD have sprung up all over. They search for
eavesdropping equipment, then notify the client if they're being tapped. It's
up to the client to respond to the intrusion.
Each of TRD's employees is a retired CIA or FBI operative. Formerly, they
planted bugs for Uncle Sam. Since it's illegal to plant bugs for anyone else,
these men now engage in counter surveillance work, pinpointing eavesdropping
devices, and sometimes the culprits who put them there, for TRD's client
companies.
Where Do They Put The Bugs?
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Your TELEPHONE, of course, is a convenient place to install an eavesdropping
device. But this doesn't mean that the illegal tapping will be limited to your
phone conversations.
Electronic phones have microphones which are always "live," even when the
telephone is on-hook. Stick an amplifier and transmitting unit to the
microphone, and you have constant surveillance of all conversations taking
place in that room, whether or not the phone is off-hook at the time.
A device rapidly gaining popularity among today's wire-tappers is a mouthpiece
containing a tiny bug, which looks exactly like the one of your 2500 set. All
it takes is one trip to the water cooler or the men's room for the insider to
surreptitiously make the old switcheroo.
LOUDSPEAKERS are another favorite location for wire-tappers, because they can
pick up conversations when not in use. Paging systems, piped in music, and
telephone systems all employ some variety of amplifier which the culprit can
use to his advantage.
LINE INTERCEPTORS allow eavesdroppers more extensive coverage of your
activities, since they can monitor more than on-line communications from a
single listening post.
But really, the number of places you can find a bug is limited only by the
tapper's imagination. Light switches, plugs, clocks, calculators, legs of
wooden chairs, staplers, ashtrays, the underside of a toilet bowl -- all of
these items have proved fertile territory for the little critters.
Tools For Finding The Bugs
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
TRD's people use a patented Surveillance Search Receiver to locate the bugs.
The Receiver uses a broad-band radio spectrum, from 25 kHz to 7 gHz.
If there is an unaccounted-for radio frequency emission on the premises, the
Receiver will tune it in on a small spectrum monitor. It then traces the
emission to its inevitable source, the bug.
For room bugs, they also use a Non-Linear Junction Detector, which can pinpoint
all electronic circuit diodes or resistors in the architecture of the building.
The Detector emits a high microwave signal into walls, furniture, et al.,
causing any circuit hidden within to oscillate. As soon as they oscillate,
they become detectable.
Mr. Lang clears up a misconception about the Russians bugging our embassy in
Moscow. "They didn't riddle the building with actual bugs, instead, they
buried millions of little resistors in the concrete."
The embassy, therefore, became a hot bed for false alarms. Whenever the
American counter-measure people came in with their detectors to look for a bug,
they'd pick up oscillation readings from the countless resistors and
capacitors buried in the walls. Finding any real bugs would be infinitely more
difficult than finding the old needle in a haystack.
For finding wire-taps along the phone lines, TRD uses a computerized electronic
Telephone Analyzer. The unit runs 18 different tests on phone lines between
the CPE block and the Central Office (CO). Resistance, voltage, and line
balance are just a few of them. Once they locate a tapped line, they send a
pulse down it with a time-domain reflectometer, which can pinpoint exactly
where in the line the bug has been affixed.
Bear in mind that wire-tapping is extremely difficult and time consuming. As
much as 20 hours of conversations has to be monitored every single business
day. Because of this, key executives' telephones are usually the only ones
slated for a wire-tap.
Catching The Culprit
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Finding a wire-tap is easier than finding the spy who bugged your office.
Direct hardwire taps can be traced to the remote location where the snoop
stores his voltage-activated electronic tape recorder. After you've found the
monitoring post, it's a matter of hanging around the premises until someone
comes to collect the old tapes and put in fresh ones.
As for room bugs, your best bet is to make the device inoperable, without
removing it, and wait for the eavesdropping to come back to fix or replace it.
Once Is Never Enough
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Some of TRD's clients have their offices checked monthly, some quarterly.
After the initial sweep, you can have equipment installed on your phone lines
which constantly monitors any funny stuff.
As for TRD, they offer a money-back guarantee if they fail to detect an
existing bug on your premises. Mr. Lang assures us that Fortune 500 company
has been bugged to a greater or lesser extent. That's how out-of-hand the
problem is getting.
Toward the end of our conversation, Mr. Lang pauses. "So you're really going
to print this, huh? You're really on the up and up?" Then he spills the
beans.
It turns out Mr. Fritz Lang is really Mr. Frank Jones (he says), a licensed
private investigator with a broad reputation in the industry. He used the
alias because he suspected I was from a rival counter-measure agency, or worse,
a wire-tapper, trying to infiltrate his operations.
Which quite possibly I am. You can't trust anybody in this spy business.
_______________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 26, File 8 of 11
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
<> <>
<> Future Transcendent Saga Appendix III <>
<> "Limbo To Infinity" <>
<> <>
<> Internet Domains <>
<> <>
<> April 1989 <>
<> <>
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
Special thanks goes out to Henry Nussbacher who did the actual compiling of
this list. For those of you on Bitnet, you may have seen this previously in
the form of BITNET GATES.
For readers who are a little unsure of what this file shows, I will try to
explain a little. As you already know from the Future Transcendent Saga, there
are many different networks all around the world. Most of these networks are
connected in some way, usually all being called the Internet.
Now, as you should know, Taran King and Knight Lighting both have addresses on
Bitnet that are on the node UMCVMB.BITNET. However, this node also exists
on the Internet in a different form: UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU.
EDU is the Internet domain for academic nodes. Not every node on Bitnet has a
translation on the Internet. Then again, only a small fraction of the
nodes on Internet have Bitnet equivalents.
So what this file really shows is what network you are sending mail to when you
have an address that contains a nodename or routing designation that looks a
little strange. For people on Bitnet it also shows what Bitnet address serves
as the gateway between Bitnet and whichever network they are sending to on the
Internet.
The following is a table of gateways between Bitnet and other networks. It is
in the format of;
Domain: The upper level recognized name by the Columbia University VM
mail system.
Name: The descriptive name of this network.
Gateway: Where the mail is sent to in Bitnet. Unless otherwise specified,
the gateway expects to receive a BSMTP (Batch Simple Mail
Transfer Protocol) envelope. Users in general do not need to
worry about the contents of this field. This is not a mailbox
for general questions but rather the server machine (daemon) that
acts as the transporter of mail from one network to another.
Software postmasters are expected to configure their system so
that their system sends to the nearest gateway and not to the
default gateway.
Translation: Upon occasion, certain addresses will be translated internally to
point to an indirect gateway. In such a case, the complete
address is specified.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Internet Commercial Clients (COM)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Domain: COM
Name: Internet - Commerical clients
Gateway: SMTP@INTERBIT
Domain: CRD.GE.COM
Name: General Electric Corporate Research & Development
Gateway: MAILER@GECRDVM1
Domain: HAC.COM
Name: Hughes Aircraft Co. Local Area Network
Gateway: SMTPUSER@YMIR
Domain: STARGATE.COM
Name: Stargate Information Service
Gateway: SMTP@UIUCVMD
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Internet Academic Clients (EDU)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Domain: EDU
Name: Internet - Academic clients
Gateway: SMTP@INTERBIT
Domain: ARIZONA.EDU
Name: University of Arizona, Tucson
Gateway: SMTPUSER@ARIZRVAX
Domain: BATES.EDU
Name: Bates College Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@DARTCMS1
Domain: CMSA.BERKELEY.EDU
Name: University of California at Berkeley
Gateway: MAILER@UCBCMSA
Domain: BERKELEY.EDU
Name: University of California at Berkeley Campus Mail Network
Gateway: BSMTP@UCBJADE
Domain: BU.EDU
Name: Boston University Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@BUACCA
Domain: BUCKNELL.EDU
Name: Bucknell University Local Area Network
Gateway: SMTP@BKNLVMS
Domain: BUFFALO.EDU
Name: State University of New York at Buffalo
Gateway: SMTP@UBVM
Domain: BYU.EDU
Name: Brigham Young University Campus Network
Gateway: MAILER@BYUADMIN
Domain: CALTECH.EDU
Name: California Institute of Technology local area network
Gateway: MAILER@HAMLET
Domain: CLAREMONT.EDU
Name: Claremont Colleges Local Area Network
Gateway: SMTPUSER@YMIR
Domain: CLARKSON.EDU
Name: Clarkson University Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@CLVM
Domain: CMU.EDU
Name: Carnegie Mellon University Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@CMUCCVMA
Domain: COLORADO.EDU
Name: University of Colorado at Boulder Local Area Network
Gateway: SMTPUSER@COLORADO
Domain: COLUMBIA.EDU
Name: Columbia University Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@CUVMA
Domain: CONNCOLL.EDU
Name: Connecticut College Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@CONNCOLL
Domain: CORNELL.EDU
Name: Cornell University
Gateway: MAL@CORNELLC
Domain: CUN.EDU
Name: University of Puerto Rico
Gateway: SMTPUSER@UPRENET
Domain: CUNY.EDU
Name: City University of New York
Gateway: SMTP@CUNYVM
Domain: DARTMOUTH.EDU
Name: Dartmouth College Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@DARTCMS1
Domain: GATECH.EDU
Name: Georgia Institute of Technology Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@GITVM1
Domain: HAMPSHIRE.EDU
Name: Hampshire College Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@HAMPVMS
Domain: HARVARD.EDU
Name: Harvard University Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@HARVARDA
Domain: HAWAII.EDU
Name: University of Hawaii Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@UHCCUX
Domain: IASTATE.EDU
Name: Iowa State University Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@ISUMVS
Domain: KSU.EDU
Name: Kansas State University
Gateway: MAILER@KSUVM
Domain: LEHIGH.EDU
Name: Lehigh University Campus Network
Gateway: SMTPUSER@LEHIIBM1
Domain: LSU.EDU
Name: Louisiana State University local area network
Gateway: SMTPUSER@LSUVAX
Domain: MAINE.EDU
Name: University of Maine System
Gateway: MAILER@MAINE
Domain: MAYO.EDU
Name: Mayo Clinic LAN, Minnesota Regional Network
Gateway: SMTPUSER@UMNACVX
Domain: MIT.EDU
Name: MIT Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@MITVMA
Domain: NCSU.EDU
Name: North Carolina State University
Gateway: MAILER@NCSUVM
Domain: CCCC.NJIT.EDU
Name: NJIT Computer Conferencing Center
Gateway: MAILER@ORION
Comments: In process of establishing a single NJIT.EDU domain
Domain: NWU.EDU
Name: Northwestern University Local Area Network
Gateway: SMTPUSER@NUACC
Domain: NYU.EDU
Name: New York University/Academic Computing Facility LAN
Gateway: SMTP@NYUCCVM
Domain: OBERLIN.EDU
Name: Oberlin College
Gateway: SMTPUSER@OBERLIN
Domain: PEPPERDINE.EDU
Name: Pepperdine University
Gateway: MAILER@PEPVAX
Domain: PRINCETON.EDU
Name: Princeton University Local Area Network
Gateway: VMMAIL@PUCC
Domain: PURDUE.EDU
Name: Purdue University Campus Network
Gateway: MAILER@PURCCVM
Domain: RICE.EDU
Name: Rice University Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@RICE
Domain: ROSE-HULMAN.EDU
Name: Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology Local Area Network
Gateway: SMTPUSER@RHIT
Domain: SDSC.EDU
Name: San Diego Supercomputer Center
Gateway: MAILER@SDSC
Domain: STANFORD.EDU
Name: Stanford University Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@STANFORD
Domain: STOLAF.EDU
Name: St. Olaf College LAN, Minnesota Regional Network
Gateway: SMTPUSER@UMNACVX
Domain: SWARTHMORE.EDU
Name: Swarthmore College Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@SWARTHMR
Domain: SYR.EDU
Name: Syracuse University Local Area Network (FASTNET)
Gateway: SMTP@SUVM
Domain: TORONTO.EDU
Name: University of Toronto local area Network
Gateway: MAILER@UTORONTO
Domain: TOWSON.EDU
Name: Towson State University Network
Gateway: MAILER@TOWSONVX
Domain: TRINCOLL.EDU
Name: Trinity College - Hartford, Connecticut
Gateway: MAILER@TRINCC
Domain: TRINITY.EDU
Name: Trinity University
Gateway: MAILER@TRINITY
Domain: TULANE.EDU
Name: Tulane University local area Network
Gateway: MAILER@TCSVM
Domain: UAKRON.EDU
Name: University of Akron Campus Network
Gateway: MAILER@AKRONVM
Domain: UCAR.EDU
Name: National Center for Atmospheric Research Bldr CO
Gateway: SMTPSERV@NCARIO
Domain: UCHICAGO.EDU
Name: University of Chicago Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@UCHIMVS1
Domain: UCLA.EDU
Name: University of California Los Angeles
Gateway: MAILER@UCLAMVS
Domain: UCOP.EDU
Name: University of California, Office of the President
Gateway: BSMTP@UCBJADE
Domain: UCSB.EDU
Name: University of California, Santa Barbara
Gateway: MAILER@SBITP
Domain: UCSD.EDU
Name: University of California at San Diego Campus Mail Network
Gateway: MAILER@UCSD
Domain: UCSF.EDU
Name: Univ of California San Francisco Network
Gateway: BSMTP@UCSFCCA
Domain: UFL.EDU
Name: University of Florida, Gainesville, FL
Gateway: MAILER@NERVM
Domain: UGA.EDU
Name: University of Georgia Campus Network
Gateway: MAILER@UGA
Domain: UIC.EDU
Name: University of Illinois at Chicago
Gateway: MAILER@UICVM
Domain: UIUC.EDU
Name: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Local Area Network
Gateway: SMTP@UIUCVMD
Domain: UKANS.EDU
Name: University of Kansas
Gateway: SMTPUSER@UKANVAX
Domain: UKY.EDU
Name: University of Kentucky
Gateway: MAILER@UKCC
Domain: UMN.EDU
Name: University of Minnesota LAN, Minnesota Regional Network
Gateway: SMTPUSER@UMNACVX
Domain: UNL.EDU
Name: University of Nebraska Lincoln
Gateway: SMTPUSER@UNLVAX1
Domain: UOREGON.EDU
Name: University of Oregon
Gateway: SMTPUSER@OREGON
Domain: URICH.EDU
Name: University of Richmond network
Gateway: SMTPUSER@URVAX
Domain: UPENN.EDU
Name: University of Pennsylvania Campus Network
Gateway: SMTPUSER@PENNLRSM
Domain: USC.EDU
Name: University of Southern California, Los Angeles
Gateway: SMTP@USCVM
Domain: UTAH.EDU
Name: University of Utah Computer Center
Gateway: SMTPUSER@UTAHCCA
Domain: UVCC.EDU
Name: Utah Valley Community College
Gateway: SMTPUSER@UTAHCCA
Domain: VCU.EDU
Name: Virginia Commonwealth University Internetwork
Gateway: SMTPUSER@VCURUBY
Domain: WASHINGTON.EDU
Name: University of Washington Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@UWAVM
Domain: WESLEYAN.EDU
Name: Wesleyan University Local Area Network
Gateway: MAILER@WESLEYAN
Domain: WISC.EDU
Name: University of Wisconsin Local Area Network
Gateway: SMTPUSER@WISCMAC3
Domain: WVNET.EDU
Name: West Virginia Network for Educational Telecomputing
Gateway: MAILER@WVNVAXA
Domain: YALE.EDU
Name: Yale University Local Area Network
Gateway: SMTP@YALEVM
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
United States Of America Government Domains
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Domain: GOV
Name: Internet - Government clients
Gateway: SMTP@INTERBIT
Domain: JPL.NASA.GOV
Name: Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Gateway: MAILER@HAMLET
Domain: LBL.GOV
Name: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory
Gateway: MAILER@LBL
Domain: NBS.GOV
Name: National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gateway: SMTPUSER@NBSENH
Domain: NSESCC.GSFC.NASA.GOV
Name: NASA Space and Earth Sciences Computing Center
Gateway: MAILER@SCFVM
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Italian National Network (IT)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Domain: IT
Name: Italian national network
Gateway: MAILER@ICNUCEVX
Domain: TO.CNR.IT
Name: CNR (Italian Research Council) Network
Gateway: CNRGATE@ITOPOLI
Domain: INFN.IT
Name: Italian Research Network
Gateways: MAILER@IBOINFN
INFNGW@IPIVAXIN
Comments: IPIVAXIN is to only be used as a backup gateway in the event that
IBOINFN is broken.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Other Standard Domains Not Previously Detailed
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Domain: ARPA
Name: Advanced Research Projects Agency - US DOD
Gateway: SMTP@INTERBIT
Domain: AT
Name: University Network of Austria
Gateway: MAILER@AWIUNI11
Domain: BE
Name: Belgian Research Network
Gateway: MAILER@BEARN
Domain: CA
Name: Canadian mail domain
Gateway: MAILER@UTORGPU
Domain: CDN
Name: Canadian University X.400 Research Network
Gateway: MAILER@UWOCC1
Comments: The gateway at CERNVAX is no longer supported due to
the high cost of X.25 transfer over public data networks.
Domain: CERN
Name: Center for Nuclear Research Network
Gateways: 1) MAILER@UWOCC1
2) MAILER@CERNVAX
Domain: CH
Name: Swiss University Mail Network(s)
Gateway: MAILER@CEARN
Domain: CHUNET
Name: Swiss University pilot X.400 Network
Gateway: MAILER@CERNVAX
Domain: DBP.DE
Name: German X.400 National Network
Gateway: MAILER@DFNGATE
Domain: DE
Name: EARN view of German academic networks
Gateway: MAILER@DEARN
Domain: DK
Name: Denmark's Internet Domain
Gateway: MAILER@NEUVM1
Domain: ES
Name: Spanish Internet Domain
Gateway: MAILER@EB0UB011
Domain: FI
Name: Finland's Internet Domain
Gateway: MAILER@FINHUTC
Domain: FR
Name: French University pilot X.400 Network
Gateway: MAILER@CERNVAX
Domain: HEPnet
Name: High Energy Physics network
Gateway: MAILER@LBL
Domain: IE
Name: Ireland Academic X25 Network
Gateway: MAILER@IRLEARN
Domain: IL
Name: Israeli Academic Research Network
Gateway: MAILER@TAUNIVM
Domain: IS
Name: Icelands Internet Domain
Gateway: MAILER@NEUVM1
Domain: JP
Name: Japanese network
Gateway: MAILER@JPNSUT00
Domain: MFENET
Name: Magnetic Fusion Energy Network
Gateway: MFEGATE@ANLVMS
Domain: MIL
Name: Internet - Military clients
Gateway: SMTP@INTERBIT
Domain: NET
Name: Internet - Network gateways
Gateway: SMTP@INTERBIT
Domain: NL
Name: Netherlands Internet Domain
Gateway: MAILER@HEARN
Domain: NO
Name: Norwegian Internet domain
Gateway: MAILER@NORUNIX
Domain: ORG
Name: Internet - Organizational clients
Gateway: SMTP@INTERBIT
Domain: PT
Name: National Scientific Computation Network (of Portugal)
Gateway: MLNET@PTIFM
Domain: SE
Name: SUNET, Swedish University NETwork
Gateway: MAILER@SEKTH
Domain: SG
Name: Singapore National Network
Gateway: MAILER@NUSVM
Domain: SUNET
Name: Swedish University X.400 Network
Comments: The gateways at CERNVAX and UWOCC1 are no longer supported
due to the high cost of X.25 transfer over public data
networks -- see domain SE
Domain: UK
Name: United Kingdom University/Research Network (Janet)
Gateway: MAILER@UKACRL
Comments: NRSname is basically a reversal of the domain address.
Example: user@GK.RL.AC.UK becomes user%UK.AC.RL.GK@AC.UK
Domain: UNINETT
Name: Norwegian University pilot X.400 Network
Gateway: MAILER@NORUNIX
Domain: US
Name: Internet - USA clients
Gateway: SMTP@INTERBIT
Domain: UTORONTO
Name: University of Toronto local area Network
Gateway: MAILER@UTORONTO
Domain: UUCP
Name: Unix Network
Gateways: 1) MAILER@PSUVAX1 (USA)
2) MAILER@UWOCC1 (Canada)
3) BSMTP@UNIDO (Germany)
4) MAILER@MCVAX (Netherlands)
Alternate addressing: user%node.UUCP@HARVARD.HARVARD.EDU
user%node.UUCP@RUTGERS.EDU
Comments: Only users in Germany are allowed to send to UNIDO. All
European users are recommended to use MCVAX.
Domain: WUSTL
Name: Washington University local area Network
Gateway: GATEWAY@WUNET
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bitnet - Internet Regional Gateways
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Below is a list of those sites that will handle regional traffic between
Bitnet and the Internet:
SMTP@CUNYVM
SMT@CORNELLC
MAILER@MITVMA
MAILER@ICNUCEVM - available only for Italian nodes
You should *ALWAYS* use the generic address of SMTP@INTERBIT and never any of
the addresses mentioned above. The addresses stated above are for
informational and debugging purposes ONLY. Failure to abide by this rule will
cause the owners of the gateway to close their service to all Bitnet and EARN
users.
Indirect Domains
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Domains that are unreachable directly, but that the Internet exit of Mailer
knows how to translate:
Domain: DEC
Name: Digital Equipment Internal Network (Easynet)
Gateway: SMTP@INTERBIT
Sample: user@domain.DEC
Translated to: user%node.DEC@DECWRL.DEC.COM
Domain: OZ (soon to become OZ.AU)
Name: Australian University Network
Gateway: SMTP@INTERBIT
Sample: user@node.OZ
Translated to: user%node.OZ@UUNET.UU.NET
Domains that are unreachable directly but that are accessible by specifying the
address explicitly:
Name: Xerox Internal Use Only Network (Grapevine)
Sample: user.Registry@Xerox.Com
Name: IBM Internal Use Only Network (VNET)
Sample: user@Vnet
Comments: 1) Mail must be sent directly to user and not via a 3rd party
mailer (i.e. VM Mailer server)
2) User within Vnet must first receive approval within IBM to
establish a circuit and then initiate a virtual circuit. A user
within Bitnet may not establish communications with a VNET user,
without the above requirement.
3) This gateway is only open to selected nodes within IBM which
have ties with academia (i.e. ACIS).
_______________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 26, File 9 of 11
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
PWN PWN
PWN P h r a c k W o r l d N e w s PWN
PWN %%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%% %%%%%%% PWN
PWN Issue XXVI/Part 1 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN April 25, 1989 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Created, Written, and Edited PWN
PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
PWN PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
Welcome to Issue XXVI of Phrack World News. This issue features articles on
Robert Tappen Morris, ITT, Telenet, PC Pursuit, a hacker's convention in
Holland, government wiretapping, viruses, social security numbers, a rivalry
between two different factions of TAP Magazine and much more.
As we are getting closer to SummerCon '89, it is becoming increasingly
more important for us to get an idea of who to be expecting and who we need to
contact to supply with further information.
Since we only communicate directly with a select group of people at this time,
we recommend that you contact Red Knight, Aristotle, or Violence (or other
members of the VOID hackers). These people will in turn contact us and then we
can get back to you. Keep in mind that only people who are able to contact us
will be receiving the exact location of SummerCon '89.
Please do not wait till the last minute as important information and changes
can occur at any time.
:Knight Lightning
_______________________________________________________________________________
Cornell Panel Concludes Morris Responsible For Computer Worm April 6, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
By Dennis Meredith (Cornell Chronicle)
Graduate student Robert Tappan Morris Jr., working alone, created and spread
the "worm" computer program that infected computers nationwide last November,
concluded an internal investigative commission appointed by Provost Robert
Barker.
The commission said the program was not technically a "virus" -- a program that
inserts itself into a host program to propagate -- as it has been referred to
in popular reports. The commission described the program as a "worm," an
independent program that propagates itself throughout a computer system.
In its report, "The Computer Worm," the commission termed Morris's behavior "a
juvenile act that ignored the clear potential consequences." This failure
constituted "reckless disregard of those probable consequences," the commission
stated.
Barker, who had delayed release of the report for six weeks at the request of
both federal prosecutors and Morris's defense attorney, said, "We feel an
overriding obligation to our colleagues and to the public to reveal what we
know about this profoundly disturbing incident."
The commission had sought to determine the involvement of Morris or other
members of the Cornell community in the worm attack. It also studied the
motivation and ethical issues underlying the release of the worm.
Evidence was gathered by interviewing Cornell faculty, staff, and graduate
students and staff and former students at Harvard University, where Morris had
done undergraduate work.
Morris declined to be interviewed on advice of counsel. Morris had requested
and has received a leave of absence from Cornell, and the university is
prohibited by federal law from commenting further on his status as a student.
The commission also was unable to reach Paul Graham, a Harvard graduate student
who knew Morris well. Morris reportedly contacted Graham on November 2 1988,
the day the worm was released, and several times before and after that.
Relying on files from Morris's computer account, Cornell Computer Science
Department documents, telephone records, media reports, and technical reports
from other universities, the commission found that:
- Morris violated the Computer Sciences Department's expressed policies
against computer abuse. Although he apparently chose not to attend
orientation meetings at which the policies were explained, Morris had
been given a copy of them. Also, Cornell's policies are similar to
those at Harvard, with which he should have been familiar.
- No member of the Cornell community knew Morris was working on the worm.
Although he had discussed computer security with fellow graduate
students, he did not confide his plans to them. Cornell first became
aware of Morris's involvement through a telephone call from the
Washington Post to the science editor at Cornell's News Service.
- Morris made only minimal efforts to halt the worm once it had
propagated, and did not inform any person in a position of
responsibility about the existence or content of the worm.
- Morris probably did not intend for the worm to destroy data or files,
but he probably did intend for it to spread widely. There is no
evidence that he intended for the worm to replicate uncontrollably.
- Media reports that 6,000 computers had been infected were based on an
initial rough estimate that could not be confirmed. "The total number
of affected computers was surely in the thousands," the commission
concluded.
- A computer security industry association's estimate that the worm caused
about $96 million in damage is "grossly exaggerated" and "self-serving."
- Although it was technically sophisticated, "the worm could have been
created by many students, graduate or undergraduate ... particularly if
forearmed with knowledge of the security flaws exploited or of similar
flaws."
The commission was led by Cornell's vice president for information
technologies, M. Stuart Lynn. Other members were law professor Theodore
Eisenberg, computer science Professor David Gries, engineering and computer
science Professor Juris Hartmanis, physics professor Donald Holcomb, and
Associate University Counsel Thomas Santoro.
Release of the worm was not "an heroic event that pointed up the weaknesses of
operating systems," the report said. "The fact that UNIX ... has many security
flaws has been generally well known, as indeed are the potential dangers of
viruses and worms."
The worm attacked only computers that were attached to Internet, a national
research computer network and that used certain versions of the UNIX operating
system. An operating system is the basic program that controls the operation
of a computer.
"It is no act of genius or heroism to exploit such weaknesses," the
commission said.
The commission also did not accept arguments that one intended benefit of the
worm was a heightened public awareness of computer security.
"This was an accidental by-product of the event and the resulting display of
media interest," the report asserted. "Society does not condone burglary on
the grounds that it heightens concern about safety and security."
In characterizing the action, the commission said, "It may simply have been the
unfocused intellectual meandering of a hacker completely absorbed with his
creation and unharnessed by considerations of explicit purpose or potential
effect."
Because the commission was unable to contact Graham, it could not determine
whether Graham discussed the worm with Morris when Morris visited Harvard about
two weeks before the worm was launched. "It would be interesting to know, for
example, to what Graham was referring to in an Oct. 26 electronic mail message
to Morris when he inquired as to whether there was 'Any news on the brilliant
project?'" said the report.
Many in the computer science community seem to favor disciplinary measures for
Morris, the commission reported.
"However, the general sentiment also seems to be prevalent that such
disciplinary measures should allow for redemption and as such not be so harsh
as to permanently damage the perpetrator's career," the report said.
The commission emphasized, that this conclusion was only an impression from its
investigations and not the result of a systematic poll of computer scientists.
"Although the act was reckless and impetuous, it appears to have been an
uncharacteristic act for Morris" because of his past efforts at Harvard and
elsewhere to improve computer security, the commission report said.
Of the need for increased security on research computers, the commission wrote,
"A community of scholars should not have to build walls as high as the sky to
protect a reasonable expectation of privacy, particularly when such walls will
equally impede the free flow of information."
The trust between scholars has yielded benefits to computer science and to the
world at large, the commission report pointed out.
"Violations of that trust cannot be condoned. Even if there are unintended
side benefits, which is arguable, there is a greater loss to the community
as a whole."
The commission did not suggest any specific changes in the policies of the
Cornell Department of Computer Science and noted that policies against computer
abuse are in place for centralized computer facilities. However, the
commission urged the appointment of a committee to develop a university-wide
policy on computer abuse that would recognize the pervasive use of computers
distributed throughout the campus.
The commission also noted the "ambivalent attitude towards reporting UNIX
security flaws" among universities and commercial vendors. While some computer
users advocate reporting flaws, others worry that such information might
highlight the vulnerability of the system.
"Morris explored UNIX security amid this atmosphere of uncertainty, where there
were no clear ground rules and where his peers and mentors gave no clear
guidance," the report said.
"It is hard to fault him for not reporting flaws that he discovered. From his
viewpoint, that may have been the most responsible course of action, and one
that was supported by his colleagues."
The commission's report also included a brief account of the worm's course
through Internet. After its release shortly after 7:26 p.m. on November 2,
1988, the worm spread to computers at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, the Rand Corporation, the University of California at Berkeley and
others, the commission report said.
The worm consisted of two parts -- a short "probe" and a much larger "corpus."
The problem would attempt to penetrate a computer, and if successful, send for
the corpus.
The program had four main methods of attack and several methods of defense to
avoid discovery and elimination. The attack methods exploited various flaws
and features in the UNIX operating systems of the target computers. The worm
also attempted entry by "guessing" at passwords by such techniques as
exploiting computer users' predilections for using common words as passwords.
The study's authors acknowledged computer scientists at the University of
California at Berkeley for providing a "decompiled" version of the worm and
other technical information. The Cornell commission also drew on analyses of
the worm by Eugene H. Spafford of Purdue University and Donn Seeley of the
University of Utah.
_______________________________________________________________________________
People Vs. ITT Communications Services, Inc. March 29, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
NOTICE OF CLASS ACTION AND PROPOSED SETTLEMENT TO CERTAIN CURRENT
AND FORMER CUSTOMERS OF UNITED STATES TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS, INC.
(NOW KNOWN AS ITT COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC.)
By order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT:
A class action lawsuit has been filed on behalf of certain former and current
customers against United States Transmission Systems, Inc., now known as ITT
Communications Services, Inc., hereinafter referred to as "USTS." The Court
has preliminarily approved a settlement of this lawsuit.
YOU ARE URGED TO READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY BECAUSE IT AFFECTS YOUR RIGHTS AND
WILL BE BINDING ON YOU IN THE FUTURE.
I. NOTICE OF A PENDING CLASS ACTION
A. Description of the Lawsuit
Plaintiffs have sued USTS, alleging that USTS charged customers for certain
unanswered phone calls, holding time, busy signals, and central office
recorded messages, hereinafter referred to as "unanswered calls," without
adequately disclosing such charges to their customers or the public.
Plaintiffs seek to present their own claims for charges for unanswered
calls, as well as the claims of other current and former USTS customers for
similar charges.
USTS denies the violations alleged by plaintiffs, and contends that at all
times, USTS has charged its subscribers fairly and properly and has
disclosed fully and fairly the basis for its long distance charges. USTS
has agreed to settle plaintiff's suit solely to avoid the expense,
inconvenience and disruption of further litigation.
This notice is not an expression of any opinion by the Court of the merits
of this litigation or of the Settlement Agreement. The Complaint, the
Settlement Agreement and other pleadings in this case may be inspected
during normal business hours at the office of the Clerk of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 231 West Lafayette
Boulevard, Detroit, MI 48226.
B. The Settlement Class
Plaintiffs and USTS have entered into a Settlement Agreement, which has been
preliminarily approved by the Court. Under the terms of the Settlement
Agreement, the parties have agreed, for purposes of settlement only, that
this suit has been brought on behalf of the following class of persons
similarly situated to Plaintiffs, hereinafter known as "the Class":
All persons and entities that subscribed to and utilized the long distance
telephone service of USTS or its predecessor ITT Corporate Communication
Services, Inc., referred to collectively hereinafter as "USTS," at any time
during the period January 1, 1979 through December 31, 1985.
C. How to Remain a Class Member
If you were a subscriber to and utilized USTS' long distance service at any
time during this period, you are a member of the Class. You need do nothing
to remain a member of the Class and participate in the benefits this
settlement will provide. If you remain in the Class, you will be bound by
the results of the settlement and/or the lawsuit.
D. How to Exclude Yourself From the Class
You are not required to be a member of the Class. Should you decide that
you do not want to me a member of the Class, you must send an Exclusion
Notice that states your name, your current address, and your desire to be
excluded from the Class to the Clerk of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan at the address given at the end of this
Notice, postmarked no later than April 20, 1989. If you choose to be
excluded from the Class, you may not participate in the settlement. You
will not, however, be bound by any judgment dismissing this action and you
will be free to pursue on your own behalf any legal rights you may have.
II. TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT
The Settlement Agreement requires USTS to provide to Class members up to
750,000 minutes of long distance telephone credits having a maximum value,
at 30 cents per minute, of $225,000, hereinafter known as the "Settlement
Credits," and cash refunds up to a maximum of $50,000. These benefits are
available to Class members who file a proof of claim in a timely manner as
described in Section III below. Class members may choose one benefit from
the following options:
A. A *standardized credit* toward USTS long distance telephone service of
$1.50 for each year from 1979 through 1985 in which the Class member (i)
was a USTS customer, and (ii) claims that s/he was charged by USTS for
unanswered calls; or
B. A *standardized cash refund* of 90 cents for each year from 1979 through
1985 in which the Class member was (i) was a USTS customer and (ii)
claims that s/he was charged by USTS for unanswered calls; or,
C. An *itemized credit* toward USTS long distance service of 30 cents for
each minute of unanswered calls for which the Class member was charged
during the Class period (January 1, 1979 through December 31, 1985) and
for which the Class member has not been previously reimbursed or
credited; or,
D. An *itemized cash refund* of 30 cents for each minute of unanswered
calls for which the Class member charged during the Class period
(January 1, 1979 through December 31, 1985) and for which the Class
member has not been previously reimbursed or credited.
To obtain an *itemized* credit or cash refund, the Class member must
itemize and attest to each unanswered call for for which a refund or credit
is claimed. If the total credits claimed by Class members exceed 750,000
credit minutes, each Class member claiming Settlement Credits will receive
his/her/its pro rata share of the total Settlement Credits available.
Class members need not be current USTS customers to claim the standardized
and itemized credits. USTS will automatically open an account for any
Class member who requests credits and executes an authorization to open
such an account. If a Class member incurs a local telephone company
service charge in connection with the opening of a USTS account, USTS will
issue a credit to the Class member's account for the full amount of such
service charge upon receipt of the local telephone company's bill for the
service charge. USTS is not responsible for any other service charge that
a local telephone company may impose for ordering, using or terminating
USTS service.
The Settlement Agreement requires USTS to pay the costs of giving this
Notice (up to a maximum of $120,000) and of administering the settlement
described above.
The Settlement Agreement further provides that upon final approval of the
settlement, the Court will enter a judgment dismissing with prejudice all
claims of plaintiffs and members of the Class that have been or might have
been asserted in this action and that relate to USTS' billing practices and
disclosure practices for unanswered calls.
Counsel for the Class have investigated the facts and circumstances
regarding the claims against USTS and their defenses. In view of those
circumstances, counsel for the Class have concluded that this Settlement
Agreement is fair and reasonable, and in the best interests of the Class.
III. HOW TO FILE A CLAIM
To receive Settlement Credits or a Cash Refund, you must first obtain a
Proof of Claim Notice; then provide all the information requested and
return it to the Clerk of the Court postmarked no later than June 30, 1989.
To obtain claim forms: To file completed claim form:
USTS Class Action Claim Administrator Clerk of the United States Court
ITT Communication Services, Inc. ATTN: USTS Settlement
100 Plaza Drive 231 W. Lafayette Blvd. Room 740
Secaucus, NJ 07096 Detroit, MI 48226
If you have any further questions about this Notice, or the filing of Proof of
Claim, *write* to the USTS Action Claim Administrator at the above address. If
you have any questions about this lawsuit or your participation therein as a
member of the Class, *write* to lead counsel for plaintiffs --
Sachnoff Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd.
ATTN: USTS Settlement
30 South Wacker Drive, Suite 2900
Chicago, IL 60606
Always consult your own attorney for legal advice and questions which concern
you about your rights in any class action matter.
DO NOT telephone the Court.
DO NOT telephone the attorneys for plaintiff.
DO NOT telephone the Claims Administrator; any office of USTS or any of its
employees.
DO NOT telephone any Telephone Company asking for information on this matter.
Only *written correspondence filed in a timely manner will be considered
by the Court.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Telenet Announces New PC Pursuit Terms April 9, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Earlier this year, Telenet announced new terms for the PC Pursuit program,
which placed time limits on the use of the service, and set new rates for
usage of the service.
***** Most of the deal has been called OFF *****
In a letter dated March 29, 1989 from Floyd H. Trogdon, Vice President and
General Manager of Network Services announced several revisions in the earlier
plans. His latest letter supersedes all previous memos and usage agreements,
and becomes effective July 1, 1989.
There will be THREE membership plans:
o REGULAR membership will be $30 per month for up to 30 hours of
non-prime time (evenings and weekend) use. This can be used by the
subscriber only. No others allowed to use it.
o FAMILY membership will be $50 per month for up to 60 hours of non-prime
time (evenings and weekend) use. This can be used by the subscriber
and any immediate family members in the same household. If a single
person expected to use more than 30 hours per month, s/he would still
buy this "family" plan, even if the entire "family" consisted of just
one person.
o HANDICAPPED membership will be $30 per month for up to 90 hours of
non-prime time (evening and weekend) use. To qualify for these terms,
proof of physical handicap must be provided. Ask Telenet for the exact
terms.
EXCESS HOURS over 30 (or 60/90) per month during non-prime time hours will be
billed at $3.00 per hour. This is a decrease from the earlier proposed charge
of $4.50 per hour.
PRIME-TIME USAGE will be billed at $10.50 per hour, regardless of how much time
may be remaining on the PCP membership plan.
The billing will be in arrears each month. That is, the July usage will be
billed in August, etc. Call detail will be automatically provided to any
subscriber going over thirty hours per month.
GRACE PERIOD/FORGIVENESS: All calls will be given a one minute grace period
for the purpose of establishing the connection. There will never be a charge
for calls lasting one minute or less. If you disconnect promptly when you see
that your call will not complete for whatever reason, there will be no charge.
There will be a two minute minimum on all connections (after the first minute
has passed). Otherwise, times will be rounded to the *nearest* minute for
billing purposes.
NEW PASSWORDS AND USER I.D.'s FOR EVERYONE: During April, 1989, all current
subscribers to PC Pursuit will be issued new passwords and new user identities.
On May 1, 1989, all existing passwords and ID's will be killed.
New users after July 1, 1989 will pay $30 to set up an account. Password
changes will be $5.00. *Existing* users will never have to pay a fee to adjust
their account upward or downward from regular < == > family plans. Call detail
will be provided in June, 1989 to users with more than 30 hours of usage to
help them determine which plan they should use; however there will be no charge
for extra hours until July.
Because of the confusion and lack of good communication between Telenet and its
users over the past few months, the official change in terms from unlimited use
to measured use has been postponed from its original starting date in June to
July 1.
These are just excerpts from the letter to subscribers posted on the Net
Exchange BBS. If you subscribe to PC Pursuit, I recommend you sign on and read
the full memo, along with the accompanying Terms and Conditions and price
schedules.
Remember, any changes you may have made in February/March in anticipation of
the changeover originally planned for May/June are now void. Telenet has
stated all users will be defaulted to REGULAR memberships effective July 1
unless they specifically make changes to this during the months of May and
June.
Telenet Customer Service: 1-800-336-0437
Telenet Telemarketing: 1-800-TELENET
Sign up via modem with credit card number handy: 1-800-835-3001.
To read the full bulletins, log onto Net Exchange by calling into your local
Telenet switcher and connecting to '@pursuit'.
_______________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 26, File 10 of 11
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
PWN PWN
PWN P h r a c k W o r l d N e w s PWN
PWN %%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%% %%%%%%% PWN
PWN Issue XXVI/Part 2 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN April 25, 1989 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Created, Written, and Edited PWN
PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
PWN PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
Reach Out And TAP Someone April 3, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Two former employees of Cincinnati Bell, who were fired by the company for
"good cause" according to Cincinnati Bell Chairman Dwight Hibbard are claiming
they installed more than 1200 illegal wiretaps over a 12 year period from 1972
- 1984 at the request of their supervisors at the telco and the local police.
Among the alleged targets of the snooping were past and present members of
Congress, federal judges, scores of the city's most prominent politicians,
business executives, lawyers and media personalities.
Leonard Gates and Robert Draise say they even wiretapped the hotel room where
President Gerald Ford stayed during two visits to Cincinnati; and this part of
their story, at least, has been verified by the now retired security chief at
the hotel.
As more details come out each day, people in Cincinnati are getting a rare look
at a Police Department that apparently spied on itself, and at a grand jury
probe that has prompted one former FBI official to suggest that the Justice
Department seems more interested in discrediting the accusers than in seeking
the truth.
Cincinnati Bell executives says Gates and Draise are just trying to "get even"
with the company for firing them. But disclosures thus far seem to indicate
there is at least some truth in what the two men are saying about the company
they used to work for.
According to Gates and Draise, they were just employees following the orders
given to them by their superiors at Cincinnati Bell. But Dwight Hibbard,
Chairman of the Board of Cincinnati Bell has called them both liars, and said
their only motive is to make trouble for the company.
Cincinnati Bell responded to allegations that the company had specifically
participated in illegal wiretapping by filing a libel suit against Gates and
Draise. The two men responded by filing a countersuit against the telco.
In addition to their suit, four of the people who were allegedly spied on have
filed a class action suit against the telco.
In the latest development, Cincinnati Bell has gone public with (according to
them) just recently discovered sordid details about an extramarital affair by
Gates. A federal grand jury in Cincinnati is now trying to straighten out the
tangled web of charges and countercharges, but so far no indictments have been
returned.
Almost daily, Gates and Draise tell further details about their exploits,
including taps they claim they placed on phones at the Cincinnati Stock
Exchange and the General Electric aircraft engine plant in suburban Evendale.
According to Draise, he began doing these "special assignments" in 1972, when
he was approached by a Cincinnati police officer from that city's clandestine
intelligence unit. The police officer wanted him to tap the lines of black
militants and suspected drug dealers, Draise said.
The police officer assured him the wiretapping would be legal, and that top
executives at the phone company had approved. Draise agreed, and suggested
recruiting Gates, a co-worker to help out. Soon, the two were setting several
wiretaps each week at the request of the Intelligence Unit of the Cincinnati
Police Department.
But by around 1975, the direction and scope of the operation changed, say the
men. The wiretap requests no longer came from the police; instead they came
from James West and Peter Gabor, supervisors in the Security Department at
Cincinnati Bell, who claimed *they were getting the orders from their
superiors*.
And the targets of the spying were no longer criminal elements; instead, Draise
and Gates say they were asked to tap the lines of politicians, business
executives and even the phone of the Chief of Police himself, and the personal
phone lines of some telephone company employees as well.
Draise said he "began to have doubts about the whole thing in 1979" when he was
told to tap the private phone of a newspaper columnist in town. "I told them I
wasn't going to do it anymore," he said in an interview during the week of
April 2, 1989.
Gates kept on doing these things until 1984, and he says he got cold feet late
that year when "the word came down through the grapevine" that he was to tap
the phone lines connected to the computers at General Electric's Evendale
plant. He backed out then, and said to leave him out of it in the future, and
he claims there were hints of retaliation directed at him at that time; threats
to "tell what we know about you..."
When Dwight Hibbard was contacted at his office at Cincinnati Bell and asked to
comment on the allegations of his former employees, he responded that they were
both liars. "The phone company would not do things like that," said Hibbard,
"and those two are both getting sued because they say we do." Hibbard has
refused to answer more specific questions asked by the local press and
government investigators.
In fact, Draise was fired in 1979, shortly after he claims he told his
superiors he would no longer place wiretaps on lines. Shortly after he quit
handling the "special assignments" given to him he was arrested, and charged
with a misdemeanor in connection with one wiretap -- which Draise says he set
for a friend who wanted to spy on his ex-girlfriend. Cincinnati Bell claims
they had nothing to do with his arrest and conviction on that charge; but they
"were forced to fire him" after he pleaded guilty.
Gates was fired in 1986 for insubordination. He claims Cincinnati Bell was
retaliating against him for taking the side of two employees who were suing the
company for sexual harassment; but his firing was upheld in court.
The story first started breaking when Gates and Draise went to see a reporter
at [Mount Washington Press], a small weekly newspaper in the Cincinnati
suburban area. The paper printed the allegations by the men, and angry
responses started coming in almost immediately.
At first, police denied the existence of the Intelligence Unit, let alone that
such an organization would use operatives at Cincinnati Bell to spy on people.
Later, when called before the federal grand jury, and warned against lying,
five retired police officers, including the former chief, took the Fifth
Amendment. Finally last month, the five issued a statement through their
attorney, admitting to 12 illegal wiretaps from 1972 - 1974, and implicated
unnamed operatives at Cincinnati Bell as their contacts to set the taps.
With the ice broken, and the formalities out of the way, others began coming
forward with similar stories. Howard Lucas, the former Director of Security
for Stouffer's Hotel in Cincinnati recalled a 1975 incident in which he stopped
Gates, West and several undercover police officers from going into the hotel's
phone room about a month before the visit by President Ford.
The phone room was kept locked, and employees working there were buzzed in by
someone already inside, recalled Lucas. In addition to the switchboards, the
room contained the wire distribution frames from which phone pairs ran
throughout the hotel. Lucas refused to let the police officers go inside
without a search warrant; and they never did return with one.
But Lucas said two days later he was tipped off by one of the operators to look
in one of the closets there. Lucas said he found a voice activated tape
recorder and "a couple of coils they used to make the tap." He said he told
the Police Department and Cincinnati Bell about his findings, but "...I could
not get anyone to claim it, so I just yanked it all out and threw it in the
dumpster..."
Executives at General Electric were prompted to meet with Draise and Gates
recently to learn the extent of the wiretapping that had been done at the
plant. According to Draise, GE attorney David Kindleberger expressed
astonishment when told the extent of the spying; and he linked it to the
apparent loss of proprietary information to Pratt & Whitney, a competing
manufacturer of aircraft engines.
Now all of a sudden, Kindleberger is clamming up. I wonder who got to him? He
admits meeting with Draise, but says he never discussed Pratt & Whitney or any
competitive situation with Draise. But an attorney who sat in on the meeting
supports Draise's version.
After an initial flurry of press releases denying all allegations of illegal
wiretapping, Cincinnati Bell has become very quiet, and is now unwilling to
discuss the matter at all except to tell anyone who asks that "Draise and Gates
are a couple of liars who want to get even with us..." And now, the telco
suddenly has discovered information about Gates' personal life.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
FBI/Bell Wiretapping Network? April 3, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
[Edited For This Presentation]
Bob Draise/WB8QCF was an employee of Cincinnati Bell Telephone between 1966 and
1979. He, and others, are involved in a wiretapping scandal of monumental
proportions. They say they have installed more than 1,000 wiretaps on the
phones of judges, law enforcement officers, lawyers, television personalities,
newspaper columnists, labor unions, defense contractors, major corporations
(such as Proctor & Gamble and General Electric), politicians (even ex-President
Gerald Ford) at the request of Cincinnati police and Cincinnati Bell security
supervisors who said the taps were for the police. They were told that many of
the taps were for the FBI.
Another radio amateur, Vincent Clark/KB4MIT, a technician for South-Central
Bell from 1972 to 1981, said he placed illegal wiretaps similar to those done
by Bob Draise on orders from his supervisors -- and on request from local
policemen in Louisville, Kentucky.
When asked how he got started in the illegal wiretap business, Bob said that a
friend called and asked him to come down to meet with the Cincinnati police. An
intelligence sergeant asked Bob about wiretapping some Black Muslims. He also
told Bob that Cincinnati Bell security had approved the wiretap -- and that it
was for the FBI. The sergeant pointed to his Masonic ring which Bob also wore
-- in other words, he was telling the truth under the Masonic oath -- something
that Bob put a lot of stock in.
Most of the people first wiretapped were drug or criminal related. Later on,
however, it go out of hand -- and the FBI wanted taps on prominent citizens.
"We started doing people who had money. How this information was used, I
couldn't tell you."
The January 29th "Newsday" said Draise had told investigators that among the
taps he rigged from 1972 to 1979 were several on lines used by Wren Business
Communications, a Bell competitor. It seems that when Wren had arranged an
appointment with a potential customer, they found that Bell had just been there
without being called. Wren's president is a ham radio operator, David
Stoner/K8LMB.
When spoken with, Dave Stoner said the following;
"As far as I am concerned, the initial focus for all of this began
with the FBI. The FBI apparently set up a structure throughout the
United States using apparently the security chiefs of the different
Bell companies. They say that there have been other cases in the
United States like ours in Cincinnati but they have been localized
without the realization of an overall pattern being implicated."
"The things that ties this all together is if you go way back in
history to the Hoover period at the FBI, he apparently got together
with the AT&T security people. There is an organization that I
guess exists to this day with regular meetings of the security
people of the different Bell companies. This meant that the FBI
would be able to target a group of 20 or 30 people that represented
the security points for all of the Bell and AT&T connections in the
United States. I believe the key to all of this goes back to Hoover.
The FBI worked through that group who then created the activity at
the local level as a result of central planning."
"I believe that in spite of the fact that many people have indicated
that this is an early 70's problem -- that there is no disruption to
that work to this day. I am pretty much convinced that it is
continuing. It looks like a large surveillance effort that
Cincinnati was just a part of."
"The federal prosecutor Kathleen Brinkman is in a no-win situation.
If she successfully prosecutes this case she is going to bring
trouble down upon her own Justice Department. She can't
successfully prosecute the case."
About $200 million in lawsuits have already been filed against Cincinnati Bell
and the Police Department. Several members of the police department have taken
the Fifth Amendment before the grand jury rather than answer questions about
their roles in the wiretapping scheme.
Bob Draise/WB8QCF has filed a suit against Cincinnati Bell for $78 for
malicious prosecution and slander in response to a suit filed by Cincinnati
Bell against Bob for defamation. Right after they filed the suit, several
policemen came forward and admitted to doing illegal wiretaps with them. The
Cincinnati police said they stopped this is 1974 -- although another policeman
reportedly said they actually stopped the wiretapping in 1986.
Now the CBS-TV program "60 Minutes" is interested in the Cincinnati goings-on
and has sent in a team of investigative reporters. Ed Bradley from "60
Minutes" has already interviewed Bob Draise/WB8QCF and it is expected that
sometime during this month (April) April, we will see a "60 Minutes" report on
spying by the FBI. We also understand that CNN, Ted Turner's Cable News
Network, is also working up a "Bugging of America" expose.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Crackdown On Hackers Urged April 9, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Taken From the Chicago Tribune (Section 7, Page 12b)
"Make Punishment Fit The Crime," computer leaders say.
DALLAS (AP) -- The legal system has failed to respond adequately to the threat
that hackers pose to the computer networks crucial to corporate America, a
computer expert says.
Many computer hackers "are given slaps on the wrist," Mark Leary, a senior
analyst with International Data Corp., said at a roundtable discussion last
week.
"The justice system has to step up...to the fact that these people are
malicious and are criminals and are robbing banks just as much as if they
walked up with a shotgun," he said.
Other panelists complained that hackers, because of their ability to break into
computer systems, even are given jobs, sometimes a security consultants.
The experts spoke at a roundtable sponsored by Network World magazine, a
publication for computer network users and managers.
Computer networks have become crucial to business, from transferring and
compiling information to overseeing and running manufacturing processes.
The public also is increasingly exposed to networks through such devices as
automatic teller machines at banks, airline reservation systems and computers
that store billing information.
Companies became more willing to spend money on computer security after last
year's celebrated invasion of a nationwide network by a virus allegedly
unleased by a graduate student [Robert Tappen Morris], the experts said.
"The incident caused us to reassess the priorities with which we look at
certain threats," said Dennis Steinaur, manager of the computer security
management group of the National Institute of Standards and Technology.
But computer security isn't only a matter of guarding against unauthorized
entry, said Max Hopper, senior vice president for information systems as
American Airlines.
Hopper said American has built a "a Cheyenne mountain-type" installation for
its computer systems to guard against a variety of problems, including
electrical failure and natural disaster. Referring to the Defense Department's
underground nerve center in a Colorado mountain, he said American's precautions
even include a three-day supply of food.
"We've done everything we can, we think, to protect the total environment,"
Hopper said.
Hopper and Steinaur said that despite the high-tech image of computer
terrorism, it remains an administrative problem that should be approached as a
routine management issue.
But the experts agreed that the greatest danger to computer networks does not
come from outside hackers. Instead, they said, the biggest threat is from
disgruntled employees or others whose original access to systems was
legitimate.
Though employee screening is useful, Steinaur said, it is more important to
build into computer systems ways to track unauthorized use and to publicize
that hacking can be traced.
Steinaur said growing computer literacy, plus the activities of some
non-malicious hackers, help security managers in some respects.
Expanded knowledge "forces us as security managers not be dependent on
ignorance," Steinaur said.
"Security needs to be a part of the system, rather than a 'nuisance addition,'"
Steinaur said, "and we probably have not done a very good job of making
management realize that security is an integral part of the system."
IDC's Leary said the organization surveys of Fortune 1000 companies
surprisingly found a significant number of companies were doing little to
protect their systems.
The discussion, the first of three planned by Network World, was held because
computer sabotage "is a real problem that people aren't aware of," said editor
John Gallant. Many business people sophisticated networks."
It also is a problem that many industry vendors are reluctant to address, he
said, because it raises questions about a company's reliability.
Typed For PWN by Hatchet Molly
_______________________________________________________________________________
Ex-Worker Charged In Virus Case -- Databases Were Alleged Target Apr 12, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
by Jane M. Von Bergen (Philadelphia Inquirer)
A former employee was charged yesterday with infecting his company's computer
database in what is believed to be the first computer-virus arrest in the
Philadelphia area.
"We believe he was doing this as an act of revenge," said Camden County
Assistant Prosecutor Norman Muhlbaier said yesterday, commenting on a motive
for the employee who allegedly installed a program to erase databases at his
former company, Datacomp Corp. in Voorhees, New Jersey.
Chris Young, 21, of the 2000 block of Liberty Street, Trenton, was charged in
Camden County with one count of computer theft by altering a database.
Superior Court Judge E. Stevenson Fluharty released Young on his promise to pay
$10,000 if he failed to appear in court. If convicted, Young faces a 10-year
prison term and a $100,000 fine. Young could not be reached for comment.
"No damage was done," Muhlbaier said, because the company discovered the virus
before it could cause harm. Had the virus gone into effect, it could have
damaged databases worth several hundred thousand dollars, Muhlbaier said.
Datacomp Corp., in the Echelon Mall, is involved in telephone marketing. The
company, which has between 30 and 35 employees, had a contract with a major
telephone company to verify the contents of its white pages and try to sell
bold-faced or other special listings in the white pages, a Datacomp company
spokeswoman said. The database Young is accused of trying to destroy is the
list of names from the phone company, she said.
Muhlbaier said that the day Young resigned from the company, October 7, 1988 he
used fictitious passwords to obtain entry into the company computer,
programming the virus to begin its destruction December 7, 1988 -- Pearl Harbor
Day. Young, who had worked for the company on and off for two years -- most
recently as a supervisor -- was disgruntled because he had received some
unfavorable job-performance reviews, the prosecutor said.
Eventually, operators at the company picked up glitches in the computer system.
A programmer, called in to straighten out the mess, noticed that the program
had been altered and discovered the data-destroying virus, Muhlbaier said.
"What Mr. Young did not know was that the computer system has a lot of security
features so they could track it back to a particular date, time and terminal,"
Muhlbaier said. "We were able to ... prove that he was at that terminal."
Young's virus, Muhlbaier said, is the type known as a "time bomb" because it is
programmed to go off at a specific time. In this case, the database would have
been sickened the first time someone switched on a computer December 7, he said
Norma Kraus, a vice president of Datacomp's parent company, Volt Information
Sciences Inc, said yesterday that the company's potential loss included not
only the databases, but also the time it took to find and cure the virus. "All
the work has to stop," causing delivery backups on contracts, she said. "We're
just fortunate that we have employees who can determine what's wrong and then
have the interest to do something. In this case, the employee didn't stop at
fixing the system, but continued on to determine what the problem was." The
Volt company, based in New York, does $500 million worth of business a year
with such services as telephone marketing, data processing and technical
support. It also arranges temporary workers, particularly in the
data-processing field, and installs telecommunication services, Kraus said.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Mexico's Phone System Going Private? April 17, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
By Oryan QUEST (Special Hispanic Corespondent)
The Mexico Telephone Company, aka Telefonos de Mexico, aka Telmex, is likely to
go private in the next year or two. The Mexican government is giving serious
consideration to selling its controlling interest in that nation's
communications network, despite very stiff opposition from the local unions
which would prefer to see the existing bureaucracy stay in place.
The proposed sale, which is part of a move to upgrade the phone system there --
and it *does* need upgrading -- by allowing more private investment, is part of
a growing trend in Mexico to privatize heretofore nationalized industries.
The Mexico Telephone Company has spent more than a year planning a $14 billion,
five-year restructuring plan which will probably give AT&T and the Bell
regional holding companies a role in the improvements.
One plan being discussed by the Mexican government is a complete break-up of
Telmex, similar to the court-ordered divestiture of AT&T a few years ago.
Under this plan, there would be one central long distance company in Mexico,
with the government retaining control of it, but privately owned regional firms
providing local and auxiliary services.
Representatives of the Mexican government have talked on more than one
occasion with some folks at Southwestern Bell about making a formal proposal.
Likewise, Pacific Bell has been making some overtures to the Mexicans. It will
be interesting to see what develops.
About two years ago, Teleconnect Magazine, in a humorous article on the
divestiture, presented a bogus map of the territories assigned to each BOC,
with Texas, New Mexico and Arizona grouped under an entity called "Taco Bell."
Any phone company which takes over the Mexican system will be an improvement
over the current operation, which has been slowly deteriorating for several
years.
PS: I *Demand* To Be Let Back On MSP!
_______________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 26, File 11 of 11
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
PWN PWN
PWN P h r a c k W o r l d N e w s PWN
PWN %%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%% %%%%%%% PWN
PWN Issue XXVI/Part 3 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN April 25, 1989 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Created, Written, and Edited PWN
PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
PWN PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
Galactic Hacker Party March 30, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
GALACTIC HACKER PARTY
August 2-4, 1989
PARADISO, AMSTERDAM, HOLLAND
During the summer of 1989, the world as we know it will go into overload. An
interstellar particle stream of hackers, phone phreaks, radioactivists and
assorted technological subversives will be fusing their energies into a media
melt-down as the global village plugs into Amsterdam for three electrifying
days of information interchange and electronic capers.
Aided by the advanced communications technology to which they are accustomed,
the hacker forces will discuss strategies, play games, and generally have a
good time. Free access to permanently open on-line facilities will enable them
to keep in touch with home base -- wherever that is.
Those who rightly fear the threat of information tyranny and want to learn what
they can do about it are urgently invited to interface in Amsterdam in August.
There will be much to learn from people who know. Celebrity guests with
something to say will be present in body or electronic spirit.
The Force must be nurtured. If you are refused transport because your laptop
looks like a bomb, cut off behind enemy lines, or unable to attend for any
other reason, then join us on the networks. Other hacker groups are requested
to organize similar gatherings to coincide with ours. We can provide low-cost
international communications links during the conference.
[ Despite the wishes of those planning the "Galactic Hacker ]
[ Party," there will be NO change in plans for SummerCon '89! ]
For further information, take up contact as soon as possible with:
HACK-TIC PARADISO
P.O. box 22953 Weteringschans 6-8
1100 DL Amsterdam 1017 SG Amsterdam
The Netherlands The Netherlands
tel: +31 20 6001480 tel: +31 20 264521 / +31 20 237348
_______________________________________________________________________________
Subversive Bulletin Boards March 26, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
An article in a newspaper from the United Kingdom had an article relating to a
computer bulletin board being run by a 14-year-old boy in Wilmslow, Cheshire,
England. It contained information relating to such things as making plastic
explosives.
Anti-terrorist detectives are said to be investigating for possible breaches of
the Obscene Publications Act. Apparently reporters were able to easily gain
access to this bulletin board and peruse articles on such subjects as credit
card fraud, making various types of explosives, street fighting techniques and
dodging police radar traps.
One article was obviously aimed at children and described how to make a bomb
suitable for use on "the car of a teacher you do not like at school," which
would destroy the tire of a car when it was started.
The boy's parents did not seem to think that their son was doing anything
wrong, preferring him to be working with his computer rather than roaming the
streets.
A London computer consultant, Noel Bradford, is quoted as having seen the
bulletin board and found messages discussing "how to crack British Telecom, how
to get money out of people and how to defraud credit card companies. Credit
card numbers are given, along with PIN numbers, names, addresses and other
details."
_______________________________________________________________________________
Tale Of TWO TAP Magazines! April 24, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
It seemed inevitable that the battle for the rights to TAP would come into
play, but many wonder why it has taken so long.
The Renegade Chemist, long time member of Phortune 500 and one of its "Board Of
Directors," has been talking about re-starting TAP Magazine for at least two
years... nothing ever happened with it until now. TRC claims that the TAP
Magazine crew in Kentucky is just a fraud and that he is putting on the "REAL
McCoy."
For a free issue of The Renegade Chemist's TAP Magazine, send a self-addressed
stamped envelope to:
Data Security Consultants, Inc.
TAP Magazine
P.O. Box 271
South Windam, CT 06266-0271
Now on the other hand, Aristotle of the Kentucky based TAP Magazine has shown
an almost uncaring attitude about The Renegade Chemist's statements about TAP
Magazine. He says that he does not "really mind if these people put out a
magazine. Honestly I just want to help the community and the more magazines
and information, the better."
The really big news about the Kentucky based TAP Magazine came Saturday, April
22, 1989. Apparently, because of problems with local banks and the Internal
Revenue Service, TAP Magazine is now FREE!
The only catch is that if you want it, you have to send them a self-addressed
stamped envelope to get each issue or "you can send cash, but only enough to
pay for postage, 25 cents should cover it." Do not send any kinds of checks
and/or money orders. Anyone who did will be receiving their checks back or
at least those checks will not be cashed. The TAP Magazine staff will be
taking care of the printing costs out of their own pocket.
So for the FREE TAP Magazine, send a self-addressed stamped envelope to:
P.O. Box 20264
Louisville, KY 40220
Issue 93 is due for the end of April 1989, but Aristotle also wanted me to let
everyone know that he will be attending SummerCon '89 and bringing with him
plenty of issues of all the TAPs that he, Olorin The White, and Predat0r have
published.
As I have not seen TRC's TAP, I make no judgements. Instead, get a copy of
both TAPs FREE and compare them yourself. The market will decide which TAP
will continue.
Information Provided by
Aristotle and The Renegade Chemist
_______________________________________________________________________________
Computer Group Wary Of Security Agency April 11, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Taken from the San Francisco Chronicle
A public interest group said yesterday that the National Security Agency, the
nation's biggest intelligence agency, could exert excessive control over a
program to strengthen the security of computer systems throughout the federal
government.
The group, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility -- based in Palo
Alto -- urged key members of Congress to focus "particularly close scrutiny" on
the agency's role in helping to implement legislation aimed at safeguarding
sensitive but unclassified information in federal computers.
"There is a constant risk that the federal agencies, under the guise of
enhancing computer security, may find their programs -- to the extent that they
rely upon computer systems -- increasingly under the supervision of the largest
and most secretive intelligence organization in the country," it said.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Verifying Social Security Numbers April 11, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Taken From The New York Times
Dorcas R. Hardy, Commisssioner of the Social Security Administration, told a
Congressional committee that the agency had verified millions of SSN's for
private credit companies.
TRW, the nation's largest credit reporting company, recently proposed paying
the Social Security Administration $1,000,000 to have 140 million numbers
verified.
Phil Gambino, an agency spokesman, reported last month that the agency had
verified social security numbers only at the request of beneficiaries or
employers and had never verified more than 25 numbers at a time. He said such
disclosures were required under the Freedom of Information Act.
At the hearing yesterday, Dorcas R. Hardy, denied any other verifications at
first. However, she later admitted that in the early 1980s, 3,000,000 social
security numbers were verified for CitiCorp and that last year 151,000 numbers
were verified for TRW. Ms. Hardy said that the 151,000 numbers were just part
of a "test run."
Senator David Pryor, a democrat from Arkansas and chairman of the Special
Committee on Aging, said that previous commissioners; the Congressional
Research Service of the Library of Congress, and Donald A. Gonya, chief counsel
for Social Security have all decided that such verification is illegal.
_______________________________________________________________________________
PWN Quicknotes
1. Prank Virus Warning Message (March 28, 1989) -- An individual placed a time
bomb message on a government service system in the San Francisco Bay Area
saying, "WARNING! A computer virus has infected the system!" The
individual is learning that such a prank is considered almost as funny as
saying that you have a bomb in your carry-on luggage as you board a plane.
-- Bruce Baker, Information Security Program, SRI International
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. Hackers' Dictionary In Japanese? (March 30, 1989) -- What is this you ask?
This amusing compilation was put together a decade or so ago by artificial
intelligence (AI) graduate students at Stanford, MIT, and Carnegie-Mellon
and recorded the then-current vernacular of their shared cultures. They
did it for fun, but it somehow ended up getting published.
The Hackers' Dictionary contains more than a few puns, jokes, and other
things that are hard to translate such as "moby," as in "moby memory", or
"fubar" and its regional variants "foo bar" and "foo baz."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. AT&T's Air Force -- AT&T has an air force that patrols its cable routes,
some routes 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The AT&T air force includes
helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. For some areas, AT&T uses infantry
and armored cars. AT&T's Sue Fleming says, "We hope NOT to find any
activity. We don't want to 'catch' people. But if we do spot a digging
crew, the usual procedure is for the pilot to radio the location back to a
ground crew, who check it out. On occasion, they drop notes -- or even
land -- but that depends on where the site is. In some areas -- like New
Jersey -- unauthorized landings bring heavy penalties."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. Terrorist Threat? -- Scientific advisors to the government told a Senate
panel that telecommunications networks are tempting targets for terrorist
activity. The experts said that advances in technology -- like fiber
optics, which concentrates equipment and data -- and the fragmentation of
the telecom industry after divestiture are reasons for the increased risk.
Certainly the Hinsdale, Illinois CO fire and the recent severing of a fiber
backbone in New Jersey have shown us all how vulnerable our country's
telecom network is.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5. FCC Rules On AOS -- The FCC has ruled on a complaint filed this summer by
two consumer groups against five Alternative Operator Services (AOS)
companies. The FCC found the complaint valid and has ordered the AOS
companies to stop certain practices immediately.
The ruling states that callers must be told when their calls are being
handled by an AOS, operators must provide callers with rate information and
hotel or payphone owners cannot block calls to other long distance
carriers. (Callers who don't take any special action when making a call
will still be routed to the pre-subscribed carrier.)
The FCC has also ordered the companies to eliminate "splashing" whenever
technically feasible. Splashing is transferring a call to a distant
carrier point-of-presence and charging the caller for the call from that
point.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6. Cool New Service -- CompuServe (the world's biggest computer bulletin
board) users can now dial in and search and find articles from a bunch of
different technical trade magazines. The database was put together by an
outfit called Information Access Company. It currently contains full-text
articles for 50 publications and paraphrased abstracts for 75 more. Most
coverage begins with the January 1987 issues.
You can search the publications by magazine name, author, key word, key
phrase, etc., then pull up the abstracts of the article of interest and, if
needed and when available, get the full text of the article. And it's easy
to use.
Charge for the service is $24 per hour, $1 for each abstract, and $1.50 for
each full-text article accessed. CompuServe charges $12.50 per hour for
connect time. Both per hour charges are pro-rated, and, with the databases
being so easy to use, you'll rarely be on the board for more than 10-15
minutes, so those costs will drop.
CompuServe 800-848-8199
Information Access 800-227-8431
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
7. ISDN Calling Number Identification Services (April 7, 1989) -- Bellcore
Technical Reference TR-TSY-000860, "ISDN Calling Number Identification
Services" can be purchased for $46 from:
Bellcore
Customer Service
60 New England Ave
Piscataway, NJ 08854-4196
(201) 699-5800
This Technical Reference contains Bellcore's view of generic requirements
for support of ISDN Calling Number Identification (I-CNIS). The I-CNIS
feature extends the concepts of Calling Number Delivery and Calling Number
Delivery Blocking to ISDN lines. I-CNIS also allows the customer to
specify which Directory Number (DN) should be used for each outgoing call
and provides network screening to ensure that the specified DN is valid.
I-CNIS handles calling number processing for both circuit-mode and
packet-mode ISDN calls and provides four component features: Number
Provision, Number Screening, Number Privacy, and Number Delivery. Material
on Privacy Change by the calling party and Privacy Override by the called
party is also included.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
8. Founder of TAP Magazine, Abbie Hoffman, born in 1936, passed away on April
12, 1989. He was found dead in his apartment in New Hope, PA. He was
fully dressed under the bedcovers. An autopsy was inconclusive. An
article about him appears in the April 24, 1989 issue of Time Magazine,
"A Flower in a Clenched Fist," page 23.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
9. Bill Landreth aka The Cracker, author of Out Of The Inner Circle, has
reappeared. Supposedly, he is now working as a bookbinder in Orange
County, California and living with the sysop of a bulletin board called the
"Pig Sty." -- Dark Sorcerer (April 19, 1989)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10. Hacker/Phreaker Gets "Stiff" Penalty (Green Bay, Wisconsin) -- David
Kelsey, aka Stagehand, plead guilty to two counts of class "E" felonies
and received a 90 day jail term. Once he has completed his jail term, he
will serve three years probation and an unknown amount of community
service hours.
In addition to these penalties, Stagehand must also pay restitution of
$511.00 to Schneider Communications of Green Bay, Wisconsin. Stagehand
was given all his computer equipment back as part of the plea bargain --
minus any materials considered to be "ill gotten" gains.
_______________________________________________________________________________
! ***
1:30:22 p.m. ARE YOU STILL THERE ?
! ***
1:35:22 p.m. RESPOND OR BE LOGGED OFF
!
y
supervisors who said the taps were for the police. They were told that many of
the taps were for the FBI.
Another radio amateur, Vincent Clark/KB4MIT, a technician for South-Central
Bell from 1972 to 1981, said he placed illegal wiretaps similar to those done
by Bob Draise on orders from his supervisors -- and on request from local
policemen in Louisville, Kentucky.
When asked how he got started in the illegal wiretap business, Bob said that a
friend called and asked him to come down to meet with the Cincinnati police. An
intelligence sergeant asked Bob about wiretapping some Black Muslims. He also
told Bob that Cincinnati Bell security had approved the wiretap -- and that it
was for the FBI. The sergeant pointed to his Masonic ring which Bob also wore
-- in other words, he was telling the truth under the Masonic oath -- something
that Bob put a lot of stock in.
Most of the people first wiretapped were drug or criminal related. Later on,
however, it go out of hand -- and the FBI wanted taps on prominent citizens.
"We started doing people who had money. How this information was used, I
couldn't tell you."
The January 29th "Newsday" said Draise had told investigators that among the
taps he rigged from 1972 to 1979 were several on lines used by Wren Business
Communications, a Bell competitor. It seems that when Wren had arranged an
appointment with a potential customer, they found that Bell had just been there
without being called. Wren's president is a ham radio operator, David
Stoner/K8LMB.
When spoken with, Dave Stoner said the following;
"As far as I am concerned, the initial focus for all of this began
with the FBI. The FBI apparently set up a structure throughout the
United States using apparently the security chiefs of the different
Bell companies. They say that there have been other cases in the
United States like ours in Cincinnati but they have been localized
without the realization of an overall pattern being implicated."
"The things that ties this all together is if you go way back in
history to the Hoover period at the FBI, he apparently got together
with the AT&T security people. There is an organization that I
guess exists to this day with regular meetings of the security
people of the different Bell companies. This meant that the FBI
would be able to target a group of 20 or 30 people that represented
the security points for all of the Bell and AT&T connections in the
United States. I believe the key to all of this goes back to Hoover.
The FBI worked through that group who then created the activity at
the local level as a result of central planning."
"I believe that in spite of the fact that many people have indicated
that this is an early 70's problem -- that there is no disruption to
that work to this day. I am pretty much convinced that it is
continuing. It looks like a large surveillance effort that
Cincinnati was just a part of."
"The federal prosecutor Kathleen Brinkman is in a no-win situation.
If she successfully prosecutes this case she is going to bring
trouble down upon her own Justice Department. She can't
successfully prosecute the case."
About $200 million in lawsuits have already been filed against Cincinnati Bell
and the Police Department. Several members of the police department have taken
the Fifth Amendment before the grand jury rather than answer questions about
their roles in the wiretapping scheme.
Bob Draise/WB8QCF has filed a suit against Cincinnati Bell for $78 for
malicious prosecution and slander in response to a suit filed by Cincinnati
Bell against Bob for defamation. Right after they filed the suit, several
policemen came forward and admitted to doing illegal wiretaps with them. The
Cincinnati police said they stopped this is 1974 -- although another policeman
reportedly said they actually stopped the wiretapping in 1986.
Now the CBS-TV program "60 Minutes" is interested in the Cincinnati goings-on
and has sent in a team of investigative reporters. Ed Bradley from "60
Minutes" has already interviewed Bob Draise/WB8QCF and it is expected that
sometime during this month (April) April, we will see a "60 Minutes" report on
spying by the FBI. We also understand that CNN, Ted Turner's Cable News
Network, is also working up a "Bugging of America" expose.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Crackdown On Hackers Urged April 9, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Taken From the Chicago Tribune (Section 7, Page 12b)
"Make Punishment Fit The Crime," computer leaders say.
DALLAS (AP) -- The legal system has failed to respond adequately to the threat
that hackers pose to the computer networks crucial to corporate America, a
computer expert says.
Many computer hackers "are given slaps on the wrist," Mark Leary, a senior
analyst with International Data Corp., said at a roundtable discussion last
week.
"The justice system has to step up...to the fact that these people are
malicious and are criminals and are robbing banks just as much as if they
walked up with a shotgun," he said.
Other panelists complained that hackers, because of their ability to break into
computer systems, even are given jobs, sometimes a security consultants.
The experts spoke at a roundtable sponsored by Network World magazine, a
publication for computer network users and managers.
Computer networks have become crucial to business, from transferring and
compiling information to overseeing and running manufacturing processes.
The public also is increasingly exposed to networks through such devices as
automatic teller machines at banks, airline reservation systems and computers
that store billing information.
Companies became more willing to spend money on computer security after last
year's celebrated invasion of a nationwide network by a virus allegedly
unleased by a graduate student [Robert Tappen Morris], the experts said.
"The incident caused us to reassess the priorities with which we look at
certain threats," said Dennis Steinaur, manager of the computer security
management group of the National Institute of Standards and Technology.
But computer security isn't only a matter of guarding against unauthorized
entry, said Max Hopper, senior vice president for information systems as
American Airlines.
Hopper said American has built a "a Cheyenne mountain-type" installation for
its computer systems to guard against a variety of problems, including
electrical failure and natural disaster. Referring to the Defense Department's
underground nerve center in a Colorado mountain, he said American's precautions
even include a three-day supply of food.
"We've done everything we can, we think, to protect the total environment,"
Hopper said.
Hopper and Steinaur said that despite the high-tech image of computer
terrorism, it remains an administrative problem that should be approached as a
routine management issue.
But the experts agreed that the greatest danger to computer networks does not
come from outside hackers. Instead, they said, the biggest threat is from
disgruntled employees or others whose original access to systems was
legitimate.
Though employee screening is useful, Steinaur said, it is more important to
build into computer systems ways to track unauthorized use and to publicize
that hacking can be traced.
Steinaur said growing computer literacy, plus the activities of some
non-malicious hackers, help security managers in some respects.
Expanded knowledge "forces us as security managers not be dependent on
ignorance," Steinaur said.
"Security needs to be a part of the system, rather than a 'nuisance addition,'"
Steinaur said, "and we probably have not done a very good job of making
management realize that security is an integral part of the system."
IDC's Leary said the organization surveys of Fortune 1000 companies
surprisingly found a significant number of companies were doing little to
protect their systems.
The discussion, the first of three planned by Network World, was held because
computer sabotage "is a real problem that people aren't aware of," said editor
John Gallant. Many business people sophisticated networks."
It also is a problem that many industry vendors are reluctant to address, he
said, because it raises questions about a company's reliability.
Typed For PWN by Hatchet Molly
_______________________________________________________________________________
Ex-Worker Charged In Virus Case -- Databases Were Alleged Target Apr 12, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
by Jane M. Von Bergen (Philadelphia Inquirer)
A former employee was charged yesterday with infecting his company's computer
database in what is believed to be the first computer-virus arrest in the
Philadelphia area.
"We believe he was doing this as an act of revenge," said Camden County
Assistant Prosecutor Norman Muhlbaier said yesterday, commenting on a motive
for the employee who allegedly installed a program to erase databases at his
former company, Datacomp Corp. in Voorhees, New Jersey.
Chris Young, 21, of the 2000 block of Liberty Street, Trenton, was charged in
Camden County with one count of computer theft by altering a database.
Superior Court Judge E. Stevenson Fluharty released Young on his promise to pay
$10,000 if he failed to appear in court. If convicted, Young faces a 10-year
prison term and a $100,000 fine. Young could not be reached for comment.
"No damage was done," Muhlbaier said, because the company discovered the virus
before it could cause harm. Had the virus gone into effect, it could have
damaged databases worth several hundred thousand dollars, Muhlbaier said.
Datacomp Corp., in the Echelon Mall, is involved in telephone marketing. The
company, which has between 30 and 35 employees, had a contract with a major
telephone company to verify the contents of its white pages and try to sell
bold-faced or other special listings in the white pages, a Datacomp company
spokeswoman said. The database Young is accused of trying to destroy is the
list of names from the phone company, she said.
Muhlbaier said that the day Young resigned from the company, October 7, 1988 he
used fictitious passwords to obtain entry into the company computer,
programming the virus to begin its destruction December 7, 1988 -- Pearl Harbor
Day. Young, who had worked for the company on and off for two years -- most
recently as a supervisor -- was disgruntled because he had received some
unfavorable job-performance reviews, the prosecutor said.
Eventually, operators at the company picked up glitches in the computer system.
A programmer, called in to straighten out the mess, noticed that the program
had been altered and discovered the data-destroying virus, Muhlbaier said.
"What Mr. Young did not know was that the computer system has a lot of security
features so they could track it back to a particular date, time and terminal,"
Muhlbaier said. "We were able to ... prove that he was at that terminal."
Young's virus, Muhlbaier said, is the type known as a "time bomb" because it is
programmed to go off at a specific time. In this case, the database would have
been sickened the first time someone switched on a computer December 7, he said
Norma Kraus, a vice president of Datacomp's parent company, Volt Information
Sciences Inc, said yesterday that the company's potential loss included not
only the databases, but also the time it took to find and cure the virus. "All
the work has to stop," causing delivery backups on contracts, she said. "We're
just fortunate that we have employees who can determine what's wrong and then
have the interest to do something. In this case, the employee didn't stop at
fixing the system, but continued on to determine what the problem was." The
Volt company, based in New York, does $500 million worth of business a year
with such services as telephone marketing, data processing and technical
support. It also arranges temporary workers, particularly in the
data-processing field, and installs telecommunication services, Kraus said.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Mexico's Phone System Going Private? April 17, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
By Oryan QUEST (Special Hispanic Corespondent)
The Mexico Telephone Company, aka Telefonos de Mexico, aka Telmex, is likely to
go private in the next year or two. The Mexican government is giving serious
consideration to selling its controlling interest in that nation's
communications network, despite very stiff opposition from the local unions
which would prefer to see the existing bureaucracy stay in place.
The proposed sale, which is part of a move to upgrade the phone system there --
and it *does* need upgrading -- by allowing more private investment, is part of
a growing trend in Mexico to privatize heretofore nationalized industries.
The Mexico Telephone Company has spent more than a year planning a $14 billion,
five-year restructuring plan which will probably give AT&T and the Bell
regional holding companies a role in the improvements.
One plan being discussed by the Mexican government is a complete break-up of
Telmex, similar to the court-ordered divestiture of AT&T a few years ago.
Under this plan, there would be one central long distance company in Mexico,
with the government retaining control of it, but privately owned regional firms
providing local and auxiliary services.
Representatives of the Mexican government have talked on more than one
occasion with some folks at Southwestern Bell about making a formal proposal.
Likewise, Pacific Bell has been making some overtures to the Mexicans. It will
be interesting to see what develops.
About two years ago, Teleconnect Magazine, in a humorous article on the
divestiture, presented a bogus map of the territories assigned to each BOC,
with Texas, New Mexico and Arizona grouped under an entity called "Taco Bell."
Any phone company which takes over the Mexican system will be an improvement
over the current operation, which has been slowly deteriorating for several
years.
PS: I *Demand* To Be Let Back On MSP!
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 26, File 11 of 11
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
PWN PWN
PWN P h r a c k W o r l d N e w s PWN
PWN %%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%% %%%%%%% PWN
PWN Issue XXVI/Part 3 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN April 25, 1989 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Created, Written, and Edited PWN
PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
PWN PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
Galactic Hacker Party March 30, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
GALACTIC HACKER PARTY
August 2-4, 1989
PARADISO, AMSTERDAM, HOLLAND
During the summer of 1989, the world as we know it will go into overload. An
interstellar particle stream of hackers, phone phreaks, radioactivists and
assorted technological subversives will be fusing their energies into a media
melt-down as the global village plugs into Amsterdam for three electrifying
days of information interchange and electronic capers.
Aided by the advanced communications technology to which they are accustomed,
the hacker forces will discuss strategies, play games, and generally have a
good time. Free access to permanently open on-line facilities will enable them
to keep in touch with home base -- wherever that is.
Those who rightly fear the threat of information tyranny and want to learn what
they can do about it are urgently invited to interface in Amsterdam in August.
There will be much to learn from people who know. Celebrity guests with
something to say will be present in body or electronic spirit.
The Force must be nurtured. If you are refused transport because your laptop
looks like a bomb, cut off behind enemy lines, or unable to attend for any
other reason, then join us on the networks. Other hacker groups are requested
to organize similar gatherings to coincide with ours. We can provide low-cost
international communications links during the conference.
[ Despite the wishes of those planning the "Galactic Hacker ]
[ Party," there will be NO change in plans for SummerCon '89! ]
For further information, take up contact as soon as possible with:
HACK-TIC PARADISO
P.O. box 22953 Weteringschans 6-8
1100 DL Amsterdam 1017 SG Amsterdam
The Netherlands The Netherlands
tel: +31 20 6001480 tel: +31 20 264521 / +31 20 237348
_______________________________________________________________________________
Subversive Bulletin Boards March 26, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
An article in a newspaper from the United Kingdom had an article relating to a
computer bulletin board being run by a 14-year-old boy in Wilmslow, Cheshire,
England. It contained information relating to such things as making plastic
explosives.
Anti-terrorist detectives are said to be investigating for possible breaches of
the Obscene Publications Act. Apparently reporters were able to easily gain
access to this bulletin board and peruse articles on such subjects as credit
card fraud, making various types of explosives, street fighting techniques and
dodging police radar traps.
One article was obviously aimed at children and described how to make a bomb
suitable for use on "the car of a teacher you do not like at school," which
would destroy the tire of a car when it was started.
The boy's parents did not seem to think that their son was doing anything
wrong, preferring him to be working with his computer rather than roaming the
streets.
A London computer consultant, Noel Bradford, is quoted as having seen the
bulletin board and found messages discussing "how to crack British Telecom, how
to get money out of people and how to defraud credit card companies. Credit
card numbers are given, along with PIN numbers, names, addresses and other
details."
_______________________________________________________________________________
Tale Of TWO TAP Magazines! April 24, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
It seemed inevitable that the battle for the rights to TAP would come into
play, but many wonder why it has taken so long.
The Renegade Chemist, long time member of Phortune 500 and one of its "Board Of
Directors," has been talking about re-starting TAP Magazine for at least two
years... nothing ever happened with it until now. TRC claims that the TAP
Magazine crew in Kentucky is just a fraud and that he is putting on the "REAL
McCoy."
For a free issue of The Renegade Chemist's TAP Magazine, send a self-addressed
stamped envelope to:
Data Security Consultants, Inc.
TAP Magazine
P.O. Box 271
South Windam, CT 06266-0271
Now on the other hand, Aristotle of the Kentucky based TAP Magazine has shown
an almost uncaring attitude about The Renegade Chemist's statements about TAP
Magazine. He says that he does not "really mind if these people put out a
magazine. Honestly I just want to help the community and the more magazines
and information, the better."
The really big news about the Kentucky based TAP Magazine came Saturday, April
22, 1989. Apparently, because of problems with local banks and the Internal
Revenue Service, TAP Magazine is now FREE!
The only catch is that if you want it, you have to send them a self-addressed
stamped envelope to get each issue or "you can send cash, but only enough to
pay for postage, 25 cents should cover it." Do not send any kinds of checks
and/or money orders. Anyone who did will be receiving their checks back or
at least those checks will not be cashed. The TAP Magazine staff will be
taking care of the printing costs out of their own pocket.
So for the FREE TAP Magazine, send a self-addressed stamped envelope to:
P.O. Box 20264
Louisville, KY 40220
Issue 93 is due for the end of April 1989, but Aristotle also wanted me to let
everyone know that he will be attending SummerCon '89 and bringing with him
plenty of issues of all the TAPs that he, Olorin The White, and Predat0r have
published.
As I have not seen TRC's TAP, I make no judgements. Instead, get a copy of
both TAPs FREE and compare them yourself. The market will decide which TAP
will continue.
Information Provided by
Aristotle and The Renegade Chemist
_______________________________________________________________________________
Computer Group Wary Of Security Agency April 11, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Taken from the San Francisco Chronicle
A public interest group said yesterday that the National Security Agency, the
nation's biggest intelligence agency, could exert excessive control over a
program to strengthen the security of computer systems throughout the federal
government.
The group, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility -- based in Palo
Alto -- urged key members of Congress to focus "particularly close scrutiny" on
the agency's role in helping to implement legislation aimed at safeguarding
sensitive but unclassified information in federal computers.
"There is a constant risk that the federal agencies, under the guise of
enhancing computer security, may find their programs -- to the extent that they
rely upon computer systems -- increasingly under the supervision of the largest
and most secretive intelligence organization in the country," it said.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Verifying Social Security Numbers April 11, 1989
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Taken From The New York Times
Dorcas R. Hardy, Commisssioner of the Social Security Administration, told a
Congressional committee that the agency had verified millions of SSN's for
private credit companies.
TRW, the nation's largest credit reporting company, recently proposed paying
the Social Security Administration $1,000,000 to have 140 million numbers
verified.
Phil Gambino, an agency spokesman, reported last month that the agency had
verified social security numbers only at the request of beneficiaries or
employers and had never verified more than 25 numbers at a time. He said such
disclosures were required under the Freedom of Information Act.
At the hearing yesterday, Dorcas R. Hardy, denied any other verifications at
first. However, she later admitted that in the early 1980s, 3,000,000 social
security numbers were verified for CitiCorp and that last year 151,000 numbers
were verified for TRW. Ms. Hardy said that the 151,000 numbers were just part
of a "test run."
Senator David Pryor, a democrat from Arkansas and chairman of the Special
Committee on Aging, said that previous commissioners; the Congressional
Research Service of the Library of Congress, and Donald A. Gonya, chief counsel
for Social Security have all decided that such verification is illegal.
_______________________________________________________________________________
PWN Quicknotes
1. Prank Virus Warning Message (March 28, 1989) -- An individual placed a time
bomb message on a government service system in the San Francisco Bay Area
saying, "WARNING! A computer virus has infected the system!" The
individual is learning that such a prank is considered almost as funny as
saying that you have a bomb in your carry-on luggage as you board a plane.
-- Bruce Baker, Information Security Program, SRI International
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2. Hackers' Dictionary In Japanese? (March 30, 1989) -- What is this you ask?
This amusing compilation was put together a decade or so ago by artificial
intelligence (AI) graduate students at Stanford, MIT, and Carnegie-Mellon
and recorded the then-current vernacular of their shared cultures. They
did it for fun, but it somehow ended up getting published.
The Hackers' Dictionary contains more than a few puns, jokes, and other
things that are hard to translate such as "moby," as in "moby memory", or
"fubar" and its regional variants "foo bar" and "foo baz."
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3. AT&T's Air Force -- AT&T has an air force that patrols its cable routes,
some routes 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The AT&T air force includes
helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. For some areas, AT&T uses infantry
and armored cars. AT&T's Sue Fleming says, "We hope NOT to find any
activity. We don't want to 'catch' people. But if we do spot a digging
crew, the usual procedure is for the pilot to radio the location back to a
ground crew, who check it out. On occasion, they drop notes -- or even
land -- but that depends on where the site is. In some areas -- like New
Jersey -- unauthorized landings bring heavy penalties."
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4. Terrorist Threat? -- Scientific advisors to the government told a Senate
panel that telecommunications networks are tempting targets for terrorist
activity. The experts said that advances in technology -- like fiber
optics, which concentrates equipment and data -- and the fragmentation of
the telecom industry after divestiture are reasons for the increased risk.
Certainly the Hinsdale, Illinois CO fire and the recent severing of a fiber
backbone in New Jersey have shown us all how vulnerable our country's
telecom network is.
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5. FCC Rules On AOS -- The FCC has ruled on a complaint filed this summer by
two consumer groups against five Alternative Operator Services (AOS)
companies. The FCC found the complaint valid and has ordered the AOS
companies to stop certain practices immediately.
The ruling states that callers must be told when their calls are being
handled by an AOS, operators must provide callers with rate information and
hotel or payphone owners cannot block calls to other long distance
carriers. (Callers who don't take any special action when making a call
will still be routed to the pre-subscribed carrier.)
The FCC has also ordered the companies to eliminate "splashing" whenever
technically feasible. Splashing is transferring a call to a distant
carrier point-of-presence and charging the caller for the call from that
point.
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6. Cool New Service -- CompuServe (the world's biggest computer bulletin
board) users can now dial in and search and find articles from a bunch of
different technical trade magazines. The database was put together by an
outfit called Information Access Company. It currently contains full-text
articles for 50 publications and paraphrased abstracts for 75 more. Most
coverage begins with the January 1987 issues.
You can search the publications by magazine name, author, key word, key
phrase, etc., then pull up the abstracts of the article of interest and, if
needed and when available, get the full text of the article. And it's easy
to use.
Charge for the service is $24 per hour, $1 for each abstract, and $1.50 for
each full-text article accessed. CompuServe charges $12.50 per hour for
connect time. Both per hour charges are pro-rated, and, with the databases
being so easy to use, you'll rarely be on the board for more than 10-15
minutes, so those costs will drop.
CompuServe 800-848-8199
Information Access 800-227-8431
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7. ISDN Calling Number Identification Services (April 7, 1989) -- Bellcore
Technical Reference TR-TSY-000860, "ISDN Calling Number Identification
Services" can be purchased for $46 from:
Bellcore
Customer Service
60 New England Ave
Piscataway, NJ 08854-4196
(201) 699-5800
This Technical Reference contains Bellcore's view of generic requirements
for support of ISDN Calling Number Identification (I-CNIS). The I-CNIS
feature extends the concepts of Calling Number Delivery and Calling Number
Delivery Blocking to ISDN lines. I-CNIS also allows the customer to
specify which Directory Number (DN) should be used for each outgoing call
and provides network screening to ensure that the specified DN is valid.
I-CNIS handles calling number processing for both circuit-mode and
packet-mode ISDN calls and provides four component features: Number
Provision, Number Screening, Number Privacy, and Number Delivery. Material
on Privacy Change by the calling party and Privacy Override by the called
party is also included.
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8. Founder of TAP Magazine, Abbie Hoffman, born in 1936, passed away on April
12, 1989. He was found dead in his apartment in New Hope, PA. He was
fully dressed under the bedcovers. An autopsy was inconclusive. An
article about him appears in the April 24, 1989 issue of Time Magazine,
"A Flower in a Clenched Fist," page 23.
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9. Bill Landreth aka The Cracker, author of Out Of The Inner Circle, has
reappeared. Supposedly, he is now working as a bookbinder in Orange
County, California and living with the sysop of a bulletin board called the
"Pig Sty." -- Dark Sorcerer (April 19, 1989)
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10. Hacker/Phreaker Gets "Stiff" Penalty (Green Bay, Wisconsin) -- David
Kelsey, aka Stagehand, plead guilty to two counts of class "E" felonies
and received a 90 day jail term. Once he has completed his jail term, he
will serve three years probation and an unknown amount of community
service hours.
In addition to these penalties, Stagehand must also pay restitution of
$511.00 to Schneider Communications of Green Bay, Wisconsin. Stagehand
was given all his computer equipment back as part of the plea bargain --
minus any materials considered to be "ill gotten" gains.
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! ***
1:30:22 p.m. ARE YOU STILL THERE ?
! ***
1:35:22 p.m. RESPOND OR BE LOGGED OFF
!
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